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This project provides a new history of the implementation of federal emancipation policy 
by the Union armies during the Civil War. It examines five geographic regions occupied by the  
Union army—the Mississippi River Valley, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana and the Gulf Coast, 
and Kentucky—focusing on the activities of officials whom I term the “middle managers” of 
federal emancipation policy. Though often overlooked by historians, officers such as Union army 
Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, Commissioner for the United States Colored Troops George 
Stearns, and Major William Sidell were specifically designated by the Lincoln administration to 
superintend the implementation of emancipation policy in the disloyal states. As such, examining 
their activities allows us to pay careful attention to both the policy directives coming from 
Washington, as well as what implementation of that policy looked like on the ground, thus 
connecting “top-down” and “bottom up” history in ways that are absent from much of the 
existing scholarship. 
A fundamental component of this project is the relationship between the development of 
free labor plantations, humanitarian care for black refugees, and military emancipation. Although 
	   v	  
historians have tended to separate out the development of free labor plantations and military 
emancipation out into discrete streams of analysis, Union officers recognized how freeing slaves 
and turning plantations into sites of free labor would be instrumental in destroying the power of 
the planter class. In detailing this relationship, this project does not take an uncritical view of the 
Union army’s relationship with these formerly enslaved persons, who were often subject to 
physical abuse, neglect, and the whims of army movements. I do however, make the argument 
that an understanding of the workings of federal emancipation policy at the departmental and 
local levels belies the simplistic conclusion that the Union army did not care about African 
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Prologue 
 
“Slavery Must Die By The Laws of War”: Military Emancipation in the British Atlantic and 
United States Before the Civil War 
 
 The enslaved persons who lived and worked on the peninsula between the James and 
York Rivers all knew the stories. Twice before, during the American Revolution and the War of 
1812, British armies had arrived on the same narrow strip of Virginia soil. Both times, thousands 
of slaves who made it to British lines were granted freedom in exchange for military service. As 
rumors of war circulated following the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, slave 
owners in Tidewater Virginia beefed up slave patrols, warned each other of insurrection plots, 
and whispered about the threat the Republican Party posed to slavery. Reinforced by generations 
of oral tradition, enslaved persons in the region drew the obvious conclusions about the linkages 
between war and emancipation. As one former slave from Hampton, Virginia pointedly recalled, 
“Ev’ybody was happy when de war came.”1  
 Thomas Jefferson Randolph was haunted by the memory of those same stories. The 
grandson of the third president had served in Virginia during the War of 1812, and had witnessed 
military emancipation unleashed on his home state. Two decades later, in the wake of Nat 
Turner’s Rebellion, the Virginia House of Delegates debated and ultimately rejected Randolph’s 
bill to enact gradual emancipation. Following his proposal’s defeat, Randolph took the 
opportunity to offer a warning to his fellow Virginians. A civil war over slavery would engulf 
the nation, Randolph predicted, and when that happened, military emancipation would surely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Glenn David Brasher, The Peninsula Campaign and the Necessity of Emancipation (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2011), 25; Amy Murrell Taylor Embattled Freedom: Journey’s Through the Civil War’s Slave 
Refugee Camps (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 19-24. On slaveholder’s fears of slave 
rebellion during 1860, see William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, Volume II: Secessionists Triumphant, 
1854-1861 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 331-334. 
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follow “as night follows day.”2 Northern armies would recruit “black troops, speaking the same 
language, of the same nation, burning with the enthusiasm for the liberation of their race.”3 In 
1861, Randolph would become a colonel in the Confederate Army, destined see his prophecy 
come to pass. 
Congressman Thaddeus Stevens knew military emancipation had a long history. During 
the August 1861 debates over the First Confiscation Act, Stevens repeatedly expressed the wish 
that his colleagues read Emmerich de Vattel’s treatise, The Law of Nations. Vattel’s work, 
Stevens observed, made it “plain to those who have read it” that nations had utilized military 
emancipation since the time of Cicero, and sanctioned its use in cases like the one that currently 
existed in the United States.4 “By taking from [our enemy] every dollar of property which he has 
on earth,” Stevens thundered, Union armies “will weaken his hands, will strengthen your hands,” 
and be in perfect accordance with centuries of military emancipation.5 Moreover, Vatell’s work 
also endorsed a moral imperative for emancipation, arguing that in a “just war,” people who have 
been oppressed by the enemy, then freed, “cannot return that oppressed people to the bondage 
from which they have rescued them.”6 In times of war, Stevens concluded, military emancipation 
was sanctioned by both the laws of nations and common humanity.  
The Republican Banner, a Unionist newspaper in Nashville, Tennessee, lacked Stevens’s 
learned allusions, but made similar points. On January 26th 1861, the day Louisiana became the 
sixth state to secede from the Union, The Banner printed an editorial entitled “Disunion the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Thomas Jefferson Randolph quoted in Alan Taylor, The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772-1832 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2013), 432. 
3 Ibid, 432	  
4 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 1st Session, pg. 414.  
5 Ibid, p. 414.	  
6 Ibid, 414-415. Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, book 3, section 203 (J. Chitty trans, 1852), Burrus M. 
Carnahan Act of Justice: Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and the Laws of War (Lexington: University of 
Kentucky Press, 2007), 115. James Oakes, Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 
1861-1865 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013), 135-136. 
	   3	  
Doom of Slavery.”7 The editorial began by laying out the indisputable facts that “the prosperity 
of the South—its wealth and refinement—has resulted from the institution of slavery,” and that 
slavery likewise “depended mainly for its existence upon the protection afforded it by the 
Constitution.”8 Given these facts, the Banner asked its readers to consider a simple question: 
“How will it be after the present government is dissolved, and the Northern states are absolved 
from their Constitutional obligations?”9 The threat of military emancipation loomed over the 
answer. Northern states would all immediately become “avowed enemies” of slavery “not in the 
abstract, but practically,” and the fate of the peculiar institution would be doomed.10 
 
What the slaves on the Virginia peninsula knew, what Thomas Jefferson Randolph knew, 
what Thaddeus Stevens knew, and what the editors of The Republican Banner knew, historians 
have forgotten. Civil War scholars frequently explain emancipation by arguing that at the onset 
of the conflict, “structural forces” indicated “the Union army should have no business freeing 
slaves,” and were operating “without any clear precedent for one definite course of action.”11 
According to this logic, military emancipation was less the result of a coordinated federal policy 
that built on well-established precedents, and due more to the “momentum of events [which] 
carried partisans and casual observers alike in new and unforeseen directions.”12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Republican Banner (Nashville) January 26th, 1861. Dwight Lowell Dumond, ed., Southern Editorials on 
Secession (American Historical Association, 1931), 425-426. 
8 Ibid., 426. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.	  
11 Chandra M. Manning, Troubled Refuge: Struggling For Freedom in the Civil War (New York: Knopf, 2016), pg. 
164. For a similar perspective, see John Fabian Witt, Lincoln’s Code, The Laws of War in American History (New 
York: The Free Press, 2012).  
12 Joseph P. Reidy, “Armed Slaves and the Struggles for Republican Liberty in the U.S. Civil War” in Arming Slaves 
in Wartime: From Classical Times to the Modern Age, ed. Christopher Leslie Brown and Phillip D. Morgan (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 274. For the traditional narrative on how the war to preserve the Union 
incidentally became a war for emancipation, see also Gary W. Gallagher, The Union War (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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However, by placing the Civil War within the context of an emerging discourse on the 
emancipatory potential of the laws of war, I argue for the opposite conclusion: that freeing slaves 
in wartime was an established precedent in world history, and that early Republican policies—
the First and Second Confiscation Acts and the Militia Act—reflected their knowledge of that 
history. As several historians have observed, where the American Civil War broke with 
established precedent was its expanded use of universal military emancipation to destroy slavery 
and suppress the rebellion.13 In tracing this history of military emancipation, it is important to 
draw clear distinctions between arming slaves and freeing them—even as the former functioned 
as a precedent for the latter. Prior to the American Revolution, arming slaves did not necessarily 
mean freeing them, but after 1775, “something close to a consensus” emerged that slaves would 
earn their freedom in exchange for military service.14 
Additionally, careful analysis of the evolving precedents on freeing and arming slaves in 
wartime requires a more expansive chronological and geographical framework than historians 
have customarily deployed. Most often, historians examining the history of military 
emancipation in the United States have begun with the American Revolution, however, as 
several scholars have pointed out, “important precedents…existed from the earliest times of 
European expansion, culminating in the Seven Years War.”15 Beginning with efforts in Barbados 
to recruit and arm slaves during imperial conflicts in the 1660’s, and continuing through similar 
attempts during Queen Anne’s War and the Seven Years War, limited and often ad-hoc 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 These points have been made by James Oakes, The Scorpion’s Sting: Antislavery and the Coming of the Civil War 
(New York: Norton, 2014), 104-165 and James Oakes “When Everybody Knew” in Beyond Freedom, Disrupting 
the History of Emancipation, ed. Jim Downs and David W. Blight (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2017), 
104-118.  
14 James Oakes, “Extended Discussion on The Scorpion’s Sting,” Civil War Book Review: Vol. 16, issue 4, pg. 3. 
Online at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol16/iss4/2. 
15 Phillip D. Morgan and Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy “Arming Slaves in the American Revolution” in Arming 
Slaves in Wartime, 182. See also Eliga Gould, Among The Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the 
Making of a New World Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 71-78.	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precedents for recruiting, arming, and freeing slaves were deployed in the eighteenth century 
British Caribbean and—to a lesser extent—North American colonies.  
By the time the Seven Years War erupted in 1753, a limited but consistent pattern of 
slave mobilization was being established in the British Caribbean. The British colonies of 
Barbados, Bermuda, and Antigua had armed slaves to help repel French threats in 1702, 1707, 
and 1742, respectively, and slaves had also seen military service in British expeditions against 
Spain’s Central American and Caribbean colonies in 1740-1741. The practice was even more 
extensive on the water, as a combination of armed slaves and free blacks routinely served on all 
manner of maritime vessels. Given the scope and scale of the Seven Years War, along with the 
attrition rate of soldiers serving in the Caribbean, it came as little surprise when British 
expeditions against French Guadeloupe in 1759, Martinique in 1761, and Spanish Cuba in 1762 
all made use of slaves.16 
The British siege of Havana during the spring and summer of 1762 foreshadowed what 
was to come. The strategic gateway to the Spanish Caribbean, as well as a major trade hub, 
Havana was fortified by a wall surrounding the city, while two forts, Punta and Morro Castle, 
loomed over the harbor. The British would spend just over two months besieging the Cuban 
capital, and their forces were decimated by disease, starvation, and exposure. Present during the 
siege operations was a “company of negroes raised for the campaign, in Jamaica,” and one early 
historian of the campaign later wrote that “the employment of blacks in a military capacity” was 
widely considered to be “satisfactory” by British officers.17 Without expressing a trace of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid., 183-186; Fred Anderson, Crucible of War, The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North 
America, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage, 2000), 497-498. 
17 Asa Bird Gardiner The Havana Expedition of 1762 in the War With Spain, (Providence: 1898),179. 
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surprise, the same author noted that blacks would go on to see wider employment by both sides 
during the American Revolution.18 
As scholars such as Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, Philip Morgan, and Fred Anderson 
have noted, the slave enlistments in the British Caribbean during the Seven Years War 
functioned as critical precedent for the American Revolution. Viewing slave enlistments in this 
broader context, they argue that Lord Dunmore’s November 1775 proclamation declaring free all 
indentured servants and slaves who were willing to bear arms for the British represented the 
“culmination of an existing trend, rather than a radical departure.”19 In reality, it was both. Until 
Dunmore’s proclamation, slaves could be armed without necessarily being freed. From 1775 
onward, however, military service usually meant freedom for slaves.  
The reaction of Virginia’s white and black populations confirmed this shift. The Virginia 
Convention accused Dunmore of “encouraging a general insurrection,” and one Williamsburg 
newspaper warned the town’s black population: “should there be any amongst the Negroes weak 
enough to believe that Lord Dunmore intends to do them a kindness…let them only consider the 
difficulty of effecting their escape, and what they must expect to suffer if they fall into the hands 
of the Americans.”20 Despite the warnings, enslaved persons in parts of Virginia and other 
southern colonies began stampeding to British lines in previously unheard of numbers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid, 180. On the siege of Havana generally, see Anderson, Crucible of War, 497-502, and on the role of blacks 
specifically, see David E. Walker, “Colony Versus Crown: Raising Black Troops for the British Siege on Havana, 
1762,” Journal of Caribbean History 33:1-2 (1999): 74-83.	  
19 Morgan and O’Shaughnessy, Arming Slaves, 186, 189. On Dunmore’s Proclamation and its impact, see Alan 
Gilbert, Black Patriots and Loyalists: Fighting for Emancipation in the War for Independence (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2012), James Corbett David, Dunmore’s New World: The Extraordinary Life and Times of a 
Royal Governor in Revolutionary America (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 2013) and Maya 
Jasonoff, Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World (New York: Random House, 2012). 
20 “The Virginia Convention, December 1775” in Peter Force’s American Archives: Fourth Series. A Documentary 
History of the English Colonies in North America, Volume 4, 84-85 and “Correspondence, Proceedings, &c, 
November 1775”, ibid., Series 4, Volume 3, 1387. 
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Four years later, Sir Henry Clinton, commanding British forces on the Atlantic coast, 
built on Dunmore’s proclamation. From Phillipsburg, New York, Clinton promised freedom to 
all slaves who came within British lines, regardless of whether they offered service to His 
Majesty’s forces. Clinton’s proclamation helped lead to the expanded use of blacks as river 
pilots, laborers, and soldiers by the British forces.21 In 1780, Colonel John Laurens reported that 
Clinton’s forces operating against Savannah, Georgia were “reinforced by a corps of blacks and 
a detachment of savages,” and during the British occupation of Charlestown, South Carolina in 
1780-1781, black cavalry units comprised of fugitive slaves were utilized for patrol duties.22 
Lord Cornwallis’s ill-fated expedition up the James River in 1781 attracted about 4,500 runaway 
slaves, many of whom were inside British lines when he surrendered at Yorktown.23  
As was the case during the Seven Years War, the numbers of armed slaves were much 
higher in British Caribbean. Greater mortality rates and repeated French invasions led to 
Barbados arming slaves in 1779, and Antigua followed suit in 1780. In Jamaica, the Governor of 
the island pleaded for, and eventually received, authority to raise regiments of free blacks, while 
in St. Lucia, Brigadier General Edward Matthew recruited slaves as part of a black regiment.24 
Moreover, British naval vessels once again made regular use of slaves and free blacks, despite 
frequent complaints from Caribbean planters that British sailors prevented them from recovering 
runaways.25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 George Washington Williams History of the Negro Troops in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865 (New York: 
Fordham University Press, Reprint ed., 2012), 19. 
22 Colonel John Laurens to General George Washington, February 14th, 1780. Jared Spark’s Correspondence of the 
American Revolution, Volume 2, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1853)  402; Lt. Col. Thomas Brown to Mr. 
John Douglas, April 12th, 1781, The Online Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies, accessed December 12th, 2018, 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/black/blkords.htm.  
23 Taylor, Internal Enemy, 27. 
24 Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, 180-181; Morgan and O’Shaughnessy “Arming Slaves” 
195-196. 
25 Morgan and O’Shaughnessy “Arming Slaves”, 197.	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Meanwhile, in the Continental Army, New England led the way. Perhaps the most 
famous example was the First Rhode Island Regiment, but Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and 
New York also offered freedom to slaves in exchange for military service. Efforts to the same 
effect died in several southern states. Recommendations by the Continental Congress in 1779 
and by General Nathaniel Greene in 1781 that South Carolina and Georgia raise slave regiments 
came to naught, despite acknowledgements that the manpower was desperately needed. Both 
Greene and Colonel John Laurens, another advocate for limited military emancipation, blamed 
the failure to raise black troops in the southern colonies on the “howlings of a triple headed 
monster, in which prejudice, avarice, and pusillanimity were united.”26 
Historians have been quick to qualify the use of military emancipation during the 
American Revolution. These scholars point out that as percentages of both the overall slave 
population of the American colonies, and as an overall percentage of the British and American 
engaged fighting forces, the number of blacks freed by military emancipation was not 
substantial.27 Furthermore, they emphasize the ways that British and Americans “often did not 
make good on their promises of freedom” to slaves who served, or highlight the limitations on 
black freedom in the postwar years.28 Recently, these arguments have begun to receive important 
pushback from scholars seeking to place military emancipation in the context of “larger debates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Colonel John Laurens to General Nathaniel Greene, May 19th, 1782, Sparks Correspondence, v.3, 506. See also, 
Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1961), 68-93; Gary Nash, The Forgotten Fifth: African Americans in the Age of Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), pgs. 8-13. 
27 Recent scholarship on the Haitian Revolution has also emphasized this point as a way of making Haiti the “most” 
revolutionary of the Atlantic Revolutions. See Laurent Dubois Avengers of the New World: The Haitian Revolution 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004) and Jeremy Popkin You Are All Free: The Story of the Haitian 
Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
28 Morgan and O’Sahugnessy, “Arming Slaves” 199-201. For similar perspectives see Douglas R. Egerton, Death or 
Liberty: African Americans and Revolutionary America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Maya Jasonoff 
Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World (New York: Random House, 2011). 
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over the laws of war, subject-hood, and slavery.”29 For our purposes it is enough to note the 
growing acceptance under the laws of war for arming slaves and, after 1775, freeing enemy 
slaves in exchange for military service. 
 At the conclusion of the American Revolution, the precise boundaries of military 
emancipation sparked a contentious debate. In the Treaty of Paris, Article VII stipulated British 
evacuation proceed with “all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying 
away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants.”30 Britain claimed that they had 
already freed those who came within their lines, or who were aboard their warships, when the 
war ended, and that the language applied only to those slaves who had come in after the treaty 
was signed. Americans, on the other hand, claimed those same slaves were still within the new 
nation’s borders, and thus were required to be returned to their masters. Numerous attempts to 
get the British to budge from their position—most notably during the negotiations of Jay’s 
Treaty in 1794—failed. Britain would never return the slaves in question, nor would they 
compensate American slaveholders for their former chattel.31  
Military emancipation during the War of 1812 followed the same patterns as the 
American Revolution. Despite this immediate precedent, the British were unprepared for the 
“considerable number” of runaway slaves who immediately sought refuge aboard British ships.32 
By the summer of 1813, British officers had begun to use more and more runaway slaves to 
alleviate manpower needs, as well as employing some as guides to the Maryland and Virginia 
coastline and river networks. Equally important, British officers pressed their superiors in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 John N. Blanton, “The First Stone of Universal Liberty: Slavery, Subjecthood, and Military Emancipation in the 
American War of Independence” (paper presented at The Early American Republic Seminar, The Graduate Center, 
City University of New York, New York, NY, May 21st, 2017); Oakes, Scorpion’s Sting, chapter 4. 
30 Oakes, Scorpion’s Sting, 109. 
31 Quarles, Negro in the American Revolution 161-165; Oakes, Scorpion’s Sting 108-130, Jasonoff, Liberty’s Exiles. 
32 Quoted in Frank Cassel “Slaves of the Chesapeake Bay Area and the War of 1812” Journal of Negro History, 57, 
2 (April 1972), pp. 144-155, quote on 145.	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Whitehall to sanction more expansive military emancipation policy, arguing that a “more 
aggressive war meant trying to disrupt the plantation economy.”33 In the spring of 1814, Vice 
Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane issued a proclamation stating that all those “disposed to 
emigrate” from the United States would be welcome within British lines or on British ships.34 
These emigrants would then “have their choice of either entering into His Majesty’s sea or land 
forces, or of being sent as FREE settlers to the British possessions in North America or the West 
Indies.”35 The British established a camp for ex-slaves on Tangier Island off the coast of 
Virginia’s eastern shore, and used it as both a base for raiding expeditions and a recruiting 
nucleus for a black battalion known as the Colonial Marines. By the end of the war, roughly 
3,400 Maryland and Virginia slaves had successfully fled to British warships.36   
Upon conclusion of the war, military emancipation again sparked an acrimonious postwar 
debate. Article I of the Treaty of Ghent specified:  
All territory, places, and possessions whatsoever taken by either party from the other 
during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this Treaty…shall be restored 
without delay and without causing any destruction or carrying away any of the Artillery 
or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and shall remain 
therein upon the Exchange of the Ratification of this treaty, or any Slaves or other private 
property.37 
 
As they had during the Treaty of Paris, Americans wanted the British to surrender any runaways 
who were on American soil or aboard British ships in American waters on February 17th 1815. 
The British roundly rejected this interpretation, and would compensate the Americans only for 
slaves in delimited areas fortified by the British. In 1816, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Taylor, Internal Enemy, 4 
34 Cassel “Slaves of the Chesapeake Bay Area and the War of 1812” 150. 
35 Ibid, 150. See also Nathaniel Millet “Slavery and the War of 1812” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 73, 1 (Fall 
2012): 184-205, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42628263. For a perspective that de-emphasizes the importance of the 
laws of war (particularly Vattel) for the War of 1812, see Robin F.A. Fabel, “The Laws of War in the 1812 Conflict” 
Journal of American Studies 14, 2 (August 1980): 199-218, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27553810  
36 Taylor Internal Enemy, 3. 
37 Ibid., 429-432. 
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suggested that the parties submit to arbitration by Russian Tsar Alexander I, a move Adams 
found darkly amusing.38  
Predictably, when Tsar Alexander issued his ruling in 1822, both sides claimed victory. 
The United States was entitled to compensation, the tsar ruled, but only for slaves carried away 
from places “of which the treaty stipulates the restitution.”39 When the Americans drew up lists 
for payments of slaves in areas not specified by the treaty, along with interest payments, the 
British balked. Eventually, the British government agreed to pay the United States a lump sum of 
$2,693,120, and washed their hands of the matter.40 
 
Perhaps the most overlooked example of military emancipation in the United States was 
the Second Seminole War, fought in Florida between 1835-1842. From the outset, the 
combination of slaves belonging to white Floridians, free blacks, and Black Seminoles promised 
slavery would play a central role in the conflict. Further complicating matters was that some 
black Seminoles were legal slaves of the Seminoles, while others were runaways who  
“thoroughly identified in customs and interests with the Indians.”41 Even prior to the outbreak of 
renewed warfare, enslaved persons in the St. Augustine region had been in communication with, 
and were being recruited by, Seminoles.42 Unsurprisingly, when open warfare erupted in late 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid, 430; Fabel, “The Laws of War in the 1812 Conflict” 214; Oakes, Scorpion’s Sting, 140-141.	  
39 Oakes, Scorpion’s Sting, 141. 
40 Taylor Internal Enemy, 432; Oakes Scorpion’s Sting, 141. 
41 Kenneth Wiggins Porter, “Florida Slaves and Free Negroes in the Seminole War 1835-1842” The Journal of 
Negro History Vol. 28. No. 4 (Oct. 1943), pp. 390-421, Quote on 390, https://www.jstor.org/stable/271497. See also 
Kenneth Wiggins Potter, “Negro and the Seminole War, 1835-1842” Journal of Southern History, Vol. 30 no. 4 
(Nov. 1964), pp. 427-450, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2204280; Porter’s posthumously published work Black 
Seminoles: A History of a Freedom Seeking Peoples (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1986), John K. 
Mahon History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1991), Anthony 
Dixon Florida’s Negro War: Black Seminoles and the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842 (AHRA Publishing 
Division, 2014), Larry Eugene Rivers, Rebels and Runaways: Slave Resistance in Nineteenth Century Florida 
(Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2012). 
42 Porter, “Florida Slaves”, 390-391, 394-397. 
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1835, plantations along the St. John’s River near St. Augustine were among the Seminoles first 
targets. 
Panicked reports from slaveholders and Army officers quickly reached Washington. In 
addition to those slaves who were “induced or encouraged by the Indians, prior to the 
commencement of hostilities, to abscond from their owners,” several claimants wrote to the 
Secretary of War that many others had been “invited into [Seminole] country, and allowed 
refuge.”43 Some army officers echoed the planters. “Many slaves have escaped to and joined the 
Indians,” Major Benjamin Putnam wrote to Secretary of War Lewis Cass, “and if strong 
measures are not taken to restrain our slaves, there is but little doubt we should soon be assailed 
with a servile as well as Indian war.”44 By the end of 1836, General Thomas Jesup, the newly 
minted army commander in Florida, openly worried about the effect of continued warfare on the 
slave populations of the Deep South states.45 
Despite these concerns, Jesup knew that the combination of US military actions, disease, 
lack of supplies, and dissension during 1836 had taken their toll on the Seminoles. In early 1837, 
Jesup used a captured black Seminole to open negotiations with other Seminole chiefs. On 
March 6th 1837, a treaty was signed providing that the Seminoles and their allies emigrate west, 
but would be secured in their lives and property. As historian Kenneth Wiggins Porter has 
concluded, “this was understood by the Seminoles as protecting not only the Negroes to whom 
some of the Indians might or might not have a valid title, but also ‘their allies,’ the other Negroes 
who were then living amongst them and fighting with them.”46 Florida planters immediately 
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erupted in outrage, and petitioned Secretary of War Lewis Poinsett to reject Jesup’s agreement. 
Under immense pressure, Jesup signed a secret second agreement with a lesser Seminole chief 
on April 8th to “surrender the negroes taken during the war.”47  
Jesup’s clandestine machinations cost him dearly. Slaveholders began appearing at 
Tampa Bay demanding the “Indian negroes” who were then preparing to emigrate to westward to 
Indian country.48 The actions of these slaveholders, in turn, caused many blacks as well as Native 
Americans assembled at a camp near Tampa to flee “off to the swamps of the interior,” 
reigniting hostilities.49 “All is lost” Jesup told Colonel James Gadsen, because of the “influence 
of the negroes” among their Indian allies.50 Jesup was thus forced to spend the summer of 1837 
constructing a “crazy quilt of orders and statements” that attempted to delineate between 
runaways, those captured by Seminoles, and Black Seminole warriors.51 According to Jesup’s 
letters from the summer of 1837, between ninety and one hundred runaways were ultimately 
returned to their masters, and Jesup informed multiple slave owners that it was “not probable” 
any more would be forthcoming.52   
Nine months later, Jesup tried a different approach. Seeking to weaken the Seminoles by 
dividing them from their black allies, he issued an order directing  “all property of the Seminole 
Indians in Florida at war with the United States who separated themselves from the Indians and 
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delivered themselves up…would be free.”53 Those slaves freed in this manner would then 
emigrate west of the Mississippi. Moreover, according to Jesup’s successor, Major General 
Zachary Taylor, blacks that were captured or surrendered with Seminoles would be treated as 
prisoners of war, not as fugitive slaves, and both would be sent west.54 Army officials had also 
learned a valuable lesson from their dealings with slaveholders: angry planters could petition 
Washington, not the United States Army, for redress.     
Both policies were enforced. When slaveholders at Tampa pressed Taylor to return slaves 
from a group of Seminoles awaiting emigration west, Taylor retorted he would do nothing “to 
deprive [the Seminoles] of their property, and reduce [blacks] from a comparative state of 
freedom to slavery.”55 Undeterred, the owners followed the group to New Orleans, where they 
filed a writ of sequestration against General Edmund Gaines after his officers “refused to 
deliver” the alleged fugitives.56 Gaines responded that the blacks in question were “prisoners of 
war of the United States, taken in combat with the Seminole Indians,” and that no sequestration 
writ could override the United States Government’s jurisdiction under the laws of war.57 Firmly 
rejecting the slaveholders’ argument that the army had violated Florida law by transporting the 
slaves out of state, Gaines tersely declared that in wartime, “whatever be the laws of any State, 
they must yield to the safety of the general government.”58  
John Quincy Adams agreed. Multiple times during the 1830’s and 1840’s, Adams 
enumerated the power of Congress to “swe[ep] by the board state laws and municipal 
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56 “Heirs of Love vs. E.P. Gaines” Negroes&c, 31. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
	   15	  
institutions” in time of war.59 Indeed, it was the congressional debates over providing 
appropriations to refugees impacted by the Second Seminole War that gave Adams his opening. 
In the midst of those May 1836 debates, Adams argued that the same power that granted 
Congress authority to provide relief for wartime refugee also included “all the powers incidental 
to [waging] war” and that these powers were not derived from any “internal municipal source,” 
but from the law of nations.60 In peacetime, Adams readily conceded, the federal government 
had no power to interfere with slavery where it already existed, but in wartime, Congress “not 
only ha[s] the authority, but are bound to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States.”61 
Adams came armed with citations. From his own personal experience with the Treaty of 
Ghent, he pointed to the disputed provision that the British return all slaves when they evacuate 
forts or places in the United States. This was federal interference by means of “protection and 
support” for slavery in the Treaty, and to argue that Congress would not have the power to do so 
in these instances, Adams argued, “would be equivalent to saying that Congress would have no 
constitutional authority to make peace.”62 Adams then went on to list cases of slave insurrection, 
foreign wars, or civil war where Congress would have the right to interfere—“to sustain or 
abolish”—slavery in states where it already existed.63 Six years later, in 1842 debates over war 
with Great Britain and Mexico, Adams expanded his argument, noting that once a state called for 
federal aid in putting down a slave insurrection, it granted “full and plenary power to this House 
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and Senate over the whole subject.”64 And when those war powers were in force, military 
commanders had “all the power to emancipate slaves in the invaded territory.”65 
Both at the time and since, Adams has been depicted as pulling an about face from 
“champion[ing] the pro-slaveholder argument of the status of slaves in wartime in his capacity as 
diplomat, as secretary of state, and finally as president.”66 Moreover, legal scholar John Witt has 
portrayed Adams’ “unorthodox” arguments as largely moribund until being revived by 
“antislavery men in 1861-1862.”67 Other historians have found both assertions be overblown. 
Alan Taylor and James Oakes have each pointed out that, in 1816, Adams claimed that a 
“belligerent could not emancipate slaves under the laws of war…twenty years later, he was 
arguing that the American government had the right under the war powers clause—rather than 
the laws of war—to emancipate American slaves, not enemy slaves.”68 Nor were Adams’ 
arguments as marginalized as Witt suggests; indeed, other legal scholars have argued that Adams 
arguments were “widely circulated.”69 
It should come as no surprise, then, that at the start of the Civil War, Republicans echoed 
Adams’s arguments for the emancipatory potential of the laws of war. In April 1861, Charles 
Sumner visited the Executive Mansion shortly after the attack on Fort Sumter and presented a 
version of Adams’s argument to President Lincoln. “I…told him…that under the war powers the 
right had come to him to emancipate the slaves.”70 Sumner’s colleague James Ashley concurred. 
In speeches to Congress and letters to the editor of The Toledo Blade during the winter and 
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spring of 1861, Ashley insisted that Adams had been correct, and that the war powers clause of 
the Constitution furnished the president, as Commander in Chief, with ample authority to free 
every single slave in the rebellious state. “There is, then, but one course left,” Ashley boomed in 
January, 1861, “to use all the power of the government to crush rebellion and treason, if we 
would preserve the nation from certain and utter ruin.”71  
Nor were Sumner’s and Ashley’s “lone voices shouting in the wilderness” advocating for 
military emancipation.72 Surveying the writings of newspaper editors, Republican politicians, 
and even some War Democrats, one recent scholar has concluded that “by January of 
1861…standard Republican rhetoric” had been to warn that if the slave states rebelled, their 
constitutional safeguards for slavery would be nullified, and the federal government would be 
empowered to emancipate slaves as a means of suppressing the rebellion.73 By May 1861, 
Lincoln was receiving letters telling him to “take the occasion by the hand” and make “the bound 
of freedom wider yet” through military emancipation.74 Even Major General Nathaniel Banks, 
the former Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives, and never someone whose 
positions could be confused with those of Ashley or Sumner argued, “The first gun at [Fort] 
Sumter proclaimed emancipation.”75  
Major General Benjamin F. Butler quickly put these earlier precedents into action. On 
May 23rd 1861, three slaves belonging to Colonel Charles K. Mallory “delivered themselves up” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 “Speech of Hon. James M. Ashley, of Ohio” January 17th, 1861, and “Important Letter From Hon. J.M. Ashley” 
May 24th 1861, in James Mitchell Ashley and Benjamin William Arnett, Duplicate Copy of the Souvenir from the 
Afro-American League of Tennessee to Hon. James M. Ashley of Ohio, (Philadelphia: Publishing House of the AME 
Church, 1894) 116-164, 165-170, quotes on 140-141; Leonard Richards, Who Freed The Slaves? 13. 
72 Richards, Who Freed The Slaves?, 13. 
73 Oakes, Freedom National, 69.  
74 Ibid, 80. 
75 Major General N.P. Banks “To The People of the Louisiana” December 24th, 1862. The War of the Rebellion: A 
Compilation of the Official Records of the War of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 15 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901) 620. Hereafter, OR. 
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to Butler’s lines at Fortress Monroe, Virginia.76 After being satisfied that the men had been 
employed to work on Confederate fortifications, Butler—like British officials in both the 
American Revolution and the War of 1812—unhesitatingly “avail[ed] myself of their services” 
by employing them in the quartermaster’s department.77 When  Mallory’s agent turned up two 
days later, Butler refused to return them. Years later, Butler explained that his actions  “were a 
matter of the laws of war,” and that the “precise principle” of freeing slaves in wartime was 
widely known.78 Butler had a talent for inflating his own importance, but his wartime 
correspondence indicates he was familiar with the precedents of military emancipation.79 
Tellingly, the Republican politicians and their supporters cited the laws of war and the 
history of military emancipation—rather than Butler’s actions at Fortress Monroe—as 
precedence for the First and Second Confiscation Acts. “There can be nothing essential to the 
war’s success,” Sumner proclaimed, “which is not positively within the province of Congress, 
There is not one of the rights of war which Congress may not invoke.”80 Confiscation of slaves, 
Lyman Trumbull argued was perfectly legal, because “Congress is vested by the Constitution 
with the discretion of determining what means shall be used to accomplish suppressing the 
rebellion.”81 Many constituents agreed. Congress, one correspondent wrote Trumbull, should 
“use all the means which the law of nations” allowed to “cripple” the Confederacy.82 “The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Maj. General Benjamin Butler to Lieut. Gen. Winfield Scott, May 24th, 1861.  OR, 2:1:752. 
77 Ibid., 752. 
78 Benjamin F. Butler, Butler’s Book: Autobiography and Personal Reminisces of Major-General Benjamin Franklin 
Butler (Boston: A.M. Thayer &Co, 1892), 261, 258. 
79 When Butler began recruiting black soldiers in the Department of the Gulf during August, 1862, he told Henry 
Halleck that he was “fortified by precedents half century’s standing” and that he had “done only what Great Britain 
has done in the West Indies.” Major General Benjamin Butler to General in Chief Henry Halleck, August 27th, 1862. 
OR, 1:15, 555-556. 
80 John Syrett, The Civil War Confiscation Acts: Failing to Reconstruct the South (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005) 36-37.  
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People,” another correspondent wrote Secretary of War Simon Cameron, “are far ahead of 
[politicians] and would say amen to the banner of emancipation.”83   
The Militia Act of 1862 was a crowning blow. While the Second Confiscation Act and 
the Emancipation Proclamation have cast a long shadow, the Militia Act provided “for the 
purpose of constructing intrentchments, or performing camp service, or any other labor, or 
military or naval service for which [African Americans] may be deemed competent” and passed 
the same day as the Second Confiscation Act.84 Republican House and Senate members then 
coordinated a public defense of both measures in the pages of The National Republican. After 
repeating Sumner’s and Trumbull’s—and by extension, John Quincy Adams’s—arguments that 
“the Republic has a right to enact all laws needful and consonant with justice to suppress an 
insurrection,” lawmakers defended the Militia Act by pointing towards the history of military 
emancipation—albeit an all Americanized version.85 “Washington deemed these enslaved men 
fit to fight in the Revolution—Jackson deemed them fit to fight in the second war for 
independence,” the lawmakers reminded readers.86 Would the loyal citizens of the Union follow 
the example of these “tried patriots,” and “declare that even the slave may defend his native land, 
and to that end, shall be free?”87  
The combined scope of the Militia Act and Second Confiscation Act was audacious. 
Republicans now trained their sights on all “four millions of slaves by whose unpaid toil the 
rebellion is sustained.”88 Familiarity with the laws of war and the precedents of limited military 
emancipation had guided Republicans to this point; now, with an “imperiled country” that was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Ibid. 
84 U.S. Statutes At Large, Treaties, and Proclamations of the United States of America, vol. 12 (Boston, 1863), pp. 
597-600. 
85 The National Republican, July 17th, 1862. Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers, Library of 
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“entitled to the service of all her children,” universal military emancipation was the prescription 
for an ailing war effort.89 The immediate needs of the war, William Pitt Fessenden declared on 
the floor of Congress, demanded expanding the scope of military emancipation “by employing 
negroes, the slaves of rebels, in the service of the country.”90 Challenged by Democrats to justify 
the measure, the Maine Senator sarcastically asked, “what violation of the principles of warfare 
is it that is proposed?”91 Democrats blasted the Militia Act on constitutional grounds, but failed 
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James T. Ayers joined the Union Army to destroy slavery. Fifty-seven years old when he 
enlisted as a private in the 129th Illinois Infantry in September 1862, Ayers had been born in 
Bracken County, Kentucky, but moved first to Ohio and later to Illinois, where he became a 
preacher in the Methodist Episcopal Church. Ayers viewed the Civil War in apocalyptic terms, 
as just retribution for the sin of slavery, and he routinely wrote about his determination to “wipe 
out this Slaverry Curse.”1 Ayers must have made his antislavery convictions widely known, 
because on Christmas Day 1863, he was directed by the War Department to report to Stevenson, 
Alabama, to serve as a recruiter for the United States Colored Troops. Sensing the importance of 
his assignment, Ayers began to keep an intermittent diary chronicling his experiences freeing 
slaves. In rambling prose and imaginative spelling, Ayers provided historians with a rare glimpse 
into how the implementation of the Emancipation Proclamation operated on an individual level 
in the disloyal states. 
 For ten months, from late December 1863 to October 1864, Ayers traipsed through parts 
of Tennessee and Alabama, nailing up recruiting posters, holding meetings to encourage slaves 
to join the army, and riding from farm to farm to spread word of emancipation. Cloaked in what 
he delightfully termed “the verry best of Autherity” from the War Department, Ayers took 
particular pleasure in tormenting slaveholders by informing enslaved persons of their freedom, 
offering the men a chance to join the army, and riding away with new recruits.2 Within the 
confines of his diary, however, Ayers also vented his frustrations with several aspects of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John Hope Franklin (ed.) The Diary of James T. Ayers: Civil War Recruiter (Baton Rogue: Louisiana State 
University Press, Reprint edition, 1999) 18. 
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recruiting process: he could not understand why all the male slaves did not immediately jump at 
the chance to join the army, he was frustrated by Union Army bureaucracy, and he was 
constantly aware of the danger he faced at the hands of white Southerners. When Ayers resigned 
as a recruiter and returned to the 129th Illinois in the fall of 1864, his disgust with the limitations 
of his efforts leapt off the page. 
 Part of Ayers’s frustration, as historian John Hope Franklin has written, likely stemmed 
from his “inability to see the results of recruiting” in Tennessee, Alabama, and the Confederacy 
as a whole.3 Ayers’s frustration was typical of other Union Army recruiters who often struggled 
to place their individual efforts within the context of what one historian has recently termed the 
“military geography of emancipation.”4 This project attempts to place Ayers’s and his fellow 
recruiters’ efforts in their proper perspective by writing a history of emancipation that joins 
national, departmental, and local “scales of action” in order to show how emancipation policy 
and practice functioned in real time.5  
In order to achieve this goal, I focus on a set of officers whom I term the “middle 
managers” of federal emancipation policy. Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, Major George L. 
Stearns, Captain Rueben Mussey, Major Generals Benjamin Butler and Nathaniel Banks, 
Brigadier General Daniel Ullman, Major General Stephen G. Burbridge, and Colonel James S. 
Brisbin were all tasked by the War Department with superintending the recruiting of African 
American troops. Their unique positions within the Union Army allow us to connect the 
emancipation policies from Washington to their implementation on the ground in the 
Confederacy. Moreover, framing the project around these officers allows us to move beyond 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid., xx. 
4 Elizabeth Murrell Taylor, Embattled Freedom: Journeys Through The Civil Wars Refugee Camps (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 57. 
5 Scott Nesbitt and Edward L. Ayers, “Seeing Emancipation: Scales of Freedom in the American South” The 
Journal of the Civil War Era, vol. 1, no. 1 (March, 2011), 3-24. 
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narratives of emancipation that tend to focus either on Abraham Lincoln or on the actions of the 
Union Army and enslaved persons on the ground.6 
Using the experiences of these “middle managers” as a lens, this dissertation examines 
the implementation of federal emancipation policy by the Union Army in the Mississippi River 
Valley, the Department of the Cumberland, the Department of the Gulf, and the Department of 
Kentucky between the issuing of the final Emancipation Proclamation on January 1st 1863 and 
the end of the Civil War in April 1865. Specifically, my project addresses five interrelated 
questions: 1) What did the implementation and enforcement of military emancipation look like in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 To cite a few representative examples, both Allen C. Guelzo’s Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of 
Slavery in America New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003) and Louis P. Masur’s Lincoln’s Hundred Days: The 
Emancipation Proclamation and the War for the Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012) provide crisp, 
detailed narratives of the events leading up to January 1st, 1863, including Lincoln’s thought process, changes in the 
language of the Emancipation Proclamation, and the reaction of Northern soldiers, civilians, and politicians. Yet 
these two works are emblematic of a larger problem that permeates scholarship on the Emancipation Proclamation: 
neither actually tells us much about how the Proclamation was implemented and what its impact was in areas of the 
rebel South. Conversely, the on-the-ground focus of works such as Glenn David Brasher’s The Peninsula Campaign 
and The Necessity of Emancipation: African Americans and the Fight For Freedom (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2011) and John H. Matsui’s The First Republican Army: The Army of Virginia and the 
Radicalization of the Civil War (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 2016) provides a nuanced account 
of how a Union Army eroded slavery on the ground in one area of the Confederacy during the spring and summer of 
1862. However, because of a determination to make runaway slaves and Union soldiers the main focus of their 
story, both works are often disconnected from important elements of federal policy. For example, while the passage 
of the Second Confiscation Act in July, 1862 serves as the climax of his narrative, Brasher elides the fact that during 
the campaign, the Union Army was actually implementing emancipation policies that had already been passed by 
Congress, leaving the question of whether the Peninsular Campaign constituted a turning point in the story of 
emancipation—a central contention of Brasher’s work—open to questioning. Recently, works such as Chandra 
Manning’s Troubled Refuge: Struggling for Freedom In the Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2017) and Amy 
Murrell Taylor’s Embattled Freedom: Journey’s Through The Civil War’s Slave Refugee Camps (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2018) have begun to take aim at this problem, although both works are, by 
virtue of their focus on the contraband camps, still focus heavily on developments on the ground. 
 There is also a vast literature devoted to the question: who freed the slaves? For examples of historians who 
have emphasized the “self-emancipation” thesis, see Leon F. Litwack, Been In The Storm So Long: The Aftermath of 
Slavery (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), Vincent Harding, There is a River: The Black Struggle for Freedom in 
America (New York: Vintage, 1981), and Ira Berlin, Barbara J. Fields, Steven F. Miller, Joseph P. Reidy, and Leslie 
S. Rowland (eds.) Slaves No More: Three Essays on Emancipation and the Civil War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). Examples of works that stress Lincoln’s importance include James McPherson, Drawn With 
The Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), Allen C. Guelzo, 
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and Louis P. Masur, Lincoln’s Hundred Days. For examples of works that 
focus on the importance of the Union army’s role in emancipation see	  Gary W. Gallagher, The Union War 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), Chandra Manning, What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, 
Slavery, and the Civil War (New York: Vintage, 2007), Glenn David Brasher, The Peninsula Campaign and The 
Necessity of Emancipation John H. Matsui, The First Republican Army, and Kristopher Teeters, Practical 
Liberators: Union Officers in the Western Theater During the Civil War (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2018). 
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the rebellious states after January 1st 1863? 2) How were the important shifts in emancipation 
policy—the lifting of the bans on “enticing” enslaved blacks and black enlistment—put into 
effect by the Union Army, and what was their place in broader Union military strategy? 3) Who 
was responsible for carrying out these shifts in emancipation policy, and what did these 
operations look like on a daily basis? 4) What was the precise nature of the relationship between 
federal military emancipation policy and the state-by-state abolition policies pursued by the 
Republican Party? 5) How can taking the antislavery origins of the Civil War seriously better 
help us understand the implementation of federal emancipation policy; the people tasked with 
carrying it out; and the role of military emancipation in the United States? 
 
In reasserting the role of federal policy during the process of emancipation, this project 
builds on the pioneering work of several generations of historians of the African American 
experience. Beginning with the writings of African American veterans in the late nineteenth 
century, and continuing through the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, historians such 
as George Washington Williams, Joseph T. Wilson, Dudley T. Cornish, John Hope Franklin, La 
Wanda Cox, Mary Francis Berry, Benjamin Quarles, and many others kept their eyes trained on 
the “broad outlines of administration policy and army practice toward the problem of the Negro 
soldier in the Union Army.”7 By focusing on critical but often overlooked figures such as 
Lorenzo Thomas, Rufus Saxton, and C.W. Foster, these historians—Quarles and Cornish in 
particular—managed to connect the messy, chaotic, and conflict-ridden process of emancipation 
on the ground to the “systematized” policy directives coming from Washington.8 Even W.E.B. 
Du Bois, whose concept of a “General Strike” in his work Black Reconstruction focuses on the 
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Press of Kansas, Reprint 1987), xvi. 
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labor transfer of half a million black workers from Confederate masters to the Union Army, 
recognized that the federal and departmental emancipation policy implemented and overseen by 
Generals Benjamin Butler and Nathaniel P. Banks were critical in facilitating the revolutionary 
transition from slave to free labor in the Union occupied South.9    
Only in reaction to the shortcomings of the Civil Rights Movement during the late 1960’s 
and 1970’s did historians begin to marginalize federal emancipation policy. Appalled by the 
violent backlash to, as well as the attempted denouement of, progressive Congressional 
legislation and Supreme Court decisions, historians began to depict Union officials and 
Republican policymakers as only cursorily committed to the idea of black freedom. Works such 
as William Messner’s Freedmen and the Ideology of Free Labor, Louis Gerties’s From 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 George Washington Williams’s History of the Negro Troops in the War of the Rebellion and Joseph T. Wilson’s 
The Black Phalanx each garbled the chronology of the formulation of federal emancipation policy, but both veterans 
recognized its importance. For instance, both works simultaneously chided the Lincoln administration for pursuing a 
“conservative, vacillating, hand to mouth policy that held sway for nearly two years” (68) while simultaneously 
depicting a deliberate and coordinated, federal emancipation policy that took direct aim at slavery from the 
beginning of the war. Williams, in particular, used extensive quotations from General Orders, War Department 
Circulars, and other policy directives to detail the development of a  “competent and appropriate machinery of 
emancipation” coordinated by Washington (113). Within this framework, generals such as Lorenzo Thomas and 
Nathaniel Banks were depicted as efficient, if not always entirely successful, administrators of emancipation. 
Ultimately, Williams was too sophisticated an historian to ignore evidence, concluding “nor was it an accident that 
the Negro soldier became a profound and determinative factor in the problem of the war” (326). 
Following the publication of Williams work in 1888, it was nearly sixty years before historians revisited the 
evolution of federal emancipation policy. In quick succession, Benjamin Quarles published The Negro in The 
American Civil War (1953) and Lincoln and the Negro (1962), while Dudley T. Cornish published The Sable Arm: 
Black Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865, (1956). Building on the groundwork laid by Wilson and Williams, 
Quarles found that “on questions related to the Southern Negro, Lincoln deliberately took his time,” though Quarles 
attributed this to Lincoln’s temperament and acute sense of political timing rather than a reluctance to emancipate 
slaves (82). Moreover, Quarles devoted significant narrative space to the ways that black soldiers “found himself 
discriminated against in promotion practices, in pay, and in service assignments,” but he never lost sight that it was 
Lincoln and the War Department who were responsible for “systematizing” black recruitment, and seeing that the 
policy directives were obeyed (167, 159).  
For his part, Cornish attempted to trace the “broad outlines of administration policy and army practice 
toward the problem of the Negro soldier in the Union army” (xvi). Although he acknowledged “the slow advance of 
the movement to arm the Negro” and kept an eye on “the maze of difficulties and obstacles to be overcome,” he 
succeeded more than any previous historian in integrating the development of federal administrative policy with the 
performance of black soldiers on the battlefield (xv) In addition to focusing on neglected figures such as Lorenzo 
Thomas, Cornish focused much needed attention on the establishment and inner workings of the Bureau of Colored 
Troops, which he approvingly hailed as a “professional, organized, regularized activity under central control from 
Washington” (130). Yet Cornish took pains to consistently point out that these “organizational achievements” would 
have been “hollow indeed” without evidence that those who were being recruited could perform the work of the 
soldier on the battlefield (131). 
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Contraband to Freedmen, and Robert Engs’s Freedom’s First Generation emphasized the harsh 
impact of army policies on black men, women, and children, depicted army officials as “more 
interested in social control than social change,” and characterized Union attempts to implement a 
free labor system as a virtual rendition of slavery.10 Within this framework, federal policy began 
to disappear from historians’ analyses, and the impetus behind emancipation was portrayed as 
coming largely from slaves fleeing to Union lines. Although there have been several attempts by 
recent historians to reintegrate the importance of federal policy to the process of emancipation, 
as well as to rehabilitate the overall reputation of Republican policymakers, this depiction of an 
irrelevant or essentially conservative federal emancipation policy continues to exert a powerful 
hold on the scholarship.11 
Most recently, historians seeking to recover the concept of Union and its meaning to the 
Civil War generation have also been determined to marginalize the importance of federal 
emancipation policy. For historians such as Gary Gallagher, Daniel W. Crofts, and others, the 
overarching goal of the majority of Northerners was to protect and preserve the Union’s 
republican government. Only the demands of wartime, Gallagher argues, convinced a reluctant 
Northern public to embrace the destruction of slavery as a war aim, concluding his volume The 
Union War by asserting that “the wartime generation maintained continuity regarding their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For extended summaries outlining these points see Peyton McCrary, Lincoln and Reconstruction: The Louisiana 
Experiment (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton: University Press, 1978), 14-16, notes 22 and 23, and “The Party of 
Revolution: Republican Ideas about Politics and Social Change, 1862-1867” Civil War History, Volume 30, Number 
4 (December, 1984) pp.330-350; Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1865 (New 
York: Harper Perennial, 1988) xix-xxiv; and Thomas Brown (ed.), Reconstructions: New Perspectives on the 
Postbellum United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 3-9. 
11 For example see Downs, Sick From Freedom, Murrell Taylor, Embattled Freedom, Teeters, Practical Liberators, 
Adam Rothman, Beyond Freedom’s Reach: A Kidnapping in the Twilight of Slavery (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2015) and Leslie Schwalm, A Hard Fight For We: Women’s Transition From Slavery to Freedom 
in South Carolina (Urbana and Chicago: The University of Illinois Press, 1997). Importantly, this is not to say that 
there was not a tremendous amount of violence and suffering during the process of emancipation, and that soldiers 
and officers in the Union armies were not responsible for much of it. Rather, it is to suggest that in their focus on the 
process of emancipation on the ground, historians have lost sight of the existence and accomplishments of federal 
emancipation policy.  
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principle goals in the war…to reunite the nation.”12 In the analyses of these historians, 
emancipation was less the result of coordinated federal policy that built on established 
precedents of military emancipation, and more a simple byproduct of the conflict that ultimately 
became a necessary measure to save the Union. Ironically, for an historian who has spent much 
of his career chronicling the development of the “Lost Cause” ideology, Gallagher’s formulation 
of an almost accidental process of emancipation comes perilously close to the mere “incidence” 
of war explanation for emancipation advanced during the 1880’s and 1890’s by many ex-
Confederates.13 
 In both the above narratives, the racism of, and the resulting lack of commitment by, 
Union officials serve as sufficient explanations for the seemingly inevitable failures of 
emancipation. Not only does this interpretation read policy outcomes back into intentions, it fails 
to adequately address several fundamental questions. Why, for example, were committed 
antislavery activists such as George Stearns, Reuben Mussey, Edwin Wheelock, George Hanks, 
George Hepworth, and James S. Brisbin selected by the War Department—or high ranking 
departmental officials—to superintend military emancipation and/or the development of free 
labor plantations? Why, in places such as Tennessee and Louisiana, was there a commitment to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Gary W. Gallagher, The Union War (Harvard University Press, 2011), 153. For an extended discussion of the The 
Union War’s influence on recent Civil War historiography, see Andrew E. Slap and Thomas Smith (ed.), This 
Distracted and Anarchical People: New Answers For Old Questions About The Civil War Era North (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2013) 1-10. 
13 See for example, Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, volume 2 (New York: D. 
Appleton and Company, 1881). The “incidence” of war explanation for emancipation was also popular among some 
Northern Democrats. For example, President Andrew Johnson, meeting with Frederick Douglass in the spring of 
1866, told him the abolition of slavery was an “incident to the suppression of the rebellion.” Johnson quoted in 
David W. Blight, Frederick Douglass, Prophet of Freedom (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2018), pg. 475. 
On The Lost Cause interpretation of emancipation, see generally Gaines M. Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy: 
Defeat, The Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South, 1865-1913 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987); Gary Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 200) David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), Karen L. Cox, Dixie’s Daughters: The United Daughters of the Confederacy and 
the Preservation of Confederate Culture (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), and Caroline Janney 
Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Caroline Press, 2013). 
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the establishment of a school system for black men, women, and children? To answer these basic 
questions requires de-centering racism as a catch-all explanation for determining how 
emancipation unfolded, as well as viewing emancipation as a process that owed a significant 
amount of impetus to the workings of policy, in addition to haphazard events on the ground.14 
The objective in making this argument is not to take an uncritical view of federal 
emancipation policy or the politicians, Union officers, and enlisted men involved in its 
implementation. Unquestionably, the black refugees who made it to Union lines suffered 
profound hardships through the neglect or abuse of Union Army officers who were often more 
concerned with implementing military orders than with what happened to enslaved persons after 
emancipation. These attitudes were then compounded by the realities of shifting Union military 
priorities: moving armies often meant that black refugees received inadequate food, shelter, and 
basic medical care, all while being exposed to threat of Confederate guerilla raids and the very 
real prospect of re-enslavement. At the same time, an understanding of what federal and 
departmental emancipation policy entailed, and how it operated, forces us to reassess the tenures 
of officials such as Lorenzo Thomas, Benjamin Butler, Nathaniel Banks, and others by 
explaining what those charged with implementing emancipation policy actually did, rather than 
what they failed to do, or might have done. 
 
This project is divided into four chapters that each focus on the actions of officers in  
different regions of the Western Theater. Chapter One examines Adjutant General Lorenzo 
Thomas in the upper Mississippi River Valley; Chapter Two focuses on Major George L. Stearns 
and Captain Rueben Mussey in the United States Colored Troops Recruiting Office in Nashville, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Here my argument follows the one laid out by James Oakes in his article “The New Cult of Consensus” 
Nonsite.org Issue 20, January 25th, 2017, https://nonsite.org/feature/the-new-cult-of-consensus.   
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Tennessee; Chapter Three shifts the focus to Benjamin Butler and Nathaniel P. Banks in 
Department of the Gulf; and the final chapter integrates a border state by incorporating Stephen 
Burbridge and James Brisbin in the Department of Kentucky. Each chapter is grounded in the 
archival records of individual officers and their respective military departments, as well as 
personal correspondence, diaries, newspapers, and the Official Records of the War of the 
Rebellion. Although white officers constitute the main focus of this study, specific attention will 
also be paid to the role of black troops and refugees in undermining slavery on the ground, again 
with a clear connection to the policy directives coming from Washington.   
By focusing my project on the Western Theater, I build on the works of other recent 
historians who have sought to reassert its primacy in the process of emancipation. Despite this 
ongoing shift, the discrepancy between scholarly attention on emancipation in the Eastern and 
Western Theaters remains striking. In Virginia alone, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of 
Virginia have each been the focus of studies about military emancipation, even though the Old 
Dominion contained only 15 percent of the total number of slaves in the Western Theater.15 
Utilizing a Western Theater-wide focus allows us to compare and contrast the continuities in 
policy implementation across different Union departments and armies, while also allowing for 
important differences in implementation according to varying circumstances on the ground. 
Incorporating the loyal slave state of Kentucky provides an obvious point of comparison and 
contrast with the rebellious states not only with regard to military emancipation, but also the 
ways that the political abolitionism of the Republican Party worked with military emancipation 
to effect the destruction of slavery. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Western Theater affords examples of ways the 
development of free labor systems and humanitarian care for black refugees comprised an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Teeters, Practical Liberators, 6. 
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integral component of military emancipation. In general, scholars who study military 
emancipation focus on how commanding officers and enlisted men handled questions 
surrounding freeing slaves, while noting that the free labor plantations lie outside the scope of 
their studies.16 By contrast, historians who study free labor plantations usually frame their works 
as “rehearsals for Reconstruction” and pay minimal attention to the importance of military 
movements. Yet Union officers were acutely aware of the intricate relationship between military 
emancipation, free labor plantations, and humanitarian care for refugees (such as education), 
viewing each component as a different side of the same equation. A particular focus of this 
study, then, is the reflexive relationship between Union Army grand strategy, military 
emancipation, the development of free labor plantations, and humanitarian care for black 
refugees. 
 
One final note is in order about the scope and intent of military emancipation. Historians 
are fond of arguing that it “took armies, not policies to crush the beast [of slavery]”, and 
frequently cite individual examples of emancipation policy’s shortcomings as prima facie 
evidence for its broader ineffectiveness.17 Yet it is the shortcomings of military emancipation 
that demonstrate the importance of policy, not its irrelevance. Any Union policymaker who was 
familiar with recent military history, or who followed the progress of the Civil War closely, 
knew that military emancipation could never be universally enforced, and that it would not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In Practical Liberators, Kristopher Teeters argues that histories of emancipation in the Western Theater focuses 
mainly on the army’s plantation labor policies and does not extensively address how different commanders and their 
subordinates handled emancipation questions during active campaigns.” Although this criticism is warranted, 
Teeters’ work swings too far in the opposite direction, all but eliminating the army’s role in free labor plantations 
from his narrative (4). Similarly, Michael T. Meir, in his article “Lorenzo Thomas and the Recruiting of Blacks in 
the Mississippi River Valley, 1863-1865” writes that a “discussion of [Lorenzo] Thomas’s efforts on behalf of the 
freedpeople” including his administration of free labor plantations is “outside the scope of this essay” even as he 
admits that those efforts were important. See Smith (ed.), Black Soldiers in Blue, 268 
17 Manning, Chandra (2014) "The Scorpion's Sting: Antislavery and the Coming of the Civil War," Civil War Book 
Review: Vol. 16: Is. 3, quote on 2, https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol16/iss3/7  
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enough to abolish the institution of slavery. As the war dragged into its third year, Republicans 
began to talk about a different policy, a constitutional amendment, as the only way to complete 
slavery’s destruction.  
Nobody saw the limitations of military emancipation more clearly than Abraham Lincoln. 
In several public speeches made between February and April 1865, Lincoln spelled out the need 
for a Thirteenth Amendment by identifying areas where universal military emancipation “falls 
far short.”18 Anticipating the criticism of generations of historians, Lincoln noted that the 
Emancipation Proclamation, along with the relevant legislation, “only aided those who came into 
our lines and that it was inoperative as to those who did not give themselves up.”19 In other 
words, military emancipation had crippled slavery, not abolished the institution outright. Only a 
constitutional amendment, the “king’s cure for all the evils,” could guarantee that the work 
begun by military emancipation would be “fully consummated.”20
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 “Response to A Serenade” February 1st, 1865, Roy P. Basler, (ed.) The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 
(CWAL), Volume 8 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953-1955), 255. Lincoln also made a similar 
observation in his last public address on April 11th, 1865. “Last Public Address” April 11th, 1865, Roy P. Basler 
(ed.), Abraham Lincoln, His Speeches and Writings (Da Capo Press, 2008), 796-801. 
19 Basler, CWAL, 255. 
20 Ibid.	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CHAPTER 1 
“Give Me Only Such Officers Whose Hearts Are in The Work”: Lorenzo Thomas, War 
Department Recruiting Agents, and The Process of Emancipation 1863-1865. 
 
Shortly after the fall of Vicksburg on July 4th 1863, President Abraham Lincoln 
dispatched a hastily scribbled note to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton. The commander-in-chief 
desired a “renewed and vigorous effort be made to raise colored forces along the Mississippi,” 
and directed Stanton to coordinate with General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck to see “if any 
acceleration in the matter could be effected.”1 Lincoln was well aware that the organized 
recruiting of black soldiers had commenced in late March under the direction of Adjutant-
General Lorenzo Thomas, but the president believed that conditions were not “fully ripe” until 
the Mississippi River was opened.2 Now, with the Mississippi completely unblocked to Union 
traffic and the Confederacy split in two, black soldiers might prove “a resource which, if 
vigorously applied now, will rapidly close the contest.”3 Despite Stanton’s well-known dislike of 
the adjutant-general, Lincoln was adamant that “the evidence is nearly conclusive that Gen. 
Thomas is one of the best, if not the very best, instruments for this service.”4  
Lincoln was proven right. Not only did the recruiting and organizing of black soldiers 
play a decisive role in the war by “weakening the enemy & strengthening us,” but Lorenzo 
Thomas indeed proved to be the very best “instrument” for the service.5 By the end of the Civil 
War, Thomas estimated that his efforts—and those of the “enticement” agents under his 
command—had resulted in the recruiting and organizing of 77,720 former slaves from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Abraham Lincoln to Edwin Stanton, July 21st, 1863. Abraham Lincoln Papers (ALP), Library of Congress (LOC). All citations 
to the Lincoln Papers can be found online at: https://www.loc.gov/collections/abraham-lincoln-papers/   
2 Abraham Lincoln to Ulysses S. Grant, August 9th, 1863, ALP-LOC.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Abraham Lincoln to Edwin Stanton, July 21st, 1863. ALP-LOC. 
5 Abraham Lincoln to Ulysses S. Grant, August 9th, 1863. ALP-LOC.	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Mississippi River Valley into Union Army regiments.6 Dispatched to the Mississippi River 
Valley partly out of expediency, Thomas’s rapid creation of a recruiting apparatus and 
standardized recruiting practices where none had existed greatly facilitated the transition of 
African Americans army life, and contributed to the successful implementation and enforcement 
of the Emancipation Proclamation. 
Despite Thomas’s unique position as a chief agent of military emancipation, the 
importance of his actions—and the recruiting agents under his command—have long been under- 
appreciated by historians.7 This omission is critical because, while historians have produced 
many outstanding works on different facets of emancipation policy and process, many do 
surprisingly little to connect the federal emancipation policy articulated in Washington with its 
implementation on the ground by the Union armies in the South.8 As consequence, we still know 
relatively little about what the day-to-day implementation, operation, and enforcement of federal 
emancipation policy looked like after January 1st 1863.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Lorenzo Thomas to Edwin Stanton, October 3rd, 1865. Letters Sent by Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas (LS), 
Entry Number Pl179, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office (RGO), 1762-1984, RG 94, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 
7 This oversight is particularly surprising given Dudley T. Cornish’s call in his classic work The Sable Arm, Black 
Troops in the Civil War, 1861-1865 for a “revaluation of the role of Lorenzo Thomas in the history of American 
Negro soldiers and their role in the Civil War” (125). Yet since The Sable Arm appeared in 1956, only a few works 
on Thomas have been published, and of these only Michael T. Meir’s brief overview article “Lorenzo Thomas and 
the Recruiting of Black Troops in the Mississippi River Valley, 1863-1865” in John David Smith’s edited volume 
Black Soldiers in Blue: African Americans in the Civil War Era (The University of North Carolina Press, 2000) has 
any merit as a work of scholarship. The only recent biography of Thomas, Michael Eggleston’s President Lincoln’s 
Recruiter: General Lorenzo Thomas and the United States Colored Troops in the Civil War (Jefferson, N.C., 
McFarland Press, 2013) is a sparsely footnoted work that provides little in the way of substantive analysis, draws 
mainly on secondary sources material, and contributes little to the scholarship. Perhaps an even more startling 
oversight on the part of historians is the complete absence of scholarship on the enticement agents who served under 
Thomas in the Mississippi Valley. The only published works devoted solely to these agents are John Hope 
Franklin’s edited diary James T. Ayers, Civil War Recruiter, and a journal article under the same title. Most scholars 
whose works mention the recruiting process rely heavily on the Ayers diary.  
8 For an overview of this scholarship, see the introduction.   
9 One important exception here is Joseph T. Glatthaar’s excellent study Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of 
Black Soldiers and Their White Officers (New York: The Free Press, 1990). Glatthaar devotes some attention to the 
process of recruiting in his chapter “Filling the Ranks,” but only briefly describes the daily operations of Thomas 
and the agents under his command, and is more focused on the recruiting of free blacks in the North. 
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 In part, these shortcomings in the scholarship can be traced back to historians’ long-
standing preoccupation with the question of who freed the slaves. Generally, historians have 
been split into two camps: those who argue for the idea of self-emancipation—that by running to 
Union lines, escaping slaves were responsible for forcing the hand of Congress and the Lincoln 
administration—and those who believe Lincoln deserves most (though not all) of the acclaim.10 
Within the past decade, a third camp has emerged that more fully emphasizes the role of Union 
soldiers and armies as the critical actors in process of emancipation. These scholars argue that 
the success of Lincoln and enslaved persons depended heavily on the actions of the Union 
Army.11 However, by presupposing one correct (or more correct) answer, historians have 
unintentionally created an artificial divide in the historiography that inhibits our ability to 
comprehend the ways federal emancipation policy, the Union armies, and the actions of slaves 
themselves built off of, and worked in tandem with, each other.  
This chapter examines the efforts of Union Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas and his 
subordinates to recruit and organize regiments of African American soldiers in the Mississippi 
Valley between March 1863 and April 1865. During these two years, Thomas functioned as the 
critical link between the federal emancipation policy adopted in Washington and the 
implementation of that policy by Union armies on the ground in the rebel South. Chronicling his 
actions and those of his recruiting agents enables us to follow military emancipation up and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For examples of historians who have emphasized the “self-emancipation” thesis, see Leon F. Litwack, Been In 
The Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), Vincent Harding, There is a 
River: The Black Struggle for Freedom in America (New York: Vintage, 1981), and Ira Berlin, Barbara J. Fields, 
Steven F. Miller, Joseph P. Reidy, and Leslie S. Rowland (eds.) Slaves No More: Three Essays on Emancipation 
and the Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Examples of works that stress Lincoln’s 
importance include James McPherson, Drawn With The Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 196, Allen C. Guelzo, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in 
America (New York, Simon and Schuster, 2003, and Louis P. Masur, Lincoln’s Hundred Days: The Emancipation 
Proclamation and the War for The Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).	  
11 For examples of this emphasis see	  Gary W. Gallagher, The Union War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011), Chandra Manning, What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War (New York: 
Vintage, 2007), and Glenn David Brasher, The Peninsula Campaign and The Necessity of Emancipation; African 
Americans and the Fight For Freedom (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010).	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down the chain of command and trace with some precision the daily impact of the Emancipation 
Proclamation. An analysis of how Thomas directed these recruiting and organizing efforts, and 
examining how they operated on a daily basis, provides an understanding of the inner workings 
of federal emancipation policy and paint a more cohesive portrait of the destruction of slavery in 
the United States.  
Furthermore, this chapter argues that Thomas’s development of a plantation-lease system 
in the Mississippi Valley, his concordant attempts at fostering a loyal population along the banks 
of the river, and his efforts at reforming conditions in Union contraband camps constituted 
critical components of Thomas’s recruiting mission and overall contribution to Union military 
operations. Although the intertwined and reflexive nature of all these operations might seem 
obvious—and indeed they were to Thomas—historians of black soldiers, along with historians of 
the development of a free-labor system in the Union-occupied South, and Union military 
campaigns, have not sufficiently acknowledged the full complexities of this relationship.12 This 
oversight is particularly glaring because it was so plainly obvious to the high command of the 
Union Army. Not only did field commanders such as General Ulysses Grant consider the lining 
of the west bank of the Mississippi with a loyal population of free black laborers and white 
leasers crucial to maintaining the Union Army’s line of supply, but establishing a loyal 
population could also help foster the eventual readmission to the Union as free states. Moreover, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For example, Michael T. Meir dismissed both the plantation-lease system and Thomas’s broader “efforts on 
behalf of the freed-people” as outside the scope of his article, even though he readily acknowledged the subject’s 
importance to the Adjutant General. See Meir “Lorenzo Thomas” in Smith (ed.) Black Soldiers in Blue, pg. 268. In 
contrast, Louis Gerteis’s From Contraband to Freedmen: Federal Policy Towards Southern Blacks 1861-1865 
(Westport, CT., Greenwood Press, 1973) devotes most of his attention to the plantation-lease system when 
discussing Thomas’s mission in the Mississippi River Valley, pausing only to note that “contraband camps 
facilitated both the recruitment of black troops and the cultivation of plantations,” Gerteis, 125. Even otherwise 
excellent histories of the Vicksburg campaign and the Army of the Tennessee such as Michael B. Ballard, 
Vicksburg: The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004) 
and Steven E. Woodworth Nothing But Victory: The Army of the Tennessee 1861-1865 (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2005) have neglected or downplayed both the role of recruiting and organizing black troops and the 
plantation-leasing system as part of Union military strategy.	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black refugees would support the lucrative production of cotton, while at the same time 
establishing a free-labor blueprint for the postwar world. With their extensive knowledge of the 
region, black workers, along with new United States Colored Troop recruits, could then both 
guard these plantations to ensure their families’ safety and operate effectively against 
Confederate guerillas. A central goal of this chapter, then, is to convey the reflexive nature of the 
relationship between military emancipation and the free labor plantations, as Thomas understood 
it, and in the process break free of the scholarly tendency to focus on one or the other. 
Finally, although Thomas spent parts of 1864 in Louisville helping Union officials 
navigate emancipation in Kentucky, his actions in the Bluegrass State will only be briefly 
summarized in this chapter. An in-depth analysis of Thomas’s role in the recruiting of black 
troops in Kentucky is the subject of Chapter Four, and will be discussed here only to provide the 
basis for a comparison and contrast between the process of recruiting and enlisting slaves in the 
disloyal states versus loyal slave states.13   
 
Lorenzo Thomas was an unlikely harbinger of revolution. Born in New Castle, Delaware 
in 1804, Thomas was the fifth of Evan and Elizabeth Thomas’s six children. While Thomas had 
family members who served in both the American Revolution and the War of 1812, there is no 
direct evidence that this connection prompted Evan to secure his fifteen year-old son an 
appointment to West Point in 1819.14 The younger Thomas ranked in the middle of his class, 
graduating seventeenth in a class of thirty-five in 1823, and was commissioned as a second 
lieutenant in the 4th U.S. Infantry. Thomas spent much of his early career serving in Florida, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Lorenzo Thomas to Edwin Stanton, October 5th, 1865, LS, RG 94, NARA. 
14 For a more expanded summary of Thomas’s early life see Michael A. Eggleston, President Lincoln’s Recruiter: 
General Lorenzo Thomas and the United States Colored Troops (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, 2013) 
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performing garrison duty and helping supervise construction of a military road to St. Augustine. 
During this time in Florida, Thomas must have demonstrated an aptitude for paperwork, for the 
1830’s saw the first assignments in the succession of administrative posts that would define his 
military career. Serving in the Adjutant-General’s Office in Washington, the Quartermaster’s 
Department during the Florida War in 1836-37, and as chief of staff of the Army in Florida, 
likely instilled in Thomas an appreciation of military logistics and procedure, and secured him 
rapid promotion to first lieutenant, captain, and major.15 
 During the Mexican-American War, Thomas served as chief of staff to Major General 
William Orlando Butler, and was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1848 for “gallant and 
meritorious conduct” at Monterrey.16 At the end of the war, Thomas was sent back to 
Washington, where he resumed his rank as major in the 4th Infantry. By the early 1850’s, General 
Winfield Scott had apparently become aware of Thomas’s talents for administrative duties, for 
he appointed the 49-year-old his chief of staff in 1853, a position Thomas held until the spring of 
1861. Simon Cameron, Lincoln’s first secretary of war, appointed Thomas adjutant general with 
the rank of brevet brigadier general in March 1861. Cameron’s tenure as the head of the War 
Department would be brief and marred by charges of incompetence and corruption, and in 
January 1862, Lincoln effectively shunted him aside by appointing him U.S. ambassador to 
Russia, replacing him with the efficient Ohio lawyer, Edwin M. Stanton.17  
 Thomas’s first two years as adjutant general were a crash course in the power politics of 
the Union high command. His first lesson resulted from Major General John C. Fremont’s 
ineptitude. Nicknamed the “Pathfinder of the West” for his pioneering exploits during the 
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1840’s, Fremont had been the Republican candidate for president in 1856. Largely due to his 
combination of personal popularity and political importance, he had been appointed to command 
the Department of the West during the summer of 1861. His tenure was nothing short of a 
debacle. Frémont failed to support Union forces in the field, alienated Missouri’s Unionist 
governor, and installed himself in a St. Louis mansion where he surrounded himself with a large, 
ornamental staff. A short time into his command tenure, reports that contractors in his 
department were defrauding the government by overcharging for military supplies began 
filtering back to the capital.18  
 Most inflammatory of all was Frémont’s proclamation of August 30th 1861, declaring 
martial law in Missouri and emancipating all the slaves of rebel owners. A few days later, 
Lincoln wrote to explain his “anxiety” that the order “will alarm our Southern Unionist friends, 
and turn them against us—perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect for Kentucky.”19 Lincoln then 
requested that Fremont modify his order “so as to conform to the first and fourth sections” of the 
recently passed Confiscation Act.20 When Fremont refused to comply, Lincoln publicly 
instructed the general to amend the order, generating a storm of controversy.21 As this drama 
unfolded, Frank Blair, a colonel in Fremont’s command and brother of Lincoln’s postmaster 
general, catalogued the general’s incompetence, writing that it was his “decided opinion” that 
Fremont should be relieved of command and a “man of ability put in his place—the sooner the 
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better.”22 When Fremont learned of the letter—and that it had been shown to Lincoln—he had 
Blair arrested. To sort out this multi-layered mess, Lincoln dispatched Thomas and Secretary of 
War Simon Cameron to Missouri.23  
On October 21st 1861, Thomas submitted a blistering report. Having conducted 
interviews with numerous subordinates within Frémont’s command, Thomas detailed instances 
of “contracts [that]…were given to individuals without resorting to bids,” along with supplies 
such as blankets and rifles that were “rotten and worthless.”24 Fremont had a personal bodyguard 
of 300 men, and had even appointed a music director to his staff as a captain of engineers.25 
Observers reported to Thomas that Fremont was incapable of managing the responsibility of a 
departmental command, and that they generally questioned “The Pathfinder’s” intellectual 
capacity.26 Thomas’s report concluded that Fremont’s command suffered “the want of military 
foresight and soldierly judgment” in “directing the necessary means for putting and maintaining 
in the field the forces under his command.”27 
Thomas’s report ignited a firestorm, and General Fremont’s supporters quickly refuted 
the charges. John Sherman, Republican Senator from Ohio, ridiculed Thomas as someone who 
“travels all over the country, outside of his office, to pick up scraps of testimony,” and wondered 
aloud about the credibility of his report.28 A letter to the editor of The New York Tribune signed 
“One Who Knows” defended Frémont’s dealings with contractors by arguing that he been 
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inadequately supplied and thus forced into purchasing expensive and shoddy equipment.29 
Another anonymous defender, “An Impartial Reader,” undertook a point-by-point refutation of 
Thomas’s report, and accused the adjutant general of being part of “something like a conspiracy” 
aimed at overthrowing Fremont.30  
On the other hand, The New York Times published a lengthy defense of Thomas on 
October 31st. Calling his report “certainly the most remarkable document that has seen the light 
since beginning of the present war,” The Times lamented “the attempted deprecation of 
[Thomas’s] honor and fairness.” In The Times’s estimation, not only had Thomas followed his 
orders, but he had carried out his instructions competently and was well qualified to make any 
military observations about the state of affairs in the Department of the West.31 Several 
Democratic papers took the opportunity to use Thomas’s report to bludgeon their Republican 
competitors. The Bedford Gazette (PA) commended Thomas for having “fully ascertained” 
Frémont’s “incapability to manage a force so large, his reckless extravagance, and corrupt and 
dishonest dealings,” promising “loyal Democracy would rush to the rescue of the President” 
should a “powerful faction among the Republicans move to break down the Administration.”32 
The Holmes County Farmer (OH) commended Thomas for “appearing to have settled the 
question of Fremont’s fitness,” and chided the “abolition portion of the Republican press” for 
“clinging to Fremont with unyielding tenacity.”33 Weighing the evidence, New York diarist 
George Templeton Strong concluded that Fremont had “undoubtedly shown lack of direction and 
foresight” and was “in the hands of California gamblers and speculators,” thus making Fremont’s 
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removal a “lamentable necessity.”34 Lincoln was also persuaded by Thomas’s report, and 
removed Fremont from command in late October. 
 Although the furor over Thomas’s report soon subsided, he was quickly caught up in 
another controversy that would have far more lasting implications. When Edwin Stanton 
replaced Simon Cameron as head of the War Department early in 1862, he seems to have taken 
an instant dislike to Thomas. The source of this friction, as well as its overall impact on the 
men’s subsequent command relationship, has been a subject of some controversy. For example, 
Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold Hyman, in their biography of Stanton, attributed the animosity 
to Stanton’s inherent distrust of regular army officers.35 More recently, Michael T. Meir has 
suggested the animosity “could have stemmed from the fact that Thomas was a Cameron 
appointee and as such did not have Stanton’s trust.”36 Yet an examination of newspaper articles 
from the time suggests a third reason behind the tense relationship: ongoing whispers about 
Thomas’s supposed disloyal activities.  
 By the time Stanton took command of the War Department on January 20th, rumors about 
Thomas’s loyalty had been circulating for weeks. Where and how the charges originated are not 
entirely clear, but in early January several newspapers reported—inaccurately as it turned out—
that Thomas had been charged “with correspondence, either directly or indirectly to the 
Confederates.”37 The Cincinnati Daily Press reported that the “alleged arrest of General Thomas 
and his family” had caused the “greatest excitement” in Washington before the allegations were 
discovered to be false.38 Ten days later, The New York Times was reporting that “serious charges 
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against [Thomas’s] character” had been alleged, though it did not specify the nature of the 
charges.39  Newspapers then began to report Thomas’s resignation as a fact, apparently assuming 
that Cameron’s impending departure also signaled the end of Thomas’s tenure as adjutant 
general.40  
No concrete evidence was ever produced against Thomas, and no official charges ever 
came of the allegations, but the whispers seem to have given Stanton reason to distrust his new 
subordinate. Years later, E.D. Townsend, a senior assistant in the Adjutant General’s Office 
recalled that Stanton “often sent for me individually” instead of communicating with Thomas 
directly, an arrangement that Townsend found “most uncertain and embarrassing.”41 In a 
transparent attempt to get Thomas out of Washington, Stanton continually dispatched him to 
points across the North to perform ceremonial duties for much of 1862. After about a year of this 
awkward and cumbersome arrangement, Thomas could not have been surprised when, on March 
25th 1863, Stanton curtly informed him that the “exigencies of the service” required the adjutant 
general to undertake an inspection tour “of the armies, military posts, and military operations of 
the West.”42  
Stanton’s order outlined several overall objectives and granted Thomas wide 
discretionary power. The adjutant general was directed to proceed immediately to Cairo, Illinois, 
where he was to make an examination of the post and the conditions of its contraband 
population.43 Thomas was to closely observe “the manner in which [blacks] are received, 
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provided for, and treated by military authorities.”44 He was further authorized to give orders that 
would provide for the contrabands’ “humane and proper treatment,” and do whatever was 
necessary “to enable them to support themselves and to furnish useful service to the 
government.”45 Finally, Thomas was to make comparable observations at places such as 
Columbus, Kentucky, Memphis, Tennessee, and any other Union command posts on his way to 
General Grant’s headquarters at Milliken’s Bend, Louisiana.46     
The main thrust of Thomas’s mission, however, was to emphasize to General Grant, his 
subordinate officers, and their enlisted men in the Mississippi River Valley “the importance 
attached by the Government to the use of the colored population emancipated by the President’s 
proclamation.”47 Thomas was to particularly stress that any officer who failed to properly carry 
out the new policy would not “be considered in discharge of his duties under the [Confiscation] 
acts of Congress, the President’s proclamation, and the orders of this Department.”48 Beyond 
this, Thomas was to determine which officers would be willing to command black soldiers, and 
set about actively recruiting and organizing regiments, keeping the War Department apprised of 
his progress.49   
Thomas’s first step was to explain the new federal emancipation policy to the Union 
Army rank and file. At each stop along his route, Thomas began by explaining that the 
Confederacy sent all their white males into the field, keeping their slaves behind to raise the 
crops that supported their armies.50 With this in mind, the Lincoln administration had now 
determined “to take from the rebels this source of supply—to take their negroes” and make them 
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send whites from the army back to cultivate their farms and plantations.51 Then, getting to the 
heart of the policy changes, Thomas would inform the troops that officials in Washington were 
“very much pained to hear” that the “appellations” of fugitives “for admission within our lines 
have been refused by our officers and soldiers.” Such actions were to cease immediately, and 
fugitives were now “to be encouraged to come to us. They are to be received with open arms; 
they are to be fed and clothed; they are to be armed.”52   
The policy of enticing and arming of blacks having been made “fully known,” Thomas 
outlined the specifics of his mission.53 The adjutant general had been sent by Washington “to 
raise as many regiments of blacks as I can” and was authorized to grant commissions to white 
officers “whose hearts are in [recruiting black soldiers]” regardless of their current rank.54 
Conversely, Thomas was also authorized “to dismiss from the army any man” whom he found 
mistreating freed-persons or otherwise disobeying the policy of the government.55 In a clear 
warning to any officer or enlisted man who was determined to resist the new policy, Thomas 
announced that he would dismiss these men as unworthy of service in the Union Army.56  
Thomas was empowered to implement these new policies “as if the President of the United 
States himself were present,” and had been directed to “refer nothing” to Washington.57 
Reporting to the War Department shortly after his arrival at Cairo on March 31st, Thomas 
wrote that he had “fully made known the policy of the government respecting the contrabands,” 
and that his speech at his first stop was “well received.”58 Indeed, Thomas would record 
enthusiastic responses to his speeches at every stop he would make on the Mississippi River that 
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spring. This was undoubtedly an exaggeration. Newspapers reported the full text of Thomas’s 
speeches, although the speech’s effectiveness and the reaction of the soldiers usually depended 
on the newspaper’s political orientation. The New York Tribune printed Thomas’s speech at 
Helena under the headline, “WHITE SOLDIERS APPROVE THE POLICY,” noting that 
Thomas’s remarks were “received with great satisfaction and applause.”59 In contrast, a 
correspondent for The Indiana State Sentinel who had witnessed a number of speeches by 
Thomas predicted the troops would “perhaps one day teach the Administration and its agents” 
that they “have not yet sunk so low that they are ready to be prostituted to whatever measures the 
Administration sees proper to propose.”60 For his part, Thomas only cared that the Union Army 
seemed to be accepting “the necessity of using the negroes in any way to crush the rebellion.”61 
Thomas’s first reports back to Washington also detailed the condition of the contraband 
population. He found a total of 1,530 refugees living in “indifferent and limited” barracks at 
Cairo, Illinois, and suffering from diseases such as smallpox, measles, and pneumonia.62 
Clothing, with the exception of several blankets, had been furnished by the Society of Friends, 
while meager rations had been distributed by the Subsistence Department.63 Although Thomas 
reported that a company capable of bearing arms could immediately be raised from the men, he 
noted that little thought seemed to have been given to how to usefully employ the rest of the 
contraband population. Recognizing that the contrabands could not remain at Cairo, where they 
would be both idle and ill, Thomas also believed he could not send them to the North or into the 
border states, where they would arouse existing “prejudice” or possibly “be reduced to 
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slavery.”64 For those who could work, Thomas proposed moving them to Island Number 10 on 
the Mississippi, where they could cultivate subsistence crops and cotton for the benefit of 
themselves and the Union Army.65 
Following his directive from Washington to secure their “humane” treatment and provide 
“useful service” to themselves and the government, Thomas began to devise a plan for the 
leasing of confiscated or abandoned plantations and the employment of the contrabands as free 
laborers.66 In doing so, Thomas underscored how military emancipation and the development of 
a free-labor system in the rebel South were inextricably woven together. In order to “secure the 
safety of commerce and navigation on the Mississippi River,” those males who could not be 
“induced” to serve in the Union Army—be it as soldiers, teamsters, or laborers—would, along 
with women and children, be “placed on abandoned plantations to till the ground.”67 Black 
regiments raised in the area would simultaneously “give protection” to the plantations, while also 
“act[ing] effectively” against Confederate guerillas in the area.68 This, in turn, would help ensure 
the uninterrupted flow of troops and supplies for the campaign against Vicksburg. Grant and his 
subordinates were reportedly “unanimous in their approval” of Thomas’s plan.69 
Thomas also hoped to simultaneously demonstrate “that the freed negro may be 
profitably employed by enterprising men.”70 To oversee the project, Thomas appointed a board 
of three men—George B. Fields, A.E. Strickle, and L.S. Livermore—to see that plantations were 
leased “to persons of proper character,” and to ensure that the “mutual obligations” between the 
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black workers and their employers would be “faithfully performed.”71 Black male workers were 
to be paid seven dollars a month, women five dollars a month, and children between 12-15 years 
of age half the wages of the adults.72 Families were to be kept together, and each worker was to 
be provided with clothing—although the cost was to be deducted from their wages.73 Under no 
circumstances were the workers to be “subjected to corporal punishment by lash” or any other 
“cruel and unusual modes.”74 Initially, with only a limited area safely under Union control, 
roughly forty plantations were leased along an approximately seventy-five-mile stretch of the 
river. Although military protection could not be guaranteed, commanders were ordered to render 
military assistance so long as it did not “do injury to the service.”75  
As he was developing his plan for plantation leasing, Thomas continued his tour of Union 
military posts to announce the new federal emancipation policy. Proceeding to Columbus, 
Kentucky, and then to Memphis, Tennessee, Thomas reported that his speeches were  “hailed 
with delight by the troops,” and that at Memphis he authorized Major General Stephen Hurlbut 
to recruit six companies of black artillerists from the contraband population within his lines and 
select their officers.76 Moving next to Helena, Arkansas, Thomas found his efforts “aided in 
every way” by General Benjamin Prentiss.77 After speaking before an audience of 7,000 troops at 
Helena, Thomas reported that “the policy respecting arming the blacks” had “infused new life 
into the troops, and they say now they see that the rebellion will be crushed.”78 In particular, 
Thomas credited General Prentiss and his subordinates for following his remarks with their own 
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“high commendations” of the policy, noting that reinforcement from the high ranking officers 
was important in ensuring the support of the enlisted men.79  
In Lake Providence, Louisiana on April 9th, Thomas spoke in the morning to General 
McArthur’s division and in the afternoon to General John A. Logan’s division of General James 
B. McPherson’s Army Corps, 11,000 men in total. Thomas again noted that the troops received 
the policy announcement with enthusiasm, but he reserved special praise for the “many speeches 
made by officers of different ranks, fully endorsing the policy.”80 He was particularly impressed 
by General Logan’s remarks, noting in his report to Stanton that Logan had not only heartily 
endorsed his remarks, “but went far beyond them, stating most emphatically that he would never 
return to his home…until this wicked rebellion shall be utterly crushed.”81 Thomas requested that 
each of these divisions raise two regiments of black soldiers, but optimistically predicted, “the 
difficulty will be to restrict [McArthur and Logan] to that number, for at least ten regiments can 
now be obtained.”82 Attending to the logistics of equipping the new troops, Thomas requested 
that 1,000 pairs of “negro shoes, of large sizes,” along with a requisition for the appropriate 
number of arms and clothing, be forwarded immediately to the Union supply depot at 
Memphis.83 
Following Thomas’s policy announcements, the new regiments were formed 
immediately. While at Helena, Thomas had reported that he “authorized one regiment [the 1st 
Arkansas Infantry] this morning, and at noon three companies of one hundred each were ready 
for muster.”84 By the time Thomas arrived at Grant’s headquarters at Milliken’s Bend on April 
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11th, the 8th, 9th, and 10th Regiments of Louisiana Volunteers of African Descent had all been 
formed and mustered into federal service.85 Thomas was insistent that officers for the new 
regiments be selected by an examining board “without regard for present rank” with “merit alone 
being the test.”86 Only those white officers who were firmly committed to implementing the 
recruiting and organizing of the new black regiments—or who desired promotion badly enough 
to commit to the cause—were acceptable.87 
As Thomas continued to proceed down the Mississippi, he found a generally receptive—
or at least officially compliant—audience within the Union high command. From Grant’s 
headquarters at Milliken’s Bend he wrote “the policy respecting the negroes having been 
adopted, commanding officers [here] are perfectly willing and ready to afford in carrying it out 
to a successful issue.”88 Indeed, Grant had already been informed by General-in-Chief Henry 
Halleck on March 31st that “it is the policy of the government to use the negroes of the South, as 
far as practicable, as a military force,” and that “every slave withdrawn from the enemy is 
equivalent to a white man put hors de combat.”89 Like Thomas, Halleck had heard that officers in 
Grant’s command “not only discourage the negroes from coming under our protection, but by ill-
treatment force them to return to their masters.” This, Halleck curtly informed Grant, was “not 
only bad policy in itself,” but was “directly opposed to the policy adopted by the government.”90 
In case Grant somehow missed the point, Halleck concluded by telling him that the opinions of 
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individual officers on the matter were irrelevant, as it was the duty of all officers and enlisted 
men to “cheerfully and honestly endeavor to carry out the measures so adopted.”91  
Thomas and Halleck need not have worried. Grant replied that the officers under his 
command were “so much of soldiers as to feel themselves under obligation to carry out a policy 
which they would not inaugurate in the same good faith and with the same zeal as if it were of 
their own choosing.”92 As Grant pointedly noted to Lincoln later that summer, he could be relied 
upon to “give [Thomas] all the aid in my power” and carry out “any policy ordered by proper 
authority to the best of my ability.”93 True to his word, Grant immediately began to send “forage 
parties” out to the east bank of the Mississippi River “to collect the blacks,” prompting Thomas 
to assure Secretary Stanton and General Halleck that “we shall obtain all [the recruits] that we 
require.”94 Thomas praised Grant’s efficiency and professionalism in implementing the new 
policy, informing Washington that Grant and his officers afforded him “every facility” in his 
efforts, and that he would have “no difficulty” in organizing as many as 20,000 black troops 
from the region.95   
On the other hand, Thomas’s assessment—barely two weeks into his mission—that “the 
prejudices in this army respecting the arming of negroes are rapidly dying out” was premature.96 
From the Department of the Gulf, Brigadier General Daniel Ullman reported that, with a few 
exceptions, all of the civil and military officials he had encountered in that department “seem to 
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be opposed (some bitterly) to the policy of the government in this matter.”97 Despite official 
policy and explicit orders to the contrary, Ullman bitterly noted, “many have endeavored to 
throw every obstacle in their power in my way.”98 One of those obstacles Ullman referred to was 
likely Brigadier General Charles P. Stone. Writing from Port Hudson, an irate Stone informed 
Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, commanding the Department of the Gulf, that another Union 
general, George Andrews, had just dispatched a small cavalry force to the opposite bank of the 
Mississippi “with orders to collect all the able-bodied black men and bring them here.”99 Stone 
regarded this move as militarily and politically unsound because the farmers in the area were 
well disposed towards the federal government, and their slaves were “contented and quiet.”100 
Stone feared that if the slaves were taken, it would “make hostile a region now friendly” while 
only securing a “few worthless soldiers” and their families.101 With either tremendous boldness 
or incredible stupidity, Stone confessed that, although he “did not feel at liberty” to countermand 
the orders to recruit black troops, “were I in command I should not hesitate to do so.”102  
 Thomas made it clear that he would tolerate no opposition to the new policy. A few 
weeks into his mission, Captain Thomas K. Barrett of the 90th Illinois was dishonorably 
dismissed from the service of the United States “for a highly insubordinate statement respecting 
the Adjutant-General of the Army” that had been published in The Chicago Times.103 Barrett had 
written that the regiment would refuse to endorse the new policy “because they would not basely 
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stultify themselves and renounce the honest convictions of their hearts.”104 After some men of 
the same regiment apparently “hissed” at Thomas as he announced the recruitment of blacks, the 
adjutant general had the officers arrested.105 Officer resignations also came quickly. Two 
members of the 53rd Indiana, Major Thomas McGrain, Jr. and Captain Seth Daily, both 
submitted their resignations shortly after hearing of General Thomas’s announcement of the 
emancipation policy.106 Likewise, Lieutenant Colonel O.M. Tennison of the 1st Kansas 
Volunteers also resigned because he objected to arming blacks, and all three men were 
immediately dismissed from the service.107 In an attempt to expedite the culling of disobedient 
officers, Thomas soon authorized some individual corps commanders to dismiss from the service 
any officer who tendered his resignation in protest of the recruitment of black soldiers.108   
The sheer amount of energy Thomas expended implementing the new federal policy 
made him physically sick. On April 15th he wrote to General Frederick Steele that, “on account 
illness,” he would not be able to visit his command in person.109 Not leaving anything to chance, 
Thomas reminded the general that “the policy now is, to encourage [blacks] to come within our 
lines, to arm and equip those who are fit for military service.”110 As at his other stops, Thomas 
made sure to note that those unfit for the army—women, children, and the elderly and infirm—
were to be housed for “agricultural purposes, on the plantations that the Government may 
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appropriate.”111 Once Thomas recovered his strength he proceeded on his mission, authorizing 
Granville Dodge, commanding the district of Corinth, Mississippi, to raise two or more black 
infantry regiments, along with companies of siege artillery to garrison forts.112  
As he was continuing this work, Thomas also made sure that the new black regiments 
were getting all the supplies they needed in a timely fashion. Section IV of Special Orders 
Number 22, issued in early May, stated that in order to “hasten the arming of troops of African 
descent” the arms, accouterments, and ammunition were to be issued directly to the regimental 
quartermasters, rather than at the division or brigade level.113 Thomas further sought to make 
sure the new troops received their uniforms in a timely fashion, writing to Secretary of War 
Stanton towards the end of May that he would personally “take the Clothing of the army for [the 
3rd Mississippi] regiment” as he made his way to Grand Gulf Mississippi to oversee its 
organization and mustering.114 
Once the enlistment policy had been explained, Thomas peppered generals throughout 
the Mississippi River Valley with advice and requests for updates on their recruiting efforts. To 
General Grant, he suggested “that you authorize the Recruiting Officers to enlist the negroes in 
the several regiments” that seemed to have “so many in excess as waiters and hangers-on.”115 
Indeed, Thomas’s correspondence with generals from May and June 1863 is littered with 
inquires about the progress and strength of the newly formed USCT regiments.116 In a reply that 
must have brought a smile to Thomas’s face, General Hurlbut responded to one such inquiry that 
he was currently raising “one Regiment at Columbus Kentucky, one of heavy artillery, twelve 
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hundred at Memphis, four at Corinth, Jackson, and on the rail road route to Memphis.”117 
Thomas quickly transmitted these reports directly back to the War Department. By the middle of 
May, Thomas eagerly reported to Stanton that he expected 5,000 more troops to be raised in the 
next two weeks alone. “A number of recruiting officers are with General Grant’s Army,” he 
informed Stanton “and I hope by the end of the month that all will be filled.”118  
Thomas quickly discovered, however, that Union Army movements “measurably 
retarded the filling of negro regiments.”119 In the same letter to Stanton reporting his expectation 
that he saw “nothing to prevent” the aim of raising twenty thousand black troops, Thomas also 
reported that he had to put on hold his original plan “to send armed parties across the 
[Mississippi] river and gather in the blacks.”120 Due to the manpower needs of Grant’s campaign 
against Vicksburg, “the force left in Louisiana is too small to do much in this way,” and 
recruiting officers had to be attached to Grant’s active campaign operations.121 Despite the 
difficulties, the process of recruiting illustrates the enforcement of the Emancipation 
Proclamation on the individual level, and reveals the ways that federal emancipation policy 
transformed individual soldiers and officers into agents of emancipation and the Union Army 
into an instrument of liberation. Thomas may have been the chief organizer of black troops, but 
his actions must be connected to the individuals who actually would fan out into the plantations 
and farms of the Mississippi River Valley seeking recruits for black regiments and helping to 
topple the institution of slavery in the process.122   
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For all the attention historians have devoted in recent decades to the importance of 
African American troops, we still know little about the process by which the Union Army 
actively enticed slaves off farms and plantations, or about its connections to federal emancipation 
policy. Primarily, it is a problem of source material. Official reports, correspondence, and 
regimental papers, while rich with detail about the formation of black regiments, do not always 
shed light on the individual interactions between recruiting agents, slaves, and plantation owners 
that characterized the process of emancipation at its most basic level. In particular, although 
official reports and correspondence usually mention the number of slaves brought back to Union 
lines by cavalry or recruiting expeditions, they had little space for detailing the conversations 
that took place. Letters and diaries can often shed more light on this process and are consulted in 
subsequent chapters, but many are scattered in archives across the country and as a consequence 
are beyond the scope of the chapter’s focus on Thomas. 
As historians Joseph Glatthaar and John David Smith have outlined, recruiting for black 
regiments took several forms. Thomas was empowered by the War Department to authorize a 
white officer to recruit a black regiment; these officers, in turn, promised an officer’s 
commission to white soldiers who assisted with recruiting duties. Once the required number of 
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new black recruits had been mustered in, the white soldiers who assisted in the recruiting process  
would be discharged from their former regiments and receive their new commissions. Other 
times, black soldiers and white officers could be organized into a recruiting party to fill out an 
existing regiment, or be attached on special assignment to cavalry regiments that were 
conducting raids into the countryside.123 Alternatively, as was the case with Major George 
Stearns and Colonel Reuben Mussey in Nashville, officers could be designated to set up a 
network of recruiting posts, with their activities coordinated by a central office.  
Fortunately, enough details about recruiting operations can be pieced together by using a 
combination of Official Reports, diaries of Confederates who lived in the area, the 
correspondence of Confederate generals, and a few carefully chosen recollections of officers and 
men who served in black regiments. In late June 1863, Lieutenant Colonel B.D. Meek, 
commanding the 4th Cavalry Brigade, set off on a “scouring” mission near Chulahoma, 
Mississippi for horses and mules. As the raiding party plowed through the Mississippi 
countryside, potential recruits flocked to Meek’s column; by the time the party returned to camp, 
ninety new recruits had been obtained.124 Other times, these expeditions came up empty. When 
Embury Osband was appointed Colonel of the 3rd US Colored Cavalry in October 1863, he was 
directed by Major General James B. McPherson to fill his regiment by recruiting from enemy 
plantations in between Skipwith’s Landing and Tallulah Courthouse, Mississippi125 Osband, 
however, “obtained no recruits” during his four day expedition, likely because seven hundred 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 63-64, 72-75; Bob Luke and John David Smith, Soldiering For Freedom: How the 
Union Army Recruited, Trained, and Deployed the U.S. Colored Troops (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2014), pgs. 27-49. 
124 Report of Lieut. Col. Basil D. Meek, Eleventh Illinois Cavalry, commanding the Fourth Cavalry Brigade, June 
25th, 1863. OR, 1:24:2:498. For another example see RJ Ogelsby to Hurlbut, June 10th, 1863. OR 1:24:3:400 
125 Major General U.S. Grant to Major General James B McPherson, October 10th, 1863. OR 1: 30: 4, 233.  
	   57	  
Confederate cavalry had moved through the same area just days before, running slaves off into 
the interior of the state and preventing them from enlisting in the Union Army.126   
As Osband’s report highlights, black recruits and their families faced a constant threat of 
violence and re-enslavement at the hands of Confederate cavalry and guerillas. In early May, 
Brigadier General Hugh T. Reid reported to Major General James B. McPherson that roughly 
eighty enemy raiders had attacked near Lake Providence, and “carried away between 15-20 
negroes.”127  A month later, Confederate General Hugh McCullough reported that he had sent 
out a raiding party near Milliken’s Bend for the express purpose of capturing black soldiers who 
had been firing on Confederate troops from houses in the area. McCullough happily reported that 
his raid had resulted in the “capture of 19 negroes,” all of whom had been found near the houses 
in question.128  
Although it is virtually impossible to quantify the ratio of enslaved men who entered the 
Union ranks versus those who—preferring to remain with their families—were pressed into 
service against their will, there is no question Union recruiters sometimes used less-than-savory 
tactics. Robert Cowden, who would later command the 59th USCT, described the questionable 
methods used to recruit in the Mississippi Valley:  
The plan for ‘persuading’ recruits while it could hardly be called the shot-gun policy was 
equally as convincing and never failed to get the ‘recruit.’ The negroes were held as 
property by their masters and were appropriated as such, along with mules and horses, 
which were put in the same list and confiscated as a ‘military necessity.129  
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Apparently, these recruiting agents, “mounted on whatever they could pick up,” succeeded in 
filling up Cowden’s regiment in a little over a month.130 Similarly, Lieutenant David Cornwell of 
the 9th Louisiana, having been less successful in recruiting black men as he had hoped, hit upon 
the idea of promoting one of his new recruits to sergeant and taking him to visit neighboring 
plantations.131 In a four-day excursion, Cornwell and Sergeant Jack Johnson gathered sixty new 
recruits for the regiment.132 
Larger expeditions obviously had the capacity to “gather up” higher numbers of slaves. 
The correspondence between Grant and his subordinate generals in the region during the summer 
of 1863 contains a variety of instructions to carry out the active enticement policy that Thomas 
had spelled out. For example, when Major General Francis Herron made an expedition to Yazoo 
City, Mississippi in mid-July, Grant instructed him to “bring all the negro men that you can.”133 
Although official reports for the Yazoo expedition are silent on the matter of recruiting, Grant 
later expressed satisfaction that “General Herron’s trip to Yazoo City gave us a great many 
recruits.”134 Similarly, when General Ransom made an expedition to Natchez, Mississippi around 
the same time, Grant briskly informed Halleck that the excursion “has given and will give 
several thousand [black troops].”135 The New York Times reported that Ransom’s expedition was 
bringing “great numbers of freed Africans” into Union lines, and “able bodied males are at once 
put in the African regiments.”136 About a month later, when Grant sent one expedition from 
Natchez to Harrisonburg and another from Goodrich Landing to Monroe, he informed Lincoln 
that he had “ordered recruiting officers to accompany these expeditions,” and subsequently sent a 
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cavalry brigade to Vicksburg so that he could “move troops a greater distance into the interior 
and facilitate materially the recruiting service.”137  
Recruiting agents attached to larger expeditions sometimes recorded phenomenal—
almost unbelievable—success. Colonel Ruben Mussey reported that one unnamed agent, who 
accompanied General W. Sooy Smith’s expedition into Northwest Mississippi as part of General 
Sherman’s operations against Meridian in 1864, “brought back about 800 men, who were put 
into regiments in Memphis.”138 Impressive as these numbers might seem for a single recruiter, 
Sherman’s official reports for these operations recorded that the number of former slaves brought 
back by his military operations alone numbered well into the thousands.139 Similarly, Mussey 
reported that recruiting operations for the 17th USCT, which took place in Northern Alabama and 
parts of Georgia, brought back three hundred recruits from a region he referred to as “the 
pocket.”140  
Accounts of Southern plantation and farm owners offer some of the best glimpses into 
both the process of recruiting off the plantations, and the challenges faced by Thomas and his 
recruiters faced. Alfred Quine, overseer of Fonsylvania Plantation near Vicksburg, recorded what 
happened when General Grant’s forces occupied the area in the spring of 1863. In early May, 
several weeks before the Union forces actually arrived in the immediate area of the plantation, 
reports of their approach caused “grate excitement” among the slaves, though work proceeded 
largely as normal.141 When Union forces finally arrived on the plantation on May 25th, Quine 
witnessed firsthand the process of emancipation: “All hands went to work and worked up to 12 
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o’clock,” at which point “the Yankees came and set the Negroes all free and the work all 
stopped.”142 Over the next week, Quine reported “2 to 5 Yankees here every day” taking slaves, 
corn, wagons, and oxen back to Union lines.143  
Other Confederate plantations in the area reported an almost identical process. In her 
diary, Brockburn, Kate Stone reported that two Yankee soldiers stopped at the plantation of her 
neighbor, Mrs. Hardison, and had “a long talk with her negroes.”144 The result was that “six of 
the men with their children and families walked off in broad daylight,” following an altercation 
where the slaves “used the most abusive language” towards Mrs. Hardison.145 The next day, 
Stone reported that “the Negroes on Mrs. Stevens’s, Mr. Conley’s, Mr. Caitlin’s, and Mr. Evan’s 
places ran off to camp and returned with squads of soldiers” to help free the rest and make off 
with other materials.146 Relocating with her family to Monroe, Louisiana, Stone later recounted 
that armed Yankees and black soldiers had returned to the Hardisons’s home and departed 
“carrying with them every Negro on the place.”147  
Correspondence between Confederate generals in the region further highlighted the 
connection between the implementation of emancipation policy and the destruction of slavery. 
General Edmund Kirby Smith, commanding at Shreveport, Louisiana, reported during the 
summer of 1863 that the recruiting and organizing of black regiments was “being pushed to 
formidable proportions.”148 In words that perfectly described what Lorenzo Thomas was aiming 
to accomplish, Smith warned fellow General Sterling Price, “our plantations are made [the Union 
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Army’s] recruiting stations, and unless some formidable check can be devised, a strong and 
powerful force will be formed which will receive large additions as he advances on our 
territory.”149 In response, Confederate generals such as Smith and Richard Taylor subsequently 
issued instructions for subordinates to “render every such assistance to planters removing their 
negroes” away from areas where they “were at all liable to fall into the hands of the Enemy.” By 
October 1863, General Joseph E. Johnston, then commanding the Confederate Department of the 
West, ordered Brigadier General Benjamin Chalmers, commanding Confederate cavalry in North 
Mississippi to send all the black males within his area of operations to Meridian, Mississippi, to 
work on Confederate fortifications.150 According to Johnston’s adjutant, the main reason for the 
order was that “every negro fit to be made a soldier of is put by the enemy into his ranks.” 151 
 As the process of Union recruiting was kicking into high gear, Thomas fell seriously ill 
and was forced to return to Washington. Although he tried to keep up with his correspondence 
during this period—he was especially gratified to hear about the bravery of black soldiers at 
Milliken’s Bend—he would not be healthy enough to return to the region in person until early 
August. While recuperating, Thomas received word of Vicksburg’s surrender on July 4th and 
immediately began looking forward to the potential of Union advances into the interiors of 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas to “collect as many blacks as possible.”152 In particular, 
Thomas had high expectations for a proposed Union invasion of Arkansas under General 
Frederick Steele. In early August, as Steele was making the final preparations for his advance 
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from Helena, Thomas arrived at Memphis on his return trip west. Making sure to catch the 
general before he departed, Thomas “had him instructed to bring back all the blacks he could 
possibly gather,” confidently predicting to Stanton that “the contemplated movements in 
Arkansas will give us a large numbers of negroes.”153 However, while recruiters attached to 
Steele’s expedition succeeded in securing enough blacks to fill out one black regiment, this 
evidentially did not meet Thomas’s expectations of a “large number” of black recruits; the 
adjutant general was frustrated by reports of “destitute” recruits who “suffered much from 
inclement weather,” a lack of proper uniforms, and timely medical care.154  
Thomas’s frustration with Steele’s Arkansas expedition proved to be a harbinger of 
things to come. Upon returning to the Mississippi River Valley later in the summer, Thomas was 
“disappointed at finding so few negroes” because they had all been absorbed as plantation 
laborers or “taken to fill up regiments previously organized.”155 Even the regiments now in the 
process of formation were being delayed “for want of non-commissioned officers,” something 
that caused Thomas “great embarrassment” to report back to Washington.156 By the end of 
August, an unusually pessimistic Thomas wrote to Washington, “this month closes, with 
seemingly little done in the organization of blacks.”157 Although he promised he “had not been 
idle” and that new recruits had in large part been used to replace battle losses from older 
regiments, Thomas admitted that recruiting was now more difficult.158 Blacks had been “driven 
back” away from Union lines by their masters, and the only way to “get at them” was to send 
larger expeditions into the interior.159 
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Thomas was also greatly chagrined to discover that many black refugees had been 
allowed “to remain in many instances in a state of almost inactivity” within Union lines.160 The 
adjutant general considered this state of affairs not only “injurious to the interests of the service,” 
but also fostering “habits of idleness, sickness, and disease” among blacks.161 Perhaps most 
distressing was the situation Thomas discovered at Lake Providence in late August. Roughly 
1,000 black refugees, almost all of them women and children, were found “in a most helpless 
condition” on the banks of the Mississippi.162 As it turned out, when federal troops had left the 
area to participate in the movements against Vicksburg, this group had left their plantations. 
Apparently, the group had repelled an attack of Confederate guerillas with the aid of a Union 
gunboat, “but expected another attack” at any moment.163 Thomas moved all the refugees under 
the protection of black regiments stationed at Goodrich’s Landing, Louisiana but found himself 
at a loss for what to do about this “helpless class” whose presence in multiple federal outposts 
was constantly increasing.164 In an attempt to solve the problem, he recommended that the “old 
men, women, and children should be advised to remain on the plantations,” especially those on 
land within Union lines.165 
The staggering number of black refugees posed a logistical problems for Thomas and 
many Union commanders in the Western Theater. Simply put, the Union Army lacked the 
adequate supplies and facilities needed to care for the hundreds of thousands of refugees who 
sought protection within their lines. During the spring of 1863 alone, John Eaton, Jr. appointed 
“Superintendent of Contrabands for the Department of the Tennessee” by Grant, reported that 
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there were 3,700 former slaves at Corinth; 1,700 at Grand Junction; 5,000 at Cairo; and 2,400 at 
Lake Providence.166 The drive towards, and subsequent fall of, Vicksburg sent these numbers 
skyrocketing as thousands more refugees streamed towards Union lines and stretched already 
taxed resources. By late fall Samuel Shipley, making a tour of the camps on behalf of the Friends 
Association of Philadelphia, estimated the number of refugees under federal care in the 
Mississippi River Valley to be close to 50,000.167  
  In addition to facilitating the uninterrupted flow of military supplies down the 
Mississippi, Thomas’s plantation-leasing system was in part designed to help alleviate the 
refugee problem. He envisioned the role of contraband camps as “temporary expedients,” 
supplying manpower to both the army and plantations while avoiding the supposed inactivity 
that Thomas believed came “from being congregated in large numbers” in the camps.168 By the 
late summer of 1863,  “after much reflection and consultation with officers,” Thomas concluded 
that all such persons who could not serve as soldiers should remain on plantations where they 
had formerly been slaves, “especially those within our lines, where we can have oversight of 
them.”169 Those from plantations outside the Union lines would also be encouraged to return “in 
cases where we are satisfied their former masters will not run them off or sell them.”170 
Somewhat naively, Thomas became convinced after having “conversed with a number of 
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planters” around Natchez that many of them would be “perfectly willing to hire negroes and 
adopt any policy that the government may direct.”171   
 Despite Thomas’s continued optimism, warning signs about problems with the 
plantation-leasing system had been slowly emerging all summer. As early as July, General Grant 
had warned Thomas that George B. Field and Lark S. Livermore, two of the three commissioners 
that he had appointed to superintend the plantation system “were doing a great deal of harm.”172 
According to Grant, “the limitations of a private letter” would not suffice “to describe their 
character, selfishness misrepresentations, and impracticable characteristics for doing good to any 
cause.”173 Even when the two problematic commissioners were replaced, one Union general 
nicknamed them “the Adventurer, the Gambler, and the Projector,” and declared they were only 
interested “in making rules and decisions against [the black workers’] interests, cotton closes 
their eyes to justice just as it did in the case of the former slave masters.”174   
Some of the lessees had also come under intense scrutiny for their treatment of black 
workers. In October, Major Julian Bryant, inspecting the plantations controlled by government 
lessees in the area surrounding Goodrich’s Landing, reported that “in no case have I found a 
strict compliance with the terms of their contracts on the part of the Lessees of plantations.”175 In 
many cases, he had discovered “an utter disregard of even the commonest principles of humanity 
and the rights of individuals, in their treatment of the contrabands.176 These workers were treated 
as “mere brute[s],” Bryant concluded, as the lessees were simply focused on extracting “the 
greatest amount of labor at the least possible expense.”177 While Bryant found several plantations 
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where the care of the workers was considered adequate, the vast majority were characterized by 
inadequate rations, “totally neglected” or “very filthy” living quarters, and contracts that had 
been ignored by the lessees.178  
General John P. Hawkins, Commander of the District of Northeastern Louisiana, further 
elaborated on the problems Bryant identified. Hawkins wrote to abolitionist Gerrit Smith that 
while the workers were hired at the established rate of seven dollars per month, “the time is 
counted, twenty six working days to the month and every day deducted that the negro does not 
work either on account of sickness or weather.”179 The end result was that, “instead of working 
by the month,” as they had been led to believe, the black laborers were working “by the day for 
the merest pittance.”180 In Hawkins’s estimation, lessees “generally were adventurers [and] 
hangers on of the Army” who “cared nothing how much flesh they worked off of the negro 
provided in was converted into good cotton.”181 Hawkins’s recommendations for fixing the 
system were unambiguous and sweeping: he wanted to abolish the commissioners, annul their 
contracts, and “make the labor of the negro so much in demand that he will be treated as a human 
being.”182  
 Perhaps the most damning reports were James Yeatman’s Report on the Condition of the 
Freedmen and Suggestions of a Plan of Organization for Freed Labor, both published in 1864. 
Yeatman had toured the Mississippi River Valley on behalf of the Western Sanitary Commission 
during the fall of 1863 and was generally appalled by both the attitudes of the lessees and the 
conditions endured by the workers. With a few exceptions, Yeatman fumed, “the parties leasing 
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plantations and employing these negroes do it from no motives either of loyalty or humanity.”183 
Having interviewed many workers, Yeatman found that “none showed the least unwillingness to 
work,” but “if they were only paid their little wages as they can earn them, so that they could 
purchase clothing, and were furnished with the provisions promised they could stand it.”184 
However, despite all of this, following a brief meeting with Thomas to present his findings, he 
had a favorable impression of the adjutant general’s dedication to his mission. 
 Other aid workers were less critical. The Reverends G.E. Hail and E. Sails—who also 
worked for the Western Sanitary Commission—announced in a circular for the 1864 
“Freedmen’s and Union Refugees in the Mississippi River Valley Sanitary Fair” that the “overall 
policy of the Government in the treatment of these people is humane.”185 Hail and Saile 
reminded everyone that the officers were responsible for running an “extensive system” of free 
labor plantations in the midst of a war zone, and cautioned readers that they should not expect 
“that these arrangements can be worked so perfectly that there will not be much suffering and 
destitution” amongst the freed-persons.186 Hail and Sails did not gloss over accounts of the freed 
persons suffering—they acknowledged that “very large numbers of women and children are left 
without adequate provisions”—but called on patriotic and benevolent northerners to pick up the 
slack.187 The message was clear: despite Thomas’s efforts, the Union Army simply did not have 
the capacity to provide for all refugees, and private charity was needed to help fill the gaps. 
 Likely in response to conflicting reports flowing out of the region, Thomas wrote a 
summary of his own efforts “to ascertain the condition of the leased plantations” to Stanton on 
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October 15th.188 Thomas observed that the lessees and freedmen had “labored under great 
disadvantages,” most notably the fact that the system had only begun to be implemented  “fully 
two months from the time the cotton should have been planted.”189 The resulting process of 
playing catch-up had placed a great strain on both the workers and the lessees. Furthermore, the 
shifting of troops in relation to the Vicksburg campaign had left the plantations “without 
adequate protection” and, as a result, Confederate raiders had succeeded in “scattering and 
driving off” the black workers.190 With an emphasis that Yeatman would have identified as part 
of the problem, Thomas reported that, despite the difficulties, “not one of the leases will lose 
money, all will profit.”  As for the freedmen, Thomas protested that they had all been paid 
according to a wage scale established by the Board of Commissary and were “more abundantly 
fed than they were when they were held in slavery.”191  Reminding Stanton of the plantation 
system’s function in Union military operations, Thomas concluded his letter by observing, 
“while transports on the river have been fired into by the Rebels, not a single shot has been fired 
from the line of the river covered by leased plantations.”192 This was true for seventy-five miles 
above Vicksburg, and demonstrated “the importance of lining the river with a loyal 
population.”193 
 To ascertain the true conditions of the freedmen both on the plantations and in the 
contraband camps, as well as to report on recruiting in general, Stanton sent Brigadier General 
James S. Wadsworth to the region in early November. “The policy of the Government as I 
understand it,” Wadsworth wrote, was to “establish in the rebellious Districts & especially to line 
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the banks of the Mississippi with a loyal population” that recognizes the “right as well as the 
efficacy of the Emancipation Proclamation.”194 Wadsworth found that at least this much had 
been accomplished, and that General Thomas had exhibited “discretion and integrity” in the 
discharge of his duties.195 In words that were a virtual echo of Thomas’s October 15th report, 
Wadsworth wrote that the “means of the Lessees were limited,” and that “several of the leased 
Plantations were overrun by the enemy in the midst of” planting season.196 Much of the suffering 
endured by the freedmen was due to the “heartless course pursued by large Slave holders” who 
had fled the region with their most valuable workers, thus “leaving on the Plantations the 
women, children, aged and infirm without food, clothing or other supplies.”197 Although 
Wadsworth recognized the “many discouragements & disappointments” in the payment of wages 
and the procurement of food and medical supplies, he concluded that the plantation lease system 
still “has been practically successful.”198  
Wadsworth later testified before the American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission that his 
report on the lease conditions in the Mississippi Valley was “apologetic” and deliberately crafted 
to “put the best face upon this matter.”199 According to Wadsworth’s testimony, the reason for 
his subterfuge was political. Had he issued a negative report, “opponents of the system” would 
have held up his criticisms of the plantation-lease system as “the natural fruits of emancipation” 
and the “inevitable consequence” of black freedom.200 Within the confines of his testimony to 
the AFIC, Wadsworth was more candid. The lessees “had generally tried to do their duty,” 
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Wadsworth believed, but two of the three commissioners “were not fit men,” for which he 
recommended their immediate removal.201 Wadsworth also admitted that he had “very severe” 
conversations with superintendents of several contraband camps and plantation lessees about the 
conditions he had found, and explained that he did not include them in his initial report because  
“it would only be to put ammunition in the hands of the copperheads.”202 Despite the political 
maneuvering, Wadsworth’s testimony still commended Thomas’s efforts and reaffirmed his 
assessment that the system inherently faced great difficulties in being “imperfectly commenced, 
in the midst of fighting and war.”203    
Wadsworth was more critical of the USCT in general.204 The New York native found 
that, due to their prejudices against black soldiers, many of the initially commissioned white 
officers were “placed in positions they were not capable of performing.”205 The problem had 
partly been corrected because the “prejudice has now mainly disappeared,” but many 
“inefficient” officers still held USCT commissions.206 Wadsworth also found that the black 
troops stationed at posts in the Mississippi Valley were generally well disciplined, but lacked 
adequate instruction in drill, a deficit he attributed to both the quality of the officers and the 
“great portion of time” the soldiers spent on garrison and fatigue duty.207 Overall, Wadsworth 
pronounced the sanitary conditions of the men and their camps to be in good condition, and 
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predicted a “great improvement in their character as soldiers” as soon as they were given 
adequate time and instruction for drill.208  
An additional problem that Wadsworth commented on extensively was the declining 
number of recruits. Although recruiting officers for the USCT were stationed at “all the military 
posts” along the Mississippi, the Union Army was still obtaining an insufficient number of 
enlistments.209 The reasons for this were twofold: Thomas had stressed repeatedly to Washington 
since the summer, many of the able bodied males had “been run off by their masters to Georgia, 
Alabama, or Texas” in order to keep them away from the Union armies.210 This problem was 
compounded by the fact that the Quartermaster Department, Commissary Department, and 
Department of Engineers all employed a sizable number black men, and the needs of these 
departments rendered it “not advisable” to impress them into the service.211 To help address the 
problem, Wadsworth recommended that the considerable number of men who were “employed 
as servants by the officers in [the Mississippi Valley] or who in some way have become camp 
followers” be put into military service.212 Doing so, Wadsworth concluded, would add more 
soldiers to the ranks of black regiments than would otherwise be possible.213   
Despite the shortage of recruits, by the time Thomas submitted his year-end report for 
1863 the day before Christmas, the number of black men he had recruited and organized into 
USCT regiments was staggering. In approximately nine months, he had added 20,830 black 
soldiers to the Union muster rolls from the Mississippi Valley; about 15,500 of those were in 
infantry regiments.214 Thomas estimated that about 5,000 men had died of disease, been 
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captured, “or lost to the service by other casualties,” while an unspecified number had been lost 
to desertion.215 In Thomas’s estimation, the newly-recruited black soldiers had demonstrated an 
aptitude for military service and were generally satisfied with their positions in the Union 
Army.216 Although Thomas once again reminded Stanton of the “great difficulties” he 
encountered because “the rebels have run off the slaves,” he anticipated that as the armies 
advanced in the coming year, “the number of our colored organizations will be largely 
increased.”217   
Early 1864 saw Thomas stop in Kentucky on his way to Nashville to evaluate recruiting 
efforts in middle and eastern Tennessee.218 As will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter, 
Thomas found that recruiting operations in Kentucky bore several broad similarities to those in 
the Mississippi River Valley. Both recruiters and recruits in Kentucky faced widespread 
reactionary violence, forcing Thomas to send  “large detachments” of soldiers “through the 
several counties to give protection to those who desire to leave their home and join the army.”219 
Much like the Mississippi River Valley, Thomas found these cavalry detachments necessary to 
“penetrate the interior” because they “abound[ed] with Southern sympathizers who adopt every 
means possible to prevent the negroes from proceeding to the camps of reception” or reach 
recruiting stations.220 Also like in the Mississippi River Valley, black troops in Kentucky proved 
to play a central role in the recruiting process. According to Thomas, “seeing the protection 
afforded them,” blacks would “in numbers, attach themselves to these bodies of troops.”221  
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In his memoirs, General Augustus Chetlain, who briefly assisted with recruiting black 
troops in Kentucky, recalled that “fully equipped” companies of black troops would “be sent to a 
certain section of the state, with orders to bring in all colored men found of suitable age and of 
apparent good health and physique.”222 One such regiment that was initially organized for this 
purpose was the 5th Colored Cavalry, which Thomas saw at Lexington. This regiment had been 
one of two USSC regiments that Thomas wanted organized specifically because cavalry 
regiments would “greatly aid recruiting and act most efficiently against guerillas.”223 By the 
middle of September, Thomas proudly reported that “fourteen thousand colored men, including 
one thousand Kentucky negroes recruited in Evansville [Indiana]” had been mustered into Union 
service, and that “we now average one hundred to two hundred recruits per day.”224  
 Although recruiting in Kentucky occupied much of Thomas’s attention during the 
summer of 1864, he continued to follow events in the Mississippi River Valley. Specifically, 
Thomas was concerned about a law passed in July 1864 that allowed Northern states to send 
civilian recruiting agents to go into the disloyal states to recruit slaves and fill draft quotas. 
Thomas had several objections to the use of these Northern state agents. He correctly pointed out 
that the enlistment of black soldiers could “only be made in the presence of troops” either by 
their escaping to Union lines or by sending “a military force into the interior and collect 
them.”225 These Northern agents could do “nothing of themselves,” and any agent other than a 
military officer was consequently useless.226 Thomas believed that all other such agents would 
only get in the way, and that the military commanders “will be averse to lending them their aid in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Augustus L. Chetlain, Recollections of Seventy Years (Galena, Illinois: Gazette Publishing Company, 1899), 104, 
accessed April 23rd, 2015, https://archive.org/stream/recollectionsof00chet#page/104/mode/2up . 
223 Thomas to Col. E.D. Townsend, September 19th, 1864, LS, AGT, RG 94 NARA. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Thomas to Stanton, September 5th, 1864, LS-AGT, RG 94 NARA. 
226 Ibid. 
	   74	  
cases where authorized recruiting officers are on hand to do the work.”227 Thomas was right on 
the mark; generals including Sherman and Grant frequently complained that these northern 
recruiting officers were nuisances.228  
 The state agents not only got in the way, but some proved to be brazenly corrupt and 
indifferent towards their recruits. While visiting Natchez to inspect the progress of the 
organization of black regiments and the plantation leasing system, Thomas heard stories about 
the nefarious practices of these state agents. One unnamed colonel of a black regiment reported 
that state agents, by offering a large bounty to his men, were enticing them to desert, “procuring 
citizens clothing, and secreting themselves until an opportunity appears for escaping from the 
place, for the purpose of enlisting.”229 The colonel added that the problem was increasingly 
widespread across the rest of the regiments in the area, and that the bounties the new recruits 
secured caused further dissension amongst the veterans.230 From Vicksburg, one general reported 
to Thomas “diseased men, entirely unfitted for the service, were taken and passed by the 
Examining Surgeon.”231 In Thomas’s view, “the service is being decidedly injured by the 
speculations of these Agents,” and he subsequently recommended to Stanton that they “be 
directed to cease recruiting.”232 Despite Thomas’s objections—and those of other Union 
generals—the state agents activities would continue for the rest of the war, as a way for Northern 
states to address the political-military problem of quota shortfalls. 
 Thomas’s exposé of the state agents came in the midst of a two-week-long inspection 
tour of the Mississippi in mid-September. Mirroring his initial trip sixteen months earlier, 
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Thomas made stops at several Union commands as he descended the river. Inspecting General 
Canby’s position in Southern Louisiana, Thomas reported that, with Union forces “having gained 
a foothold in the mainland of Southern Alabama,” more blacks “would steadily come into our 
lines,” and thus enabling Canby to reinforce the strength of existing regiments.233 At Natchez and 
Vidalia, Thomas found the black troops to be in fine condition, while expeditions into the 
interior were expected to be sufficient to fill up existing black regiments.234 At Davis Bend, 
Louisiana, black farmers were protected by eight companies of a black regiment and would soon 
“be self-sufficient.”235 On the banks of the Mississippi above Vicksburg, black regiments gave 
protection for the “line of settlement on the river, Goodrich’s Landing, and Milliken’s Bend.” 236 
Two regiments of the USCI, a battery of the USCHA, and white troops garrisoned Helena. The 
“energetic” commander of the garrison, Colonel Crooks, would shortly “make excursions into 
the country to gather colored recruits to fill the regiments.”237 At Memphis, General Washburne 
was organizing an expedition to “move rapidly in the direction of Montgomery and Selma, 
Alabama” that, in addition to tearing up railroads and freeing Union prisoners of war, would 
“necessarily gather a large number of negroes, and thus be enabled to fill up the diminished 
ranks of the regiments within his district.”238 By early November, Thomas reported that the 
Union Army had 56,320 black troops stationed at points along the Mississippi River, and this 
was specifically excluding Tennessee, North Georgia, and most of Louisiana.239  More troops 
could have been put in the field, Thomas claimed, but for the “pressing demands” of several 
other departments in the Mississippi Valley, and for “laborers with the troops operating in the 
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field.”240 Perhaps most proudly, Thomas observed that “the prejudice in the Army against [black] 
employment as troops, was very great; but now, since their fighting qualities have been fully 
shone by the blacks, it has greatly changed.”241  
 Returning to Louisville, Kentucky, Thomas continued to deal with all matters large and 
small related to the recruiting of black troops. In early January, Thomas received reports that 
wounded USCI troops in Hospital 16 in Tennessee were being neglected.242 Visiting the 
installation, Thomas was appalled at the conditions. The building on the whole was “unsuitable,”  
more to the point the beds of soldiers with amputations had not been changed in almost a month, 
while the men complained that “everything was saturated with blood” and others were being 
eaten alive by lice.243 “Had these men been white soldiers, do you think there would have been 
these conditions?” Thomas asked rhetorically “No! and yet the blacks fell side by side of the 
whites.”244 Immediately taking steps to rectify the situation, Thomas notified the chief 
quartermaster at Nashville that it was “highly important” that the “wounded colored soldiers in 
hospital no. 16 should be moved to hospital 6 as early as possible.”245 Thomas “requested” that 
two wards occupied by quartermaster workers be “at once vacated” so that “all the wards will be 
accessible for their legitimate purposes.” 246Several days later, Thomas visited the transferred 
soldiers and was “much pleased” with the improvements in their accommodations.247  
 The situation at Hospital 16 was one of the last crises that required Thomas’s 
immediate attention. By early spring of 1865, the recruitment of black troops in the Mississippi 
Valley, Kentucky, and everywhere else was starting to wind down. On the night of April 2nd 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Ibid. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Thomas to Col. R.I. Wood, January 16th, 1865, LS-AGT, RG 94 NARA. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Thomas to Brig. Gen. J.L. Donaldson, January 16th, 1865, LS-AGT, RG 94 NARA. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Thomas to Wood, January 16th, 1865. LS-AGT, RG 94 NARA.	  
	   77	  
1865, the Confederate government abandoned its capital in Richmond, and USCT troops were 
some of the first to march into the city. One week later, General Robert E. Lee surrendered the 
Army of Northern Virginia, the Confederacy’s most important field army, to General Grant at 
Appomattox. Thomas would not be present in Washington for the Grand Review of the Armies 
in May 1865, but one wonders what his reaction was when he was informed that the War 
Department invited no USCT regiments to participate. 
 Thomas’s “Final Report,” written in October 1865, was an impressive catalogue of the 
adjutant general’s accomplishments. Despite the “sudden” nature of his assignment, Thomas 
ultimately oversaw the recruitment of four black cavalry regiments, nine batteries of light 
artillery, eight batteries of heavy artillery, and a whopping fifty-seven infantry regiments. All 
told, 77,720 black soldiers, or roughly 43 percent of the total number of African Americans who 
served in the Union Army were recruited and enlisted as consequence of Thomas’s  “operations 
in the West and Southwest.”248 Indeed, Thomas’s presence in the Mississippi River Valley was 
the physical manifestation of federal emancipation policy. On his arrival, Thomas found that 
policy regarding blacks was haphazard and wildly inconsistent. Some commanders received 
them “gladly,” others “indifferently,” while in numerous cases black soldiers “were refused 
admission within our lines and driven off.”249 The adjutant general may have exaggerated by 
claiming that, as soon as he “announced by [the Secretary of War’s] authority the views of the 
President and yourself” the new policy respecting the transition to active enticement enlistment 
of black troops, all opposition “ceased,” but not by much.250 As soon as Thomas announced the 
policy, individual commanders took steps to implement the active recruitment and enlistment of 
black men either already within their lines, or to entice them off the farms and plantations of 
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disloyal persons. Thomas was the critical link between the federal emancipation policy issued 
from Washington and its implementation on the ground in the rebel South. That implementation 
is part of one of the most remarkable stories of the Civil War: individual Union soldiers, white 
and black, responding to the policy directives coming from Washington (through Thomas) and 
recruiting slaves from farms and plantations. In the Mississippi River Valley, the process of 
“gathering up the blacks,” as Thomas called it, disproves once and for all the remarkably 
persistent notion that the Emancipation Proclamation “did not free any slaves.”    
 Thomas’s “Final Report” also discussed his recruiting activities in Kentucky, but not in 
the same manner as he discussed those in Mississippi River Valley. For one thing, he devoted 
substantially less narrative space to his activities in Kentucky, skipping over large periods of 
time and simply omitting the activities of some recruiting depots entirely. 251 When compared 
with his description of events in the Mississippi River Valley—which specified the exact dates of 
inspections and speeches at numerous command posts—one senses the frustration Thomas felt 
with the recalcitrance of Governor Bramlette and the white Kentuckians. Yet the conclusion that 
Thomas was simply not as effective an agent of emancipation in Kentucky as he was in the 
Mississippi River Valley is not wholly satisfying. Thomas’s efforts were undoubtedly limited by 
the numerous complications that arose due to slavery’s continued legality in the state, but in 
superintending the recruitment and protection of slave volunteers in Kentucky, Thomas’s actions 
still played a central role in eliminating slavery in the state. 
If Kentucky did not receive as much attention in his “Final Report” as it should have, 
another matter was entirely absent: the plantation-lease system. On the one hand, this is perhaps 
unsurprising in light of the controversy that plantation-leasing generated on the ground in the 
Mississippi Valley, in Washington, and in the Northern press. On the other hand, it would have 
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been instructive to hear his reflections (or at least his summary) on the matter as the nation 
transitioned into Reconstruction. Certainly Thomas deserved credit for attempting to implement 
a system that would benefit Union military strategy, the former slaves, and Northern 
entrepreneurs at the same time. Undoubtedly, the system was beset with difficulties, not the least 
of which were the problems caused by troop movements and the questionable motives and 
actions of some of the lessees. As the implementer of the system, Thomas deserves some of the 
blame for the clear abuses that took place. Yet these problems of competing expectations about 
the meaning of black freedom that coalesced around the plantation lease system would 
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CHAPTER 2 
“It Will Rival My Kansas Work of 1856 and 7”: George L. Stearns, Rueben D. Mussey, and the 
United States Colored Troop Recruiting Office in Nashville, Tennessee. 
 
Shortly after Abraham Lincoln’s reelection as president in November 1864, Colonel 
Reuben D. Mussey, Commissioner of the United States Colored Troop Recruiting Office in 
Nashville, Tennessee, wrote a short letter to Professor Goldwin M. Smith, Regius Chair of 
Modern History at Oxford University. Smith was visiting the United States, and Mussey wrote 
asking him to stop in Nashville before he returned to England. Aware of the professor’s interest 
in the American conflict, Mussey explained that “to a student of our war,” Nashville would be an 
example of how a place once “full of treason and slavery” was being “purged by the sharp 
medicine of civil war.”1 Displaying sharp historical instincts and a former journalist’s flair for 
language, Mussey added that Nashville provided examples of former slaves becoming soldiers 
and freemen and of the war’s impact on non-slaveholding whites and refugees, offering a lens 
through which to “see a slave state becoming a free state.”2 A visit to Nashville, Mussey 
concluded, would allow Smith to “see how the various problems of the war [were] receiving a 
solution.”3 
Professor Smith never visited Nashville, but Mussey’s assessment of Tennessee’s 
importance was correct. Scholars have produced a sizable body of literature detailing the 
destruction of slavery in Tennessee: from broad surveys of the institution’s demise, to micro-
histories analyzing the experience of black residence of cities like Knoxville and Nashville, to 
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the trials and triumphs of the United States Colored Troop (USCT) regiments recruited from 
Tennessee’s black population.4 However, we still lack a detailed examination of the inner 
workings of the USCT Recruiting Office in Nashville, its place in the broader history of 
emancipation, and its role in transforming Tennessee into a free state.5  
 This oversight is critical for several reasons. From their offices on Cherry Street, Reuben 
Mussey and his predecessor, George L. Stearns, were responsible for coordinating the activities 
of a dozen recruiting outposts scattered throughout Middle Tennessee and Northern Alabama. 
Committed antislavery advocates before the war, both Stearns and Mussey implemented federal 
emancipation policy with such fervor, that the National Antislavery Standard—a paper not 
exactly known for its fulsome praise of the Union Army’s commitment to emancipation—
declared, “[Stearns’] dozen recruiting agencies…have been a dozen antislavery agencies; a 
dozen education agencies; a dozen Freedmen’s agencies; a dozen agencies for promoting 
Northern ideas.”6 By the end of the war, the combined efforts of Stearns, Mussey, and the agents 
under their command had helped Tennessee contribute roughly 24,000 African American 
soldiers to the Union armies. 
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 The Antislavery Standard’s praise underscores a second reason for analyzing Stearns and 
Mussey’s work in Nashville. Both men viewed the recruiting of black troops as an effort  that 
involved “the question of the elevation and improvement of the [black] race.”7 To this end, with 
the assistance and approval of their superiors in Washington—if not always their colleagues in 
the Union Army—Stearns and Mussey set about providing humanitarian aid to black refugees, 
building schools for the education of freed adults and children, and attempting to implement a 
system of free labor that would help African Americans become both self-sufficient and aid the 
Union war effort. That these efforts bore a similarity to those implemented by Union Adjutant 
General Lorenzo Thomas in the Mississippi River Valley is no accident: it was part of an 
evolving, coordinated attempt on behalf of the Lincoln administration to devote attention to 
projects they saw as simultaneously related to the prosecution of the war, the humanitarian crises 
that followed wherever the Union Army advanced, and the desire to turn slave states into free 
states. Given the chaos of attempting to implement these efforts while prosecuting a war, what is 
remarkable is not the extent to which such policies fell short, but that they accomplished as much 
as they did.  
  Federal emancipation policy had significant shortcomings, but that is not due to a lack of 
effort around implementation. Historian Greg Downs has noted how historians are often guilty of 
“reading backwards from policy outcomes to judge…political commitments,” and then using 
those outcomes to render sweeping indictments that can obfuscate historical nuance.8 Although 
Downs’s work deals with the immediate postwar years, his criticism is also appropriate between 
1861 and 1865. Scholars’ presumption that the Union Army could have accomplished more if its 
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generals, soldiers, and civilian leaders displayed a higher level of commitment to emancipation 
can be misleading. In Nashville, Secretary of War Stanton placed two well-known antislavery 
activists with a history of supporting armed efforts to destroy slavery in a position to execute a 
policy of military emancipation and humanitarian care for African Americans. Even with these 
officers’ high level of commitment, the difficulties of implementing policy in a warzone, to say 
nothing of the opposition from Confederate soldiers, civilians, and from within the ranks of the 
Union Army, sometimes foiled Stearns’s and Mussey’s efforts. However, their experiences in 
Nashville help us tell a more nuanced story about the enormous obstacles the implementation of 
Union emancipation policy faced, and about the importance of acknowledging ways that it 
succeeded.  
  The notion that any sort of emancipation policy succeeded in Tennessee may come as 
surprise to some historians. Many general surveys of the Civil War or monographs on the 
Emancipation Proclamation mention Tennessee solely in the context of cataloging the 
exemptions listed in the Proclamation. These exemptions are then used to stress the limitations of 
emancipation more generally by suggesting that the Emancipation Proclamation “transformed 
the war almost in spite of Lincoln and despite its specific terms.”9 Russell F. Weigley’s A Great 
Civil War argues that, “not only were the border-states omitted, but so were most of the formerly 
Confederate areas now occupied by the Union Army. Various Virginia counties and Louisiana 
Parishes were excluded from the terms of the Proclamation, as well as the whole state of 
Tennessee.”10 Similarly, James McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom briefly notes the exemptions 
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“the Proclamation [Lincoln] signed that day exempted the border states along with Tennessee 
and Union-controlled portions of Louisiana and Virginia.”11 The implication of these analyses is 
that slaves were not being freed in places exempted from the Emancipation Proclamation. With 
regard to Tennessee, these suggestions are mistaken, for, as historian James Oakes has observed, 
“in practice exempted areas often felt the proclamation most immediately.”12 
This chapter also places George L. Stearns’s Civil War experience within the context of 
what historian Dwight L. Dumond calls the “anti-slavery origins of the Civil War.” As Stearns 
indicated in his personal correspondence, he viewed his recruiting efforts during the Civil War as 
a continuation of his work as a member of the Massachusetts State Kansas Committee and John 
Brown’s “Secret Six”. The network of itinerant’s Stearns coordinated in Massachusetts and 
Kansas during the mid-1850’s bore a striking resemblance to the recruiting network he would 
run in Tennessee; the similarities are compelling enough to suggest that Stearns modeled his 
recruiting efforts for free black regiments in the North during the spring and summer of 1863, 
and of slaves in Nashville during the summer and fall of 1863, off of his experiences with the 
Massachusetts Committee. Tracing these continuities helps refute the idea that the destruction of 
slavery was attributable solely to the military necessity occasioned by the war, and helps 
reconnect the conflict to the broader context of the nineteenth century.13 
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There was little early indication that George L. Stearns would spend his adult life trying 
to destroy slavery. Born in Medford, Massachusetts on January 8th 1809, Stearns had a 
comfortable childhood until his father’s sudden death from pneumonia in 1820. After working a 
series of odd jobs to support his family, Stearns’s mother arranged for her son to work as a clerk 
in her brother’s hardware store in Brattleboro, Vermont. George returned to Boston in 1827 to 
work as a clerk in a ship chandlery firm, where he was eventually able to secure enough financial 
support from friends and family to build a linseed oil mill and begin his career as a merchant in 
Medford, Massachusetts in 1835. A hardworking—if shy and awkward—young man, Stearns 
rapidly built his new business into one of the prosperous companies in the region by the mid-
1840’s. After the mill burned down in 1847, Stearns transitioned to lead pipe manufacturing and, 
by the middle of the 1850’s, the firm of Albert Fearing & Co. had become the leading supplier 
for much of New England.14  
   George Stearns’s motivations for joining the antislavery movement remain unclear. 
Stearns’s most recent biographer has implied that it was his religious convictions and concordant 
“concern[ed] about moral truths” account for his hatred of slavery.15 In a memoir published forty 
years after his father’s death, Frank Preston Stearns recalled that it was his father’s belief “that 
every man had a right to the fruits of his labor,” combined with the murder of Elijah Lovejoy in 
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1837 that resulted in his migration to the Liberty Party in 1840.16 Frank Stearns also wrote that 
his father believed William Lloyd Garrison’s doctrine of moral suasion was not a practical 
blueprint for abolishing slavery, whereas the Liberty Party’s platform of abolishing slavery in the 
District of Columbia and the federal territories, and abolishing the interstate slave trade, could be 
a more workable solution.17 Accordingly, Stearns cast his vote for James Birney in the election 
of 1840, providing the Liberty Party with one of the few votes it received in Medford, 
Massachusetts.18 
  Stearns’s vote for the Liberty Party drew the ire of his friends and family. Both Stearns’ 
mother and brother argued that he was supporting “vulgar fanatics,” while an argument with a 
family friend resulted in Stearns being cut out of the man’s will.19 Despite his family’s 
opposition, Stearns flirted with various antislavery political parties throughout the 1840’s, and 
provided financial backing to the Free Soil Party during the presidential campaign in 1848.20 
According to Frank Stearns, his father was outraged by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and 
vowed “no fugitive negro should ever be taken from his premises while he lived.”21 An article 
entitled “Anti-Slavery Hero” published in The New England Magazine in 1891, described how 
Stearns translated his words into action. Arriving in Boston when the city was in an uproar over 
the controversy surrounding the escaped slave Thomas Sims, the captain of a merchant vessel 
sought out Stearns with the urgent message that “he had a ‘fugitive’ for him.”22 Matters were 
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arranged so that the crew of the ship was given a brief “holiday,” and Stearns helped see the 
escaped slave transported to Canada.23   
 Like the Fugitive Slave Act, passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in May 1854 aroused a 
furor of protest across the North. Kansas aid committees were immediately formed in many 
states, and by early 1856 Stearns was regularly attending meetings of the Kansas Free State 
Delegation and the Emigrant Aid Company.24 Even as Stearns made sizable contributions to the 
Emigrant Aid Company, he quietly began to develop a blueprint for the more efficient 
coordination of efforts between local committees.25 Applying his business acumen, Stearns 
believed that one office exercising central control over all localized Massachusetts relief efforts 
for Kansas was the best way forward. On June 25th 1856, a convention of all Kansas aid 
committees created the Massachusetts State Kansas Committee, alleging that a “systematic and 
extensive conspiracy” was underway to “plant slavery” in Kansas, and selected Stearns as its 
chairman.26   
 Stearns threw himself headlong into coordinating the fundraising efforts of the 
Massachusetts State Committee. The first task was establishing a network of agents to fundraise 
throughout the state, and to lay out an organizational plan to coordinate their activities. Letters 
were sent out around the state seeking “men of the right stamp” to assist the organization through 
financial support or as canvassing agents.27 Stearns outlined his plan in a circular issued to all his 
new agents during the fall of 1856. The individual town organizations would consist of one agent 
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per town, and these agents were directed to appoint an individual collector for each school 
district.28 Each agent or county committee was to report to Stearns each week, and those lacking 
in their efforts would be reprimanded or dismissed.29 To address frequently asked questions 
about Kansas, Stearns provided his agents with the estimated number of free state settlers, as 
well as accounts of the “extreme and extensive” conditions they faced.30 By mid-September, 
Stearns reported that complete operations were up and running in Franklin, Hamden, and 
Hampshire Counties, and had “met with good success.”31  
Stearns’s fundraising efforts relied heavily on effective public speakers. His 
correspondence for the fall of 1856 is littered with letters begging, cajoling, and hectoring men 
such as Kansas Judge M.F. Conway, and former Massachusetts Governor Andrew Reeder about 
speaking engagements. Judge Conway’s value was his ability to give crowds a first-hand account 
of events and conditions on the ground in Kansas; he was thus sent to “speak in any town where 
friends of the cause can arrange a meeting,” including Pawtucket, New Bedford, Fairhaven, and 
Springfield.32 In comparison, Reeder, as a former governor of Pennsylvania, was reasonably well 
known and could draw a crowd. Consequently, he was the recipient of a string of messages from 
Stearns imploring him: “do not refuse us [as a speaker] if you can possibly come,” as his 
presence would ensure a large amount of fundraising.33 When the former governor was slow to 
reply, Stearns followed up two weeks later by asking Reeder, “can you come next week? What 
day?” and by marking his request as “very important.”34  
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Not every part of Stearns’s operation flowed smoothly. One challenge was weeding out 
ineffective agents. Charles Robinson reported that “many agents hired by the committee were 
either incompetent or corrupt,” and Amos Lawrence believed that Stearns himself “remained 
backward in showing anything which goes to show that the time that [relief] has gone by.”35 
Accustomed to running his own business, Stearns was resistant to any interference with his 
operations or suggestions about changes that needed to be made. At the same time, he was aware 
of the issues involving his agents, and worked to correct the deficiencies. On more than one 
occasion, an exasperated Stearns had to implore associates to “tell me of any [agents] who will 
work.”36 Newspapers chronicling the efforts of the aid companies reported on the activities of 
“fraudulent, bogus agents,” who “lectured on the wrongs of Kansas to replenish their private 
purses,” and questioned the overall utility of the Emigrant Aid Companies.37 
Despite his problems with agents, Stearns was heartened to receive thank-you letters 
from Kansas’s settlers. George H. Crocker, an engineer from Providence, Rhode Island who had 
been living in Kansas for nearly two years, wrote, “the motives that prompted you [to send aid] 
are appreciated by the recipients generally and myself especially,” and asked Stearns to continue 
to support those who had been “impoverished by their love of freedom.”38 Mary Caveness, a 
seamstress living in Lawrence, Kansas wrote Stearns to offer her “grateful thanks,” but reported 
that “invasion after invasion” by proslavery bands had prevented her family from opening the 
business they had planned.39 She pointedly closed her letter by telling Stearns of her confidence 
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that “our friends in the Free States will not let us suffer for food” and in the ultimate triumph of a 
“just cause.”40   
As 1856 turned into 1857, Stearns wrote, “our plan commends itself to every one,” and 
he looked forward to expanding his efforts in the coming year.41 Between August and December, 
Stearns and his agents raised approximately $48,000 in direct donations, with another estimated 
$20,000-$30,000 in in-kind donations coming through efforts spearheaded by Mary Stearns.42 
Stearns had proven he could quickly and efficiently marshal resources and coordinate the 
activities of numerous agents, backers, and speakers to facilitate the destruction of slavery. These 
experiences would in many ways provide a useful foundation for the activities he would later 
coordinate in Nashville during the Civil War. For the moment, however, a grey-eyed man who 
strode into his Boston office in January 1857 would occupy Stearns’s attention. His name was 
John Brown, and he had come east on a mission.43  
John Brown was the sharp end of the antislavery spear. Fifty years old in 1857, Brown 
had failed at every occupation he previously attempted, but he shared—indeed, surpassed—
Stearns’s determination to do something about slavery. In the spring of 1856, Brown had joined 
a free-state militia that was organized to fight the guerilla war that was rapidly engulfing Kansas. 
As the militia moved to defend the free-state town of Lawrence in May, its men learned that 
proslavery forces had burned the settlement to the ground. Further outraged by the news of the 
vicious caning of Senator Charles Sumner by South Carolinian Preston Brooks, Brown vowed to 
“strike terror in the heart of proslavery people.”44 On the night of May 24th-25th 1856, Brown 
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made good on his promise as he and seven other men forced five proslavery settlers from their 
cabins and killed them in front of their wives and children.45 
Determined to “fight fire with fire,” Brown had journeyed north to seek aid to expand his 
fight in Kansas.46 Stearns quickly gathered Howe and others members of the Massachusetts State 
Kansas Committee to hear Brown make his case for assistance. In his testimony before the 
Mason Committee investigating Brown’s raid at Harpers’ Ferry in early 1860, Stearns recalled 
that the members of the Committee were “strongly impressed with [Brown’s] courage, sagacity, 
and strong integrity.”47 A few days after this first meeting, Stearns wrote one of his agents in 
Kansas that the Committee had authorized aid to Brown in the form of two hundred Sharps rifled 
carbines, 4,000 ball cartridges, 31,000 military caps, and six iron ladles currently being stored in 
Iowa.48 Stearns also informed Brown that the Committee had authorized an appropriation of 
$500 to pay his expenses. By April 1857, the Committee had further authorized Brown to sell 
one hundred of the rifles, “using the proceeds for the benefit of the free state men,” and granted 
him $500 more dollars for expenses.49   
Brown needed all the funding Stearns could provide. Speeches across New York and 
New England failed to yield additional resources, leading Brown to write his son, John Brown 
Jr., that he had “a good deal of discouragement, and have often felt quite depressed.”50 
Nevertheless, Brown’s “Old Brown’s Farewell” speech, delivered before the Massachusetts 
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Legislature, had resonated with both George and Mary Stearns.51 Stearns authorized the purchase 
of 200 revolvers, bought with $1,300 his own money, and provided Brown with a letter of credit 
authorizing him to draw on Stearns for up $7,000 in the event of an attack by proslavery forces.52 
During the summer of 1857, Stearns contributed additional personal funds to help Brown’s 
family purchase an addition to their farm at North Elba, New York, and made several other 
contributions of varying amounts.53 All told, Stearns later estimated that he had contributed 
between $1,500 and $2,000 of his personal fortune to finance Brown’s activities in Kansas.54  
Stearns’s efforts were not limited to his wallet. In early May, he wrote to the National 
Kansas Committee in New York recommending necessary steps to secure a free Kansas. The 
appropriation of $100,000 from the Massachusetts Legislature; the continued donation of food, 
clothing, and money for the relief of free state settlers; and a large, organized armed force to 
“repel Border-ruffian outrage,” commanded by John Brown.55 Although Stearns continued to 
ensure Brown a steady supply of aid from the Massachusetts Committee, the two men were 
increasingly at odds over Brown’s finances. Brown badgered Stearns for more money, and 
Stearns, mindful of the difficulty of raising money during the ongoing Panic of 1857, became 
exasperated.56 By mid-November, Stearns was writing to one of his agents that he was under no 
“expressed or implied” obligation to Brown, and that Brown was only authorized to draw on 
Stearns if an attack on free state men occurred.57  
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The crux of the matter was that Brown craved action, but Stearns counseled caution. In 
the aftermath of the fraudulent Lecompton Constitution, Stearns wrote that the “free state party 
should wait for the B.R. moves and checkmate them. Don’t attack them, but if they attack you, 
give them Jessie, and Fremont besides. You know how to do it.”58 By this point, however, the 
political situation in Kansas had reached a fragile peace, and Brown was formulating a larger 
plan to invade the slave South with a small, interracial, armed force.59 Specifically, Brown 
proposed to seize the federal armory at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia, seize weapons, raid nearby 
farms and plantations to free slaves, and retreat to the nearby Allegheny Mountains.60 In early 
1858, Brown came east again, and wrote to a select group revealing that he had been planning 
“BY FAR the most important undertaking of my whole life,” requesting additional funds, and 
asking a select group to meet at the home of Gerrit Smith.61  
Stearns replied with the most blistering letter the two ever exchanged. The reasons for the 
tension were obvious. Hugh Forbes, an English mercenary whom Brown had hired to train his 
men in Kansas, had written several “abusive letters” to Brown’s supporters after the two had a 
disagreement over the details of Brown’s plan to attack slavery, and over Forbes’s compensation 
for his services.62 Stearns was also irritated by Brown’s standing requests for more funds. 
Consequently, he explained to Brown that he now believed “that our friends need no aid in 
defending themselves, from all marauders and that their true course now is to meet the enemy at 
the Ballot Box, and vote them down on every occasion. With the Territorial Legislature in their 
hands, they can defend themselves against every oppression, and they should to so.”63 This being 
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the case, “the contingency [of an attack by border ruffians] for which I gave you my pledge 
having ceased to exist, I am no longer bound by it, and it should be returned to me without 
condition.”64 Despite this, Stearns closed by telling Brown that he sympathized with his request, 
he believed that his “advice and encouragement to our friends will be of great importance,” and 
that he stood a much better chance of meeting with everyone if he journeyed to Boston.65 
Only Frank Sanborn and Gerrit Smith were present at Smith’s home to meet with Brown 
between February 18th- 23rd 1858. Undeterred, Brown outlined his plans to invade the south to 
obtain recruits for a black army, and read aloud his proposed “Provisional Constitution and 
Ordinances for the People of the United States.”66 Back in Boston, Sanborn relayed the rest of 
Brown’s plan, adding that Brown would be in Boston to speak with them the first week in 
March. At that meeting, Brown revealed more of the exact details of his plan for attacking 
slavery, and received the group’s support.67 One scholar has argued that he was “caught up in the 
moment” when he agreed to support Brown’s plan for slave rebellion, and that his decision had 
“an aura of innocence and childhood adventure in it.”68 Other historians have similarly dismissed 
Stearns’s involvement as an “adventurous escapade rather than a deep commitment.”69 However, 
a careful reading of the letters Stearns and Brown exchanged demonstrates the exact opposite: 
Stearns’s careful consideration of Brown’s plans, as well as their potential impact on the 
situation in Kansas. Far from being an eccentric rich man who was in over his head, Stearns had 
by this time taken Brown’s measure, and arrived at the conclusion that armed force was 
necessary. On March 12th 1858 Stearns, Smith, Sanborn, Higginson, Howe, and Parker agreed to 
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form a “Secret Committee of Six” to aid Brown’s activities. As with the Kansas activities, 
Stearns was named chairman of this committee.70 
Plans to raise $1,000 for Brown stalled immediately. Hugh Forbes had sent letters to 
Howe and Sanborn telling them that he had revealed all he knew about Brown’s plan to New 
York Senator William Seward, including the identity of his “Eastern friends.”71 During a fierce 
debate, Stearns urged the group to cease their activities and undertake damage control. Stearns 
wrote immediately to Brown telling him explicitly that the arms and aid in his possession were to 
be used only for the defense of Kansas, and he had copies of the letter sent to a number of 
prominent local and national politicians.72 In late May, five of the committee members met in 
Boston and decided that Brown should go to Kansas while they continued to raise money. A 
week later, the group met with Brown and reiterated their plan, with the added caveat that they 
were to remain ignorant of Brown’s further intentions.73 
Throughout the rest of 1858, Stearns continued to help raise funds for Brown, and the 
group corresponded with him sporadically while he was in Kansas.74 In early 1859 Stearns 
received word that Brown had conducted a raid on two Missouri plantations in late December 
1858. One planter was killed, and Brown liberated eleven slaves and ferried them to freedom.75 
Once more, Brown returned east to raise funds. In the late spring of 1859, Brown met with the 
Secret Six several times to discuss both his plans and his funding. In early June, Brown departed 
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Boston once more, telling Stearns before he left that he was embarking on a “dangerous errand,” 
and that “we may never see each other again.”76 
Brown was true to his word. On October 16th 1859 Brown seized the federal arsenal at 
Harper’s Ferry, Virginia. Four days later, Stearns learned of the failure of Brown’s efforts and 
his capture at the hands of a U.S. Army detachment commanded by Robert E. Lee. Meeting 
quickly with Samuel Howe, who begged him to accompany him to Montreal, Stearns decided 
instead to consult his lawyer, John A. Andrew. Andrew found that he could “see no possible way 
in which anyone can have done anything in Massachusetts, for which he can be carried to any 
other state. I know nothing for which you could be tried, even here.”77 Neither man knew that 
Brown had left behind documents at his Maryland hideout that implicated Stearns and the other 
members of the Secret Six. On October 22nd 1859, Stearns and Howe fled to Canada.78  
By early November 1859, George L. Stearns was a wanted man. Newspapers from South 
Carolina to Maine screamed for the conspirators’ heads. In South Carolina and Virginia, 
newspapers blared such headlines as, “Rebellion at Harper’s Ferry—Troops Called Out—
Bloodshed,” “THE VIRGINIA INSURRECTION,” and “RIOT AT HARPER’S FERRY” in big, 
bold letters.79 In the North, The Chicago Press and Tribune announced that Harper’s Ferry was a 
“stark mad enterprise” and could only have been thought up and carried out by “a squad of 
fanatics whose zeal is wonderfully disproportioned to their sense.”80 Even Republican leaning 
papers like The New York Tribune denounced “this deplorable affair” as the “work of a 
madman.81 
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After the initial firestorm, a combination of factors helped turn the tide of Northern 
public opinion. Primarily, Brown’s forthright demonstration of his moral opposition to slavery 
during his imprisonment and trial, his absolute refusal to countenance a rescue attempt, and his 
willingness to die for his cause aroused public sympathy.82 Additionally, it quickly became 
apparent that Brown was not going to receive a fair trial from Virginia officials. Public 
luminaries including Henry David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson made captivating public 
speeches, effectively, in the words of one historian, “deifying Brown” even before he was 
hanged.83 In Canada, Stearns contemplated engineering a rescue attempt, but the combination of 
Brown’s determination to stand trial, with the practical obstacles of rescuing someone from the 
most heavily guarded jail in the country led him to abandon the effort. From his jail cell, Brown 
wrote Mary Stearns that he was “quite cheerful” and asked, “may god forever reward you and all 
yours.”84 Brown requested that no “mock or hypocritical prayers” be said for him, and desired 
that his only religious attendants be “poor little dirty ragged bareheaded and bare footed slave 
boys and girls, led by some old grey haired slave mother.”85 Three days later, Brown was 
executed.  
Stearns returned to the Boston area ten days after Brown hanged, but he was not out of 
the woods yet. Early in 1860, the Senate voted to appoint a committee to examine the events at 
Harper’s Ferry, and Stearns received a summons to appear in Washington on February 17th. 
Appearing before the Mason Committee posed several critical problems for the Boston 
merchant. As his son later recalled, George Stearns was worried about being the last person 
called to testify. Although he was somewhat mollified when Boston Judge E. Rookwood Hoar 
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told him that, if any attempt were made to detain him in the nation’s capital, a Boston court 
would immediately issue a writ of habeas corpus.86 Reassured, Stearns arranged to appear before 
the Mason Committee at 11:00am on February 21st 1860. In a meeting with Charles Sumner in 
Washington the day before his testimony, the Massachusetts Senator asked if Stearns would “say 
what you think about slavery.”87 When Stearns evasively replied, “I probably shall,” Sumner 
pressed him to “tell them the whole truth.”88  
Stearns’s testimony before the Mason Committee reveals a man simultaneously trying to 
share as little incriminating information as possible while also following Sumner’s guidance. 
Senator James Mason of Virginia began the questioning, carefully probing to find out Stearns’s 
connection to the arms that were provided to Brown in Kansas. Stearns began by reading from a 
prepared statement that detailed his involvement with the Massachusetts State Kansas 
Committee, his first meetings with Brown, the Kansas Committee’s early fundraising efforts in 
1856, and his personal contributions to Brown’s activities in Kansas.89 Mason and the other 
members of the Senate committee then grilled Stearns about the timing, location, and substance 
of each of his face-to-face meetings with Brown during 1857 and 1858, including his knowledge 
of what Brown had planned for Harper’s Ferry.90  
Stearns initially endeavored to maintain a façade of deniability, couching his answers 
with qualifiers like, “I have no reason to suppose,” “I cannot specify,” or giving brief “yes” and 
“no” responses. In short order, however, Stearns veered from plausible deniability to lies.91 
When he was questioned about the circumstances surrounding a meeting he had with Brown in 
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the late spring of 1859, Stearns replied, “[Brown] came to Boston, as he told me, to get money 
for antislavery purposes.”92 Quickly the question followed, “what were those antislavery 
purposes? Did he disclose them?”93 Stearns denied any further knowledge, but he was lying. 
Indeed, he and the other members of the Secret Six knew the general outlines of Brown’s plan—
even if they did not know the exact particulars—and debated their merits multiple times in the 
late spring of 1859. However, when the Committee pushed him to answer the explicit question, 
“what were the anti-slavery purposes to which you intended [the money they had given Brown] 
to be devoted?” Stearns unabashedly fired back: 
My object, in giving him the money was because I considered that so long as Kansas was 
not a free state, John Brown might again be a useful man there. That was one object. 
Another was a very high personal respect for him. Knowing that the man had an idea that 
he was engaged in a work that I believed to be a righteous one, I gave him money to 
enable him to live or to do whatever he thought was right.94 
 
Sensing that they would be able to goad the witness, Senators Mason, Jefferson Davis of 
Mississippi, and Graham Fitch of Indiana attempted to link both Stearns’s and Brown’s activities 
to prominent Massachusetts or national government officials. When Stearns revealed that he had 
once seen Brown at the Parker House in Boston, a comical line of questioning ensued regarding 
who Stearns saw Brown talking to, and whether the conversation concerned “his desire to collect 
money for antislavery purposes”95 Stearns answered that he presumed Brown “went there for 
that purpose,” but when pressed for more information about whom Brown met there and how 
much money he might have obtained, Stearns sidestepped the question.96 Undeterred, the 
committee then questioned Stearns about whether “any men connected with the United States 
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government in any capacity” contributed to the Kansas.97 Irritated, Stearns responded with a 
defiant lecture on how his work relied “upon the laborers, the mechanics, the farmers and such 
persons.”98  
 When the committee returned to Stearns’s awareness of Brown’s intentions at Harper’s 
Ferry, Stearns became cagey and combative. In response to whether he previously understood 
that Brown was “to make any inroad upon the subject of slavery in any of the States before his 
actions in Virginia,” Stearns replied, “No, sir; not except that Brown was opposed to slavery, and 
as he had in Kansas, he would work again. I did not suppose that he had any organized plan.”99 
The more the Committee tried to goad Stearns, the more he seemed to follow Sumner’s 
suggestion to give his unvarnished opinions about slavery and Brown. Stearns readily admitted 
that he “did suppose [Brown] would go into Virginia or some other States and try to relieve 
slaves” by employing “any way he could give them liberty,” including force if necessary.100 
Finally, when Republican Senator Jacob Collamer of Vermont asked Stearns to pinpoint the 
moment when he understood that Brown might resort to force, Stearns exploded with a fiery and 
detailed summary of why he supported John Brown:  
From first to last, I understood John Brown to be a man who was opposed to slavery, and, 
as such that he would take every opportunity to free slaves where he could; I did not 
know in what way; I only know from the fact of his having done it in Missouri…I 
furnished him with money because I considered him as one who would be of use in case 
such troubles arose as had arisen previously in Kansas; that was my object in furnishing 
the money; I did not ask him what he was to do with it, nor did I suppose that he would 
do anything that I should disprove of.101  
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 At this point, Collamer interjected by directly asking whether Stearns disapproved of 
Brown’s actions. In response, Stearns placed Brown’s actions within the broader context of the 
Age of Global Revolutions. “I believe John Brown to be the representative man of this century,” 
Stearns began, “as Washington was of the last—the Harper’s Ferry affair, and the capacity 
shown by the Italian for self-government, the great events of the age. One will free Europe. The 
other America.”102 This proved to be the climax of the hearing, and after a few follow up 
questions, his testimony ended.  
 Stearns spent the following days and weeks dealing with the aftermath of his testimony. 
Writing to Samuel Howe, Stearns recounted some of the changes he had made in his testimony 
and a brief exchange he had with James Mason after the hearing had ended.103 Stearns also 
reported that he visited with Charles Sumner again after his testimony, where the Massachusetts 
Senator was preparing a speech about Harper’s Ferry and the Mason Committee that “would do 
it justice.” 104 Stearns expressed irritation with reaction to his testimony from the newspapers, 
noting that The New York Tribune had “garbled” his testimony because the reporter had tried to 
“condense” the remarks, but that The New York Herald had a much more complete account.105 
 Following his hearing, Stearns turned his attention to the 1860 election. He timed the 
conclusion of a trip out to Kansas to coincide with the beginning of the Republican National 
Convention in Chicago, planning to distribute a series of pamphlets designed to enumerate 1) 
outrages committed by the slave power “upon persons, upon Private Right, the Freedom Speech, 
the Press, and the Post Office; 2) the ways the slave power had “violated the Federal Compact” 
and involving the wholesale “destruction of lives and property”; and 3) “crimes and aggressions” 
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slaveholders had committed in diplomacy and filibustering.106 As one historian concluded, 
Stearns was attempting “to ensure that the Republican delegates were thoroughly educated as to 
the issues.”107 
 He need not have worried. Although Stearns did not stay for the entire convention, he 
told a friend after Lincoln’s nomination, that “[Lincoln] would have been a good Free-Soiler.”108 
Though Stearns had offered funding to James Lane and James Montgomery while he was in 
Kansas, and expressed his determination to “take” Kansas if the federal government did not 
declare it a free state, he was also pleased with the Republican Party and saw the ways that it 
would lead to the downfall of slavery in the United States.109 
 Never content to sit on the sidelines, Stearns also became involved in the nomination of 
John A. Andrew for governor of Massachusetts. Stearns contributed to Andrew’s election fund, 
but perhaps his more valuable contribution came in the connections he helped facilitate.110 
Building on the presumption that people who favored and assisted with Kansas relief were likely 
to be receptive to Andrew’s candidacy, Stearns expended a tremendous amount of energy during 
the fall of 1860 contacting his network of Kansas activists and urging them to get involved in the 
campaign.111 The normally media-averse Stearns even made several speeches for Andrew, 
including one following the conclusion of a Wide-Awakes rally that had marched to his home for 
the express purpose of getting him to join the procession.112 On election night, Stearns took great 
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satisfaction in informing his family that Andrew had been elected governor, and Abraham 
Lincoln president of the United States.113 
 Like many others, Stearns spent “The Great Secession Winter” trying to divine what 
would happen next. In December 1860, Stearns accompanied Governor-Elect Andrew on a trip 
to Washington, where he was pleased by the show of Republican determination not to accept any 
measures that would compromise the party platform. “Lincoln will not yield an inch,” he wrote 
to Mary a few days after he arrived, “the Republican Party will be as firm as Lincoln. No 
compromise or concession is possible.”114 After speaking with Sumner, William Fessenden, 
Montgomery Blair, Lewis Cass, and Benjamin Wade, Stearns believed if any Republican 
members vote for concession or compromise they would be “politically dead,” and if a majority 
of the party vote for compromise, “the [Republican] party is dead.” Although Stearns was not 
quite sure where the crisis was heading, he was certain that one way or another, “slavery will go 
down, dead.”115 
 Following the outbreak of war at Fort Sumter in April 1861, Stearns devoted himself to 
pushing the Lincoln administration to vigorously pursue military emancipation. He was outraged 
at accounts of slaves being returned by Union armies in Virginia, sarcastically noting in a letter 
to a friend, “slave property, so says Lincoln, must be respected.”116 Partly in reaction to these 
reports, Stearns helped form an executive committee to circulate literature on emancipation, 
hoping that dissemination would mobilize public support in the North. In December 1861, “The 
Emancipation League Declaration,” the committee’s first public announcement of its existence, 
proclaimed, “EMANCIPATION OF THE SLAVES as a measure of justice, and as a military 
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necessity.”117 Nevertheless, Stearns remained dissatisfied, writing Charles Sumner, “he could 
hope for nothing good from the imbecility in Washington” and launching his own newspaper, 
The Commonwealth, to voice his frustrations. 118  
 Despite Stearns’s criticisms of the Lincoln administration, he celebrated the release of the 
final Emancipation Proclamation. On New Year’s Eve 1862, Stearns and his wife held a party to 
unveil a bust of John Brown that Stearns had commissioned and to celebrate the president’s 
proclamation.119 Massachusetts soon requested and received permission from the War 
Department to recruit black soldiers, but because of the low number of military-age black men in 
the Bay State, Massachusetts would need help from other Northern states to fill the regiments. 
To coordinate that recruiting effort, Governor Andrew turned to George Stearns. 
 Stearns set to work immediately. With Andrew’s assistance, he organized a “Black 
Committee” that included many of his Kansas partners—including Amos A. Lawrence, James 
M. Forbes, and Richard Hallowell among others—and helped publish recruiting posters and 
subscription papers to raise money.120 He visited Frederick Douglass at his home in Rochester, 
New York to secure his aid in the recruiting efforts. Douglass readily agreed to publicize the 
efforts in his paper, The North Star, and Stearns signed him on as a recruiter before moving on to 
set up a recruiting post at Buffalo. In a short note to his wife, Stearns placed his new position 
within the context of his pre-war antislavery activities, writing that his recruiting network “will 
rival my Kansas work of 1856 and 7, being much more extensive in its operations, and far 
greater in its results.”121 John Mercer Langston, a Virginia freedman and Oberlin College 
graduate hired to help with both outreach to the black community and expanding the recruiting 
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efforts to Ohio, later recalled, “there was no man in the United States…so well adapted to 
inaugurate the movement in this behalf” as Stearns.122     
 As had been the case with Kansas, Stearns employed a network of agents to achieve his 
desired goals. The agents were paid two dollars for each recruit via private subscription fund, 
with Stearns coordinating their efforts via telegraph from his offices in Boston and Buffalo. 
Recruiting stations were set up as far west as St. Louis, and Stearns soon wrote to Mary, “the 
results begin to appear very satisfactory.”123 The antislavery press quickly took note of his 
efforts. Frederick Douglass, for one, praised Stearns for “patriotically devoting” all of his energy 
to recruiting men for the 54th Massachusetts, and was pleased by the rapid results of his efforts. 
“Four or five weeks ago,” Douglass wrote, the idea of a black regiment had been a “mere Boston 
notion—a fire shadow of New England fanaticism;” but “largely thanks to the zeal, industry, and 
efficiency of Mr. GEORGE L. STEARNS,” a recruiting network had sprung up all over the 
west.124 Drawing the obvious connection between Stearns’s antislavery activities, The 
Springfield Republican noted that “two great enterprises of this century…the freedom of Kansas, 
and…the organization of the effective force which to end this war” had found in Stearns 
“perhaps their most effective organizer and worker.”125 After remaining in Buffalo a little while 
longer to see to the recruiting for the new 55th Massachusetts, a weary Stearns returned home to 
Boston in early June 1863. 
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton also took note of Stearns’s recruiting efforts was 
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton. According to Stearns’s son, Stanton and Stearns met in 
Washington during the second week of June, with the Secretary telling him, “I have heard of 
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your recruiting bureau, and I think you would be the best man to run the machine you have 
constructed.”126 Stanton named Stearns assistant adjutant general with the rank of major, with 
authority to recruit black regiments all over the country. Notably, it seems that Stanton chose 
Stearns both for the success his recruiting network had in enlisting free black Northerners in the 
Union army, and for his commitment to the destruction of slavery. Initially directed to limit his 
efforts to the eastern states, Stearns first reported to Philadelphia, where he was instructed to 
confer with Thomas Webster, who had been authorized to take control of recruiting three 
regiments of black soldiers in Philadelphia and eastern Pennsylvania.127 
 Stearns was not in Philadelphia for long. On August 13th 1863, Stearns was ordered by 
Secretary of War Stanton to report to the headquarters of General Williams Rosecrans, 
commanding the Department of the Cumberland, to spearhead the recruitment and organization 
of black troops in that department.128 From there, he was to proceed to Nashville and any other 
points within Rosecrans’s jurisdiction that Stearns judged “advisable for the accomplishment of 
his duties.”129 Stearns was also ordered to report by letter to Adjutant General Thomas, then at 
Vicksburg in his capacity of heading the organization of black troops in the Mississippi Valley, 
and report his progress to the War Department.130 Stearns told his wife that he was pleased with 
his assignment because Tennessee was “right in the centre of the accursed institution,” and 
would provide a “centre from which to radiate.”131 After a brief delay figuring out the logistics of 
paying Stearns’s agents—the auditor of the War Department continuously protested paying their 
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expenses, they would be paid in part from a private subscription fund of $50,000 that had been 
raised in New England— Major Stearns set out for Tennessee.132 
Upon arriving in Nashville, Stearns had an audience with General Rosecrans, whom he 
found “heartily in favor of the employment of colored troops” and willing to do all he could to 
assist.133 During the meeting, Rosecrans asked Stearns to telegraph Stanton three questions 
concerning the organizing of black troops: 1) could slaves of loyal citizens be enlisted in the 
Union army without the consent of their masters? 2) Would all those blacks that enlisted be free 
once their terms expired? 3) would non-commissioned officers receive higher pay then privates, 
and if so, how much? Stanton responded that all men who enlisted would be free at the end of 
their service, that non-commissioned officers would receive the same pay as privates, with the 
caveat that “at the next Congress they will no doubt be part of the same footing as the other non-
commissioned officers;” and that slaves of loyal citizens could not be enlisted without their 
masters consent, but that if General Rosecrans and Tennessee Military Governor Andrew 
Johnson deemed it in the necessity of the service, slaves could be conscripted or enlisted with 
their owners to receive compensation.134 
Following his meeting with Rosecrans, Stearns met with Military Governor Andrew 
Johnson. Although the meeting was cordial, each man immediately telegraphed Stanton to 
criticize the other. At the heart of these complaints were competing visions over the proper use 
of African Americans in the Union Army—as impressed laborers versus combat soldiers—as 
well as jurisdictional questions about the recruiting process. Johnson wrote Stanton that while 
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steps had been taken to organize blacks for the “double purpose” of employment as laborers and 
then as soldiers, Stearns’s attempts to organize black troops and place them in camps would 
result in “idleness.”135 Viewing the Boston merchant as a threat to both his limited vision of 
emancipation, and to his authority as military governor, Johnson informed Stanton: “Major 
Stearns’s mission, with his notions, will give us no aid in the organization of Negro regiments in 
Tennessee.”136 For his part, Stearns complained to Stanton that if he organized all the black men 
willing to enlist, he could get “large numbers,” but that military governor Johnson stood in his 
way.137 Writing to his friends, Stearns was less circumspect, describing his new position was 
“half-political, half –military.”138  
Stanton responded quickly to both men. The Secretary of War made it clear that Stearns 
should conform his actions to coincide with the governor’s wishes and avoid creating any undue 
dissention. If Stearns found it impossible to work with Johnson, he was to immediately report to 
Cairo, Illinois and await further orders.139 Stanton reassured Johnson that Stearns was “bound to 
follow” the governor’s orders, and could be relieved “whenever [Stearns] action’s is deemed by 
you prejudicial.”140 Some historians have interpreted these orders as a unilateral victory for the 
governor, demonstrating Union Army support for his limited vision of emancipation.141 While it 
is clear from Stanton’s response that Stearns was to operate under the direction of Johnson and 
General Rosecrans, this was a jurisdictional victory for Johnson. Lincoln, having seem Johnson’s 
complaints about Stearns, wrote back urging the governor “to do your utmost to get every man, 
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black and white, under arms at the very earliest moment.”142 In case Johnson missed the point, 
Lincoln concluded by telling him to “act in co-operation with, and not independently of, the 
military authorities.”143  
The upshot of all this back-channel politicking was a fragile peace between the two men. 
Johnson allowed Stearns to set up his recruiting operations, but not before he delayed newspaper 
advertisements announcing the opening of recruiting posts at Gallatin, Murfreesboro, and 
Nashville.144 Despite the tension, Stearns enthusiastically told the War Department on September 
25th that he had “commenced recruiting with good prospects of success,” and by mid-October 
was reporting that he and Johnson understood each other.145  
 As recruiting operations began, Stearns’s immediate problem was the Union Army’s 
widespread impressment of African Americans in the Nashville area. “Impressment is working 
evil in this department,” Stearns wrote to Stanton, and as a result, blacks in and around Nashville 
distrusted most Union officers.146 Only a few days earlier, a Union patrol had impressed a 
substantial number of Nashville blacks as Union Army laborers, shooting and killing one man in 
process.147 Not content to pass on secondhand accounts, Stearns included the testimony of black 
resident Armistead Lewis in his letter. Lewis described being stopped by a guard shortly after 
leaving church at 11:00 am the previous Sunday and, despite having the proper pass, being 
forcibly marched to a camp with one hundred and eighty other men. The men were told that, if 
they attempted to escape, “we would be shot down,” and the group was left standing out all night 
in the cold “without tents, blankets, or fire.”148 Somewhat brazenly, Stearns implicated Johnson 
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by adding that the military governor “disproves of the impressment” but that it continued on a 
daily basis nonetheless.149   
 Given the widespread use of impressment, Stearns believed outreach to Nashville’s 
African American community was an essential step to pave the way for recruiting. Two 
recruiting agents and two African American assistants were specifically tasked with coordinating 
these efforts, but Stearns also made several appeals himself.150 On September 17th, Stearns called 
a public meeting at Caper’s Chapel to announce the terms of enlistment in the Union Army, and 
made a personal appeal to the black population.151 Stearns then published both the terms of 
enlistment and the location of recruiting stations in the Nashville newspapers, with some success: 
was soon reporting to his wife that the city’s black residents were offering him gifts of fruit and 
carriage rides.152 Pleasing though these offers must have been, what really gratified Stearns was 
being present at the first mass meeting called and conducted “exclusively by colored people” on 
October 1st. Stearns likely shared the sentiment of the correspondent for The Chicago Tribune 
who believed that the very fact that such a meeting was held was both an indicator of 
“revolutionary change” and a precursor to more changes yet to come.153 
 Stearns’s efforts immediately paid dividends. Less than two weeks after operations 
commenced, John Holmes, a recruiting agent stationed at Gallatin, reported enlisting over two 
hundred men, while C.B. Morse, an agent stationed at Clarksville, told Stearns he had “about one 
hundred and thirty here [who] are anxious to enlist.”154 A succession of rapid-fire letters and 
telegrams to Stearns from agents stationed at Murfreesboro, Gallatin, and other locations also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Stearns to Stanton, September 25th, 1863. OR, 3:3, 840. 
150 Reuben Mussey to CW Foster, October 10th, 1864, OR, 3:4, 772. 
151Heller, Portrait, 225. 
152 Stearns to Mary October 4th, 1863, JB-BSC, WVAMP 
153 Chicago Tribune, October 9th, 1863, quoted Junko Isono Kato, From Slavery to Freedom in Tennessee, 1860-
1870. (Ph.D. Diss. Columbia University, 2008), 196. 
154 John H, Holmes to Stearns, October 8th, 1863; C.B. Morse to Stearns, October 22nd, 1863, RSM, NARA. 
	   111	  
reported similar “results of our endeavors.”155 By October 21st, Stearns reported to Washington 
that one regiment was already full and recruiting had begun on a second. 
 Despite these impressive numbers, recruiting successes often varied from week to week. 
Morse, the same agent who had reported having numerous men anxious to enlist, soon reported 
that  “hardly anything going on here today. Great desolation is apparent” just a few days after 
sending Stearns 130 recruits who had been gathered at Clarksville.156 Another agent tersely noted 
at the end of October, “no enlistments today. Same as yesterday.”157 Stearns, perhaps with a 
vantage point borne of his recruiting experience in Kansas, remained undeterred by the 
inconsistent reports. “I am getting on marvelously here,” he reported to his wife, with the 
“foundation is laid for many [black regiments].”158 
 Numbers also varied based on a recruiter’s competency. In early October, one of Stearns 
agents reported that a Mr. James Trimble, who had been brought to Nashville to address the 
African American community and recruit, had attended two meetings, and was “so much under 
the influence of liquor” that he proved to be a “hindrance” to the outreach efforts.159 To make 
matters worse, Trimble then decided to open his recruiting office, and began persuading some of 
Stearns’s recruits to join him.160 Stearns revoked Trimble’s appointment and sent him home.161  
Other problems abounded. A shortage of basic supplies and medical care for the recruits 
at Gallatin meant that the new soldiers were forced to sleep “huddled together” due to lack of 
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tents, leading several men to fall ill.162 Colonel T.J. Morgan, commanding the newly formed 2nd 
United States Colored Cavalry, told Stearns that some of his recruits were “greatly in need of 
medical attendance,” and that if a physician could visit his camp “many cases of permanent 
disability could be prevented.”163 Other agents reported that their men were desperately in need 
of supplies ranging from clothing and blankets to weapons; one unnamed agent told Stearns that 
when enemy troops were reported in the vicinity of their camp, the recruits “drew rusty muskets, 
without bayonets or cartridge boxes.”164 Stearns worked to correct some of the deficiencies, but 
the Union disaster at Chickamauga, followed by the Confederate siege of Union forces at 
Chattanooga played havoc with his ability to secure the requisite amounts of food, clothing, and 
transportation for his regiments.165  
Recruiters also quickly discovered that, due to the threat of Confederate bushwhackers 
and hostile civilians, they could not venture far from their posts without Union military support. 
Edward Potter, an agent stationed at Murfreesboro, reported to Stearns that he had “been 
prevented from making the trip into Livermore county for want of cavalry” to serve as protection 
for recruiters.166 Potter believed that with two companies of cavalry placed under his command, 
“I can go where I please.”167 William F. Wheeler, an agent in Wartrace, reported that he was  
working under “great difficulties” because “no men can be got without a military escort.”168 
Wheeler warned Stearns that, outside of cities like Nashville, “the voluntary system of getting 
these men must…fail” because it was proving impossible to “get at [slaves] and lay our mission 
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before them.”169 With the right amount of troops, Wheeler estimated that approximately five 
hundred men could be recruited from two neighboring counties, but reiterated, “we shall fail 
unless we can have a military escort of a company or more.”170 Consequently, Stearns quickly 
began to detail companies on recruiting missions almost as fast as the men could be mustered 
into service. 
Recruiters and their men lived under constant threat of attack from Confederate guerillas. 
Towards the end of November 1863, the colonel of the 2nd USCT wrote Stearns that it was 
impossible to fill his regiment because the surrounding area was “full of the enemy who would 
not let men come in.”171 Even rumors of impending attacks took a toll. Agent John Holmes 
reported that word of General Wheeler’s rebel cavalry near Gallatin had his men on high alert, 
and warned Stearns, “matters grow more threatening every day.”172 Another agent reported that 
his post was the “intended point of attack” by rebel troops, while the week before a raiding party 
of about one hundred men came within striking distance of the camp.173 That same agent also 
told Stearns that he was attempting to gather about one hundred men for a recruiting expedition 
up near the Kentucky-Tennessee border, but that he refused to go with less than fifty because “it 
will not be safe to go out [into the countryside]”.174 
Meanwhile, other segments of the Nashville population also required Union outreach. 
Rueben Mussey, Stearns’s mustering officer in Nashville, wrote that loyal white Tennesseans 
initially regarded his efforts with “distrust and suspicion,” and that it was “some time elapsed 
before harmonious relations were established.”175 During his first weeks in Nashville, Stearns 
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reported that while prominent Unionists agreed, “the slave is virtually emancipated and cannot 
be returned to his old plantation,” they expressed trepidation about the prospect of black 
enlistment.176 Employing similar tactics to his efforts in the black community, Stearns and his 
agents began to reach out to prominent citizens in the Unionist community in Nashville. As 
Mussey later wrote, “by personal appeals, by public meetings, by publications and papers, 
[Stearns] presented [black enlistment] to the people of [Nashville].”177  
Recounting one such public meeting in a letter to Charles Sumner, Stearns detailed how a 
paper was read aloud “advocating the policy and proposing emancipation with compensation for 
the slaves of loyal owners.”178 After almost all of those present expressed a willingness to 
endorse this measure as a way to “increase the Union strength in this state,” one gentleman who 
had already emancipated his slaves suggested that they “avow in public their determination not 
to receive one cent for their slaves.”179 Stearns was “astonished” at the proposal, coming as it did 
from people who owned slave property “to the extent of $100,000” and suggested that both 
Sumner and the Tennessee Unionists would benefit from a “free interchange of opinion.” 180  
 Letters from recruiting agents told a more complicated story. Some agents reported 
“applications for compensation for slaves are being daily made,” while others noted that many 
Tennessee slave-owners appeared “anxious to get rid of their slaves, and take the certificate [for 
compensation]”181 Conversely, several agents suggested that while some Tennessee people 
would theoretically support compensated or unconditional emancipation, in practice it proved an 
entirely different matter. One agent told Stearns, “the people of Tennessee may be loyal Union 
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men, but when we come to take their ‘niggars,’ it assumes a different shape.”182 In Lincoln 
County, located on the Tennessee-Georgia border, the agent concluded the white population was 
“very rebellious” despite whatever Stearns had heard in Nashville, and they would need “all the 
assistance we can get” from military authorities to recruit in that area.183  
Even in Nashville, where Stearns had been so optimistic after meeting with slaveholding 
Unionists, his agents told a different story. The government required loyal masters requesting 
compensation to take an oath avowing that they were not and had never been disloyal to the 
Union in exchange, but Edward Bartlett, an agent who worked in the Nashville office, reported 
that “there is hardly one that can take the oath, for if they are not rebells now they have been.”184 
In a letter to his wife, Bartlett stated “I have not given one [voucher given to loyal masters] yet, 
for I cannot find the man that can take that oath at the top. I like that!”185 As head of the 
Nashville office, Stearns could have hardly avoided encountering such sentiments, but he 
continued to express optimism that outreach efforts to Tennessee Unionists would produce 
results. “A strong and defiant anti-slavery sentiment” is “ripening to full fruit” he told 
Washington, and would soon make itself “felt throughout the land.”186 Writing to John Murray 
Forbes, Stearns further elaborated on some of the reasons for his continuing optimism.  “Leading 
slaveholding Union men,” he wrote in mid-October, were fully aware that their “political and 
social existence here depends on the abolition of slavery and the control of the state by Union 
men.”187   
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Meanwhile, throughout October, November, and December 1863, telegrams continued to 
pour into Stearns’s Nashville office detailing recruiting agents work. “I have 35 men here at 
Gallatin,” read one, “sent 78 troops this morning,” read another, “send mustering officer, have 
twenty recruits,” “I have 100 men ready for muster” were a representative sample of these brief 
dispatches to Stearns.188 Although these telegrams and letters from recruiting agents give us 
glimpses into the daily operations of emancipation—recruiting expeditions, the training of men, 
the problems they encountered—their descriptions of expeditions are confined to a few brief 
sentences. Letters, telegrams, and even official reports often outline where the recruiting 
expeditions went, and how many recruits were obtained, but do not give much in the way of 
interactions with enslaved persons or slaveholders. Consequently, the enforcement of 
emancipation policy on an individual level can remain frustratingly opaque. Fortunately, the 
letters of recruiting agent Edward Bartlett help give a clearer picture of what the daily lives of 
these recruiters entailed.  
 Bartlett was born in 1842 in Concord, Massachusetts, one of nine children raised by Dr. 
Josiah Bartlett and his wife, Martha. Bartlett enlisted in the 44th Massachusetts in August 1862, 
seeing action at the battles of Rawle’s Mill and Whitehall in North Carolina. A committed 
Republican and fervently antislavery, Bartlett secured a position as a civilian recruiter for black 
regiments and worked with Stearns in Philadelphia before following him to Nashville.189 
Although Bartlett initially seemed impressed with the “very picturesque” Kentucky and 
Tennessee countryside, he was less smitten with Nashville.190 His initial accommodations at the 
St. Cloud Hotel were “poor,” and although he was impressed with the statehouse, he found the 
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rest of the city to be dull and covered with dust as “thick as fog.”191 While his paperwork was 
held up, Bartlett tried to see some of the sites in Nashville, but bristled to his wife that he was “in 
a hurry to get to work.”192   
Bartlett soon got his wish. Indeed, his twice -weekly letters to his wife and brother 
stopped for about two weeks shortly after he began recruiting. “We have enough [recruits] every 
day to keep us hard at work,” Bartlett noted on October 11th, with one regiment “nearly full” and 
preparations underway for a second regiment.193 Judging by his letters, many of Bartlett’s days in 
the Nashville office were filled by a combination of tedious supply requisitions and enlistment 
paperwork interspersed with efforts to secure new recruits.194 Several letters, however, help 
illustrates the interworking between federal emancipation policies, the Union Army, and 
enslaved persons.  
On Wednesday, October 7th 1863, an African American man named Fred Wilkinson 
walked into the Nashville recruiting office. Wilkinson approached Bartlett and told him that he 
had seventy-two men out in the country who wanted to enlist in the Union Army, but “wished for 
some protection” in order to make the fifteen-mile trip to the town of Goodlettsville, just north of 
Nashville.195 Bartlett immediately arranged for Company A of the 2nd USCT to “bring them in” 
the following day, and assigned himself and another recruiting agent to meet up with the 
regiment just outside of town.196  
At the appointed time the next day, Bartlett and his fellow agent met up with Wilkinson 
and the men of Company A, and proceeded about fifteen miles north to Goodlettsville. 
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According to Bartlett, the sight of “niggars with guns” was a “bitter pill for [the white citizens of 
Goodlettsville] to swallow,” but they remained silent while the regiment went to the designated 
location and returned with thirty-eight newly freed slaves.197 Once he was back in Nashville and 
had time to reflect on the day, Bartlett told his wife that the sizable number of new recruits gave 
him “great pleasure,” and that the conduct displayed by the black soldiers during the raid 
demonstrated that “the negro could be as good a soldier as the white man.”198 The expedition 
perfectly captures the workings of emancipation. An escaped slave had journeyed to a Union 
Army outpost charged with implementing federal policy of enticing and recruiting slaves; the 
recruiters arranged for the help of the USCT, and with the now-former slaves’ guidance 
proceeded to enforce the Emancipation Proclamation in the Tennessee countryside.  
Recruiting for a second regiment took longer than Bartlett expected, but by late October 
he was reporting that “things are in working order” and that he expected no further delays in 
raising regiments.199 By the middle of November, he reported that recruiting in Nashville was 
“nearly played out,” although a he was still obtaining recruits every day.200 Indeed, at the 
moment Bartlett was writing that letter, four more regiments were now being formed throughout 
middle Tennessee, with the 4th at Clarksville, the 5th at Columbia, and the 6th at Murfreesboro. 
Even during a period he considered a lull in recruiting, Bartlett had to interrupt his letter writing 
to deal with paperwork for one hundred men coming in from Stevenson, Alabama.201 
 Both Bartlett and Stearns also deemed the “question of colored troops to involve the 
question of the elevation and improvement of the race.” To this end, Stearns undertook the 
beginnings of a massive humanitarian effort for black refugees in Nashville, including 
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establishing a contraband camp, hospital, and educational outreach.202 When Stearns had arrived 
in Nashville, there was little to no organized provision for the care of black refugees, despite the 
disease and starvation suffered by those refugees concentrated in the Tennessee capital.203 Joseph 
G. McKee and M.M. Brown, agents for a northern benevolent society reported that blacks 
“occup[ied] old and decayed buildings and cellars and outhouses as dwellings and from the 
insufficiency of shelter and the scarcity and high price of food, suffering must ensue from their 
present condition.” 204 Recognizing that something needed to be done immediately, Stearns 
commandeered a deserted church at the edge of town to begin placing the wives and children of 
soldiers who had enlisted. Rations were drawn for these refugees and “as fast as possible they 
were hired out.”205  
Recruiting agents stationed in Nashville spent much of their time dealing with the 
humanitarian crisis. Bartlett reported that many agents felt it was their duty to assist these 
refugees, and that he spent a significant amount of time helping them to find paid work. “I have 
had three women and their children here with me for the last day or two,” Bartlett told his wife, 
and he was relieved to have “at last disposed of them all” by sending two to work as cooks and 
finding a spot in the hospital for another mother and her small children.206 All of these women 
and children were family members of black soldiers, and Bartlett expressed surprise that “the 
men seem to think that if we recruit them we must also provide for their families.”207 At the same 
time that Bartlett recognized that “we can not turn them out onto the streets and so of course we 
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have to take care of them.”208 In early November, Bartlett told his wife that Stearns was also 
“hard at work trying to make some arrangement for the provision of the wives and families of 
soldiers.”209 
Stearns’s broader humanitarian efforts included working to establish schools for African 
American refugees in Nashville. During the fall of 1863, Stearns utilized his network of wealthy 
friends in New England, Philadelphia, and other northern states to procure teachers and establish 
a permanent school for African American girls. While they would run into problems of funding, 
supplies, and white violence, by February 1865 four schools had opened in the Nashville area 
that were supported by northern benevolent societies and the Union Army.210 Stearns also 
directed that the chaplains of the new regiments make “instruction of the regiment a part and the 
principal part of their duty.” W.F. Mitchells, a “competent and hardworking gentleman” 
appointed by the Pennsylvania Freedman’s Association was appointed to superintend the 
establishment of schools in east and middle Tennessee, as well as in Northern Georgia and 
Alabama.211 In the estimation of Stearns’s successor, Reuben Mussey, the major he had taken the 
first steps towards “freeing and educating and enfranchising the colored race, not as colored 
people, but as human beings.”212  
Stearns was not around to see the fruits of his labors, having resigned his commission in 
January, 1864.  According to the explanation given by Stearns’s son, the major left following a 
personal disagreement with Secretary Stanton. In late November, Stearns asked Stanton for a 
furlough so that he could spend some time at home in Medford. Stanton did not reply to 
Stearns’s initial request, so the major journeyed to Washington in mid-December and met with 
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Stanton, who granted him leave. Returning to Washington in early January, Stearns evidently 
tried for several days to see the Secretary of War again. When the two happened to encounter 
each other at a party, Stanton brusquely asked Stearns why he was not then in Tennessee. 
Stearns, deeply insulted by Stanton’s public rebuke, resigned the next day.  
The records of Stearns’s subordinate and replacement, Reuben D. Mussey, hint at a 
different explanation. In early February 1864, Colonel T.J. Morgan, then visiting Knoxville on 
recruiting business, wrote to Mussey that Assistant Adjutant General and Head of the Bureau of 
Colored Troops C.W. Foster believed Stearns was a “mere trickster” who, “through political 
influence had secured a majorship and that his chief desire was to get the pay of such rank.”213 
Morgan told Mussey that he had taken steps to correct this impression, but also informed him 
that the question of who organized the colored troops was receiving a great deal of attention, 
making Foster and Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas a “little jealous” of Stearns.214 Morgan 
concluded that one or both men had taken “some steps to make their connection with the matter 
apparent.”215  
It is possible that the personal slights that took place between Stearns and Stanton just 
happened to occur around the same time all the whispering about Stearns and the attention he 
was receiving. Another possible explanation is that Stearns had somehow gotten wind of the 
back channel politicking, and that he was going to see Stanton to set the record straight. Stearns 
may have taken Stanton’s inability to see him, and the confrontational attitude when he finally 
did, as evidence that Foster, who worked closely with Stanton in Washington, had succeeded in 
convincing the Secretary that Stearns was unworthy of his post.216 If these whispers about 
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Stearns had reached the ear of his immediate subordinate, it seems likely that Stearns would be 
aware of them as well, particularly considering that Mussey greatly admired his boss, and 
nothing in Mussey’s correspondence suggests he was angling for Stearns’s job. Whatever the 
explanation, there was no denying Stearns had been effective. He had been recruiting in the 
Department of the Cumberland for just over one hundred days, enlisted over 6,000 men, 
established a functioning network of agents and recruiting posts, and began several important 
humanitarian efforts on behalf of freed people in Nashville.  
 Reuben D. Mussey was the obvious choice to succeed George Stearns. A young, 
Dartmouth-educated journalist, Mussey shared Stearns’s commitment to the “sacred work” of 
recruiting black troops, as well as to the education and humanitarian care for the freedmen. 
Shortly after Mussey assumed command of the Nashville office, he wrote to the Philadelphia 
Freedman’s Society what amounted to a guiding philosophy of his time in Nashville. The people 
of the United States were “sadly mistaken,” Mussey wrote, if they believed that the only task at 
hand was to “break the chains of bondage.”217 The recruiting and enlisting of black soldiers was 
“a minor half of our duty,” and Mussey vowed to use his new position to help place blacks “upon 
the same plane where they would have stood had we not held them in bondage.”218 Mussey 
considered his recruiting efforts to be the first of several steps in transforming slaves into 
freedmen, and a slave state into a free state.  
 Even as letters streamed into the Nashville office still addressed to Major Stearns, 
Mussey began assessing the overall progress of black recruiting in Tennessee. Visiting the 
Department of the Ohio, Thomas Morgan, commanding the 14th USCT, reported that many high-
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ranking men were “warm friends of the move [to recruit black troops],” and that the new 
commander “expressed pleasure at the thought of the work being pushed forward with rigor.”219 
Morgan was particularly impressed by General Davis Tillson, Chief of Artillery and the officer 
responsible for constructing the defenses around Knoxville. “[Tillson] has the correct ideas in 
relation to negroes and negro troops,” Morgan enthusiastically informed Mussey, and was 
warmly supportive “in the cause of the liberation and education of the blacks.”220 Morgan also 
noted that several generals known to be less welcoming of recruiting black troops would 
ultimately do nothing to oppose it, “being too cautious to put their fingers in the crack when Sec. 
Stanton can so easily shut the door.”221 From Chattanooga, a recruiting agent reported to 
Mussey, “there is nothing to prevent the formation of a col’d reg[iment] here,” while the 
commander of Union forces stationed at Sparta, Tennessee informed the USCT office that there 
were “a great many colored men here who wish to enter the service.”222 Most promising to 
Mussey was that soldiers who had “ever been enemies of these unfortunate people” were 
applying in droves to command black regiments.223  
Mussey might have been a little less sanguine had he been aware of the problems facing 
the refugee rendezvous Camp Foster, just outside Nashville. Captain Ralph Hunt, the 
commander of the camp, had little interest in caring for black refugees. USCT officers reported 
to Mussey that surgeons under Hunt’s direction were providing inadequate medical care to black 
soldiers, and refusing to explain their actions.224 The commissary for the camp reported that  
“none of the officers at the camp give me any direction as to the manner or quantity of my issue 
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of supplies,” and that he frequently had to guess at the total number of people needing food.225 
After further observation, the commissary concluded that the supplies authorized and allowed the 
refugees were “not sufficient for [black soldier’s] comfortable healthful subsistence.”226 In mid-
May, Mussey told another officer that the mortality rate at Camp Foster had grown to between 
three and four refugees per day.227  
By June 1864, conditions in the camp had grown so desperate that the Senate sent a two-
man team out to Nashville to investigate. The commissioners found the camp devoid of 
“anything tending to the reasonable comfort of its unfortunate inmates.”228 Captain Hunt, in 
addition to siphoning off supplies meant for the contrabands for his own private use, had five 
horses reserved for himself, and had the inmates of the camp build him a “fine brick house” for 
his official headquarters as superintendent.229 Refugees were poorly fed and housed in 
dilapidated tents, with many dying as a result of the outright neglect by “those whose duty it was 
to provide care for them.”230 While the investigators recognized that the government’s attempt to 
“provide for the wants and ameliorate the conditions of these unfortunate refugees” was well 
intentioned, the effort was likely to flounder until a “sound-judging, sagacious, energetic and 
philanthropic” person was placed in charge.231 Hunt was eventually replaced as commanding 
officer of the camp, but conditions at Camp Foster remained bleak. 
 Mussey regarded the failure of Union officers and officials to care for African American 
refugees as intolerable, and he did everything in his power to alleviate their sufferings. Office 
records show that he corresponded regularly with freedman’s aid associations in an attempt to 
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gather more supplies for black refugees, and that he sought to have contraband camps within his 
area of operations placed under his control. At the end of March he wrote Abraham Taylor, 
President of the Contraband Relief Association in Cincinnati, that he had succeeded in getting 
another contraband camp placed under his supervision, located near Huntsville, Alabama.232 
Mussey had been in contact with the new head of the camp, and requested that Taylor send a 
variety of seeds including cucumber, radish, melon, cabbage, and onion so that the refugees 
could be assured a variety of food.233 Mussey also offered the camp’s commander some pointed 
advice about his primary responsibilities, urging him to “confine yourself to the necessities of 
these people” and make sure that “the distribution of contributions of clothing +c from Northern 
aid societies and philanthropic individuals, the general care for these people, temporary and 
spiritual needs, assisting them to find compensated employment, procuring from the Post 
Commandant rations for them and superintending their issue” were his primary objectives.234 By 
the fall of 1864, Mussey was lobbying to establish the position of Superintendent of Freedmen in 
Tennessee, who would have discretionary authority in dealing with the care for black refugees.235 
 Intertwined with Mussey’s concern for black refugees was his desire to continue 
expanding Stearns’s education system. To that end, he endeavored to accommodate teachers 
from northern benevolent associations who came to educate the freed-persons. “I am very glad 
that your association is to send teachers [to Nashville]” Mussey wrote to the head of the 
Philadelphia Freedman’s Benevolent Association, “and I will, to the extent of my ability, most 
heartily cooperate with them.”236 Mussey made good on his promise. When teachers complained 
of cramped quarters, insufficient school supplies, and an inability to draw rations, or fell ill, he 
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tried to correct the problems. On several occasions, Mussey personally inspected the workings of 
the schools in Nashville. In mid-May 1864, Mussey reported to Washington that he had just 
come from one such observation, noting that about 200 students total attended the school, where 
he had observed one class of “20-30 [students] of all sexes” who demonstrated “they were all 
eager to learn.”237  
 Mussey’s efforts to expand freedman’s education ran into several hurdles. Primarily, 
there was a shortage of teachers and basic educational materials. In early June, Mussey glumly 
reported that all the teachers sent to Nashville by the Freedmen’s Aid Association were sick with 
typhoid fever and that one had already died.238 Robert R. Wescott, a teacher in one of the 
Nashville schools, reported that he “could have more scholars” if he had more resources, but that 
with no assistance there were only so many students he could attend to at one time.239 Mussey 
had greater success with the education of men in USCT regiments. In early 1865, he proudly 
informed the War Department that every black regiment he helped recruit had some type of 
arrangement for each of his regimental chaplains to help supervise the educational advancement 
of black troops.240   
  Although Mussey considered the education of, and humanitarian care for, African 
Americans to be an essential component of his role as head of the Nashville office, his principle 
duty remained the recruiting of black troops. All through the spring, Mussey experienced similar 
ebbs and flows in recruiting to those Stearns had seen the previous fall. In his weekly updates to 
the Washington, Mussey often alternated between reports of good progress and none at all. For 
example, on March 28th and April 4th, Mussey told Washington that continued reports from all 
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fronts indicated that men were being recruited in good numbers, with the 17th USCT in need of 
only 25 more men to complete the regiment.241 However, on April 11th, Mussey wrote to 
Washington, “little has been done in the progress of recruiting in his portion of [Tennessee]” and 
elaborated on the reasons why he believed numbers were down.242 According to Mussey, a 
combination of high wages for black laborers, the development of free-labor plantations, and the 
refusal of the government to pay black soldiers the same as whites were all limiting the number 
of recruits.243  
By the second week of May, Mussey reported that recruiting had slowed to a trickle, and 
expressed frustration at having received little further information about the progress of the 42nd 
and 44th USCT.244 Despite his dismay, he noted that “the advance of [Sherman’s] army [from 
Chattanooga] is expected to give a large number of recruits,” and that the provost marshals had 
been instructed to “act as recruiting agents” and to “send back all men for recruits.”245 On the 
first of June, he wrote that efforts had met with “little success at the front,” but that the “cordon 
holding the blacks will break soon” with enough recruits could be found at the front to easily fill 
up the 44th USCT.246  
Mussey also found cause for optimism in the number of slaves coming from Kentucky to 
Tennessee. As will be discussed in a later chapter, Kentucky slaves flooded into Tennessee in 
such high numbers during the late spring and summer of 1864 that it became nearly impossible 
to keep an accurate count. On June 7th, Mussey wrote the War Department—in a letter he 
tellingly marked “unofficial”—that he had just received nearly 350 recruits from Kentucky and, 
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promised the War Department that if were allowed to establish five camps in Kentucky he would 
fill five regiments in six weeks.247 One estimate placed the number of Kentucky slaves at the 
Clarksville, Tennessee recruiting post (just across the Kentucky border) at around 500, and 
Mussey was soon begging George Stearns to use his political connections to finagle recruiting 
agents in Tennessee authority to operate in the Bluegrass State.248 Even without that authority, 
Union officials in Kentucky estimated that several thousand slaves from the Bluegrass States had 
enlisted at Tennessee recruiting posts by July 1864.249  
Mussey dealt swiftly and severely with any cases of mistreatment of black soldiers or 
refugees. In mid-April, several cases came to Mussey’s attention concerning the abuse of 
soldiers by officers in the 13th and 16th USCT. The colonel of the 13th USCT was accused of 
tying down and flogging the men of his command, and trying to pass off a “woman of bad 
character” as his wife to his soldiers.250 Two other officers were charged with having 
impregnated a black women residing near the camp. After sifting through written evidence and 
oral testimony from all three incidents, Mussey was persuaded the charges were true and 
recommended to Adjutant General Thomas that the offending soldiers be dismissed from the 
service.251 Later in the spring, Mussey also reported continued hostility between white Tennessee 
(Union) troops and the black regiments he had been recruiting. At Gallatin, white troops had 
recently burned the building used for a black school, with matters growing so strained that 
Mussey was informed, “no negro dares to walk the streets of Gallatin.”252 When members of the 
6th Kentucky Cavalry (Union) fired on black soldiers doing guard duty, Mussey had the incident 
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officially investigated. When the mayor of Columbia, Tennessee reportedly flogged a black 
teacher, Mussey had him tried by a military commission.253  
 During the summer and fall of 1864, a new category of recruiting agents added to 
Mussey’s problems. Up until this point, most of the recruiters used by both Stearns and Mussey 
had been involved in recruiting the 54th and 55th Massachusetts a year earlier, had followed 
Stearns to the Department of the Cumberland, and were committed to the idea of black troops. 
This changed abruptly when Congress passed a law on July 4th 1864 allowing Northern states to 
recruit in Alabama and Georgia, with those recruits filling the state quotas.254 Predictably, agents 
of Northern states began to flood into the Department of the Cumberland and elsewhere in search 
of recruits. In theory, the idea would strengthen federal recruiting efforts of black soldiers and 
benefit both the state and federal governments. Initially, Mussey had high hopes, writing Stearns 
that the plan would help fulfill his “utmost desire” to see blacks near the front recruited into the 
Union Army.255  
In practice, the state recruiting agents were a disaster. Part of the problem was that the 
Union commander of the Army of the Tennessee, William T. Sherman, considered the idea of 
civilian recruiters a “nuisance,” arguing that “bidding and bartering” for recruits would only 
hamper Union efforts to reinforce their armies. Furthermore, Sherman told one recruiting agent 
in late July that, although he would continue to “conduct [blacks] to safe points,” he preferred to 
use them only as teamsters, laborers, and cooks because they “were in a transition state” and thus 
“not the equal of the white man.” 256 Sherman also sent a stream of invective-laced telegrams to 
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Washington, telling General-in-Chief Henry Halleck that the policy was “the height of folly” and 
that he refused to allow recruiters around his army.257 Sherman’s dispatches immediately caught 
the attention of Lincoln, who wired the general a reminder that a “law is a law,” and that “it is 
not for the War Department or myself, to restrain or modify the law in its execution, further than 
actual necessity may require.”258 Although he acknowledged to Sherman that he not 
“apprehended…[the state agents] would produce such an inconvenience to the armies in the 
field” Lincoln also pointedly asked the fiery general to give his “hearty cooperation.”259 
Despite this prodding from his commander-in-chief, Sherman barely modified his 
position. As Mussey told Stearns in early August, Sherman lets recruiting agents “go to the front 
but refuses to provide subsistence for the recruits nor does he allow them transportation back. 
[Sherman] is determined they shall not succeed.”260 A few days later Mussey tried to offer 
several suggestions about how to work around the problem, but confidentially told Stearns, “two 
years of negro valor has produced no further impression on a general holding Sherman’s 
position.”261 For his part, Sherman continued to tell Washington that his “peculiar notions” were 
shared “by a great portion of our fighting men,” and that all the officers and men in the Union 
Army were “down on it as they see it as a form of buying substitutes.”262 Believing that the 
recruiting efforts would thus pose several problems for his army, and knowing how politically 
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important his campaign against Atlanta was to the Lincoln administration in an election year, 
Sherman largely refused to have any dealings with the “unscrupulous state agents.”263  
 Mussey soon came to share Sherman’s appraisal of the state agents. No sooner had the 
state agents begun to arrive and register with Mussey’s office than he was telegraphing 
Washington that the states here have been “unfortunate in their [choice of] agents.”264 One agent 
had already suggested to Mussey that it would be to his “pecuniary advantage” to help him 
secure recruits, while another asked Mussey’s military secretary if he was open to being 
bribed.265 Perhaps most troubling, while the state agents had been prohibited from recruiting in 
Tennessee, a third agent proposed to “get men [in Tennessee] and swear they were from 
Alabama,” then collect the bounty.266 By the second week in August Mussey doubted “there are 
five of the 36 agents who care a snap of their finger for the negro or who are interested in the 
Colored Troops.”267 The exasperated colonel began keeping a tally of the number of agents he 
had registered along with the number of men they had recruited and sending it Washington.  
Attempted bribery and fraud were the least of the problems caused by the state agents. 
Indeed, Mussey’s Register of Letters Sent for the late summer and early autumn of 1864 reads 
like a crime blotter. State agents were investigated for alcohol abuse, disorderly conduct, and 
having “unspoken persons” frequenting their tents at night.268 Even worse, two state recruiting 
agents were arrested for kidnapping slaves and forcing them into the service at Stevenson, 
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Alabama. Evidently, the two agents, in cooperation with two or three field officers, were also 
guilty of impressing slaves, throwing them into jail and keeping them there “until to get there 
freedom they consented to enlist.”269 Mussey had at least one of the agent’s passes revoked and 
ordered him to leave the department, and fumed to a friend that the state agents overall were 
chiefly concerned with “outbidding and overreaching each other.”270 Worst of all from Mussey’s 
perspective, the state agents “have no heart in the anti-slavery movement,” and consequently 
their efforts did not add much to overall recruiting numbers.271 As early as August 22nd, Mussey 
was reporting that many agents were already on their way home.272    
 Officers from USCT regiments also became involved in state agent’s fraudulent schemes. 
In mid-September, Mussey reported a series of charges brought against a Major Jackson of the 
15th USCT for “bringing to Nashville men recruited in Tennessee and selling them to New York 
agent as recruited in Georgia and Alabama.”273 The men were mustered into the credit of the 
State of New York, with Jackson and the colonel of the 15th USCT dividing the bounty between 
them. Mussey had the officers investigated by a military commission, and Major Jackson was 
ultimately cashiered from the service.274  
 Fraudulent recruiting practices, along with the abuse of black soldiers and refugees, were 
difficult to eradicate because they were sanctioned by some district or department commanders. 
Since at least the spring of 1864, Mussey had been engaged in a campaign to have Major General 
Lovell H. Rousseau, Commander of the Military District of Nashville, removed from his post. 
According to Mussey, Rousseau—a Unionist former slaveholder from Kentucky—had long been 
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playing a double game of “talking anti-slavery,” but violating military orders “allow[ing] 
slaveholders to take their slaves back from our lines.”275 When an investigation into Rousseau’s 
involvement into the abuse of blacks at Gallatin, Tennessee failed to dislodge him, Mussey 
apparently began compiling his own evidence and sending it to Washington.276 By mid-August, 
Mussey was telling anyone who would listen that “our trouble here may be summed up in one 
word—Rousseau.”277 
Mussey had obtained copies of an order from Rousseau to the commander of the Union 
post at Clarksville to allow an unnamed Kentuckian to take his slaves from inside Union lines 
back into Kentucky “without interference from the military authorities.”278 According to Mussey, 
there were numerous examples of Rousseau ordering slaves to be taken back “provided they are 
willing,” including the story of a ten-year-old boy whose master came with two soldiers to 
Edgefield, “got [the boy], and drove off.”279 In another instance, a black woman employed as a 
nurse by Mussey told the colonel’s wife, “not even the Confederates had hurt the Colored people 
as General Rousseau.”280 “Every Union man here prays for his removal,” Mussey told an 
influential friend, going on to plead for his removal before concluding “secessionists he aids, 
Union men he bothers and punishes.”281  
After compiling a catalogue of Rousseau’s transgressions, Mussey wrote several 
Congressman about the district commander. Specifically, Mussey had learned of a military 
commission at Columbia, Tennessee as a consequence of several cases of “enormous and 
outrageous abuses of colored men and women by citizens” that had been dissolved leaving 
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several cases untried.282 In cases where the accused were found guilty, Rousseau had 
disapproved the findings on a technicality, but accepted the findings where the accused were 
acquitted. Because of Rousseau’s political clout—Mussey complained several times that “he has 
all the [news]papers”—Mussey begged the commissioners not just to investigate those particular 
cases, but the management of the entire Union post at Columbia.283  
 Mussey further elaborated that, having received reports from “reliable men,” an 
investigation would show that the colonel of the 14th Michigan had surrendered slaves to their 
owners, that these slave owners whipped and shot their returned slaves to death without any 
interference, that extraordinary favors were granted to secessionists, that displays of loyalty to 
the Union by blacks were frowned upon, and that the “whole economy” was sanctioned by 
Rousseau.284 In a separate letter to Stearns, Mussey informed his predecessor that the “perfectly 
infamous” conduct of the District Commander required Mussey to personally visit Washington 
to make a full accounting of Rousseau’s “outrages and wrongs.”285 Knowing how deeply Stearns 
still cared about affairs in Tennessee, and likely trying to secure his political clout, Mussey 
warned his predecessor, “[Rouseau] must go out if we want to do anything [in Tennessee] for 
liberty and Nationality.”286 Unfortunately, Rousseau’s position as a Kentucky Unionist, 
combined with the political clout he had accrued as District Commander in Nashville, allowed 
him to stay in his post in the Tennessee capital. 
 Although Mussey was preoccupied with state recruiting agent problems and General 
Rousseau’s transgressions, he was still heavily involved with the activities of black troops. 
Despite support for black soldiers in combat roles from people such as Mussey, Chetlain and 
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Adjutant General Thomas, other commanders, including Sherman and George Thomas, limited 
them to garrison duty, guarding railroads, and work on fortifications. This was not to say that 
black troops did not see much action. In December 1863, the 61st USCT Infantry successfully 
defended the railroad depot it was guarding at Moscow, Tennessee. Other skirmishes soon 
followed through the winter of 1863-1864 as Confederate guerillas continued their attacks 
against black troops guarding Union supply lines.287  
The most infamous Tennessee battle that black troops took part in was at Fort Pillow on 
April 12th 1864. Following the Union soldiers’ evacuation of the fort, Confederate forces under 
General Nathan Bedford Forrest massacred both black and white troops who were attempting to 
surrender.  Nearly two hundred USCT soldiers, along with about one hundred white Union 
troops, were killed. Confederate surgeon Samuel Caldwell later wrote his wife “terrible was the 
slaughter” that followed the battle, and adding, “it was the most horrible sight that I have ever 
witnessed.”288 From Nashville, a fuming Mussey wrote the War Department that it was the 
gravest crime committed during the entire war.289  
 Infuriated USCT troops nursed a burning desire for vengeance during the summer and 
fall of 1864. Many also chafed at being confined to guard or fortification duty, a sentiment that 
was likely exacerbated by their continued conflicts with white (Union) troops. In late November 
Mussey noted to a member General Chetlain’s staff that “considerable ill-feeling” still existed 
between black and white troops in Nashville, and that violence tended to break out “when [the 
white troops] get under the influence of liquor.”290 The resentment of black soldiers at this 
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continued violence was “sharp,” but many in the USCT in the Department of the Cumberland 
believed the only way to make it stop was by proving themselves in a major battle.291  
They finally got their chance at the battle of Nashville in mid-December 1864. On 
December 15th, the 12th, 13th, 14th, 17th, 18th and 44th USCT executed a successful diversionary 
feint against the right wing of Confederate General John Bell Hood’s Army of Tennessee.292 
This success made possible George H. Thomas’s sledgehammer blow against Hood’s left wing, 
forcing a Confederate retreat to a new defensive position.293 The following day, black regiments 
again played a key role, suffering heavy casualties in an attack on the center of Hood’s line, but 
occupying Confederate attention long enough for Union forces to smash through the Confederate 
left.294 A second charge against the Confederate center than broke through the Confederate line, 
prompting a watching General Thomas to assert that “the question is settled, the negroes will 
fight.”295 A jubilant Mussey wrote afterwards that the black soldiers “have sustained the part 
assigned them with distinguished bravery and honor,” and pointedly told Washington, “as I rode 
over the ground in front of the Fort, black and white dead lay side by side.”296  
 As Union armies inched closer to victory during the winter of 1864-1865, Mussey began 
turning his attention towards the reconstruction of Tennessee. Interestingly, while Mussey 
acknowledged the importance of facilitating the transition from slave to free labor on abandoned 
and confiscated plantations, a free labor system does not appear to have been implemented on as 
wide a scale as Lorenzo Thomas’s efforts in the Mississippi River Valley. In Tennessee, this 
effort commenced on April 18th, 1863 when Edwin Stanton issued instructions to Andrew 
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Johnson pursuant to his authority as Military Governor of Tennessee. As part of an order 
defining his responsibilities and authority, Johnson was instructed to “lease for occupation and 
cultivation” any abandoned land and plantations falling within his jurisdiction, and also to take 
charge of abandoned slaves “whose masters have been, or are now, engaged in rebellion.”297 
Stanton further instructed Johnson to “provide for [freepersons’] useful employment and 
subsistence,” in this case meaning that able-bodied males could perform work on fortifications, 
while also taking steps to find work for all others “of whatever age or sex.”298 Any sick or 
invalid refugees were to be provided with hospital care, while the quartermaster and commissary 
would furnish clothing and subsistence.299  
 Although Johnson would employ large numbers of black men to work on fortifications, 
railroads, and other public projects, the plantation element of Stanton’s instructions did not begin 
to take shape until nearly ten months later, in February 1864.300 In General Orders Number 2, 
dated February 4th—the same orders that established the infamous contraband camp under 
Captain  Hunt—Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas instructed that all able-bodied males received 
into Union lines be mustered into Federal service, and all other blacks would be “required to 
perform such labor as may be suited to their several conditions” on farms or plantations.301 
Civilians of “known loyalty” could apply to hire black workers, and sign annual contracts with 
terms that were virtually identical to the ones Thomas had established in the Mississippi River 
Valley.302 Employers were required to agree to feed, pay, and “treat humanely” all their workers, 
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and if “persons of sufficient character and responsibility” could not be found, district 
commanders could assign black workers to abandoned or confiscated farms and plantations.303  
  Thomas’s order had less of an impact in the Department of the Cumberland than its twin 
in the Mississippi River Valley. As several historians have pointed out, not only was there 
competition for black male laborers with the USCT and Andrew Johnson in Tennessee, but 
officers such as District Commander Rousseau also seemed to have little interest in the program, 
and their apathy drew both Mussey’s ire and his extended ruminations on the future of the 
state.304 In mid-August 1864, Mussey wrote an extended rumination on the subject entitled 
“Considerations Relative to the Restoration of Civil Government in Tennessee, and the Abolition 
of Slavery in that State.” The essay, which fills five full pages of Mussey’s Letters Sent book, is 
constructed as a series of recommendations, the hypothetical objections that might be raised to 
those proposals, and Mussey’s responses.305  
Mussey based his arguments on the premise that, “slavery must be wiped out in 
Tennessee.”306 This might be accomplished readily enough by enlisting all able-bodied male 
slaves into the army, but for the “lingering notion” among some Tennessee slave owners that 
“the thing will somehow be ‘fixed up’ and that they will be allowed to retain their slaves.”307 
Mussey feared that in local and statewide elections, these slaveholders would unite with 
conservative Union men and those who had taken the amnesty oath to defeat the 
administration.308 The government needed to adopt measures to accomplish the destruction of 
slavery, and make these “Northern adventurers” feel the presence of the government. The great 
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question, according to Mussey, was “can these measure be accomplished by some action, and if 
so what is that action?”309 For Mussey the solution was to establish the Provost Marshal’s 
Bureau in the State of Tennessee. If established, the Provost Marshal’s Bureau could direct its 
operations “to the procurement chiefly of colored recruits and make a thorough enrollment of all 
persons liable to the draft within our lines.”310  
 Trying to anticipate reactions to this plan, Mussey wrote out what he believed to be the 
most likely and forceful objections. In his estimation, the greatest obstacle was that the Provost 
Marshal Bureau had not been established in insurrectionary districts and it would be impossible 
in a state so “debatable” as Tennessee for its operation to be successful.311 For Mussey however, 
the answer was self-evident: the establishment of the Bureau would indicate “permanency in 
occupation” that would strengthen Union men and discourage those loyal to the Confederacy. 
Mussey noted that if Sherman captured Atlanta, the only close forces would be guerillas and 
raiders, and a Provost force could be cobbled together to meet this threat from Pennsylvania, 
Missouri, and Kentucky.312 Regarding the numerous departments that already existed in the state, 
and the problems that introducing the Provost Marshal would add, Mussey wrote that the head of 
the Bureau only needed to have a distinct understanding of his duties a spirit of accommodation, 
and “judiciously locating” a military force under his command that would not report to any other 
commanders.313 Unsurprisingly, Mussey recommended the USCT for the job, knowing that black 
soldiers would get more black recruits than white soldiers, and would more forcefully convince 
everyone that “all hopes of resuscitating [slavery] should be abandoned.”314 Finally, Mussey 
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asserted that the Provost Marshal Bureau should be headquartered at Nashville, and that a force 
be raised by levying a quota on all the districts of Tennessee with special attention paid to getting 
“rid forever of slavery in this state and assuring Tennessee to the cause of Liberty and 
Nationality.”315 Interestingly, although Mussey wrote his thoughts down in the official record 
book of his office, he apparently never shared them with the War Department. 
 In early 1865, with Lincoln having won re-election, the Confederacy close to collapse, 
and Union victory in sight, Mussey revisited the subject of Tennessee’s reconstruction. In a 
series of pointed questions to himself, he promulgated questions that Tennessee and, indeed 
many of the disloyal states would grapple with during Reconstruction. “Where should this 
supervision [of the freedman] be? In the hands of the civil or military authorities?”316 While 
Mussey readily admitted that the question was a civil one under normal circumstances, he knew 
that any civil authority in Tennessee that would protect and enumerate the rights of the freedmen 
would be one whose authority “rested in and flows from the Military Governor whose authority 
is supported by the machinery of armies rather than courts.”317 The implications for Mussey were 
clear: if freedom for African Americans were to be more than simply the absence of slavery, if it 
were to involve expanded civil, political, and labor rights, along with land redistribution, it 
would have to continue to rely on the force of Union arms.318 To what degree that would or 
could be done, Mussey concluded, could not yet be answered. 
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CHAPTER 3 
“All The Abolitionists Here Assist Me”: Benjamin Butler, Nathaniel Banks, and Emancipation in 
the Department of The Gulf, 1862-1865. 
 
On March 17th 1865, a “mass meeting of the colored citizens” took place at Economy 
Hall in New Orleans. The attendees passed a series of resolutions criticizing the limitations on 
emancipation in the Department of the Gulf, and forwarded the document to the departmental 
commander, Major General Stephen A. Hurlbut. Specifically, the petitioners denounced the labor 
system introduced by Hurlbut’s predecessor, Major General Nathaniel Banks, as  “not practically 
differ[ing] from slavery,” though they added important caveats based on the prohibition of 
selling and whipping human beings.1 Moreover, the resolutions condemned the workings of the 
Union Army’s Bureau of Free Labor as “inconsistent with freedom,” and informed the 
commanding general that “without the right of contracting freely, and voluntarily, on the terms 
of labor,” there could be no concrete freedom for any black workers in the Department of the 
Gulf.2 Further grievances lambasted the restrictions on black mobility, the arbitrary power of the 
Provost Marshal General Bureau, and policies pursued by superintendent of the Bureau of Free 
Labor, Thomas W. Conway. The petitioners concluded by declaring that unless emancipation 
was simply a “falsehood intended to deceive the world,” Union officials needed to begin 
expanding the civil, political, and economic freedoms of black people.3   
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General Hurlbut’s reply was blistering. “Instead of assembling in Mass meetings and 
wasting your time in high sounding resolutions,” he scolded the petitioners; they should devote 
their time to “assisting in the physical and moral improvements of the Freedmen.”4 Addressing 
each of the petition’s grievances, Hurlbut fiercely defended the accomplishments of existing 
emancipation policy by enumerating the differences between slavery and freedom that now 
existed in the Department of the Gulf:  
The Freedmen is paid for his labor, the slave is not. The Freedman’s wife and family are 
his—The slave’s are not. Black education is given to the Freedmen and his children. To 
the slave it is forbidden. The Freedmen can bring suits and be witness. The slave cannot. 
These things you know to be true and yet you falsify and deny these great facts.5 
 
Hurlbut was far from finished. The general also reminded the delegation that the presence 
of the Union army was a necessity. Without the aid and protection of federal troops, the 
freedmen could be “defrauded” out of their wages, forced into lopsided labor contracts, and have 
no guarantees that any contracts would be fulfilled. “You cannot do away with the effects of two 
centuries of wrong upon White and Black in a day or a year,” Hurlbut haughtily concluded, “you 
must wait and work. Not call meetings and pass resolutions.”6  
 Hurlbut’s response grates on our modern ears. At best, the general appears insensitive to 
black refugee’s tenuous hold on freedom. At worst, Hurlbut represents the embodiment of one 
historian’s conclusion that “the [Union] military did not care about the welfare of the slaves.”7 
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Closer scrutiny, however, reveals far more than a federal commander who was unsympathetic to 
the plight of newly emancipated persons. Indeed, Hurlbut’s response underscores the critical role 
of federal policy for the process of emancipation in the Department of the Gulf, and highlights 
the interworking between federal policy and departmental policy, as well as the impact these 
policies had on the ground-level operations of emancipation.  
Despite the relative simplicity of this observation, during the last forty years historians 
examining the Department of the Gulf have minimized the important role of federal policy in the 
process of emancipation, and have paid inadequate attention to the ways that federal and 
departmental policy built on, and reinforced, and occasionally contradicted each other. In order 
to remedy this deficiency, this chapter traces the development and implementation of Union 
emancipation policy in the Department of the Gulf, and analyzes both the problems and 
accomplishments connected with that implementation. Specifically, this chapter looks at three 
interrelated areas of policy formulation and operation: the recruiting and enlisting of black 
soldiers, the development of the free labor plantation system, and the establishment of a public 
education system for African Americans. In a similar manner to previous chapters on Lorenzo 
Thomas in Mississippi River Valley, and George Stearns in Nashville, Tennessee, my analysis 
looks at the ways that these three specific areas of policy formation were reflexive upon each 
other, thus belying many historians’ tendency to separate each out into discrete streams of 
analysis. 
In order to reassess the implementation of emancipation policy in the Department of the 
Gulf, this chapter begins with the arrival of Union forces and the capture of New Orleans in the 
spring of 1862. I examine the policies implemented by General Benjamin Butler regarding the 
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treatment of fugitive slaves, the recruiting of black soldiers, the initiation of a free-labor 
plantation system, and the actions taken to provide humanitarian care for black refugees. This 
section allots significant narrative space to the controversy between General Butler and General 
John W. Phelps over the latter’s refusal to return fugitive slaves and determination to enlist 
blacks into the army during the spring and summer of 1862. With a few notable exceptions, most 
historians have framed the Butler-Phelps exchange along a good guy/bad guy dichotomy that 
distorts the dispute into a personal clash over the morality of slavery.8 Yet a closer reading of the 
disagreement between Butler and Phelps belies these uncomplicated distinctions; the issues 
between the two generals revolved more around conflicting views over military commanders 
authority to free slaves, as well as the applicability of existing federal policy to the situation on 
the ground in Louisiana. In short, policy rather than personality shaped the trajectory of the 
Butler-Phelps disagreement.  
This chapter then looks at the policies and procedures pursued by Butler’s successor in 
Department of the Gulf, Major General Nathaniel P. Banks. Through a careful examination of 
the ways that Banks sought to implement federal emancipation policy, develop a free-labor 
plantation system and implement elements of humanitarian care for blacks, this section argues 
for a more evenhanded evaluation than the “Bobbin Boy” is usually accorded.9 It argues that 
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Banks was less conciliatory towards the planters, and more sympathetic towards emancipated 
blacks than historians have traditionally allowed, and that this was in part due to his obeying 
policy dictates emanating from Washington. Perhaps most importantly, it argues that Banks’s 
free-labor system was not, as many historians have contested, slavery by another name, but 
rather a determined attempt to effect a revolutionary transition from an economy built on 
property rights in human beings to one based on wage labor. This determination is reflected not 
only in Banks’s repeated attempts to correct problems with, and abuses of, his labor system, but 
in his appointment of committed anti-slavery advocates such as George Hepworth, Edwin 
Wheelock, and Benjamin Rush Plumly to positions where they could act on their beliefs. 
The objective in making these arguments is not to take an uncritical view of Butler, 
Banks, and the policies that they pursued. Without a doubt, both considered the cultivation of 
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Unionist sentiment amongst Louisiana planters to be a key component of their mission in the 
Department of the Gulf, and Banks in particular constructed his labor policies with a significant 
amount of their input. Moreover, the black refugees who made it to Union lines unquestionably 
suffered profound hardships through the neglect or abuse of Union army officials and white 
planters, and both generals proved to be only moderately effective in correcting these cruelties. 
At the same time, an understanding of what federal and department emancipation policy entailed, 
and how it operated, forces us to reassess the tenure of both Butler and Banks in the Department 
of the Gulf by explaining what those charged with implementing emancipation policy actually 
did, rather than what they failed to do, or might have done.  
 
In undertaking this re-evaluation of emancipation policy in the Department of the Gulf, 
this chapter places this region within the broader context of emancipation policy in the 
Mississippi River Valley and the Department of the Cumberland, enumerating both points of 
comparison and contrast. The issue of loyalty is paramount in this regard. Unlike many upriver 
areas of the Mississippi River Valley under the control of Adjutant General Thomas, as well as 
“the pocket” area of Middle Tennessee and Northern Alabama—excepting some in Nashville—
where George Stearns and Reuben Mussey operated, many planters in and around New Orleans 
proclaimed their uninterrupted loyalty to the federal government. These planters subsequently 
remained on their plantations when the Union army advanced into the countryside, and 
demanded that the army return any fugitive slaves and act as a police force against slave 
insurrection. Thus, Butler and Banks faced troublesome questions and competing interests 
regarding loyalty and the protection of slavery on a scale that far surpassed the areas examined in 
previous chapters. 
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These complications make following the operation of federal emancipation policy in the 
Department of the Gulf much less straightforward than in the Mississippi River Valley or Middle 
Tennessee. Adding a further layer of difficulty is that both Benjamin Butler and Nathaniel Banks 
men were professional political operatives, and lacked the by-the-book nature of Lorenzo 
Thomas or the humanitarian impulses of George Stearns and Rueben Mussey. In today’s 
parlance, Butler and Banks were adept at talking out of both sides of their mouths. Yet, it is 
precisely because the Department of the Gulf often proved to be such a quagmire that it so 
important. In spite of innumerable complications posed by loyalty, individual personality, and 
even the sheer scope of the Department of the Gulf, we can still clearly discern the workings of 
emancipation policy at multiple levels, thus serving as a reminder to historians that we ignore or 
marginalize policy at our own peril.  
Moreover, in analyzing the commands of both Butler and Banks, the intertwined social, 
political, and military elements of federal emancipation policy also forces a fundamental 
reconsideration of how Civil War historians construct their narratives. In a similar manner to 
works on both the upper portion of the Mississippi River Valley, Tennessee, Port Royal, South 
Carolina, and other areas, many works on the Department of the Gulf have fallen victim to a 
scholarly tendency to examine narrow slices of individual subjects. As a consequence, historians 
examining early efforts at Reconstruction or the transition from slave to free labor pay little 
attention to military operations, and those who do tend to shift their focus almost exclusively to 
political matters following the fall of Port Hudson in July, 1863. Yet this focus has led historians 
to largely neglect the importance of military operations for the political reconstruction of 
Louisiana and its subsequent readmission to the Union as a free state.10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Messner, Federal Army and the Blacks, 3. In Lincoln and Reconstruction, Peyton McCrary dispatches the Red 
River Campaign in two pages, while Union military operations flit in and out of Louis Gerteis’s From Contraband 
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This oversight is particularly evident during the failed Union attempts to undertake a 
campaign up the Red River and into Texas. Specifically, one argument this chapter will make is 
that the destruction of slavery and the desire to bring Louisiana back into the Union as a free 
state played a much more important role in the operational strategy of the campaign than 
historians have traditionally allowed.11 Simply put, it will highlight how the Lincoln 
administration needed Union armies to reclaim Louisiana so that officials could register 
Unionists, call a state convention that would ban slavery, and allow Louisiana to rejoin the 
Union as a free state. To this end, Major General Banks was ordered to neutralize the 
Confederate Army under General Richard Taylor, which depended on manpower and supplies 
coming from Texas. The Red River Campaign may have been a military debacle, but if we take 
into account the larger political goals that influenced operational strategy, the campaign must be 
judged in a different light. 
A few final words are in order concerning the geographic and chronological scope of this 
chapter. The Department of the Gulf stretched from Pensacola, Florida, westward across the 
bayous of southern Louisiana and terminated at Union outposts in Texas. At various intervals, 
the Union army marched northward and westward, covering most of the state of Louisiana and 
driving up the Mississippi River Valley. Since Union army headquarters were located in New 
Orleans, the Crescent City and the surrounding parishes occupy a predominant amount of space 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to Freedmen. Military historians have fared only slightly better, with William Dobak’s Freedom By The Sword and 
Gary Joiner’s Through the Howling Wilderness: The 1864 Red River Campaign and the Union Failure in the West 
(Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 2006) often struggling to try and convey the relationship 
between Union military movements and political developments in Louisiana.  
11 Most historians of the Red River Campaign emphasize that the decision to undertake the campaign was motivated 
by the Lincoln administrations desire for cotton, or to thwart French imperial objectives in Mexico. For the former 
emphasis, see Ludwell Johnson, The Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1958) and Stephen A. Townsend, The Yankee Invasion of Texas (College Station: 2006). 
For the emphasis on events in Mexico, see Michael Thomas Smith “For Love of Cotton: Nathanial P. Banks, Union 
Strategy and the Red River Campaign.” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association, 
Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 2010): pp. 5-26, and Gary Joiner: Through The Howling Wilderness: The 1864 Red River 
Campaign and the Union Failure in the West (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2006). 
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in this narrative. However, an effort has been made to incorporate areas—such as the District of 
Key West and the Dry Tortugas—not adequately incorporated within scholarship on the 
Department of the Gulf. Furthermore, because historians who have examined the Department of 
the Gulf have exhibited a tendency to allot far more narrative space to 1863 than 1864—
particularly with regard to Banks and the free labor system—this chapter attempts to accord each 
an equal amount of space, with the result being a more complete assessment of its 
accomplishments and shortcomings.  
Because of the scope and complexity of events in the Department of the Gulf, this chapter 
is structured slightly differently than the others in this project. It proceeds chronologically 
through General Butler’s tenure as commander from April-December, 1862, and then proceeds 
both thematically and chronologically in examining emancipation and the recruiting of black 
soldiers, the development of a free labor plantation system, the education system for black 
refugees and the conflict between the War and Treasury Department during Nathaniel Banks’s 
tenure. Each of these sections builds on the previous one by adding a new layer of complexity to 
the overall story of emancipation, demonstrating how each of these discrete areas were deeply 
interrelated. 
 
Major General Benjamin Franklin Butler created controversy wherever he went. A 
prominent Massachusetts Democrat and lawyer prior to the war, Butler parlayed his political 
clout into a commission as a brigadier general from Massachusetts’s governor John Andrew. 
During the opening months of the conflict, Butler was involved in a series of altercations that 
brought him both national recognition and an artificially inflated military reputation. On April 
19th, 1861, the 6th Massachusetts, members of Butler’s newly raised Massachusetts brigade, were 
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assaulted by secessionist sympathizers as they marched down Pratt street in Baltimore on their 
way to Washington. Four soldiers were killed, including one who was “hit by a piece of iron 
thrown from an iron foundry,” and thirty-six others were injured.12 Railroad bridges from 
Philadelphia and Harrisburg to Baltimore were burned, and telegraph wires to Washington were 
cut, effectively isolating the national capital from the rest of the North.   
  Butler was nothing if not resourceful. When word of the riot reached him, Butler, by then 
marching south with the 8th Massachusetts, “concluded to send troops to Annapolis” by getting 
the troops off their trains at Perryville, Maryland, taking charge of a ferry boat, and sailing down 
the Chesapeake Bay to the Maryland capital.13 Upon landing at Annapolis, Butler was informed 
that workers from the Annapolis and Elk Cliff Railroad had “taken up the rails for their road,” 
and destroyed rolling stock, in order to prevent the passage of troops to the national capital.14 
Butler solicited help from soldiers in his command that had an engineering background to repair 
both the track and cars, and then proceeded on to Washington.15 For his efforts, Butler was 
widely praised by much of the Northern press, and recieved compliments from Charles Sumner, 
Winfield Scott, Governor Andrew, and President Lincoln.16 In Baltimore, a “large meeting of 
citizens” unanimously denounced the passage of Northern troops through their city.17  
 Despite the outpouring of praise and vitriol, it was Butler’s tenure at Fort Monroe in 
Virginia that would swell his reputation to grandiose proportions. On May 23rd, 1861, Butler was 
alerted to the presence of three runaway slaves who had “delivered themselves up” to his picket 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Butler to Governor Andrew, April 19th, 1861, The Private and Official Correspondence of Gen. Benjamin F. 
Butler (BC) (Norwood, MA: Plimpton Press, 1917), vol. 1, 17; McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 285-286. 
13 S.M. Felton to Captain M. Galloway, April 19th, 1861, BC, v.1, 17. 
14 Butler to Major General Patterson, April 24th, 1861, BC, v. 1, 33. 
15 Ibid., 33-34. 
16 Governor Andrew to Butler, April 23rd, 1861, BC, v.1, 31-32. 
17 Butler to Andrew, April 19th and April 20th, 1861, BC, v.1, 17, 18-19; McPherson, Battle Cry, 286.  
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guard.18 The slaves, Shepard Mallory, Frank Baker, and James Townsend had belonged to 
Colonel Charles K. Mallory, then in command of Confederate forces in the area around Fortress 
Monroe. After questioning the runaways, Butler ascertained that the men were about to me 
moved to the Carolinas in order to perform labor for Confederate forces. As the men appeared 
“very serviceable,” and Butler had need for their labor, he determined to employ them in his 
quartermaster department and “send a receipt to Colonel Mallory for their services.”19  Invoking 
the well-established precedent of property confiscation from military history, Butler termed these 
fugitive slaves “contraband of war.” 
 When Colonel Mallory caught wind of Butler’s actions, he dispatched an aide, Major 
Cary, to demand Butler return the three escapees under the provisions of the 1850 Fugitive Slave 
Act. Butler cheekily responded that the “fugitive slave act did not affect a foreign country, which 
Virginia claimed to be,” but that if Colonel Mallory would come to the fort and take the oath of 
allegiance, Mallory, Baker, and Townsend would be returned.20 Butler’s offer was met with a 
deafening silence, and he urgently telegraphed his actions to Washington with the pointed 
question “shall [Confederates] be allowed use of this property against the United States and we 
not be allowed its use in aid of the United States?”21 Three days later, with entire families of 
fugitive slaves now starting to arrive at Fort Monroe, Butler again frantically asked the War 
Department “as a political question and a question of humanity can I receive the services of the 
father and mother and not take the children?”22 Secretary of War Simon Cameron replied that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Major General Butler to Lt. Genl. Winfield Scott, May 24th, 1861, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the 
Official Records of the War of the Union and Confederate Armies (OR) (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1880-1901), Series 2, volume 1, 752. For differing opinions on the implications of Butler’s actions, see 
Manning, Troubled Refuge, 171-176; Oakes, Freedom National, 93-99; Richard, Who Freed the Slaves?, 25-27. 
19 Major General Butler to Lt. Genl. Winfield Scott, May 24th, 1861, OR, 2:1, 752. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Major General Butler to Lt. Genl. Winfield Scott, May 27th, 1861. OR, 2:1:754. 
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Butler’s actions were approved, though the “final disposition” of the escaped slaves would be 
“reserved for future determination.”23  
 Butler’s actions created a sensation. General-in-Chief Winfield Scott labeled his actions 
“Butler’s fugitive slave law,” and newspapers across the North applauded his policy.24 The ever-
ambitious Butler hoped that his newfound popularity would lead to an independent field 
command, and that desire shines through in scattered letters throughout the summer of 1861.25 
Towards the end of the summer, a golden opportunity presented itself. From his many 
correspondents and his reading of the newspapers, Butler was aware that Massachusetts lagged 
behind her enlistment quotas. Accordingly, he unsubtly let it be known to Washington that, were 
he given an independent field command, a  “portion of the people in New England, theretofore 
acting upon the same political ideas that I had done, would largely be induced to follow me and 
enlist for the war.”26 On September 10th, 1861, the War Department granted Butler authority to 
raise six regiments in New England for an as yet unspecified expedition.27 Butler set to work 
immediately, and in mid-November, he was informed that the purpose of his expedition would 
be to occupy Ship Island off the coast of Louisiana, with the eventual objective being the city of 
New Orleans.28   
Following repeated delays with securing the necessary men and supplies, as well as a 
rancorous controversy over his authority with Massachusetts Governor John A. Andrew, Butler 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Secretary of War Simon Cameron to Maj. Genl. Benjamin Butler, May 30th, 1861, OR, 2:1: 754-755. 
24 Oakes, Freedom National, 99. 
25 See General Butler to Mrs. Butler, August 8th and 11th, 1861. BC, v.1, 199, 208-209. 
26 Butler to Hon. Daniel Richardson, February 3rd, 1862. BC, v.1, 335-336. 
27 General Orders No. 2, September 10th, 1861. BC, v.1, 239. 
28 Maj. Genl. George B. McClellan to Maj. Genl. Benjamin F. Butler, February 23rd, 1862, Stephen W. Sears (ed.) 
The Civil War Correspondence of George B. McClellan, (New York: De Capo Press, 1992), 187-189; Dobak, 
Freedom By the Sword, 92-93. 
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and his men finally sailed for the Louisiana coast on January 13th, 1862.29 Butler’s command, 
the newly christened Department of the Gulf, was to comprise all of the Gulf of Mexico west of 
Pensacola, Florida, as well as any gulf states that might become occupied by Butler’s army. 
Additionally, Butler was directed by Union General-in-Chief George B. McClellan to cooperate 
with the Navy to secure the city of “vital importance,” New Orleans, before turning his attention 
to Mobile, Alabama Pensacola, Florida and Galveston, Texas.30  
The voyage to Ship Island was not smooth. Sarah Butler, the general’s wife, complained 
that a particularly fierce storm “struck the quivering ship like heavy artillery” off Cape Hatteras, 
North Carolina, that required the men to bail water throughout the night.31 Worse still, part of the 
expedition ran aground on the Frying Pan Shoals off of Cape Fear, North Carolina, had to be 
rescued by another vessel and put into Port Royal, South Carolina for repairs. Frustrated by the 
“series of most unparalleled marine disasters,” Butler rushed to assure the War Department that 
the expedition had made “every haste” and would be ready to cooperate with the Navy in the 
capture of New Orleans.32 
 When the beleaguered ships finally limped into Ship Island on March 21st, 1862, Butler 
immediately encountered more delays. Transport ships to carry the troops ashore were nowhere 
to be found, and more storms prevented any movement for three days. To make matters worse, 
initial plans for joint operations with Flag Officer David Farragut and the Navy against New 
Orleans were delayed after a combination of bad weather and low water prevented Farragut’s 
ships from getting into proper position. Butler was also startled to learn that the Union Navy was 
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running short on coal, forcing him to loan Farragut over a thousand tons from army stores, and 
hurriedly send ships to Cuba for more.33 
 Health problems among the soldiers compounded Butler’s predicament. One Union 
officer reported that a Maine regiment of over 800 men was packed into a transport ship meant to 
carry 350 soldiers. The “insufficiency of transportation,” the officer concluded, had “impaired 
[the soldiers] health very materially,” and resulted in daily funerals on the island.34 The crowded 
conditions on Ship Island, in combination with the oppressive weather did little to improve the 
soldier’s morale, while the arrival of escaped slaves to the island added to the close quarters.35 
On just one morning, five slaves were discovered having paddled all night “in a open boat” 
twelve miles from Biloxi, Mississippi, braving storms and fog to reach Union lines.36 These five 
slaves were the first in the vast flood of men, women, and children, who would endure torturous 
journeys in order to reach Union lines in the Department of the Gulf. 
  On April 10th, 1862, a frustrated Butler embarked with eight infantry regiments, and 
several artillery batteries in support of Flag Officer David Farragut’s fleet, to reduce Fort 
Jackson and Fort St. Philip, the Confederate held works that controlled the Mississippi below 
New Orleans. Sustained bombardments by the navy failed to yield any results, so in the early 
hours of April 24th, Farragut cut through the blockages Confederate troops had constructed in the 
river, and ran his fleet successfully passed the forts. Watching the scene unfold some 800 yards 
from Ft. Jackson, Butler reported to the War Department that the action was “unprecedented in 
naval warfare” and congratulated Farragut on the “bold, daring, brilliant, and successful 
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passage.”37 To his wife, Butler was less complimentary of the naval officers. The general fumed 
that Farragut leaving Forts Jackson and St, Phillip unreduced—and Butler’s men exposed—was 
a “wholly unmilitary proceeding” that he attributed solely to the “race for the glory of capturing 
New Orleans between [Farragut] and Commodore [Andrew] Foote.”38 
 Despite Butler’s dyspeptic complaining, Confederate forces abandoned New Orleans, and 
the city surrendered to Federal gunboats on April 27th, 1862. Butler took possession of the “black 
and sullen town” on April 30th, established his headquarters at the St. Charles Hotel, and 
immediately ordered the band to play “Yankee Doodle” and “The Star Spangled Banner” with a 
“fiery energy.”39 With his headquarters surrounded by several pieces of federal artillery and a 
regiment of Union soldiers, no Confederate partisans attempted to disturb the proceedings. From 
her family home inside the city, Confederate diarist Sarah Morgan bemoaned the cowardice of 
Confederate troops, and concluded that only the women who remained in the city had been true 
to the Confederate cause.40 The Union occupation of New Orleans had begun. 
 Butler’s first priority was to re-establish rule of law in the Crescent City. Almost 
immediately on landing in New Orleans, Butler wired the War Department that the city was 
under mob rule, and that the newly raised flag of the United States had been “torn down with 
indignity.”41 Taking a hard line in his dispatches to Washington, Butler assured his superiors that 
the perpetrators would be made to “fear the stripes if they do not reverence the stars of our 
banner.”42 In this tense atmosphere, Butler made his inaugural address to the people of New 
Orleans on May 1st, 1862. Butler established marshal law, but assured the occupied city that 
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Union forces had come to restore order and ensure obedience to the laws of the United States.43 
All shops and places of amusement were to be kept open, while public houses and saloons were 
required to receive a license. Newspapers and printed materials detailing the movements of 
Union troops were prohibited, and the killing of United States soldiers would be regarded as 
assassination and not an act of war.44 
 The most contentious phrases of Butler’s proclamation dealt with the protections of 
persons and property. Echoing similar pronouncements made by General’s Thomas Sherman and 
Ambrose Burnside when they occupied portions of the Carolinas, Butler drew stark distinctions 
between loyal and disloyal persons.45 All those willing to take the oath of allegiance to the 
United States would have both their persons and property protected by the Union armies, while 
those still found to be disloyal would forfeit those safeguards.46 Some historians have read these 
passages and, eliding the distinctions Butler drew between loyal and disloyal persons, have 
depicted this document as an indication that “for the sake of promoting Unionism,” the Union 
army in the Department of the Gulf would unilaterally endeavor “to keep slaves on the 
plantations.”47 Another recent scholar has even gone so far as to argue based on Butler’s 
proclamation, “Union soldiers did not come south to free slaves.”48 
 A more reasonable assessment is that Butler was unsure of his legal footing and trying to 
walk a fine line regarding loyalty and property protection.49 As will be discussed in further detail 
below, during in his tenure at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, Butler had found that planters in the 
region had either abandoned their slaves, or forced them to aid the rebellion by working on 
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fortifications. The rights of property under those circumstances, Butler would write a few weeks 
later, were “easily settled” because the disloyalty of the planters could be readily established. 
Louisiana was a different case entirely. When the Union forces arrived, many planters remained 
on their farms and plantations and declared themselves “well-disposed towards the Union, only 
fearing lest their negroes should not be let alone.”50 Given these complications it is no wonder 
that one historian has concluded that Butler deliberately  “left the status of slavery in Louisiana 
up in the air.”51  
Butler needed answers quickly. The arrival of Union forces in Louisiana had indeed 
precipitated a stampede of both black refugees and angry masters into Union lines. “Many 
runaways come to me for protection,” one Union general noted just two weeks into the Union 
occupation, and  “their masters come after them.”52 From Jefferson Parish, one planter fumed 
“My negro Sam and his wife Mary left my farm on the 19th inst,” taking with them a variety of 
supplies including a mule, a cart, food and blankets.53 The planter immediately sent his son to 
recapture the fleeing slaves, and found that they had sought refuge at Camp Parapet, several 
miles above New Orleans. Brigadier General John W. Phelps, commanding at Camp Parapet, 
curtly refused to give the planter’s son “any redress” and sent him away.54 Several other planters 
informed Butler that their slaves, “heretofore quiet,” were now fleeing in droves to Union lines 
where they are “received and protected.”55 
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As some of these complaints suggest, word had quickly spread amongst slaves in the 
region that they would find a safe haven at Camp Parapet. Located three miles from New 
Orleans, the camp was commanded by Brigadier General John W. Phelps, a Vermont born West 
Pointer who proudly proclaimed his antislavery convictions. Immediately upon his arrival in the 
Department of the Gulf, Phelps had issued a proclamation that amounted to a lecture on the 
degrading influence of slavery on the history of the United States. Slavery, Phelps declared, was 
a curse on the nation, an anathema to free labor society, and an institution that prevented the 
United States from taking its rightful place as an example for the world.56 Moreover, according 
to Phelps, since Louisiana and every other slave state had been admitted into the Union since the 
adoption of the Constitution had been admitted in “direct violation” of the Constitution, slavery 
had no legal standing in the nation, and by entering into that compact, the free states had the 
“highest obligations of honor and morality to abolish slavery.”57 Having been placed in a position 
to act on his convictions, Phelps announced that he was willing to “set the example,” in 
Louisiana and use his position as commander at Camp Parapet to free any slave who came within 
his lines.58  
  Building off this reading of American constitutional history, Phelps argued that there 
could be no such thing as a loyal slaveholder. “It is impossible that a slaveholder can be loyal to 
free government,” he explained, because as a class, slaveholders believed the “political power of 
the country shall not extend to that institution to modify, regulate, or control it.”59 As 
consequence, all slaveholders shared the fundamental assumption of slavery’s inviolability that 
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was antithetical to the very nature of democratic self-government. Thus, in Phelps’s estimation, 
slaveholders were only truly loyal to the institution of slavery; any loyalty to the United States 
was merely incidental to the protection of their chattel property. Practical concerns regarding the 
progress of the war also informed the Vermonter’s position. Because fear of turning a “few 
thousand” loyal slave holders against the government demanded that the government refuse to 
enlist “four millions [of slaves],” thus prolonging both the war and the institution of slavery.60 
Consequently, it was in obedience to these “worst opponents of the national government” that 
led the United States to the “absurd, not to say ridiculous position” of trying to “conduct war in 
obedience to slave institutions, when it was those institutions which caused the war.”61 Because a 
loyal slaveholder could not truly exist, and because the Lincoln administration was wasting its 
time trying to pretend it did, Phelps felt no compunction about ignoring the issue of loyalty 
altogether.  
Phelps’s disregard for the slave-owner’s loyalty dovetailed neatly with his conception of 
his authority as military commander. Echoing many in the Republican Party, Phelps believed 
that the secession of the South and the outbreak of war would mean abolition through military 
emancipation. “If the South violate and break up the government,” Phelps wrote in an undated 
entry in his Commonplace Book, “they expose themselves unprotected to a stronger party. The 
only security that they have for their slave property lies in the general government,” and breaking 
up that government would remove that security.62 Moreover, Phelps, who was versed in both 
world history and the laws of war, observed that “amidst the clash of arms,” the “laws of peace 
are silent,” and the “usual course pursued by a general or by military power” that waged war 
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against a slaveholding society would be military emancipation.63 Consequently, not only did 
Phelps argue that he had the military authority to emancipate all slaves who came into his lines, 
but also those same laws of war allowed him to enlist these escaped slaves as soldiers in the 
army. To help buttress his argument, Phelps cited “examples and precedents in the history of the 
past,” noting that “the enfranchisement of the people of Europe has been and is still going on 
through the instrumentality of military service; and by this means our slaves might be raised in 
the scale of civilization and prepared for freedom.”64   
Finally, inextricably intertwined with both Phelps’s disregard for the issue of loyalty and 
his conception of his power to emancipate slaves was his belief in the notion of a “ higher law.” 
“No combination of men can give the right to hold slaves,” Phelps mused, because it would be 
“an act violative or moral law over which men have no control.”65 Framing his moral position in 
an broader context, Phelps declared that the “abolition of slavery is a necessity of the age,” and 
to sidestep the issue would be “to revert to the low political trickery which [the United States] 
practiced before the war.”66 Phelps knew these positions were not likely to endear him to many in 
the Department of Gulf, and he seemed to relish the prospect. To a Vermont Congressman, 
Phelps wrote that he wished “neither to serve under or with men who favor compromise, or any 
settlement of slavery, short of its abolition,” and he was prepared to accept the full consequences 
of this position.67  
  In sum, the combination of Phelps’s conviction that their could be no such thing as a 
loyal slaveholder, coupled with his conception of his authority to free slaves, and belief in the 
higher law meant that the Vermonter entered the Department of the Gulf believing that he had 
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both the military authority as well as the moral imperative free all the slaves in Union occupied 
Louisiana, regardless of their owners loyalty to the Union. Butler disagreed. As a departmental 
commander in an area where many slaveholders were professing loyalty to the Union, Butler 
carefully scrutinized the circumstances where his military authority allowed him to free slaves. 
Butler had no issue with freeing the slaves of those “actively in arms” or who have “aided the 
rebellion in their several spheres,” but he argued that there was “in most cases no military 
necessity for…immediate confiscation” of slaves.68 Furthermore, confiscation of slaves, when 
done without reference to a slaveholder’s loyalty would, in Butler’s estimation, “work injustice 
to the bona fide loyal creditor, whose interest the Government will doubtless consider.”69 Yet 
even as he explained his reasoning to Washington, Butler made certain that his views on the 
institution of slavery were not “misunderstood” by his superiors in the War Department.70 In 
language that could have come from Phelps’s diary, Butler declared slavery “a curse to a nation,” 
and this feeling had only been “deepen[ed] and winden[ed]” by his firsthand contact with the 
institution.71  
Scholars have devoted an inordinate amount of attention to explaining the exchanges on 
emancipation between Generals Butler and Phelps. With a few notable exceptions, most 
historians have framed the dispute according to a good / bad dichotomy, making the dispute into 
a personality conflict that seems to be more about the morality of slavery as an institution than 
the policies to be pursued regarding freeing slaves.72 Such an analysis distorts how Butler and 
Phelps themselves actually viewed their exchanges, which for the most part centered around the 
ability of military commanders in Louisiana to free slaves, and the applicability of existing 
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federal emancipation policy to the situation on the ground. Much more united Butler and Phelps 
on the slavery question than divided them, and the conflict between the two stemmed less from a 
personal conflict where one general was determined to uphold slavery and another was 
determined to destroy it, then from both having different conceptions of their authority as 
military commanders to free slaves.73  
It was a child seeking freedom who ignited the dispute. Barely over a week into the 
Union occupation, Irwin Pardon, a boy belonging to a slave owner named J.B. G. Armand, fled 
to Phelps’s lines at Camp Parapet. Armand complained to Butler, who immediately wrote to 
Phelps with pointed instructions. “If I have any use for the services of such a boy, I employ him 
without scruple,” Butler explained, “if I do not, I do not harbor him.”74 The next day, Butler 
again wrote to Phelps, this time with a directness that hinted at a mounting frustration. Two 
planters, Peter Saure and P. Soniat of Jefferson Parish, wanted Phelps to return their slaves in 
order to perform work on a levee. Butler ordered Phelps to give the planters “every aid,” even if 
it meant “returning their own negroes and adding others if need be to their forces.”75 As if to 
forestall Phelps’s inevitable objections, Butler added that the matter of levee repair was “outside 
of the question of returning negroes.”76  
 Phelps ignored Butler’s carefully worded directives. Indeed, his diary entries for the first 
few weeks of May seemed to mock his commanding officer by recording the continued arrival of 
run away slaves to Camp Parapet. “Danish counsel called yesterday after slaves” Phelps recorded 
on May 12th, “he owns a sugar plantation.” Three days later, Phelps reported “negroes still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 My interpretation of the Butler-Phelps controversy follows that put forward by McCrary Lincoln and 
Reconstruction, 83-90 and Oakes, Freedom National, 218-223, 245-250. Chandra Manning identifies the problems 
inherent in framing the conflict along a good/bad dichotomy, but reduces much of it to the nebulous question of 
“leadership.” Manning, Troubled Refuge, 102-106, 338, n.3. 
74 Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler to Brig. Genl. Phelps, May 9th, 1862, OR, 1:15, 442. 
75Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler to Brig. Genl. Phelps, May 10th, 1862, OR, 1:15, 443. 
76 Ibid., 443. 
	   163	  
continue to come in with complaints against the severities of their masters,” with one runaway 
telling the general that “if he went back they would ‘whip him until they whipped maggots into 
him, and then he would die.’”77 By May 21st Butler’s irritation had started to boil over, and he 
ordered Phelps to provide a list of all persons “white or black, remaining, being permitted to 
remain harbored or in any way within your pickets,” and followed that up by directing Phelps to 
“cause all unemployed persons, black and white, to be excluded from your lines.”78 Phelps 
cheekily responded to this by placing the black refugees immediately outside to his lines.79 
 Several historians have observed a clear pattern in Butler’s initial correspondence with 
Phelps.80 Butler’s orders scrupulously avoided any mention of slaves, or the status of those 
blacks employed by, or barred from Union lines. What did appear repeatedly in Butler’s 
communications were the phrases  “black or white persons,” “every person, white and black,” 
“all females, white and black,” and “all women and children, both white and black.”81 Indeed, in 
his initial May 9th communication with Phelps, Butler had explicitly spelled out that those whose 
labor he had no use for should be treated like “any other vagrant,” and his repeated subsequent 
references to both whites and blacks meant the orders applied to both races.82 As one historian 
has concluded, “Butler wrote his instructions as if the people arriving at the Union camps were 
vagrants” welcoming all those whose labor could be utilized by the Union army, while at the 
same time expressing doubts about the authority of a military commander to free slaves.83 Phelps 
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recognized no such limitations on his authority to free slaves, and his initial refusal to comply 
with Butler’s orders underscored that understanding. 
With his blossoming standoff with Phelps in mind, Butler sought clarification on 
emancipation policy from the War Department. In sharp, legalistic prose, he fired off a long 
series of questions to Secretary of War Stanton framed entirely around the “state of negro 
property and the condition of the negroes as men.”84 At Fortress Monroe, Butler explained, he 
had found blacks either deserted by their masters or impressed to work on fortifications in 
support of the rebellion. The course of action in those cases had been easily established, Butler 
reminded his superiors, and his actions had both been approved by the government and later 
helped provide the basis for the First Confiscation Act.85 Yet as Butler perceived almost 
immediately, the loyalty—however dubious—of many planters, coupled with their continued 
residence under Union rule meant that the situation in Louisiana had far surpassed the scenarios 
covered by the War Department guidelines. Butler thus informed the War Department that he 
had tried to solve the question of loyal slaveholders by delineating “the good, loyal, and 
peaceful” as well as the “peaceful, if not loyal” from those who were actively disloyal.86 In cases 
involving a breach of loyalty, Butler once again told Washington that he had “no hesitation” 
about confiscating any property, including slaves, but as for the other cases, he was uncertain 
regarding his legal authority as a military commander.87 
The sheer number of people currently within Butler’s lines added another layer of 
complexity. Estimates placed the number of slaves in Union occupied Louisiana during the 
spring of 1862 at around 100,000, not including the Union occupied portions of the Lower 
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Mississippi River Valley.88 “Many [slaves] have sought to be kept, fed, and live in quarters with 
my troops,” Butler informed the War Department, and he was already having problems feeding 
all the existing people—his own troops included—within his lines.89 “Women and children are 
actually starving in spite of all I can do” he told Stanton, and he wondered aloud if freedom 
should continue to be “obtained only by the first that apply?”90 Again wanting to make certain 
that the War Department did not read his dispatches as containing his personal views on slavery 
as an institution, Butler made it clear that he deplored the “baleful” effects of slavery, and was 
only trying to deal with all the complexities that the Union occupation in Louisiana had caused.91 
“Now,” he exasperatingly asked Stanton, “what am I to do?”92 
As Butler waited for a response from the War Department, his exchanges with Phelps 
intensified. On May 27th, Captain Edward Page Jr., an officer in charge of black workers helping 
repair a levee, reported to headquarters that his work was being impeded by soldiers from Camp 
Parapet who were freely roaming the countryside, enticing slaves off plantations, and insulting 
planters.93 “If on any plantations here a negro is punished” Page fumed, “a party of soldiers are 
sent immediately [from Camp Parapet] to liberate them and with orders to bring them to 
camp.”94 Only the day before, Page told Butler, soldiers from the camp had marched onto the 
plantation of a Mrs. Fendair, broken into her outhouse, and freed three slaves who had been 
confined there overnight.95  
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Butler may not have been entirely certain about the extent he could receive and employ 
fugitive slaves, but he was certain no authority existed for Union soldiers actively enticing slaves 
off farms and plantations. The commanding general dispatched an aide-de-camp, Captain 
Haggerty, to Camp Parapet to enforce Phelps’s compliance. Haggerty was ordered to make an 
examination of the camp and report back the number of blacks residing inside, and ensure that 
Butler’s May 23rd order excluding all unemployed persons from Union lines was being properly 
obeyed by General Phelps.96  Most importantly, Haggerty was ordered to inform Phelps that 
soldiers under his command must be prevented “from strolling without authority and without 
right outside of your lines” and from “interfering (under cover of United States authority)…in 
the domestic affairs of the people around about you.”97 In his diary, an incensed Phelps wondered 
if the United States government had “turned slave-driver.”98 
Much to both Page and Butler’s consternation, Phelps steadfastly refused to follow 
orders. A week after Page detailed the excursions of the soldiers stationed at Camp Parapet, he 
informed Butler that despite his explicit instructions, “General Phelps has received negroes with 
the lines,” and continued to forcibly deny any planters attempt to reclaim their slaves.99 Further 
exacerbating tensions, the controversy threatened to take on an international dimension when 
slave-owners who were representatives of foreign governments tried to reclaim their slaves. V. 
Kruttschnidt, acting as acting Consul for Prussia and Hanover in New Orleans reported that two 
of his slaves, Nancy and Louisa, had run away to Camp Parapet, and requested that Butler issue 
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orders to “deliver them up” to his custody.100 Once again, Phelps refused to surrender the escaped 
slaves. 
By the middle of June, both generals were requesting the War Department settle the 
policy dispute. Although pressure had been building for six weeks, the immediate catalyst for 
these entreaties occurred on June 15th when Major Frank Peck of the Twelfth Connecticut 
reported to Phelps that a steadily increasing number of escaped slaves were congregating near 
Union pickets.101 According to statements provided by the fugitives, the most recent arrivals had 
belonged to a planter named Babbillard Lablanche, who had given them the choice of “leaving 
before sundown or receiving fifty lashes each.”102 Unsurprisingly, Lablanche disputed this story, 
claiming that he told his slaves that if they were “determined to go” he would “hire them a large 
boat to put them across the [Mississippi] River.”103 The refugees from the Lablanche plantation 
arrived at Camp Parapet interspersed with other men, women, and children from as far away as 
hundred miles up the Mississippi River. All were “quite destitute” and had nothing to eat except 
the rations they were given by Union soldiers.104 In a line Peck undoubtedly knew would catch 
Phelps’s eye, he wondered “whether some further regulation in reference to these unfortunate 
persons is not necessary” in order to deal with the swelling refugee population.105 
 Phelps was wondering the same thing. He fired off a lengthy missive to R.S. Davis, 
General Butler’s Assistant Adjutant General, telling him “it is evident that some plan, some 
policy, or some system is necessary on the part of the Government.”106 According to Phelps, the 
“quiet operation” of existing Congressional law was inadequate to cover the situation in the 
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Department of the Gulf.107 Even the “mere refusal” of Union soldiers to return fugitive slaves as 
required by Congressional legislation passed in March 1862, was now insufficient to cover the 
situation on the ground in Louisiana.108 The only solution was for a “public agent” to be 
“invested with wider and more positive powers than this”—i.e. the power to both admit fugitive 
slaves and to have them declared free by military necessity.109  
Butler also wanted policy clarification, and readily endorsed Phelps determination to 
make the dispute a “test case for the policy of the Government.”110 Once more delineating 
between his personal views and his authority as a military commander, Butler informed 
Washington that he respected Phelps’s “honest sincerity,” but he believed that “the policy [of the 
Government] to be the one that I am pursuing.”111 Tellingly, it would be the policy of the 
Government that determined Butler’s evaluation of Phelps’s actions: if the policy was the one of 
limited emancipation that Butler had been insisting upon, than General Phelps was “worse than 
useless” in command of Camp Parapet.112 However, if Phelps more expansive positions were 
more in line with government policy, than his service was “invaluable, for his whole soul is in 
it.”113 Only when Butler hastened to explain that his position as a military commander did not—
indeed, could not—reflect his personal aversion to the institution of slavery, did questions of the 
morality of slavery as an institution enter into his side of the disagreement.  
 Stanton replied to Butler twice, first on June 29th before his letter was brought to 
Lincoln’s attention, and then again on July 3rd, after it received the president’s consideration. 
Initially, Stanton was purposely vague, telling Butler that it had not yet “been deemed necessary 
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or wise” to issue any specific instructions, but advising him the government was “unwilling” to 
forgo Phelps’s services.114 Lincoln’s subsequent response offered further clarification. The 
President was of the opinion that the March 1862 Act of Congress prohibited the slaves from 
being returned to their masters and that “common humanity” meant that they “must not be 
permitted to suffer from want of food, shelter, or other necessities of life; that, to this end, they 
should be provided for by the Quartermaster’s and Commissary Department; and those who are 
capable of labor should be set to work for reasonable wages.”115 Stanton then qualified that the 
president’s directives were “not meant to settle any general rule” regarding slaves or slavery, but 
was meant to apply narrowly to the case that had been presented. 116 
Despite Lincoln’s explanation, some historians have taken the last sentence of Stanton’s 
telegram as an indication of timidity regarding changes in emancipation policy.117 This 
interpretation fails to take into account the broader changes to federal emancipation policy then 
being made in Congress. At the very moment these telegrams were flying back and forth from 
New Orleans, Congress was establishing a “general rule” by putting the final touches on a 
Second Confiscation Act that would aim to free all the slaves of all the rebels. Thus, it was with 
the widely publicized knowledge that Congress was soon going to enact wide-scale changes to 
federal emancipation policy that Lincoln and Stanton applied the president’s decision only to the 
particulars of the case before them.118 Just two weeks after Lincoln and Stanton’s reply, the 
Second Confiscation Act became law, and the War Department issued General Orders 109 to 
implement these changes. Section 11 of those orders authorized the president “employ as many 
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laborers…so many persons of African descent as can be advantageously used” and told army 
commanders to pay them reasonable wages.119 By early August, Stanton was writing Butler that 
the Second Confiscation Act, along with General Orders 109 “will instruct you fully” on the 
policy he should pursue.120  
Butler interpreted both Lincoln’s initial instructions and the subsequent Congressional 
legislation as a victory for Phelps. “The Government have sustained Phelps about the Negroes” 
but wrote to his wife, and predicted, “we shall have a negro insurrection here I fancy…and who 
can blame them?”121 Butler’s official and private correspondence reflected this shift in policy. To 
this point Butler’s personal denunciations of slavery had always been carefully qualified by 
phrases such as “my views,” and relegated to brief sub-sections of his reports to Washington.122 
Now, more uninhibited rants against the “lying, meanness, wickedness, and wrong” of the 
slaveholders began to appear more regularly in his letters, with some diatribes taking on a 
Phelps-ian quality.123 Indeed, one of the more tantalizing bits of evidence from Phelps’s diary is 
an entry from July 17th that reads simply “dined yesterday with General Butler and staff.”124 
Although we can only guess if the two generals discussed or debated the authority of a military 
commander to emancipate slaves, it becomes harder to read the Butler-Phelps controversy as a 
personal clash over the morality of slavery when the two seemed to be dining together amicably. 
Lincoln also expressed his support for Phelps’s actions in a handful of letters written 
during the last two weeks of July. One was sent to Reverdy Johnson, a prominent Maryland 
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Democrat sent to Louisiana by the State Department to investigate the charges of corruption by 
foreign consuls against Butler, another was dispatched to New Orleans lawyer Thomas Durant, 
and a third was sent to Democratic operative August Belmont. On July 16th, Johnson had 
reported to Lincoln that if Phelps’s course of action were followed “this State cannot be, for 
years, if ever, reinstated into the Union.”125 Lincoln testily replied that the people of Louisiana 
“knew how to be rid of General Phelps,” and that was to “remove the necessity of his presence” 
by ending their war against the government.126 Responding to similar concerns from Belmont, 
Lincoln defended his policy shifts by telling the financier “broken eggs cannot be mended; but 
Louisiana has nothing to do now but to take her place in the Union as it was, barring the already 
broken eggs.”127 Lincoln made sure General Butler was furnished with copies of his letters to 
both Durant and Johnson.  
If Phelps felt any sense of vindication over the shift in policy, few traces survive in his 
diary or extant correspondence. Many of his diary entries for June and July 1862 are devoted to 
chronicling the further arrival of runaways at Camp Parapet. “We commence the day with a 
Federal salute,” Phelps dryly remarked on July 4th, “soon afterwards a large number of negroes 
came in from a neighboring plantation.”128 One reason for Phelps’s continued disgust was the 
large number of slaves who continued to wind up in New Orleans penitentiaries at the hands of 
Union soldiers. [Slaves] go to town expecting relief from [the Union army] and get locked in 
jail,” while individual soldiers such as a Major Whitmore of the 30th Massachusetts Infantry 
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“surrenders them to their masters without hesitation.”129 To Phelps chagrin, throughout July and 
August city police, with the assistance of some military personnel, continued to arrest fugitive 
slaves in defiance of Stanton’s orders prohibiting the practice, although Phelps also exulted when 
Union soldiers at Baton Rouge freed some sixty slaves confined in the state prison.130 
By the time Lincoln’s letters reached New Orleans, Phelps had already begun to take 
things one-step further by forming some of the black refugees at Camp Parapet into regiments. 
Phelps had contemplated this step ever since his arrival in the Department of the Gulf, filling 
page after page of his diary by venting his frustration at the government’s lack of desire to enlist 
black soldiers. “Slaves who seek protection from the United States are—what?” he had asked 
rhetorically back in late May, “not formed into Regiments to oppose the wicked rebellion and 
resist the oppression of their masters, but are set to work by the United States to protect those 
masters.”131 For several weeks, Phelps proceeded with organization of these regiments, and on 
July 30th he sent a note to the quartermaster department requesting arms and other provisions for 
three regiments of black troops. Phelps currently had three hundred men organized into five 
companies and informed departmental headquarters that with the proper facilities he could 
quickly fill three regiments. Moreover, Phelps assured Butler that he believed his men “are all 
willing and ready to be put to the test,” as they were “willing to submit to anything rather than 
slavery.”132  
 Butler reacted by trying to find a middle ground. He ordered Phelps to put the 
contrabands to work constructing defensive fortifications around Camp Parapet. Phelps fired 
back that while he was willing to train black regiments to fight against “assailants” of the 
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Government, he was not “willing to become the mere slave driver which you propose.”133 
Having perceived Butler as continuously stalling his efforts to harbor fugitive slaves by 
contesting his authority to do so, and now trying to halt his efforts to train black soldiers, Phelps 
abruptly submitted his resignation. Apparently frustrated with the politics of emancipation, 
Phelps grumbled in his diary “party is made for man, not man for party.”134  
 Butler was flabbergasted by his subordinate’s reaction. The commanding general had 
believed that his instructions were an appropriate half step until the matter could be relayed to 
Washington, but Phelps resignation had forced his hand. After rushing to inform Washington 
that he had not been told of Phelps’s actions in advance, he tried to placate his erstwhile 
subordinate. Once again, the issue was Phelps’s authority as a military commander. As Butler 
explained it, only the President had the authority to employ African Americans in the military 
service of the United States, and, as consequence, he did not believe that Phelps was 
“empowered to organize into companies negroes and drill them as a military organization.”135 To 
Phelps’s specific grievances, Butler replied that he could see “neither African nor slavery in the 
commander of the post clearing from the front of his lines by means of able-bodied men under 
his control the trees and underbrush which would afford cover and shelter” to his enemies.136 
Butler’s line of reasoning had little impact, and Phelps sailed for home at the beginning of 
September. 
Ironically, by the time Phelps departed, both federal policy and the military situation in 
the Department of the Gulf had begun to shift in favor of black soldiers. In mid-July, the Militia 
Act passed by Congress had authorized the president to enlist black men “for the purpose of 
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constructing intrentchments, or performing camp service, or any other labor, or military or naval 
service for which they may be deemed competent.”137 Equally as instructive were the letters that 
had been flying back and forth between Butler and Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase. 
When Lincoln had instructed Chase to pass along copies of his letters to Reverdy Johnson and 
Thomas Durant to Butler at the end of July, Chase had included his own commentary in a cover 
letter. The Treasury Secretary took the opportunity to tell Butler which way the policy winds 
were blowing: the recent acts of Congress left no wiggle room, military emancipation was now 
to have “practical application” in Louisiana.138 Chase further elaborated that he had “heard 
intimations from the President that it may become necessary, in order to keep the river open 
below Memphis, to convert the heavy black population of its banks into defenders.”139 In case 
Butler somehow missed the point, Chase concluded by informing him “you can hardly go too far 
to satisfy the exigency of public sentiment now.”140 
 Once again, Butler responded quickly to a change in policy directives. On August 2nd, he 
was writing to his wife that Phelps had “gone crazy” because he was raising black regiments, and 
hurrying to reassure Washington that he had acted “without orders and without my 
knowledge.”141 Ten days later, following his receipt of the letters Chase had written on July 31st, 
he bluntly told his wife “I shall arm the ‘free blacks,’ I think, for I must have troops, and I see no 
way of getting them save by arming the black brigade that the rebels had.”142 In a brief note he 
had to have known that Stanton would share with both Chase and Lincoln, Butler wrote that he 
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had determined to utilize the services of free men of color in New Orleans.143 Equally as 
instructive is that Butler, who had up to this point been eager to have Washington resolve his 
disputes with Phelps, did not even wait for Stanton’s official authorization. General Orders 63, 
issued on August 22nd, invited all free black men of the Native Guards that had been authorized 
by the Confederate States to join the Union army. The troops were to be paid and outfitted in the 
same manner as other Volunteer Troops of the United States, subject to the approval of the 
President.144  
  Butler’s was fortunate to have the immediate ability to “call on Africa” in the form of the 
Louisiana Native Guards.145 To General-in-Chief Henry Halleck, Butler explained that because 
these men had originally been organized in May 1861 and offered themselves to Confederate 
Governor of Louisiana Thomas Moore, “I am fortified by precedents of half century’s standing, 
acted upon by Confederate authorities within six months, and I believe I have done nothing of 
which the most fastidious member of Jefferson Davis’s political household can rightfully 
complain.”146 Butler’s desperate need for more troops also played a role in his decision. In early 
August, a Confederate offensive had evicted Union forces from Baton Rouge, and left Butler 
begging the War Department for reinforcements.147 With Halleck unable to supply more troops, 
and his own forces also weakened by attrition, the Native Guards could help Butler solve his 
manpower shortage. 
General Phelps—at this point awaiting transport home—was unimpressed. In his mind, 
Butler had not organized the Native Guard “because it was right in itself,” but because their 
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previous enlistment by Confederate officials had provided Butler with the cover he needed. “He 
is still at the old political issue,” Phelps complained, “instead of being occupied with the 
magnitude of the crisis.”148 In a criticism that would later be reiterated by generations of 
historians, Phelps believed the timing of Butler’s change in position this had less to do with any 
change in policy than with the determination that he could now use black troops to advance his 
national standing and his political career. Certainly part of this criticism is valid. Butler was 
never one to miss an opportunity to take a politically expedient position. As his perceptive wife 
wrote in a series of letters between August and September, “Phelps policy prevail[ed] instead of 
yours” but “reliable” political people had deemed Butler’s subsequent course of action “just 
right, neither too fast or too slow.”149 George Dennison, sent to oversee Treasury Department 
operations in Louisiana, sensed as much when he wrote that the main reason Butler objected to 
Phelps harboring and arming fugitive slaves was because “Gen. Phelps had the start of him, 
while Gen. B. wanted the credit of doing the thing himself, and in his own way.”150 Butler was 
doing it “shrewdly and completely, as he does everything,” Dennison concluded.151 
 However, while Butler’s personal political calculations certainly played a role, there is 
also no denying that following Union policy shifts, Butler threw himself wholeheartedly into 
recruiting and organizing black regiments. In early September he predicted to Secretary Stanton 
that within ten days he would easily have the 1,000 men necessary to fill up one regiment.152 By 
September 20th, Butler was writing to his wife that he had already raised two regiments of “the 
chosen people of colour,’ as General [Andrew] Jackson terms them,” and the first regiment, 
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Louisiana Native Guards was mustered into service on September 27th, with the 2nd Regiment 
mustered in two weeks later on October 12th.153  
 Moreover, for a general who had taken pains to point out that the Louisiana Native 
Guards were free blacks whose unique status had kept him “clear of the vexed question of 
arming the slaves,” Butler and his subordinates seemed to pay remarkably little attention to the 
actual status of the men who were recruited.154 Joseph T. Wilson, an officer in the 2nd Louisiana 
Native Guards, later wrote, “any negro who could swear he was free, if physically healthy was 
accepted.”155 George Dennison’s regular letters to Secretary Chase substantiates Wilson’s 
memory. In theory, Dennison wrote, “[Butler’s] order says none are to be received but those who 
have received freedom through some recognized legal channel”—those who had been freed by 
their masters, those who were declared free by military courts, and all those who came in from 
enemy lines.156 In practice, Dennison triumphantly informed Chase, “you see this includes almost 
all the colored people.”157 This was exactly what Chase wanted to hear, and he wrote Butler 
approvingly about “enlisting without much regard to status prior to enlistment” and asked 
pointedly whether it is “not clear, then that the presumption of freedom is in favor of every man 
only to be set aside in case of some by clear proof of continuous loyalty?”158 
 Complaints from planters also confirm that Butler and his subordinates paid little 
attention to the status of their black recruits. Ann Bernard, a “loyal citizen” residing on a 
plantation near Baton Rouge complained that “large number of U.S. troops” came onto the 
property and talked with her slaves, many of whom then “returned with them + were received + 
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protected in the lines of said army.”159 The following day, more troops returned to her plantation, 
“guided by the petitioners slaves” and preceded to recruit more slaves and take away livestock. 
Bernard sent the Union army a bill for all the damages she calculated—totaling some 
$47,786.50—but received no response.160 Likewise, the residents of Assumption Parish, who had 
“with unanimity” declared their “allegiance to the Government of the United States” complained 
that the “organization of negro regiments and the enticing of plantation slaves by recruiting 
officers to enlist as soldiers” had  “entirely demoralized and rendered practically useless to the 
planters not only the slaves within the encampment of the army, but also those few remaining at 
home.”161      
Meanwhile, by early November the 1st and 2nd Louisiana Native Guards were being 
deployed in Union field operations, accompanying General Godfrey Weitzel’s expedition into 
the Lafourche district west of New Orleans. Weitzel’s mission was to destroy Confederate 
General Richard Taylor’s army, and Butler’s subordinate did not think much of the black troops 
attached to his command. “The commanding general knows well my private opinions on this 
subject,” Weitzel reported from the field, “I cannot command these negro regiments.”162 
According to Weitzel, since the arrival of the Native Guard regiments in the Lafourche district, 
“symptoms of servile insurrection” were multiplying, with white women and children terrified 
by black soldiers.163 White residents had repeatedly warned Weitzel that the “present 
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demoralization and insubordination of the negroes” would result in “frightful excesses” if the 
Union army did not immediately stop them.164 
Butler ordered his aggrieved subordinate to conform his actions to federal policy. “By the 
act of Congress,” Butler told his subordinate, “independent of the President’s proclamation, 
having come from Rebel masters into our lines in occupation of rebel territory…[escaped slaves] 
are free.”165 The commanding general then went even further, eviscerating Weitzel’s rationale for 
having no faith in the Native Guards.166 Based on Weitzel’s own reports to headquarters, Butler 
pointed out that these regiments had not failed to perform their required duties, nor had they 
failed to follow the orders or commands of their officers. Butler reserved particular ire for 
Weitzel’s charges that the soldiers of the Native Guard were having a bad “moral effect” on the 
white residents of Louisiana. “Is it the arrival of a negro regiment” that was causing the 
problems, Butler asked rhetorically, “or is it the arrival of United States troops, carrying, by act 
of Congress, freedom to the servile race?”167 Having received his policy guidance from 
Washington, Butler would brook no compromise from a subordinate who hesitated to enforce 
that policy on the ground. 
Even as he admonished Weitzel to conform to existing policy, Butler also recognized that 
the flood of slaves to Union forces posed a logistical problem. Black refugees were “now coming 
in by the hundreds, say thousands, almost daily” Butler had informed Halleck in early 
September, and the increased flood of refugees due to Weitzel’s movements had further strained 
the quartermaster’s ability to provide enough food for the troops in the field.168 Officers 
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marching in Weitzel’s columns reported similar problems. “I have been trying to secure available 
shelter for [the black refugees] reported the colonel of the 8th Vermont, “but they come upon me 
so fast I have found it very difficult.”169 Nonetheless, the sympathetic colonel promised to “spare 
no pains to care for them, for they are reliable friends.”170 
To help solve this problem, Butler relied on existing policy. General Orders 109 had 
implemented Section 11 of the Second Confiscation Act, as well as section 15 of the Militia Act, 
allowed all military commanders could employ any blacks whose labor could be advantageously 
used, and these laborers were to be paid “reasonable wages,” which were determined by the 
Militia Act to be $10 per month for able-bodied males, with $3 deducted for clothing.171 
Additional prodding from Secretary Chase had enjoined Butler to tell Louisiana slaveholders that 
“thenceforth they must be content” to pay black workers wages.172  
Accordingly, in late October, Butler held a meeting with “the planters, loyal citizens of 
The United States, in the parishes of Saint Bernard and Plaquemines.”173 The resulting agreement 
stipulated that “all person’s heretofore held to labor” to work under the supervision of designated 
loyal planters and their overseers.174 Loyal owners were required to pay each able-bodied male 
worker ten dollars a month, subtracting three dollars for clothing, with the workday set at ten 
hours. The agreement forbade corporeal punishment from being inflicted on the laborers, but 
insubordination or “refusal to perform suitable labor” would be reported to an assistant provost 
marshal for punishment.175 The black workers of any planter who refused to enter into the 
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agreement or remained disloyal were free to hire themselves out to either loyal planters or 
plantations run by agents of the Union government.  
Thus, as Weitzel and other Union army commanders began to occupy more and more 
territory during the late fall of 1862, Butler began implementing his nascent labor system on a 
wider scale. “It is our duty to take care of them,” Butler declared in early November, “and that 
includes employment.”176 Weitzel was subsequently directed to implement a wage labor system 
that mirrored the one Butler had negotiated with the planters of Plaquemine and St. Bernard 
parishes, and General Orders number 91, issued on November 9th, formalized these directives, 
and appointed a three person Sequestration Commission to seize the property of persons disloyal 
to the United States.177 The Commission was to arrange the harvest of crops on abandoned or 
sequestered estates, and use the same wage labor scale Butler had arranged in the October 
agreements. The property of loyal unionists was protected, but Butler was careful to spell out in 
directives to his commanders that he did not mean “loyalty by lip service.”178    
 Getting all Union commanders to obey both the spirit and the letter of these directives 
proved difficult. Brigadier General Thomas Sherman, General Phelps’s replacement as 
commander of Camp Parapet, banned any black refugees who were not employed by the army 
from entering his lines, with the provost marshal forcibly placing the remainder in contraband 
camps.179 Despite Butler’s explicit instructions to the contrary, General Weitzel did not always 
prove diligent in having his subordinates monitor the conditions on the plantations that came 
within his advancing line.180 Moreover, once the plantations were up and running, many black 
workers learned that payment could be haphazard and infrequent. For example, a “Report on the 
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Star Plantation” submitted during mid-summer of 1863 found that workers had yet to be paid at 
all, and a representative of the New England Freedman’s Aid Society depicted destitute black 
workers, having not been paid for their labor, fleeing back to Union military posts and pestilent 
contraband camps.181  
  Lincoln monitored Butler’s efforts from Washington. The president was “much 
interested” in Butler’s labor arrangement with the planters, and inquired about the breadth and 
scope of the free-labor program.182 Butler replied with an air of self-congratulation that his 
experiment was  “succeeding admirably,” but also outlined the obstacles he was facing.183 Many 
planters had rejected the contracts because they would not “relinquish the right to use the whip,” 
and Butler steadfastly refused to “send back to be scourged, at the will of their former and in 
some cases infuriated masters, those black men who had fled to me for protection.”184 Equally as 
problematic was that some of the allegedly loyal planters were colluding “not to make any 
provision this autumn for another crop of sugar next season,” thereby leaving many blacks 
without any means of support.185 Despite these problems, Butler was convinced that slavery was 
“doomed,” and that with the protection and supervision of the army, it was possible to organize 
black laborers in a timely manner.186 
Even as we acknowledge the limitations of Butler’s regime, there can be little question 
that a combination of federal and departmental policy, implemented by the Union army, and 
assisted by thousands of fleeing slaves, had begun to wrought the destruction of slavery and the 
spread of free labor in Louisiana. Every laborer on plantations run by the government, every 
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soldier accompanying Weitzel’s force, represented the disintegration of the chattel principle—
the idea of property in human beings—the very basis of slavery in the United States. As we have 
seen, this did not mean freed persons on Union run plantations, within Union lines, and in 
contraband camps did not suffer profound hardships, or that their labor would not be forcibly 
extracted. At the same time, this was not slavery; these black refugees were, in Butler’s words, 
“treated as human beings,” not commodities.187 As Butler himself noted in testimony before the 
American Freedman’s Inquiry Commission, “the thing [eradication of slavery] once started, will 
not go backward.”188  
Indeed, once Union policy directives had been made clear, Butler rapidly undertook the 
recruiting and organizing of black troops, and began to organize a free labor system where 
former slaves were working for wages. “No other officer appreciates, like Gen. Butler,” George 
Dennison concluded, “the importance of freeing and arming the colored population…all the 
proslavery influence in this State cannot change him in this matter.”189 Indeed, under Butler, 
many planters in the Department of the Gulf had been forced to accept the Union army’s labor 
arrangements, or try and remove themselves and their chattel to the interior. Either way, the 
planter’s iron grip on control was starting to crumble. As New Orleans newspaper article phrased 
it, with only a slight overstatement, “the revolution is total.”190  
 By the end of 1862, Butler’s labor program was gaining more support from official 
Washington. Secretary of War Stanton, Secretary of the Treasury Chase, and Union 
Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs all praised Butler’s efforts in their year-end reports. 
According to Meigs, the expedition Butler had organized under General Weitzel had “recovered 
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some of the finest lands in Louisiana,” and thus opened up enough land to “afford the means of 
living to all such persons” who could not be employed by the Union armies.191 The Union 
Quartermaster General had also received regular updates from his subordinates in New Orleans, 
and concluded that Butler’s arrangements had ensured “cultivation of the soil will afford [black 
refugees] occupation and sustenance.”192 Stanton’s report did not mention Butler by name, but 
the implications of his year-end report for 1862 were clear. “Rightly organized in the recovered 
territory” Stanton argued, black laborers, with some organization and protection from the Union 
army, “would not only produce much of what is needed to feed our armies…but they would 
forever cut off from the rebellion the resources of a country thus occupied.”193 It was no accident 
that this was exactly the type of system Butler was trying to implement in New Orleans. 
Even as officials in Washington praised his efforts in Louisiana, Butler remained mired in 
controversy. Rampant allegations of financial corruption swirled around Butler, his brother 
Andrew Butler, and other subordinate officers in the Department of the Gulf. George Dennison 
reported to Chase that “extensive commercial proceedings” had been “tolerated (to say the least) 
by [Butler],” and that these dealings had created a “general disgust” within the Department.194 
For the remainder of his life, Butler denied any wrongdoing by either him or his brother, but 
subsequent historians have pieced together credible enough chain of evidence to demonstrate that 
the Butler family certainly profited from their time in the Department of the Gulf.195 Alone, these 
allegations might not have been enough to force Butler’s recall, but his heavy-handed dealings 
with many of the foreign diplomats in New Orleans had also created problems for William 
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Seward and the State Department. It was most likely a combination of both that led to Butler 
being replaced in mid-December 1862 by Major General Nathaniel P. Banks. 
 
Major General Nathaniel P. Banks sailed into the Department of the Gulf determined to 
revive his reputation. A two-term governor of Massachusetts and former Republican Speaker of 
the United States House of Representatives, Banks, like Butler, had used his political clout to 
secure a command in the Union army. Unfortunately, as a field commander, Banks had proven to 
be a combination of unlucky, unimaginative, and incompetent, and had been notoriously 
humiliated by General Stonewall Jackson during spring campaigns of 1862 in the Shenandoah 
Valley. Evidentially, Banks’s appeal as a departmental commander was his political finesse and 
personal charm, both of which presented a sharp contrast to the blunt and abrasive Butler. One of 
Banks’s staff aides noted in his diary that Banks was guided by the supposition that “Butler’s 
rule was violent and high handed,” and thus his policy would be more “conciliatory.”196  Another 
of Banks subordinates believed that it was Banks’s moderation that convinced an “over-careful 
President” to make the appointment.197 “There had been harsh measures enough in this 
department,” the same observer wrote, “and since Butler had stroked the cat from tail to head, 
and found her full of yawl and scratch, it was determined to stroke her from head to tail, and see 
if she would not commence to purr.”198  
 Upon his arrival in New Orleans, Banks immediately went to see General Butler with the 
order removing him from command. Banks was full of praise for the departing general, telling 
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Halleck that Butler had given him “all the assistance I could wish.”199 Banks was also pleased to 
inform the General-in-chief that he had met with Admiral David Farragut of the United States 
Navy, and received his assurances of “hearty cooperation and support” in his military objective 
of forcing the surrender of the Confederate garrison at Port Hudson. Heartened by this assurance 
of cooperation, Banks promised Washington that they could count on him for rapid action.200 
 Banks’s guarantees quickly collided with his administrative responsibilities. Day after 
day, Banks found himself occupied with matters pertaining to the assessing of taxes, regulation 
of churches, the confiscation of estates and the working of plantations, to say nothing of the 
countless requests for favors or patronage.201 To make matters worse, the men and material 
required for Banks to undertake the planned spring campaign were in short supply. “I have 
nothing to fight with” Banks told his wife, “No Cavalry. No artillery. No transportation. Nothing 
that is required for the work expected of me.”202 By early January, the commanding general was 
loudly complaining to Halleck about the scope of his responsibilities. “The precise nature of the 
duties devolving upon me,” he curtly informed his superior, had not been properly conveyed, 
“except so far as they were embodied in the instructions upon military topics received from 
you.”203 
 No issue occupied more of Banks’s time than slavery. Following the change in command, 
planters in the region quickly besieged Banks with requests for aid in the return of fugitive 
slaves. One planter informed Banks that he had made repeated attempts to “have my Negro 
Charlotte delivered to me,” but repeated attempts to gain an audience with one of the provost 
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marshals had yielded no results.204 Likewise, Mary Graham sought an audience with the General 
because in July 1862, she had one of her slaves, Aaron, arrested and confined to jail for “safe 
keeping.”205 Suddenly, in early September, Aaron had been mysteriously “transferred” to the 
USS Tennessee without Mrs. Graham’s knowledge or consent. Believing that “it cannot be the 
policy of the government to interfere with, or deprive, a woman, of her rights” Graham asked not 
only for restitution for Aaron, but aid in reclaiming others who had been “enticed from my 
home.”206 
Irate former owners were not the only ones who pressed Banks for assistance. Black 
refugees desperately appealed to the general for assistance locating family members still trapped 
in slavery. One freedwoman—writing on stationary bearing the image of Confederate General 
P.G.T. Beauregard—begged Banks to hear her “humble petition” for assistance in reclaiming her 
son because “the person that got him claims him as a slave.” Pleading with the general to “pleas 
to listen to me for a little while or tell me when I can see you or where to call at,” she asked for 
any help he could provide in reclaiming her lost child.207 Through an intermediary, another 
mother asked for assistance in reclaiming her two boys who were promised their freedom by 
their former owner in Maryland after her death. The former owner died without leaving a will, 
whereupon the brother sold them to a slave-trader in Alexandria, Virginia, and the two boys 
wound up as the property of a Mr. Montero in New Orleans. Mr. Montero was “assuredly a 
rebel,” and the intermediary requested that Banks “cause [the two boys] to be forwarded north” 
at the first opportunity.208 
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As if to underscore the urgency of these competing claims, reports quickly filtered in 
from the areas surrounding New Orleans that a slave insurrection was planned for the Christmas 
holiday. In order to help “allay the fears of many classes of people,” Banks was forced to 
dispatch troops to places such as St. James Parish, on the west bank of the Mississippi, where 
they remained through the first few weeks of January.209 Writing to Halleck and Lincoln, Banks 
believed that the “exigencies of the hour” rendered it necessary to “relieve the people of their 
apprehensiveness as to outbreaks among the slaves.”210 In order to address these concerns, Banks 
issued a proclamation on December 24th, 1862 “to correct public misapprehension and 
misrepresentation” regarding the intentions of the federal government in relation to slavery.211 
Many historians have judged the tone of Banks’s Christmas Eve address to be wholly 
conservative. According to this interpretation, Banks’s proclamation sets the tone for a regime 
that heavily valued the cultivation of unionist slaveholders, and was determined to use the Union 
army as an instrument of white control over slaves.212 Several sections of the address validate 
this analysis. Banks observed that many areas of Louisiana had “not yet been designated by the 
President as in rebellion,” and thus Lincoln was unlikely to abolish slavery in those areas.213 
Moreover, Banks “enjoined” all soldiers and officers of the Union army were to prevent any 
public disturbances, and all slaves were “advised to remain on the plantations until their 
privileges have been definitely established.”214 In case anyone missed his meaning, Banks 
declared  “the war is not waged by the Government for the overthrow of slavery.”215 
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At the same time, Banks was also convinced that “violence and war” meant that slavery 
must die.216 His proclamation called attention to the March 1862 Act of Congress forbidding 
Union soldiers from returning fugitive slaves and, although he was careful to state that no 
“encouragement” would be given slaves to desert their plantations, he insisted  “no authority 
exists to compel [slaves] to return.”217 Additionally, following Butler’s precedent, Banks advised 
planters to make arrangements to divide their crop amongst the black workers as a form of 
compensation for their labor. Perhaps most dramatically, Banks then bluntly informed his 
audience that continued war meant military emancipation, and with it inexorably came the 
destruction of slavery. “The first gun at Sumter proclaimed emancipation,” he declared, and the 
continuation of the war “would consummate that end.”218 Any slave holder expecting assistance 
from the army was mistaken, as it was “impossible” that anyone in the Union army “should 
counsel the preservation of slave property in the rebel States.”219 For Banks, a conciliatory 
attitude towards the planters did not involve skirting congressional legislation or ignoring the 
realities of military emancipation. 
True to his word, the first few weeks worth of entries in Banks’s Letters Sent book are 
littered with rejections of requests for assistance in reclaiming slaves. Indeed, these requests 
happened often enough that Banks developed a formulaic reply. In two terse sentences, Banks 
would quote the March 1862 Act of Congress prohibiting all officers or military personnel in the 
Union forces from returning fugitive slaves, and inform the slaveholder that their request  
“cannot be complied with.”220 Union military personal stationed at posts throughout the 
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Department of the Gulf also received instructions to the same effect. Writing to Brigadier 
General Cuvier Grover, commanding at Baton Rouge, Banks wrote that while the army could 
“require the negroes who come within our lines to labor either on the public works or on the 
plantations,” the army could “in no way restore the negroes to servitude, or place them at work 
under their former masters.”221   
Banks’s instructions to Grover also suggested the magnitude of the black refugee crisis. 
Later in 1863, Banks wrote that upon his assumption of command there were “many thousands 
of negroes in idleness” within his lines, and that eleven thousand families—he did not offer a 
breakdown by race—were being supported at the government’s expense.222 James McKay, 
investigating conditions in the Department of the Gulf on behalf of the American Freedmen’s 
Inquiry Commission, repeated these estimates in his report to Secretary of War Stanton during 
the spring of 1864.223 Other observers suggested those estimates were low. One Treasury 
Department employee in the Department of the Gulf believed their were at “at least 20,000 black 
men within our lines,” a number that obviously did not factor women and children into 
account.224 Citing the Chief Quartermaster for the Department of the Gulf, Union Quartermaster 
General Montgomery Meigs noted in his annual report for 1862 that by Christmas of that year, 
there would be nearly 50,000 refugees within Union lines around New Orleans.225 During his 
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first few months in New Orleans, Banks grew so alarmed by the conditions in and around New 
Orleans that he feared for the health of everyone in the city if something was not done to address 
the refugee crisis.226 
Inspections at Union posts in the department, as well as correspondence with other 
officers, further highlighted the desperate conditions faced by black refugees. From Kenner, 
Louisiana, Colonel Charles Stevens described the horrid conditions the freed-people faced. 
Having worked sunrise to sundown, seven days a week since September of 1862, the clothing of 
the men at the camp was in a “shocking condition,” yet the lieutenant whom Stevens had 
relieved had seen no need for distributing the clothing already on hand.227 The women were in 
even worse condition than the men, and throughout the camp, the only bedding Stevens found 
“consisted of a few quilts and blankets, with a little hay.”228 Performing an inspection of the 
Union post at Baton Rouge on January 21st, Banks pronounced himself horrified by the “abject 
misery” faced by the black workers who were constructing fortifications for the Union army.229  
 Unsurprisingly, letters from fretful planters during early 1863 detailed stories of how 
military occupation were eroding slavery. The lawyers for one planter in Jefferson parish 
informed Banks that their client’s plantation had become “disorganized from the desertion of 
fifty negroes” leaving him with just ten to harvest his crop.230 From Terrebonne Parish, planters 
lamented the “deplorable condition of their once flourishing and happy Parish” and catalogued 
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all the property that had been confiscated by the Union armies.231 According to these planters, 
“designing persons” had lead their slaves to believe that they were now owners of everything left 
on the plantation.232 Their slaves “quit work, go & come when they see fit,” carry off livestock, 
and congregate together, these same planters complained, with everything done “against the will 
& in defiance of the orders of their masters.”233   
Thus faced with the plight of the black refugees on the one hand, and the demands of the 
planters on the other, Banks attempted to split the difference. In General Orders Number 12, 
issued at the end of January, Banks outlined his vision for a free labor system in Louisiana. 
Black workers were entitled to an “equitable share” of any crops they produced, and the 
Sequestration Commission was directed to meet with “planters and other parties” in order to 
establish a yearly system of regulations governing black labor.234 Proprietors were to provide for 
the food, clothing, proper treatment and just compensation for black workers, and, upon the 
acceptance of an agreement, the officers of the Government would enforce “all the conditions of 
continuous and faithful service” on the part of the black workers.235 Finally, the Quartermasters 
Department was ordered to manage unemployed black workers on abandoned plantations, 
assigning either government officials or “suitable persons” to individual estates.236 Proudly 
enclosing a copy of his order in a letter to his wife, Banks predicted that it would “solve all the 
troubles here about slavery.” 237 
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 Following Banks’s directives, members of the Sequestration Commission met with 
several delegations of planters in early February. Although Banks later wrote that “in arranging 
the conditions of their labor, the negroes were consulted by men of their own color,” no 
surviving primary sources indicate that this was the case.238 Nonetheless, on February 5th, Banks 
presented a delegation of planters with the regulations drawn up by the Commission at the St. 
Charles Hotel.239  Union Army Provost Marshals would be instructed to “induce the slaves” to 
return to the plantation and sign contracts to “work diligently and faithfully” for one year.240 
“Mechanics, Sugar Makers, drivers” and other skilled workers would receive three dollars per 
month, able bodied males two dollars per month, and women one dollar per month. Provost 
Marshals in the individual parishes were authorized to collect planter’s signatures on agreements 
and enforce its provisions for the government.241 When a black worker returned to a plantation—
this was considered “proof of assent” to the labor agreement—the provost marshal was charged 
with making sure both sides obeyed the agreements.242 Workers were required to remain on the 
plantations, demonstrate “respectful and subordinate deportment” to their employers, while 
planters were expected to “faithfully and fairly” abide by all the terms of the contract.243 
Banks’s labor system sparked an avalanche of criticism. Although Banks had been lead to 
believe that the “majority of the planters…believed the order was prompted by the best of 
motives and would have a good effect on the negroes by forcing them to labor,” their reaction 
was not nearly this placid.244 Slaveholders from St. James Parish blasted the new regulations as 
an “attempt to reconcile things which, in their nature, are utterly incompatible,” and amounted to 
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an “actual and immediate emancipation.”245 Black workers on several plantations voiced their 
opinions with their feet by throwing down their tools and leaving  “in a body.”246 
 National reaction was just as swift. Sampling opinion he had collected from the North, 
one officer in the Quartermaster’s Department told Banks he had heard “but [a] single expression 
regarding your wise and well timed orders” on the “vexed question,” and that was a satisfaction 
“from all the parties in the North.”247 Others were less complimentary. Abolitionist Wendell 
Phillips lambasted Banks as a “faltering, stupid general” who was caving to the interests of the 
slaveholders and shackling blacks to a system that was little better than slavery.248 Tellingly, 
while many planters expressed a begrudging acceptance of Banks’s system, some of the most 
vehement reaction came from planters in areas exempt from the Emancipation Proclamation. 
One group of Louisiana planters protested to Banks “the enforcement of this voluntary system of 
labor in the two Congressional Districts where slavery is maintained…is utterly 
incompatible.”249 To pay slaves according to Banks’s circulated agreement, the planters 
concluded, was “equivalent to an actual and immediate emancipation in all of Louisiana.”250 
Other planters worried about the army’s ability to enforce the vagrancy provisions of the 
agreement, and peppered Banks to provide personal assurances that he would choose officers 
who would not hesitate to carry out those provisions.251 
Repeating Wendell Phillips’s criticism, most historians have portrayed General Banks’s 
labor agreement as wholly conciliatory towards the planters, and thus provided the basis for a 
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wage labor system that was little better than slavery.252 Yet under Banks regulations, masters 
were required to agree to pay their former slaves wages, were forbidden from using corporal 
punishment, and from meddling in the private family lives of black workers. All of these 
stipulations took deliberate aim at some of the fundamental pillars of chattel slavery and 
represented a crippling blow to the “ancien regime.” Moreover, Banks’s regulations were to be 
enforced by Union army officials and sanctioned by the Lincoln administration, thus 
unmistakably throwing the power of the federal government behind the transition to free labor.253  
On the other hand, the restrictions were important. Black workers had no say in choosing their 
employers, and their contracts bound them to one plantation for the entire year. Additionally, 
black workers mobility was severely circumscribed by provost marshals who were empowered to 
arrest and detain those found off their plantations without proper authorization. While these 
restrictions are important, they did not make Banks’s free labor system synonymous with 
slavery; nor did it make the system an amalgamation of slavery and freedom. These newly freed 
slaves were now paid wageworkers with contracts enforced by the Union Army, not 
commodities that could be bought and sold at the whim of the planters.  
Banks was eager to receive on-the-ground feedback on the workings of his new system. 
To supply the requisite information, Banks appointed George Hanks, Colonel of the 15th, United 
States Colored Infantry, as Superintendent of Negro Labor in the Department of the Gulf, and 
directed him to report directly to headquarters. Furthermore, Banks also deputized two chaplains 
with strong antislavery credentials, George H. Hepworth and Edwin H. Wheelock, to travel 
throughout the department and inspect conditions on all the plantations. Like Hanks, Wheelock 
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and Hepworth were directed to make regular reports straight to Banks, and give the commanding 
general unvarnished information as to the operations of the labor system. Pleased by Hepworth, 
Wheelock, and Hanks’s eagerness to undertake their assignments, Banks confidently informed 
his wife “all the abolitionists here assist me.”254 
 The selection of Hanks, Hepworth, and Wheelock to their positions is critically 
important. Faced with a decision as to who would provide the most unvarnished feedback, Banks 
appointed three dedicated antislavery advocates to positions where they could make their views 
known and, in Hanks case, where he had an entire office under his direction. These were men 
who were most likely to spot any instances of abuse or mal-treatment of freed persons, and make 
recommendations that would change the labor arrangements. Furthermore, in the case of 
Hepworth and Wheelock, Banks also chose to bypass the normal military chain of command, and 
have their reports submitted directly to the headquarters. Undoubtedly it could be argued that 
these appointments were an attempt to stifle the criticism that Banks’s program did not give 
enough aid to the freed-person, and that Banks, always attuned to the political winds, was 
building support within the Republican Party for a possible presidential run in 1864. Yet these 
criticisms cannot explain why Banks often took their suggestions to heart, and would base some 
of the changes to the labor agreement in 1864 on the suggestions of antislavery military officers.    
 In a series of reports and recommendations presented to headquarters, Hepworth and 
Wheelock conductive systematic examinations of nearly every free-labor plantation in the 
Department of the Gulf. Starting during the first week of April, the pair began visiting 
plantations on the west bank of the Mississippi downriver from New Orleans. On plantations 
such as the Magnolia Plantation, where Hepworth and Wheelock determined that Banks’s labor 
agreement had been carried out in good faith, the pair found the freed workers “docile, 
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industrious, and quiet.”255 Conducting extensive conversations with the workers in order to learn 
their grievances and routines, Hepworth and Wheelock found “in almost every instance,” the 
freed workers grateful to the government for the protection they afforded, and willing to labor 
under the existing arrangements. Where the “experiment of free labor has been fairly tried,” the 
inspectors concluded that it was no longer an experiment, “but a success.”256 
 Of course, such triumphal reports were not the case on all the plantations. On estates such 
as that of Colonel Maunsel White, Hepworth and Wheelock found the planters “wedded to the 
‘Ancient Regime’” and unwilling to accept any terms short of the reinstitution of slavery.257 
Unsurprisingly, on plantations where these attitudes prevailed, the freed-people were “ill-fed, 
illused, miserable + discontented, seizing any chance to run away.”258 Colonel White, for 
instance, had signed the labor contract with the government, but “daily violates its conditions” 
through the mal-nutrition of physical abuse of black workers, and Banks’s inspectors were 
horrified to discover that brutal whippings of the workers took place “under the eye and sanction 
of a corporal Hood, a solder placed by the provost marshal on the plantation.”259 Moving quickly 
to try and remedy the situation, Hepworth and Wheelock forbid the continuation of flogging, and 
recommended to the Provost Marshal General that corporal Hood be removed immediately.260 
 The conditions on Bradish Johnson’s plantation were even worse. The main problem was 
the cruelty of the overseer, a man who assaulted and abused the black workers with impunity. In 
private interviews black workers told the two chaplains “we will accept even the devil for an 
overseer, if you will only remove this man!” and begged for permission to enlist in the army.261 
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After the inspectors two left, they found out that Decker had  “harangued” the workers, bragged 
about the scope of his control over them, and roundly abused Banks’s administration of the 
Department of the Gulf. 262As a result of these interactions on the Johnson plantation, Hepworth 
and Wheelock recommended to Banks that they be given authority to recruit and enlist and male 
workers who wished to join the Union Army.263  
Additional recommendations concerned the New Orleans civil police. In many locations, 
the police had been called in by the planters to arrest workers, with city jails “used for [black 
workers] ‘safe keeping’ as the phrase goes.”264 These procedures, both inspectors complained, 
were inconsistent with Banks system, and should be prohibited.265 An undated endorsement 
written on the back of the report commented that “most of the evils” mentioned by Hepworth and 
Wheelock had been corrected, though it did specify how this was accomplished.266  
Quickly realizing just how many blacks were confined to parish jails, Hepworth and 
Wheelock made a point to visit more of the jails immediately after submitting their initial report 
to Banks. Touring the jail at Carrollton they found thirteen black men, along with three white 
civilians, and two Union soldiers. One of the black prisoners was not even listed in the record 
book, meaning that he would remain in jail indefinitely, while another had been placed in the jail 
for “safe keeping” since December, 1862.267 Many of the other blacks had also been placed in the 
jail for same purpose, though the “charge of larceny appears next to their names.”268 As 
Hepworth and Wheelock dryly noted, the officers who arrested the black workers, along with the 
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justice of the peace who tried them, were state and civil officers “subserving the interests of the 
planters,” while “neglecting those of the government.”269  
Reports from other Union officers echoed some of Hepworth and Wheelock’s findings. 
Captain Samuel Cozzens, who had taken charge of abandoned and confiscated plantations from 
the Sequestration Commission on February 15th, also spent much of the spring of 1863 
performing inspections. On May 15th, he presented Colonel S.B. Holabaird, Chief Quartermaster 
for the Department of the Gulf, with a report and recapitulation that filled fourteen legal sized 
pages. Cozzens’s report confirmed that the relative successes or failure of the plantation system 
varied on a case-by-case basis. For example, the “Point Celeste” plantation, belonging to 
McManus and Griffin, was in “very bad order” and “stripped of everything.”270 Cozzens 
immediately hired a government-paid overseer to attend to the rehabilitation and successful 
cultivation of the crops through the free-labor agreement. Likewise, the “Sarah” plantation, 
formerly owned by a Mr. F. Smith, but now abandoned, was “stripped of nearly everything 
valuable,” but since Cozzens had installed his salaried overseer, he was optimistic about the 
“prospect of a good crop.” 271 
 Cozzens seemed particularly enthused—perhaps a little too much so—by the success of 
plantations where he had hired overseers. For example, on some plantations the former managers 
had been ejected, and the correct steps for cultivation had been “invariably done in all the cases 
where [Cozzens] rented the plantations.”272 Meanwhile, on the Taylor plantation, Cozzens 
believed that the prospect for a lucrative sugar crop outstripped the possibilities for any of the 
other plantations left under his charge, and Cozzens further hoped that on plantations like the 
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Hermitage, where he had “not the requisite number of hands to labor,” that if he were able to 
procure the proper number of workers, the success of those plantations would be virtually 
assured.273 
 On other plantations, Cozzens found conditions more troubling. The Buland plantation, 
Cozzens informed Banks, “had not been properly managed,” while in the Parish of St. Charles, 
seven abandoned plantations had been seized because the freedmen “had refused to work for the 
owners,” thus turning the plantation into a “resort for runaway negroes.”274 In each case, 
Cozzens admitted that he found the freed people “suffering for want of proper and suitable 
clothing,” and that he had been obligated to provide them with both food and clothing, as they 
were “indisposed to work” otherwise.275 Although Cozzens did not share Hepworth and 
Wheelock’s humanitarian concern for the welfare of the freedmen, he did try to ensure Banks’s 
policies were followed. On several plantations, he found a disposition on the part of local provost 
marshal’s to “unaccountably interfere” with the management of the plantations.276 Cozzens did 
not cite specific instances of abuse—or perhaps attempts to correct abuse—except to state that he 
was unhappy with the “spirit” this interference produced among the workers, and led to the 
leases on the plantations “extremely negligent” in obeying order from Cozzens office.277 After he 
reported the interferences to Provost Marshal General James Bowen, Cozzens believed that he 
had been given all the orders necessary to remedy any conflict between the provost marshal and 
his overseers. 
The correspondence and reports of Hepworth and Wheelock, along with that of Hanks 
and Cozzens, all identified abusive or corrupt provost marshals—with the help of civilian 
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police—as one of the key problems with Banks’s labor system. Indeed, Banks’s labor system 
was structured in a way that placed a tremendous amount of power in the hands of  Provost 
Marshal General Bowen and his deputies. Assistant provost marshals were assigned to oversee 
the implementation of the labor arrangements within each parish, and these officials in turn 
reported to Provost Marshal General Bowen. Bowen would work closely with Captain Cozzens, 
who had control of leasing the confiscated and abandoned plantations, assigned from the 
Quartermaster’s Department, and who reported to Colonel S.B. Holibaird, Quartermaster 
General for the Department of the Gulf.278  
In practice, this chain of command meant that it was the assistant parish provost 
marshal’s who would control the actual day-to-day enforcement of the plantation regulations, 
and planters in the region quickly attempted to exploit this command structure. James McKaye, a 
representative of the American Freedman’s Inquiry Commission, reserved special ire for the 
assistant provost marshals in a detailed report to Secretary Stanton. These “young subalterns,” 
McKaye fumed, were often “received into the houses of the planters and treated with a certain 
consideration.”279 Having been provided with a wide range of creature comforts, these officials 
thus became “the employees instrument of great injustice and ill treatment toward his colored 
laborers.”280 McKaye concluded this section of his report by bluntly informing Stanton that the 
provost marshals  “do not see that General Banks’s orders are carried out.” 281 
Union soldiers, Department of the Gulf officials, and black refugees all filled the Letters 
Received for the Department of the Gulf with complaints about provost marshals who abused the 
freed-people. One captain in the 13th New Hampshire Volunteers confessed to Banks that he had, 
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by request of the provost marshal in Carrollton, Louisiana, sent a guard across the Mississippi to 
assist local police in making the arrests of slaves who had reportedly been threatening their 
master’s life. Only afterwards did the captain learn that his men had stood by while the arrested 
men had been whipped by police.282 Captain Elen reported that he always furnished men for the 
provost marshal so that they could assist local police in making arrests, but was unsure what 
action, if any, needed to be taken against the men who had witnessed the whipping “”merely 
from curiosity!”283 The captain hastened to assure his superiors that the men under his command 
“have never returned nor assisted in the return of fugitive slaves to their masters, nor have they 
whipped or assisted in whipping any.”284 In another case, Superintendent for Negro Labor 
George Hanks reported that on the plantation of a Dr. Knapp, black workers who had been 
arrested and brought to the plantation for that purpose were building a new levee. Some of the 
workers were “nearly naked and all locked at night into a brick building.” Dr. Knapp informed 
Hanks that the workers had all been arrested and brought to the plantation “under the direction of 
the Provost Marshal.”285  
 Of course, not all the parish provost marshals were cruel. Some sought to both make sure 
Banks’s labor system was implemented fairly, and punish those who mistreated freed-people. 
When Provost Marshal General Bowen learned that a slave who had been whipped subsequently 
died from his injuries, he immediately ordered the arrest of those responsible.286 Bowen also 
instructed Page that he should “arrest all persons who were present at the infliction of the 
whipping,” because this made them accessories to murder.287 Bail was set for those witnesses at 
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$10,000, and those who could not pay were held in jail to await trial. The principle suspect 
apparently escaped into an area controlled by Confederate forces, but four unnamed white male 
witnesses were arrested and imprisoned.288 Similarly, 1st Lieutenant Robert Gaskill of the provost 
marshal’s office in the Parish of Iberville, reported blacks from nearby plantations in order to 
avoid parties of Confederates who were operating in the area. These black refugees had “no 
clothing to keep them warm at nights, nothing to eat, and ask [Gaskill] what they shall do[?]”289 
Gaskill labeled them a “great annoyance,” but nevertheless informed his superior “they must 
have something to eat,” and so provided them with rations290.  
  Banks moved quickly to try and remedy the situation with the assistant provost marshals. 
In early March, he ordered Provost Marshal General Bowen to release “all negroes confined in 
the Prisons of the various Parishes not charged with crime or misdemeanor,” but imprisoned 
“merely on the charge of vagrancy,” to be released and sent to Hanks’s recruiting depot for black 
laborers.291 As these orders suggest, Banks’s aim in securing the release of black prisoners was 
directed at procuring more laborers for the free-labor plantations. To that end, Banks also 
informed Bowen that all blacks who had “no regular habitation or employment” could be 
arrested by the provost marshal and also sent to Hanks’s depot. “Such an arrangement,” Banks 
believed, would “add much to the peace and comfort of [New Orleans].”292 Instructions to this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Provost Marshal James Bowen to Colonel [unnamed] June 15th, 1863, LR, DG, RG 393, NARA. 
289 1st Lieut. Of Pro. Mar. Robert Gaskill to Col. H. Robinson, Pr. Mar. Genl. October 19th, 1864, LR, DG, RG 393, 
NARA. 
290 Ibid. 
291 N.P. Banks to Brig. Gen. James Bowen Provost Marshall General, March 3rd, 1863, LS, DG, RG 393, NARA. 
292 Ibid. Bowen was subsequently ordered by Banks to inspect all the prisons in New Orleans and the Parish of 
Orleans and “discharge all the negroes held without charges.” See A.A. General [unsigned] to Bowen, April 2nd, 
1863, LS, DG RG 393, NARA. 
	   204	  
effect immediately went out to all the assistant Provost Marshal’s in the Department of the 
Gulf.293 
  Unfortunately, the wide discretion in these orders lead to more abuse than it corrected. 
Bowen informed Banks that at least one of his subordinate general’s orders regarding the 
vagrancy of the freedmen was “perhaps too preemptory,” but assured the general that “care 
would be taken that [the orders] purpose is not misunderstood.”294 Such assurances quickly 
proved to be wildly optimistic. The historian of the Fifteenth New Hampshire Volunteers later 
cited a letter from one soldier in the regiment detailing how the men “went down to an old 
brickyard this morning, and surrounded a lot of niggers and put them on a boat. They send them 
up river to work on plantations…they have to drive them to the boat at the point of bayonet; 
when they see you coming they run like a flock of sheep.”295 Moreover, the civilian police in 
New Orleans and the surrounding parishes often assisted union officials in rounding up black 
refugees. According to George Hanks, “members of the Police of this Parish [New Orleans] have 
unauthorizingly arrested negroes, and having subjected them to the lash, have thus coerced them 
into submitting to be hired out to the planters.”296 Hanks even found one policeman who was 
overseeing gangs of workers that they had forcibly conscripted to repair the levees on the 
plantations of several influential planters. “The coercion necessary to arrest and convey [the 
freed people to the plantations],” Hanks tartly observed, was causing “much excitement” among 
both the blacks and the civilian and military officials who sympathized with their plight.297 
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 With many of the assistant provost marshals and civilian police officers thus proving to 
be less than trustworthy, Hepworth and Wheelock continued to pay close attention to the 
conditions in the parish prisons throughout the spring and summer of 1863. At one prison they 
found a jailer who kept no books at all, making it impossible to tell who the prisoners were, and 
what the charges were against them; the men found one black man confined for “safe keeping,” 
and ordered his immediate release.298 Another parish prison on the east side of the Mississippi 
river was, if possible, even worse. “A most loathsome place,” the men fumed, and “wholly unfit 
for any person,” and the smell inside the prisoners was so bad from the combination of sweat, 
excrement and other effluvia that both were “compelled to retire” almost immediately.299  
Almost as an afterthought, Hepworth and Wheelock’s added that they could not report on 
the general conditions in the Lafourche district west of New Orleans because those government 
run plantations “had been almost completely broken up by guerillas.”300 Indeed, government run 
or leased plantations were frequent targets for raids by Confederate forces. The Union official 
who felt this impact most directly was George Hanks, head of the Bureau of Free Labor. By the 
summer of 1863, Hanks oversaw thirty-one plantations and over 12,000 total workers, although 
those numbers fluctuated rapidly.301 Like Hepworth and Wheelock, Hanks had firm antislavery 
convictions and a genuine humanitarian concern for black workers. Hanks regularly reported to 
headquarters about his efforts to see that orders forbidding corporal punishment were carried out, 
and attempted to ensure that the Bureau of Negro Labor was kept abreast of the conditions on all 
the free labor plantations.302   
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 The progress on Hanks’s plantations was stopped dead in mid-June. As will be discussed 
in greater detail below, Confederate troops under the command of General Richard Taylor 
endeavored to relieve the pressure on the garrison at Port Hudson by launching a 
counteroffensive into the Lafourche region west of New Orleans. On June 16th, Confederate 
troops “suddenly appeared in force” near confiscated plantations worked under Hanks direction 
at Plaquemine and “commenced depredating upon, and devastating all plantations cultivated 
under the direction of any government agent.”303 The Confederates specifically targeted all the 
government run plantations, driving away the young able bodied male workers, and “abused and 
maltreated the old and defenseless.” All told, Hanks reported that despite his efforts to save both 
men and property, only one of his thirty-three plantations escaped “unmolested.”304  
 The Confederate raid crippled Hanks’s plantations. Two weeks later, Hanks informed 
headquarters that “all is confusion and disturbance,” and he feared “there will be much suffering 
and death among [the black workers] before they can be again organized.”305 Hanks did call 
special attention to the fact that about thirty plantation workers—who had received one week’s 
worth of fire arms instructions—had fought well, with one man killing a Confederate major. 
Hanks pointedly concluded one of his reports by telling Banks that he hoped the “noble heroes” 
of the 19th Army Corps would soon “cause the enemy to evacuate the territory recently occupied 
by my laborers.”306 Unfortunately, successive reports by observers who visited the damaged 
plantations believed that they would never match the level of pre-raid productivity.307 Hanks’s 
report demonstrates how the success of, and the safety of everyone involved with, the plantation 
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labor system was intimately dependent on the power of the army for protection from Confederate 
reprisals.  
  Even the rumored presence of Confederate raiders could stop work for weeks on end. 
Col. R.B. Merritt informed Assistant Adjutant General Richard Irwin that “all the planters state 
that before the Rebels came through [the Lafourche district] they were doing well under General 
Banks system,” but because of the continued threat and presence of Confederate forces in the 
region, blacks were in a state of panic.308 One confidential “Memo for General Banks” described 
the fluidity of the situation in areas perpetually on the periphery of Union control. “Bands of 
whites [guerillas] prowl around at night,” the colonel reported, “committing all sorts of 
depredations,” and recently two black men who were “endeavoring to escape” to Union lines, but 
captured by these guerillas had been hung, and one black women had been “so severely 
whipped” that she subsequently died from her injuries.309 The implication of these 
communications was clear: the area needed to be cleared of the Confederate threat by the Union 
army before the black workers could return to work. 
By the fall of 1863, Banks was spending an increasing amount of time testily defending 
the free labor plantation system. Because black labor was connected to Louisiana’s restoration to 
the Union, Banks’s plantation system was becoming another source of tension between New 
Orleans and Washington. As will be discussed further below, on November 5th 1863, Lincoln 
wrote Banks chastising him for the lack of progress in registering loyal Louisiana voters. In a 
response marked “not sent” Banks informed Lincoln “it was apparent from the terms and tone of 
your letter that you do not understand the condition of affairs in this Department.”310 Over a 
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dozen cramped pages, Banks lectured the president in language so incendiary one can practically 
feel the general’s anger radiating off the page.  
While Lincoln’s letter was responding to the delays in forming a new state government 
for Louisiana, Banks spent more time in his reply venting his anger at what he felt was Lincoln’s 
lack of appreciation for what he done for the freed people in his department. Mirroring what he 
had told General Halleck in October, Banks informed Lincoln that when he arrived in the 
Department in December 1862, he had found “many thousand negroes, many of them helpless,” 
with thousands more coming in from Confederate lines with the advance of the Union armies 
into the countryside.311 “All were put to work upon plantations who could work, and the products 
of their labor supported those who from infancy or sickness were helpless,” Banks lectured the 
president, and his administration “has never cried out against the negroes—there has not been a 
moment in my administration when I would not gladly, have undertaken to maintain without cost 
to the government, 50,000 fifty thousand negroes old and young, sick or well from any other, or 
all other departments.”312 
Ultimately, Banks decided that discretion was the better part of valor and never sent his 
reply. However, this unsent missive does indicate Banks’s frustration with some of the national 
criticism his labor system was receiving. General James Wadsworth, a War Department Special 
Inspector charged with investigating the condition of the freed people in various department, had 
blasted Banks in his testimony before the American Freedman’s Inquiry Commission. 
Wadsworth labeled Banks as “so conservative, so non-committal, and so afraid of committing 
himself,” that it was difficult for him to pin down exactly what he believed about the freed 
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people.313 Wadsworth also criticized Provost Marshal General Bowen and his subordinates for 
forcing freed people who left the plantations “to go to work on the levee, without wages,” and 
believed that such a system would render many blacks “serfs” rather than freedmen.314 Writing in 
the New York Times, editor Sidney Gay fumed that black workers were “compelled to work for 
wages two-thirds less than he could command in open market,” and was prohibited from having 
a voice in the contracts, and were “exposed to the tyrannical caprices of lifelong slaveholders.”315 
Banks, always more adept at commanding a political campaign than a military one, fired 
back. B. Rush Plumly, presumably with Banks approval, expended a tremendous amount of time, 
energy, and ink defending Banks to his abolitionist colleagues. Although Plumly later reported 
that he  “met a ‘storm’” of accusations and “injured expressions” from his old comrades, he 
steadfastly insisted that Banks program were the only practical steps that could be taken at the 
time.316 Edwin Wheelock sounded the same note in letters reprinted in William Lloyd Garrison’s 
Liberator. When Banks had first arrived the Department of the Gulf, Wheelock wrote, he found 
“many planters wedded to the past, and could not comprehend the revolution.”317 While they 
accepted the labor agreements because of the force of Union arms, they “wished for its failure,” 
and issued workers poor rations, treated workers poorly, and paid them at irregular intervals. 
Jails were filled with blacks arrested without charges, and in some cases, provost marshals had 
been bought or bribed to overlook, or be complicit in the maltreatment of the workers.318 
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According to Wheelock, Banks “swiftly remedied” as many of these problems as was possible, 
and by the end of 1863, “order was gradually brought out of chaos.”319  
 Plumly’s and Wheelock’s efforts helped convince William Lloyd Garrison of the 
“essential benevolence of the Banks system.”320 By the middle of 1864, Garrison was regularly 
reprinting vigorous defenses of Banks system in the pages of The Liberator, and took pains to 
correct “the disparagement of Gen. Banks, and, through him, Pres. Lincoln” by pointing out that 
criticisms of Banks wage scale failed to facto into account the food, clothing, and medical care 
that the freedmen received from the Government.321 Garrison also defended Banks in his private 
correspondent, telling Francis Newman to “take a telescopic rather than microscopic view” of 
Banks labor system.322 “Instead of dwelling upon and magnifying to huge dimensions those 
incidental errors and outrages,” Garrison urged Newman to note that slavery had received its 
“death warrant” and the “haughty Slave Power has been laid low in the dust.”323 Although 
Garrison wrote privately to Banks that he still had some questions about the overall treatment of 
the freed people in the Department of the Gulf, when Banks delivered a full throated defense of 
his program, entitled Emancipated Labor in Louisiana, in the fall of 1864, Garrison not only 
published the text of the speech, but told his readers that Banks efforts to “deliver the oppressed 
from the yoke of slavery” while at the same tie “reconcile the employers and the employed” were 
worthy of public commendation.324  
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For his part, Lincoln continued to support the Banks. As 1863 drew to a close, Lincoln 
instructed Banks to “exercise supreme authority” over all civil and military affairs of the 
department, take control of the organization of the free state government, and make it clear “that 
the government in all its forms has one head—the general commanding the Department.”325  
Assured of his authority by the president, Banks issued two orders meant to assert further control 
over the progress of labor and reconstruction in Louisiana. The first, issued on January 11th, 
announced that the parts of the old state constitution of Louisiana that related to slavery were 
“inconsistent” with the present condition of public affairs, and “inapplicable” to any class of 
persons.”326 The old state constitutional provisions related to slavery were “inoperative and 
void,” and eradicated any conservative Unionist hopes that the soon to be reconstructed state 
government would sustain the institution.327 The order also provided for the election of local 
officials including governor, lt. governor, and superintendent of education to take place in six 
weeks time.328 
Banks followed that announcement with General Orders Number 23, issued in early 
February. General Order 23 reflected a year of careful consideration on Banks’s part about the 
problems with his labor system, and constituted a thoughtful attempt to remedy those problems. 
Wages were raised to $8 per month for first class hands, and $3 per month for fourth rate hands, 
and employers were now required to provide not only medical care, but rations, clothing, and 
housing to both workers and their dependents. The workday was shortened to ten hours in the 
winter and nine hours per day in the summer, and provided workers with a lien on the crop as a 
guarantee for wages. Planters were ordered to provide land for garden plots for cultivation by the 
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freed people, and offer incentives for extra work. Like the previous years regulations, Banks 
declared vagrancy and idleness a crime, to be enforced by the provost marshal, and restricted the 
mobility of the workers once they had agreed to a contract, and also forbade military recruiting 
on the plantations. Perhaps most dramatically, workers were now allowed to choose their 
employers, and while blacks would, for the moment have to work for hire, Banks allowed that 
eventually they might be allowed to rent or even own their own land. These changes reflected 
Banks’s evolving thought process about his labor program, as well as the degree to which he had 
quickly moved in a radical direction.329  
James McKay, an emissary from the American Freedman’s Inquiry Commission (AFIC), 
arrived in Louisiana just prior to the implementation of these new regulations. Secretary of War 
Stanton had created the AFIC in the spring of 1863, and charged it with visiting the Union 
occupied areas of the South and reporting “what measures will best contribute to their protection 
and improvement.”330 McKaye was joined on the AFIC by two other committed anti-slavery 
stalwarts, Robert Dale Owen and Samuel Gridley Howe, but McKay was the only one who 
ventured to the Department of the Gulf. During his visit, McKay struck up a detailed exchange 
with Banks that continued after he left the Department of the Gulf. These letters subsequently 
informed McKay’s report to Secretary of War Stanton, and his account was expanded and 
published later in 1864 under the title The Mastership and Its Fruits: The Emancipated Slave 
Face to Face With His Old Master.331 
Banks, clearly aiming at his Northern critics through the AFIC representative, addressed 
several problems with the free labor system in his communications with McKay. In particular, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 General Orders No. 23, February 3rd, 1864, OR 1:34:2, 227-231.  
330 Quoted in McCrary, Lincoln and Reconstruction, 153. 
331 My description of McKaye’s activities is heavily indebted to both McPherson, The Struggle For Equality, 182-
186, and McCrary, Lincoln and Reconstruction, 153-156.  
	   213	  
Banks zeroed in on planter resistance and the jurisdictional arrangement between the War and 
Treasury Departments. Many planters, he wrote, behaved with “incredulity as the success of the 
[free labor] experiment” became clear, while overseers continued to act with “intractability and 
brutality” towards black workers.332 Only government supervision and intervention, coupled with 
guarantees that Banks deemed “essential to the security of practical freedom and civil rights” of 
the freed people would ensure the future success of free labor in Louisiana.333 Banks also 
reserved special ire for the Treasury Department—then involved in an ongoing jurisdictional 
dispute with the War Department over control of the free labor plantations, discussed in detail 
below—telling McKaye that the assignment of plantations and abandoned lands to one 
department, and the protection and support of emancipated people to another, caused 
“incalculable evils.” 334 
  Sensing a captive audience, Banks sought to explain to McKay how far free labor in the 
Department of the Gulf had come in just one year. Whereas there had previously been thousands 
who were without employment or houses, and “decimated by disease and death of the most 
frightful character,” Banks now claimed that “there are not at this time 500 persons who are not 
self-supporting.”335 Moreover, Banks told McKay that he had no doubts about the capabilities of 
the freed persons, because sufficient interactions with them told Banks that they had a “clear 
comprehension of their position and the duties which rest upon them,” than other classes of 
persons.336 To support his observations, Banks told McKay that black workers uniformly 
accepted the necessities of labor, and that the conditions they demanded—such as insisting that 
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they not be flogged, their families not be separated, and their children be educated—
demonstrated the “good sense with which they approach the change in their conditions.”337  
Judging by his letters to Banks, his subsequent report to the Secretary of War, and the 
publication of the Mastership and its Fruits, McKay found much to be pleased about with 
Banks’s labor system. He used excerpts from Banks’s letters “to sustain the positions that I have 
taken in my report to the Secy. Of War,” and told Banks that he believed his report would “serve 
to vindicate you from some of the misunderstanding which exists here relative to your treatment 
of the emancipated population in your department and the labor system adopted by you.”338 
McKaye also secured testimony praising Banks’s labor program from people such as 
Superintendent of the Bureau of Negro Labor George Hanks. Sounding rather like Banks, 
McKaye reminded readers of The Mastership and It’s Fruits that the labor system was 
undertaken “in the midst of a great war,” and was meant to “meet the urgent necessities which 
presented themselves in the confusion and chaos consequent upon the breaking up of the old 
system.”339  
Echoing some of Banks’s criticisms, McKaye also identified the “most serious error” of 
the current system as “present arrangements for the care and protection of these people arises out 
of the assignment to a different agency of the care and disposal of the abandoned plantations.”340 
According to McKaye, it was the frequent conflict between the War Department and the 
Treasury Department, not the neglect or incompetence of the commanding general, that had 
resulted in many “evils and abuses” of the freedmen.341 Nevertheless, reflecting on his countless 
conversations with free black workers, McKaye concluded that neither department fully 
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recognized the freed persons’ “right to intervene in his own affairs,” nor had they taken adequate 
steps to secure the “great end of educating him to self control, self reliance, and to the exercise of 
the rights and duties of civilized life.”342  
McKay did not swallow all of Banks’s explanations whole. In both his correspondence 
with Banks and his later report, he provided a detailed analysis of the flaws that needed to be 
corrected: classification of laborers that determined wages were left to employers and provost 
marshal, and did not take into account the “capacities or wishes of the employed” before 
determining wages, and left deductions for food and clothing to the employers “sense of what is 
needful for them,” and placed too severe restrictions on black mobility.343 Perhaps most 
frustrating was that Banks had not done enough to punish the former masters who were still 
attached to slavery, and were taking every opportunity to defraud or abuse the former slaves.344 
Despite these criticisms, McKaye publicly defended Banks by publishing several laudatory 
editorials in The Liberator.345  
James McKaye left the Department of the Gulf before he could assess the full impact of 
the new labor regulations, but reports from other officials were generally positive. From the 
Office of the Superintendent of Negro Labor, George Hanks reported that provost marshal’s had 
visited the plantations during the month of February to explain the new regulations, and by late 
spring, Hanks noted that “the crops are nearly all planted, and in every case when the negroes are 
treated fairly, and their conditions and responsibility explained to them, they are working with an 
alacrity never before known.”346 According to Hanks, there were also fewer cases of abuse at the 
hands of the overseers had been reported, and those that were had been “promptly and severely 
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punished” by the provost marshal.347 While the hostility of the ex-slave owners remained a 
problem, Hanks informed headquarters that conditions for black workers were “showing a 
flattering improvement” from the previous year, and would soon elevate themselves to “the 
national standards of freedom.”348  
Captain George S. Darling, an assistant provost marshal in the Parish of St. John the 
Baptist, was one of those who went from plantation to plantation to observe the impact of the 
regulation changes. Darling reported that he had explained General Orders Number 23 “until all 
were in a degree familiar with the practical meaning of the whole,” and happily noted that black 
workers demonstrated a “commendable prudence” in making contracts with their former masters, 
bringing up grievances and requiring assurances for the future.349 In Darling’s estimation, the 
black workers were willing to work hard, comprehended the new system, and seemed 
particularly interested in the education of their children. On over half the plantations that he 
visited, Darling noted that he had not once been called to punish any of the workers.350 
Importantly, like McKay, neither Hanks nor Darling denied that substantial problems remained. 
Protection for the workers on the government plantations had defied a solution since the 
devastating Confederate raids during the summer of 1863, and sometime in 1864, Hanks 
submitted a “plan for the protection of Negroes between the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi in 
case of a raid or incursion by the enemy”.351 On the approach of enemy forces the provost 
marshal would immediately dispatch couriers to plantations and order the people to provide 
themselves with rations and flee to designated temporary shelters. Moreover, at these designated 
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places, “all troops that could be spared” were to be stationed for the protection of the freed 
people, and Hanks, being kept informed by provost marshals and post commanders would see to 
the supplying of the freed people with supplies from commissary stores in New Orleans.352 
Unfortunately, Hanks’s plan does not seem to have been given a trial, and the threat of 
Confederate raids continued to plague the plantations through the end of the war.353   
  Planter intransigence also continued unabated. Defying Banks’s regulations and orders to 
provide rations, medical care, and supplies to their workers, planters either refused to provide 
these basic necessities or charged freed persons exorbitant prices.354 Hanks acknowledged that 
his power in these circumstances was limited, telling Banks that he had “frequently written 
letters to employers when complaint has been made that the laborers have been overtasked, 
poorly fed, or defrauded in the matter of clothing or pay, admonishing them that if they 
persisted” in violating the labor orders that their crop would be cultivated solely for the benefit of 
the government.355 This threat, Hanks conceded, only “sometimes has a salutary effect” and he  
wanted a military officer under his direction to be detailed to in each parish to visit the plantation 
to obtain testimony from the workers so that “many flagrant abuses might be abolished and many 
cases of injustice” corrected.356  
Banks responded by ordering Colonel Gardner Banks to visit as many parishes as 
possible and “communicate with all classes of people, to ascertain and report their condition, and 
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their relation with each other.”357 Colonel Banks was chosen because he was “sufficiently 
acquainted with the policy of the government” to understand its expectations and desires without 
detailed instructions.358 General Banks was also particularly interested to know if the “negro 
laborer has been treated as a man: if he does his duty, receives his pay, and if subjected to 
punishment, whether he is whipped or maimed or how punished and what participation and 
influence the several provost marshals have in maintaining the just and relations of the laborer 
and the employee.”359 In other words, General Banks wanted to ensure that his policies—
sanctioned by Washington—were being followed and, where they were not, ascertain who was 
responsible, and what steps needed to be taken to correct the problems. 
 
Both Banks and McKay had also complained that the administration of the free labor 
plantations had become hampered by a jurisdictional conflict between the War and Treasury 
Departments. The power struggle began in July 1863, when Banks—in response to 
Congressional legislation from the previous March—began transferring authority over all 
confiscated and abandoned estates from the War Department to Benjamin Flanders, 5th 
supervisory agent for the Treasury Department. During July and August, a total of seventy 
plantations were transferred from the War Department to the Treasury Department, and placed 
under the supervision of the new Superintendent of Plantations, Samuel Cozzens.360 Flanders, 
Cozzens, and the subordinates under their direction now assumed responsibility for the 
supervision of conditions on government run plantations, including the payment of wages, 
treatment of workers, and settling disputes between workers and plantation leases. However, as 
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several historians have noted, both Flanders and Cozzens viewed these plantations “chiefly as 
sources of revenue,” and thus focused their attention on those plantations that were “likely to 
generate a profit” for the government.361 This profit-driven focus would be particularly 
problematic for Colonel Hanks because General Order Number 88, issued by the War 
Department in mid-September, ordered the Bureau of Free Labor to turn over to Flanders all the 
plantations, quartermaster supplies, and laborers under his charge.362 
Hanks was profoundly skeptical of Flanders’s administrative ability and commitment to 
the freed-people. A month after he was ordered to make the transfer, Hanks vented his 
frustrations in a letter to one of the Commissioners of Enrollment for black troops in the 
Department of the Gulf. Flanders had been making “great changes” Hanks fumed, as plantations 
that had been established to provide for the aged and infirmed were no longer functioning in that 
capacity, leaving the blacks who had resided there “dependent on the charity of other than the 
Treasury Dept. for their daily foods.”363 Indeed, Hanks was particularly incensed because 
laborers who could work were kept on the plantations, while workers who were deemed 
unproductive were sent to contraband depots in Union occupied parishes or New Orleans 
itself.364 Such an arrangement meant an influx of blacks to already crowded depots, and the 
straining of already scare resources. When one of Flanders’s agents wrote to Hanks requesting he 
provide more workers for the government plantations, Hanks tersely replied that he could “not 
consent to the separation of families or that able bodied shall be selected and the disabled, infirm, 
and children be turned adrift.”365  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 Berlin, Wartime Genesis, 363. 
362 Special Orders No. 88, summarized in George Hanks to Col. John S. Clark, October 16th, 1863, NBP, LOC. 
363 Hanks to Clark, October 16th, 1863, NBP, LOC. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid. See also “Treasury Department Inspector of Plantations to the Superintendent of Plantations in the Treasury 
Department, 5th Supervising Agency”, September 27th, 1863, Berlin, Wartime Genesis, 463-468. 
	   220	  
In Hanks’s estimation, because the Treasury Department now administered and received 
all the profits from the government run plantations, Flanders had to also support the aged and 
infirm freed-people.366 Banks agreed with this assessment, and voiced his complaints repeatedly 
to Washington throughout October.367 Halleck, either wanting to avoid a jurisdictional dispute 
with the Treasury Department, or wanting to cut through the governmental niceties, told Banks 
that he could order planters to stop evicting any destitute freed people, and that he could take 
control of property needed to provide for the destitute.368 Banks quickly complied, prompting an 
incensed Flanders to send a stream of messages to Washington in an unsuccessful attempt to 
reverse Banks’s directives.369 
By July 1864, the conflict reached a new level of vitriol when Congress granted the 
Treasury Department administrative authority over all freedman’s affairs. In mid-September, 
General Orders Number 257 outlined the new regulations that had been created by Secretary of 
the Treasury William Pitt Fessenden. These Treasury Department’s regulations differed from 
Banks’s regulations in several key respects. Primarily, workers were classified via age, a step 
that took the worker classification out of the hands of the provost marshals and planters. Workers 
were also paid more, with $15-25 per month for men, and $10-18 per month for women. 
However, workers would pay for their own food and clothing, and half their wages were 
reserved until the end of the year. Additionally, workers who were found to be in violation of 
their contracts would forfeit all of their back wages, while the Treasury Department would 
assume control over care for aged and infirm blacks. Perhaps most contentious—at least in the 
minds of military officials in the Department of the Gulf—was that the new regulations specified 
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that military control over the plantation system would be replaced by a civilian administration 
run by Treasury Department employees.370  
No army official was more infuriated at the changes than the new Superintendent of Free 
Labor, Thomas W. Conway. Conway had assumed control of the office in August after George 
Hanks had been charged with corruption. Conway reported in late September that Flanders in 
conservation had injudiciously let it slip that “[Banks] had ruined the negro-you had allowed the 
grand opportunity to pass when the blacks could have been saved-you had done more harm in 
this respect, and in every other, than any man in the country.”371 Flanders also apparently told 
Conway  “nothing could be done with the Treasury Regulations for the freedman as far as this 
department was concerned, and that [Banks] system was worse.”372 Flanders believed that he 
could do a better job administering the freedman’s affairs than Banks or his subordinates. 
Conway offered repeatedly to stay on in whatever capacity Flanders would find for him, but the 
Treasury Agent’s repeated diatribes against Banks and his labor system had made Conway 
conscious of his limitations, and he labeled Flanders “unfit…for the promotion of the cause of 
the government.”373  
Flanders soon justified Conway’s pessimism.  The Treasury Department agent “did not 
know where to begin,” and because of Conway’s ties to Banks, would not allow Conway to 
provide any guidance.374 In fairness to Flanders, the scope of his task was immense. The 
Treasury Department was now responsible for securing wages to workers in a year that saw 
military campaigns ravage the countryside, and planters throw workers off the land while 
claiming they had nothing. The resulting flood of refugees taxed both the Bureau of Free Labor 
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and the Treasury Department to the utmost. The sheer number of responsibilities would have 
taxed an able and efficient administrator, and Flanders was neither. Conway reported that as soon 
as Flanders officially took control of administrative responsibilities, despite previous 
protestations that he was “ready to assume the charge of the work,” went “almost crazy’ his first 
day on the job. 375 
Indeed, Conway found out that Flanders had no idea how to draw money to acquire 
rations or supplies, nor did he have any idea of the total number of black workers under his 
supervision. In letter after letter to Banks—who was then in Washington attempting to see to 
Louisiana’s readmission to the Union—Conway pointed out the “chaos” inherent in trying to 
replace one system with another in the middle of planting season, listed all the work the army did 
for the freed people on a daily basis—“complaints are heard, wrongs adjusted, and a thousand 
other small things”—and begged Banks to return to New Orleans and take charge of the situation 
immediately.376 The upheaval caused by Flanders’s incompetence and the change in system, 
Conway predicted, meant  “not one-half the plantations will be worked under the proposed 
Treasury system” during the coming year.377  
With Banks away on leave in Washington, Conway turned to new Department of the 
Gulf commander Stephen A. Hurlbut. Hurlbut immediately wrote Flanders “such a severe letter 
as could hardly be beaten,” telling Flanders that for “every case of suffering and neglect arising 
under his charge he should hold his (Flanders) dept responsible and report the matter to 
Washington.”378 What nobody in Louisiana knew was that Fessenden had in fact suspended the 
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implementation of the new regulations until early 1865, as Flanders did not even learn of the 
order until December 1864.379 Treasury Department officials in Washington had assumed that 
military officials in the Department of the Gulf were still responsible for the conditions of the 
freedmen, while in Louisiana, Union officials were insisting that Treasury Department 
representatives assume total control over the freed-people. 
What particularly incensed Conway was that Flanders, in devising a new free labor plan 
for 1865, solicited the feedback of the planters but not the freed people. The planters responded 
with a veritable deluge of suggestions that indirectly pointed towards just how radical Banks 
system had become in 1864. The planters desired greater restrictions on black mobility, an end to 
their ability to raise livestock and have gardens, a reinstitution of corporal punishment, and other 
methods of enforcing “obedience” from “a people entirely oblivious of moral obligations 
resulting from their contract.”380 To Conway, the planters were the ancient regime, still 
desperately clinging to slavery, and he refuted the assumption that “capital shall control labor” 
by telling Flanders to “take the voice of the colored people themselves into account.”381  
 
The power struggle between the War and Treasury Departments was only one of several 
jurisdictional conflict that ensnared the free labor plantations. Another was the Union army’s 
recruiting of black males. On July 11th, 1863, George Hanks intercepted an order to Union army 
recruiting sergeants—themselves black males—instructing them to “bring in all able bodied men 
of color who have no apparent business, as recruits for [black regiments].”382 This unwonted 
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seizing of men, Hanks complained, limited the effectiveness of the plantation lease system, and 
brought competing manpower needs of the army into direct conflict with each other.383 The most 
frequent target of Hanks’s wrath was the man Washington had placed in charge of recruiting 
black soldiers in the Department of the Gulf, Brigadier General Daniel Ullman. 
Daniel Ullman was not Lincoln’s first choice to command black troops in the Department 
of the Gulf. The officer the president wanted for the job was the recently resigned John Phelps, 
who was summoned to Washington several times by Stanton in late 1862 and early 1863. During 
these meetings, Stanton “coolly” offered Phelps a commission as a Major General of Volunteers 
in order to raise black troops in Louisiana.384 Phelps declined because he was certain the 
presence of loyal slaveholders in Louisiana meant that he would have to become “an apologist 
for the slave.” “I might raise negro troops,” Phelps informed Stanton,  “not in New Orleans or in 
Tennessee or in Kentucky” but in places where “the business would be sufficiently 
respectable.”385 Despite Phelps’s moralistic rejection, not three months after he had resigned over 
the issue of raising black troops, the Lincoln administrations first choice was to place a dedicated 
anti-slavery person in a position where he could act on his convictions. 
 Phelps having declined the offer, the Lincoln administration turned to Ullman. A New 
York lawyer, gubernatorial candidate as a Know-Nothing in 1854, and a recent convert to the 
Republican Party, Ullman forever existed in his own imagination as the man responsible for 
convincing Lincoln to recruit black soldiers. Shortly after the war, Ullman told a gathering of 
Union veterans that, in the fall of 1862, he had informed the president “you arm the Blacks, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 Hanks to Irwin, July 11th, 1863, NBP, LOC. 
384 Phelps Diary, entry for February 13th, 1863, JWPP, NYPL. See also diary entries for December 14th and 31st, 
1862, both in JWPP, NYPL.  
385 Phelps Diary, entry for February 13th, 1863, JWPP, NYPL. 
	   225	  
enlist them into the Armies of the United States.”386 When Lincoln reportedly asked if he would 
be willing to command such a force, Ullman recalled himself as telling the president that he 
“would glory in aiding to strike what, I am sure, will be the most effective moral blow of the 
war.”387 On January 133h, 1863, Ullman was given his chance to strike that “moral blow,” when 
Stanton directed him raise four regiments of Louisiana Volunteer Infantry, later amended to 
include an additional six battalions.388 Ullman immediately opened a recruiting headquarters for 
officers of his brigade at 200 Broadway in New York City, and set about selecting what he 
termed “the right men.’”389 
 As Ullman was setting-up his recruiting apparatus, Banks was ridding the ranks of black 
officers. On January 16th, 1863, Banks received instructions from Adjutant General Lorenzo 
Thomas to report the number of blacks in military service in his department. In reply, Banks told 
the adjutant general that he was replacing the black company officers with whites ones “as 
vacancies occur” because he believed that black officers were “detrimental to the service” and 
had become a “source of annoyance and embarrassment.”390 Banks also denied a petition from 
members of the Native Guards asking that they be grouped together as brigade, in order to 
forestall the difficulties of serving with white soldiers, and for a chance to prove themselves in 
battle. At least one observer believed that Banks was too easily “guided by his West Point 
officers, most of whom, for some reason or another, have prejudice against negro troops.”391   
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  One tactic Banks used during the winter and spring of 1863 were the newly implemented 
examination boards for officers of black regiments. On February 3rd Special Order Number 34 
convened an examination of seven colored officers in the 2nd Louisiana Native Guards. When the 
board found three of the seven deficient in several areas, the regiments commanding officer 
complained to Banks that “the policy of our country is to give this race an opportunity to 
manifest their patriotism, Ability, and intelligence by aiding and crushing the rebellion,” and the 
purge was an attempt to “paralyze its power by overthrowing its officers.”392 Banks was 
unmoved, and the four remaining officers who sat before the board resigned shortly thereafter.393 
 Another tactic was maneuvering the Native Guard officers into resigning. Early in 1863, 
when white soldiers of the 13th Maine refused to recognize the authority of a black officer of the 
day, a scuffle ensued between the regiments. Banks called the men of the black regiment into his 
headquarters, and asked about the incident. When the officers responded with their grievances at 
a second interview, Banks proposed that they resign en masse rather than being thrown out of the 
army. Upon receiving their resignations, Banks apparently issued an order discharging the men, 
but not doing so publicly. When the men returned to Baton Rouge, they found they had been 
discharged and white officers already appointed in their place.394 Now aware that they had been 
outmaneuvered, the officers sent a petition to Secretary of War Stanton who forwarded the 
petition back General Banks, and then apparently declined to take any further action.395  
Meanwhile, Ullman worked quickly in New York City. Within two weeks of his 
appointment he was reporting to the War Department that the “machinery begins to work well,” 
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and that he had a “large number” of applications for officer positions.396 Governors who were 
sympathetic to his cause, such as John Andrew of Massachusetts and Abram Coburn of Maine 
wasted little time in offering their assistance. Having been introduced to Coburn through a letter 
from Vice President and Maine native Hannibal Hamlin, the governor assured Ullman that he 
would give his “hearty cooperation,” and asked how many officers Ullman desired from his 
state.397 For his part, Governor Andrew sent Ullman a long list of Massachusetts’s men, noting 
that he had “taken pains…to include names of known antislavery feelings, who would not be 
impeded in their duty by prejudices of race or color.”398  
  The “machinery” did not work well everywhere. Captain A.B. Botsford, recruiting 
officers for Ullman in upstate New York, informed the general that he had heard “a great deal of 
talk against [Ullman’s mission],” particularly from those who supported New York’s Democratic 
Governor Horatio Seymour.399 Others warned Ullman that he might face violent reprisals from 
Democrats in New York City, and the general himself later wrote that public opinion was “far 
from being ripe” about regarding black soldiers.400 Despite the prospect of violent reprisals from 
Democrats, by the middle of February Botsford and other recruiting agents were reporting good 
progress, and believed they could have as many officers as was needed.401 Ullman 
enthusiastically reported his progress to the War Department, and requested that his authority be 
expanded from a single brigade, as “the same machinery which can raise a corps of officers for 
one can without difficulty raise many.”402 
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Lincoln and Stanton were eager to see recruiting results in Louisiana, not New York. On 
February 19th, Senator Ira Harris of New York wrote Ullman that Lincoln was “very anxious that 
you should move to the scene of your operations as soon as possible.”403 Ullman failed to take 
the hint, instead sending a series of complaints to the War Department instead asking why they 
had denied his request to make an announcement of his appointment and duties in The 
Associated Press.404 Stanton, not known for his patience with self-promoting generals, not only 
ignored Ullman’s complaints, but ordered him stop organizing for more regiments in New York, 
and “proceed to work at once without any further delay.”405 Ullman dithered on, prompting the 
now exasperated Stanton to him tell that Lincoln was growing impatient and that as soon as 
transportation was ready, he should depart for his new assignment.406 Ullman was directed to 
make his headquarters at Baton Rouge, where the War Department pointedly hoped that he 
would be able to fill his brigade with recruits within a month of his arrival.407 
  Ullman’s orders gave him expansive authority. Not only could he recruit anywhere in the 
Department of the Gulf, but he was also authorized to recruit one battalion in Louisiana to be 
used exclusively for scouting purposes.408 This was a clear recognition that a significant 
component of the recruiting efforts would rely on Louisiana blacks knowledge of the 
countryside, as well as an acknowledgement that slaves were more likely to be amendable to 
being recruiting by black soldiers than white. In a similar manner to Lorenzo Thomas in the 
Mississippi River Valley, Ullman was also empowered to dismiss from the service any officer 
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who had committed offenses that “demand such punishment.”409 The message from Washington 
was clear: any officer who stood in the way of Ullman’s ability to implement the recruiting and 
enlisting of black troops had no place in the Union army. 
General Halleck apprised Banks of Ullman’s mission in late March. Halleck directed 
Banks to facilitate Ullman’s efforts in filling up his brigade, and volunteers for the units were to 
be “allowed to come in from the plantations, and from every other source.”410 A few days later, 
Lincoln added that if the opportunity arose to expand the “general object” of recruiting beyond 
Ullman’s operations, it should be done.411 In reply, Banks promised that he would aid Ullman in 
“every possible way,” and believed that only a few weeks would be required for him to fill his 
brigade.412 Wanting to ensure that both Lincoln and Stanton knew that he was going to abide by 
the new policy, Banks informed Halleck that would be “glad to have this dispatch 
communications shown” to them as soon as possible.413 
Banks was cagier when informing political officials in the Department of the Gulf of 
Ullman’s mission. Banks alerted Cuthbert Bullett, Benjamin Flanders, and Michael Hahn that 
Stanton had directed Ullman’s brigade “recruited from the negroes on the plantations near New 
Orleans” and added “I shall comply with this order.”414 Banks also pointedly informed all three 
men “if the friends of the government think [recruiting off the plantations] injudicious they make 
representations at once.”415 Hahn immediately fired off a letter to Lincoln asking that Banks be 
allowed to exercise caution regarding the “particular localities in which negro troops are to be 
raised,” and hinting at the consequences that wanton recruiting off plantations would have for 
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Unionist sentiment and the political reorganization of the state.416 The exchange foreshadowed 
the potential jurisdictional and political schisms that recruiting operations would cause in the 
Department of the Gulf.  
When Ullman finally arrived in the Department of the Gulf on April 20th, he immediately 
established a recruiting depot at Baton Rouge, and “fit out an expedition” to establish other 
depots and recruiting operations in and around Franklin, Louisiana.417 Banks, hearing of 
Ullman’s arrival, ordered him to report to his headquarters in the field, and the two generals 
conferred at Opelousas, Louisiana on May 4th. At this meeting, the Department of the Gulf 
commander turned over all the black recruits that had come into Union lines during the current 
campaign up the Bayou Teche.418 All able-bodied black men were mustered into regiments, 
while those unfit for duty would be placed to work on the fortifications, and women and children 
sent to Bureau of Negro Labor head George Hanks. Exactly one month later, on June 4th, Ullman 
reported that the five regiments of his brigade were filled, and ready to take part in active 
operations against Port Hudson. 
By that time Ullman and Banks were at each other’s throats. The issue was each general’s 
respective authority over the recruiting of black troops. Prior to their first meeting in early May, 
Banks had slyly informed Ullman that he wanted to speak with him “about a plan that I have 
entertained for many weeks upon the organization of [black] troops in this department.”419 The 
plan, Ullman quickly discovered, was the formation of a Corps d’Afrique with Ullman as one of 
three brigade commanders, and overall corps command to be exercised by Major General George 
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L. Andrews.420 The corps was to consist of eighteen regiments of five hundred men each, and 
relegated Ullman to the command of one brigade—his commission was that of a Brigadier 
General—with Andrews and Banks now in charge of the overall recruiting and organization 
black troops. 
Undoubtedly, Banks had contrived this jurisdictional alchemy to place recruiting black 
troops under his immediate supervision. Lincoln’s March instructions to Banks allowed him to 
expand recruiting efforts as he saw fit, and in Banks’s estimation this discretionary authority was 
sufficient to allow for the formation of a Corps D’Afrique. Banks’s low opinion of Ullman’s 
abilities also played a role in his decision. To his wife, Banks characterized Ullman as a “poor 
man” who would cause problems in the Department of the Gulf, an assessment shared by many 
others in Louisiana.421 George Dennison, who rarely agreed with Banks about anything, bluntly 
informed Secretary Chase that Ullman “not the right kind of man for the position.”422 Likewise, 
J.S. Bangs, one of Ullman’s subordinates, and later a Commissioner of Enrollment for black 
troops, considered Ullman to be incompetent and ineffective recruiter. Long after the war, Bangs 
retained his conviction that the government “had made a mistake in the selection of [Ullman],” 
and that all the officers who served under him were tainted by his “utter incapacity” for 
command.423 Ultimately, the politically astute Banks saw an opportunity to reassert his authority 
over black recruiting, as well as reduce the power of a subordinate officer whom he heartily 
detested.  
Although Ullman had been out-maneuvered, he refused to cede any control without a 
fight. During the late spring and summer of 1863, the two continued to clash repeatedly over 
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whether Ullman was allowed to recruit off any of the free-labor plantations. Ullman’s orders had 
empowered him to recruit black troops from anywhere in the department, but following pressure 
from Michael Hahn, Banks advised Ullman, “not to recruit from plantations [around New 
Orleans]” and “suspend any recruiting operations” on the plantations until clarification could be 
obtained from the War Department.424 Banks warned his subordinate that his instructions on the 
subject were to be “scrupulously adhered to,” and that only instructions from the President issued 
through the War Department would reverse the suspension of recruiting on the plantation.425 
Ullman was livid. Not only had few of the men promised to him by Banks actually been 
mustered into service but, in his mind, Banks’s labor system had quickly become a “serious 
impediment” to his recruiting efforts.426 Ullman had observed Banks’s labor system firsthand, 
and had not come away impressed. The system is a  “virtual rendition of the negro to slavery,” he 
declared to Adjutant General Thomas; the workers were often subjected to brutal cruelty, and 
they were rarely paid on time.427  Ullman let his superiors in the War Department know that they 
had to decide whether the priority was on the recruiting of black troops, or on the cultivation of a 
free labor system, melodramatically concluding one missive that prioritizing the latter 
“neutralizes the moral effect of my movement.”428  
The controversy between the two generals created conflicts that reverberated up and 
down the chain of command. For example, Ullman reported that while trying to recruit at 
Brashear City, that he faced frequent indifference from several Union Army bureaus, which 
caused frequent delays in getting supplies for his recruits.429 Equally as problematic were the 
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“overt acts” of defiance that Ullman’s men encountered in the actual process of recruiting 
men.430 Ullman complained to Banks that Colonel Walker of the 4th Massachusetts Volunteers 
had “almost entirely prevented” his officers from recruiting blacks arriving at Brashear City, and 
Chaplain S.M. Kingston openly declared himself “opposed to the policy of the government, and 
that, in his judgment, those who are endeavoring to free slaves are the greatest enemies of the 
country.”431 Ullman reported that he gave Kingston “a lecture he would not forget,” requested 
that Banks place the whole of Brashear City under his command, and asked that the chaplain be 
removed and replaced by one whom Ullman knew to be “faithful, true, and active.”432  
Walker and Kingston told a different story, one that depicted Ullman as utilizing 
indiscriminate recruiting tactics. Kingston informed headquarters that he had orders from Banks 
that instructed him that blacks arriving at Brashear City “should be sent directly to the 
plantations reserved for them,” but that Ullman’s men had “taken [black men] away from their 
families as soon as they landed, by actual force, leaving their wives and children weeping and 
complaining.”433 According to Walker and Kingston, they were endeavoring to “bring order out 
of confusion,” prevent the separation of families, and “considering in justice and mercy the rights 
of all poor negroes.”434 It was this latter action that one of Ullman’s subordinates saw as 
interfering with the enlistment of black recruits. Kingston wrote that he had attempted to explain 
directly to general Ullman that they were not trying to prevent enlistment, but “arranging to carry 
it on more efficiently.” Ullman apparently did not believe a word, and summarily dismissed the 
chaplain from his office. 435 
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Even at the height of tensions between the generals, Ullman also informed Washington 
that Banks resistance to recruiting off of the free labor plantations did not mean that the 
commanding general stood in the way of recruiting efforts more generally. Unfortunately, other 
officials in the Department of the Gulf were another matter. Ullman claimed he could have 
already had 10,000 men easily, but that “excepting Major General Banks, Brigadier General 
Bowen and a few other exceptions, the whole body of officers in this Department, military and 
civil, oppose, some bitterly, the policy of the government in this matter, and many have 
endeavored to throw every obstacle in their power in my way.”436 Other officers seconded this 
assessment. From Baton Rouge, Colonel Cyrus Hamlin, son of Vice President Hamlin, reported 
that General Agner “is rather opposed to us,” and Ullman dutifully informed Banks that Agner 
was not actively assisting his recruiting efforts.437 Similarly, Chaplain Thomas W. Conway of the 
2nd USCI reported that there were many instances of soldiers “indirectly exposing” their hostility 
to the “arming of the colored man.”438 According to Conway, “some by sneers, other by their 
pretended belief that the blacks are required in other places, and others still who in the absence of 
officers whom they fear, deal out their venom in proportion to the authority they may 
possess.”439 Yet even with this long litany of opposition, Conway still noted that it gave him 
pleasure to report “an increase in feeling favorable to the policy of the government” in some 
quarters. 440 
Ullman’s indiscriminate recruiting methods did little to ingratiate him to headquarters. 
Having heard reports from subordinates of “many fine young men held on the plantations who 
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greatly desire to be soldiers in your command,” Ullman ignored Banks’s orders, and continued to 
recruit off the plantations surrounding New Orleans.441 Jules A. Blanc, superintendent of the 
New Canal Office in New Orleans informed Banks that he was “very much annoyed by military 
squads” from Camp Parapet and other posts who came and “took away” several of his 
workers.442 In one particular instance, Blanc had sent someone up to Camp Parapet to reclaim his 
workers, but “could obtain no satisfaction.”443 Superintendent Hanks also continued to catalogue 
the abuses of the recruiting officers under Ullman’s command, filling several letters to 
headquarters with more diatribes against the brigadier general in the first four weeks after his 
arrival. 
These howls of protest against Ullman’s recruiting tactics grew so loud that barely a 
month after the New Yorker arrived in the Department of the Gulf, Adjutant General Thomas 
was forced to issue an order forbidding all further plantation recruitment.444 In strained prose, 
Ullman informed Banks that he had not intended “to interfere directly with the negroes on the 
plantations,” and that he desired “to act in accordance with your wishes,” but in practice he did 
little to curtail the actions of his recruiters.445 Orders from Ullman’s subordinates to recruiting 
officers still gave them virtually unlimited authority to recruit off the plantations, and “any 
person or persons [who] should interfere with your business as recruiting officer” would be 
reported immediately to Ullman’s headquarters.446 
Consequently, during the summer and fall of 1863, Banks’s inbox continued to fill with 
complaints about Ullman’s recruiters. Lieutenant Colonel Frank H. Peck, commanding at 
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Brashear City, reported in mid-August that he had about one hundred black workers employed in 
rebuilding defenses mounting artillery, and building roads, but that recruiting officers “have 
appeared here with authority to take negroes where they may find them.”447 Peck desired to 
further the enlistment of black soldiers, but he regarded “the work upon which they can now be 
employed to be of greatest importance.”448 In order to solve the problem, Peck requested that his 
workers be “enlisted into the U,S. Service and that they be continued at their present work until it 
is finished.”449 Trying to finagle army bureaucracy to his advantage, Peck also suggested that the 
black workers be drilled in the use of heavy artillery, and he be designated as a recruiting officer 
so that he could then recruit his workers as a battalion of colored troops. 
 Ullman’s frustrations grew when he informed Banks that he had numerous applications 
from free African Americans looking to recruit.450 These men had informed Ullman that “large 
numbers” of recruits could be obtained immediately through raids beyond Union lines, but that 
when Ullman had attempted to stage such excursions from Baton Rouge, the commander at that 
post had “refused his permission.”451 Ullman also sent repeated complaints to Banks that 
lamented the “current of opposition to the policy of the government,” specifically calling 
attention to the Quartermaster Department’s apparent recalcitrance in furnishing supplies for the 
new recruits.452 Evidently Secretary Stanton had requested that Ullman keep him informed about 
any opposition, because the New Yorker told Banks “in accordance with a request of the 
Secretary of War, I shall represent the matter at Washington.”453  
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  Despite the protracted jurisdictional conflict between Banks and Ullman, the Union Army 
did have success implementing the recruiting and enlisting of black soldiers during the late 
spring and summer of 1863. Part of the reason lay with the movements of the Union army. As 
mentioned above, when Banks first arrived in the Department of the Gulf he had been directed to 
affect the capture of Port Hudson, on the east bank of the Mississippi River about 100 miles 
upriver from New Orleans. To that end, the spring campaigns in the Teche and Lafourche 
districts had opened up the path for many black refugees to join the Union army. “There are a 
large number of negroes in and around this place from which our officers are eagerly at work” 
reported one of Ullman’s officers, and they were “gradually filling up the ranks.”454 Successive 
reports from Brashear City further noted substantial influx of black men, women, and children 
continuing to make their way to Union lines, as troop movements through the interior dislodged 
large numbers of refugees.455 Colonel T.E. Chickering, commanding the 41st Massachusetts 
Volunteers, reported that on a move to New Iberia, slaveholders along their route of march “are 
running off the negroes into the woods, but they manage mostly to find us, or we them.”456 
Although Chickering admitted that he had no way of keeping an accurate count of the total 
number of blacks who had joined him during the march, he estimated that at least 5,000 had 
joined his train.457   
 Amidst the organized chaos of getting recruiting operations up and running, black 
soldiers took part in the Union campaign against Port Hudson during the late spring and early 
summer of 1863. Along with Vicksburg, Port Hudson was one of the final two Confederate 
fortifications preventing the Union from controlling the entirety of the Mississippi river and 
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cutting the Confederacy into two. With General Grant operating against the former, Banks and 
his 19th Army Corps slogged there way northward and were positioned around Port Hudson by 
the last week in May. Two regiments of the Louisiana Native Guards, the 1st and the 3rd, were 
part of the force that marched from Baton Rouge to Port Hudson, taking their position at the 
northern edge of the Union line. In a series of poorly led and badly coordinated assaults on the 
morning of May 27th, Union forces all along the line were repulsed, with the black regiments 
suffering about 20 percent casualties as consequence of a series of futile frontal charges.458 
 Due to questions in the North about the fighting ability of black soldiers, the participation 
of the Native Guard regiments at Port Hudson was scrutinized closely. Banks for one, elatedly 
wrote his wife that the black soldiers behaved “splendidly, splendidly!” and in his official report 
to Halleck observed “they answered every expectation. In many respects their conduct was 
heroic. No troops could be more determined or more daring.”459 Careful line edits of drafts of 
Banks’s official report found in his personal papers show careful attention to the language used 
describe the efforts of black troops—a clear indication of the commanding general’s awareness 
that his report would have reverberations far beyond the battlefield.460 Ullman, for once in 
agreement with Banks, was similarly enthused. The performance of the black soldiers, Ullman 
told Stanton, “has silenced cavaliers and changed sneers into eulogizers.”461 The praise was so 
lavish in some newspaper accounts that one historian has noted that it led to “wild excesses” 
regarding their performance.462 Nonetheless, as the foremost historian of the United States 
Colored Troops has concluded, “in defeat, these black troops demonstrated an inner strength 
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comparable to that of any soldiers in the Union army,” and in doing so, marked the battle of Port 
Hudson as a “decisive turning point” in attitudes towards the use of black soldiers in combat 
roles.463 
  In spite of the bravery displayed by black troops, the repulse of Banks May 27th assault 
meant that the Union army settled in for a siege. The commanding general immediately called on 
Ullman to “forward immediately all the [black] troops he has raised.” Ullman soon reported that 
his officers and men at Port Hudson were engaged in digging operations and often passed 
“twenty consecutive hours in the trenches.”464  Disease, enemy fire, and constant labor sapped 
the strength of these units, which summarily began to report vastly depleted numbers by the time 
Port Hudson finally capitulated on July 8th.465  
 A few weeks after the fall of Port Hudson, Banks achieved another victory when 
Adjutant General Thomas helped rid him of General Ullman. Banks had effectively reduced the 
erstwhile New Yorker to a subordinate role in recruiting operations by amalgamating his 
command into the Corps D’Afrique, and Ullman did not ease his plight by running afoul of 
Adjutant General Thomas. Ullman had repeatedly written to the Adjutant General advocating for 
black officers for the Corps D’Afrique, after Thomas had expressed his “express disapprobation” 
of the idea.466 Angered at Ullman’s repeated pressing of the matter—and looking to reorganize 
the Corps d’Afrique before Banks began his campaign into Texas—Thomas revoked his special 
orders in early September and officially assigned him to serve under Banks.467 After roughly a 
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year of guard duty at Port Hudson, Ullman was shifted to Morganza, upriver from Port Hudson, 
where he remained until excessive drinking forced his removal from command in March, 
1865.468 
Having effectively deposed Ullman, Banks charged ahead with recruiting. The nearly 
simultaneous fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in early July meant the influx of a massive 
number of blacks into Union lines. Now that conditions were “fully ripe,” Lincoln directed that a 
“renewed and vigorous effort” be made to recruit black troops in the Mississippi River Valley 
and the Department of the Gulf.469 Accordingly, on July 24th, Halleck instructed Banks “the 
organization of colored troops should be pushed forward as rapidly as possible,” and that 
directive was reinforced when another correspondent informed Banks that Lincoln was “very 
anxious about Gen. Ullman’s brigade and seemed to be impatient at his delay in organizing 
negro troops, a measure which has the fullest confidence and support of the President.”470 Banks 
also received the same message from General William Dwight, then on leave in the North, who 
wrote Banks that he had an audience with Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck, where the president 
“seemed particularly anxious that the ‘Corps d’Afrique’ should be filled up and that the greatest 
possible number of black troops should be put into the field.”471 
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Banks responded promptly to these directives. In a series of messages to Washington, he 
hastily assured Halleck “the negro regiments are organizing rapidly,” and that he would “ensure 
the government that nothing will be omitted that is calculated to strengthen this arm of the 
service.”472 Banks immediately sent word of these directives to B. Rush Plumly, the Philadelphia 
abolitionist who was then serving as a Treasury agent in the Department of the Gulf. Plumly 
responded by promising Banks that he would recruit a full brigade in forty days, and promptly 
completed the task eleven days early.473 Union officials in New Orleans marveled at Plumly’s 
“wonderful success” in recruiting among all elements of the black population, with Plumly 
himself telling Banks  “I have helped ‘get up’ their concerts; attended their meetings; churches, 
balls, parties, funerals, &c &c besides visiting constantly their houses.”474  
In the days and weeks immediately following his receipt of Lincoln’s and Halleck’s 
directives, orders flew out from Banks headquarters to ascertain the progress of black recruiting. 
The commander of the District of Pensacola was ordered to “immediately report the progress 
made in recruiting and organizing the regiment of colored troops,” and Banks further instructed 
that the organization of said regiment Banks then let it be known that he desired the organization 
of said regiment “pressed forward as rapidly as possible.”475 When he failed to receive an update 
quickly, Banks fired off a second order demanding action be taken to fill up the regiment.476 
Other orders from Banks authorized officers at place such as Baton Rouge and Fort Pike to 
recruit more black regiments, and Captain D.A. Keily, commanding at the Baton Rouge, was 
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authorized “to establish a recruiting rendezvous in such places within the Department as in your 
judgment may be favorable.”477 In mid-August, Richard B. Irwin, Banks’s Assistant Adjutant 
General, was directed to prepare a report detailing all the black troops in the department, and a 
detailed “Inspection Report” submitted for August and September 1863, outlined the significant 
progress being made with regard to the recruiting of blacks in the Department of the Gulf.478 At 
the end of August, Banks appointed Plumly Colonel, John S. Clark, and Col. George Hanks to 
head a new “Commission of Enrollment” to supervise the recruiting of all able-bodied black 
troops.479 Banks charged the commissioners with correcting the reported “injuries suffered by 
negroes who have been enrolled in the Corps D’Afrique and their families,” as well as the 
general protection, support, and employment of the soldiers families.480 “The Government is 
strong and just” Banks reminded his new commissioners, and is “greatly interested in the 
observance of the principles of justice and humanity.”481 
Banks also sent out directives seeking officers to command these regiments. “I desire to 
obtain capable and enterprising young officers” Banks informed one officer in the Department of 
Missouri, “you will please confer with your friends upon the subject” and report any appropriate 
candidates.482 To the commander of the 4th Division stationed at Carrollton, Louisiana, Banks 
followed up an in-person conversation by directing him select “good men—sensible, industrious, 
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and studious. They should report at once.”483 General William Dwight, then on leave in New 
England, was similarly directed to find “some good young men” to command in the Corps 
D’Afrique, and subsequently urged to “bring as many as you can.”484 Knowing the strong 
antislavery sentiment in his home region, Banks added “New England men should assist us in the 
operations in Texas, which will be great importance to them, and we need all their 
influence.”485Although finding white officers to command black regiments initially proved 
difficult, we can see Banks quickly responding to policy directives coming from Washington, 
and beginning to implement those directives in the Department of the Gulf.486  
By the middle of August, Banks was reporting to Lincoln and Halleck that he had raised 
nearly twenty regiments of black soldiers, along with several regiments of engineers, all totaling 
about 12,000 men.487 Banks also expected that his anticipated movements into Texas would fill 
out some of “these skeletons [regiments],” and ultimately provide him with a force of about 
25,000 black soldiers.488 Barely two weeks later, Banks proudly proclaimed that he “had all the 
able bodied negroes remaining in the Department enrolled, and shall draw upon them for 
sufficient number[s] to supply any vacancies.”489 Toward the end of October, Banks informed 
Stanton that progress on the recruiting of black troops in the Department of the Gulf was 
progressing well, and believed that anywhere between 5,000-10,000 more recruits could be 
expected in the coming weeks.490 Banks’s reports of his progress with the recruiting of black 
troops connected the process of enticement and enlistment back to Washington in a manner that 
mirrored Adjutant General Thomas in the Mississippi River Valley. 
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Banks’s optimism reflected his anticipation of a large number of potential recruits to be 
obtained during Union moves into Texas. “While your army is engaged in cleaning out 
Southwestern Louisiana,” Halleck had instructed Banks in late July, “every preparation should 
be made for an expedition into Texas.”491 Black troops were to play an essential role in beefing 
up Banks’s army, as those newly recruited could “serve as the garrisons of the forts on the river 
and interior posts,” while some of the older regiments “will do well in the field.”492 More than 
just explicitly military goals were at stake: at Lincoln’s direction, Stanton had ordered Brig. 
General George Shepley, Military Governor of Louisiana, to make a registry of all loyal citizens 
“as soon as it can conveniently be done after the people are relieved from the presence of rebel 
troops and included within the lines occupied by the armies of the United States.”493 Upon 
completion of the registration of loyal voters, a convention would be held to organize a new state 
government “recognizing the emancipation proclamation, and adopting emancipation in those 
parts of the state to which the proclamation does not apply.”494  
Understanding the broader military and political context of Louisiana during the summer 
of 1863 is critical at this juncture. Confederate General Richard Taylor’s army was still operating 
in portions of the state—hence Banks being engaged in “cleaning out” parts of Louisiana—and 
that army was sustained by supplies coming from Texas. In moving into Texas, Banks could 
either destroy the supplies sustaining Taylor’s army, or force it to withdraw from the state to 
defend its supply lines.495 Either way, in driving Confederate forces out of the state—along with 
many slaveholders fleeing to avoid a Union army implementing emancipation—much of 
Louisiana could be occupied by pro-Union, non-slaveholding forces. A new state constitution 
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would then finish what the military had started: destroying slavery in Louisiana forever, and 
paving the way for it to be readmitted to the Union as a free state.496  
Little about the campaign into Texas unfolded smoothly. For starters, Banks had several 
objections to Halleck’s suggestion to move up the Red River: August was when the river was at 
its low point, and unable to support the necessary transport ships the army would require. 
Moreover, the grueling siege operations at Port Hudson had taken a toll on his men; Banks 
believed that slogging across Louisiana in the dog days of summer would further deplete his 
ranks to unacceptable number.497 Instead, Banks opted to take a small expeditionary force to 
seize the mouth of the Sabine River on the Texas Louisiana border. From this point, Banks 
argued, he could “concentrate rapidly” on Galveston, and once that location was secured, the 
Union army could launch operations “in any direction from the interior to the Rio Grande.”498 
While he was operating in Texas, Banks promised Halleck he would take care to fill his Corps 
D’Afrique with 25,000 men.499  
Banks understood the critical role that military emancipation was to play in his operations 
into Texas. In mid-August he informed Lincoln that he anticipated his movements would fill 
existing Corps D’Afrique regiments “without delay,” and give him vastly superior numbers to 
oppose Taylor’s army.500 However, Banks also understood that the objectives of securing a free 
state Louisiana and implementing military emancipation could prove contradictory. Reports to 
Department of the Gulf headquarters told Banks that tens of thousands of slaves were being 
moved by their owners into Texas. This facilitated the goal of evicting slaveholders from 
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Louisiana, but also made the process of recruiting black troops more difficult. “It is impossible to 
raise negro regiments except we get possession of the country where the negroes are,” Banks told 
Lincoln, “this is a fact overlooked by many persons who are greatly interested in the success of 
these organizations.”501 Still, Banks’s arguments demonstrate at least a grasp of the 
interconnected nature of the federal governments twin pronged assault on slavery. 
Military operations proceeded fitfully. Confederate batteries disabled two gunboats, and 
two more ran aground when Union forces attempted to land in Texas on September 8th. None of 
Banks’s troops made it ashore, so the commander quickly audibled, and lead another expedition 
that landed near the mouth of the Rio Grande in early November, marched inland, and occupied 
Brownsville, Texas on November 6th.502 Banks then launched an attack against Corpus Christi 
during the middle of November and, once these troops reached shore safely, Banks was satisfied 
that the “practicability of re-establishing the flag of the Union in Texas could be determined,” 
and returned to New Orleans to make preparations for a larger campaign to be launched the 
following spring.503 Meanwhile, Louisiana still had yet to be sufficiently “cleaned out” and 
Lincoln’s patience was wearing thin. 
The day before Union troops occupied Brownsville, Lincoln fired off an angry note to 
Banks about the lack of progress regarding Louisiana’s restoration to the Union. Lincoln’s 
August 5th instructions had been clear: Louisianans should adopt a new constitution that 
recognized emancipation throughout the state. Integral to this effort would be a concordant 
attempt for Louisiana to adopt a “partial system” whereby whites and African Americans could 
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“live themselves out of their old relation to each other.”504 To make sure his wishes were known 
to all, Lincoln sent copies to Hahn, Flanders, and Durant, and informed Banks that he might also 
make Lincoln’s views known to the right people, particularly those integral to “giving shape and 
impetus” to the efforts to form a free state government.505 
When several months passed without much information regarding voter registration, 
Lincoln sent Banks an irritated letter on November 5th demanding to know the condition of 
affairs. Lincoln had recently received a letter from Thomas Durant informing the president that 
Military Governor George Shepley “is not taking such a [voter] registry,” and was not expecting 
to do so.506 Although Lincoln told Banks that he did not personally blame the general for the 
dawdling, the president was “bitterly” disappointed, and wanted everyone involved not to wait 
for the army to occupy more territory, but to “form a tangible nucleus, which the remainder of 
the state may rally around as fast as it can.”507 Time was of the essence, Lincoln continued, 
because “adverse element[s]” might seek to setup a state government that repudiated the 
emancipation proclamation and reestablishing slavery.508  
 
While Banks stewed over Lincoln’s rebuke, recruiters all around the Department of the 
Gulf continued to fill the United States Colored Troops. Lawrence Van Alstyne of the 95th New 
York was one of the officers responsible for filling Banks’s  “skeleton regiments.”509 Eager to 
have a chronicle of his wartime experience to share with his family, Van Alstyne kept a careful 
diary of his recruiting efforts in the bayous and plantations of Southwestern Louisiana. “When 
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the pages were enough for a letter, I cut them out and sent them home,” the aging soldier later 
recalled, “after which they were strung together on a string and saved for me.”510 Returning 
home after the war, Van Alstyne placed the collection in a desk drawer, until they were 
published under the title Diary of an Enlisted Man in 1910.511 This diary has been carefully 
evaluated and utilized by generations of historians, but the majority of scholars have not yet 
accorded this work its full importance.512 More than just a handy resource for juicy quotes about 
the relationship between white soldiers and former slaves, Van Alstyne’s diary provides details 
about the everyday process of enticing slaves off farms and plantations, and sheds light on the 
individual interactions between recruiting agents, slaves, and plantation owners that 
characterized emancipation at its most basic level. 
 Van Alstyne reported for recruiting duty on August 31st, 1863. After some delays getting 
him mustered out of his old regiment, Van Alstyne was slogging through the humid Louisiana 
countryside by the middle of October. Recruiting in Louisiana, as elsewhere, was frequently 
arduous work. Stopping first about four miles outside Vermillionville, at the plantation of 
Confederate general Alfred Mouton, Van Alstyne and other recruiters “explained our mission 
among [the slaves],” and found them “more anxious to enlist then we were to have them. Even 
the women and children wanted to go, and we had more trouble to make them understand that 
only able-bodied men were wanted, than we did to get them to enlist.”513 The following day, Van 
Alstyne and several other men “took a long ride about the country, spreading the news of our 
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headquarters for recruits.”514 While the white Louisianans they met along the way were civil, 
“their hatred of us could not be entirely covered up.” Slaves, on the other hand, went “wild with 
joy,” upon hearing the mission of the recruiters, and announced they were “eager to become 
‘Linkum Sogers.’”515 
 The process of getting the recruits back to Union lines was fraught with peril. A 
combination of short supplies, brutally hot weather, and the constant threat of capture by 
Confederate troops took an exacting toll. In Van Alstyne’s party, recruits consumed most of the 
rations before the expedition had even begun the trek back to Union lines, and the addition of 
recruit’s wives and children further strained their supplies.516 Predictably, after the initial “great 
excitement at their new prospects” wore off, many of the recruits became tired and hungry and 
before long, carts were loaded with men who could not walk any further.517 With night falling 
quickly, and the party still outside Union lines, Van Alstyne and his recruits faced a heightened 
threat of ambush by Confederate bushwhackers. Holding a quick council with the entire group, 
Van Alstyne explained that capture by guerilla bands likely “meant death” for all involved, and 
exhorted the men to keep going. Pressing forward, the exhausted expedition finally staggered 
into the safety of Union lines just before dark.518 
As they roamed through the Louisiana countryside, Van Alstyne and other Union 
recruiters witnessed the brutalities of slavery firsthand. Conversing with some of the freed 
women who attached themselves to the recruiting party, Van Alstyne was captivated by the story 
of a young woman named Margaret. Margaret’s master was in the rebel army, and she was 
married to his illegitimate son. According to Margaret, her husband had “picked up enough 
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education to be head man on his father’s plantation,” but the thirst for knowledge soon proved 
deadly.519 One day during the spring of 1863, the plantation was being visited by Confederate 
soldiers who decided Margaret’s husband “knew too much for a nigger” and subsequently “tied 
[her husband] to a tree right before her eyes.”520 Van Alstyne’s recruiting party had “given her 
the chance [to escape] she had long looked for,” and was determined to make her way to New 
York. Her ordeal, Van Alstyne concluded, had “fully reconciled me to the wisdom of the 
President’s Emancipation Proclamation.”521  
 As Margaret’s story indicates, black women and children frequently had important roles 
in the recruiting process. Indeed, black male’s enlistment in the Union army often entailed the 
wrenching decision to separate from their families, and many women and children risked 
recapture, death, and often ill treatment to follow their husbands, fathers, brothers and sons to 
Union lines. “More women and children have come [into Union lines]” Van Alstyne noted one 
day, all of them “wives and children of the men we have [recruited].”522 The sight of these 
ragged, starved, and scared women and children moved Van Alstyne to ponder their plight and 
what would happen to those who could not enlist in the Union army. “Poor things!” Van Alstyne 
lamented,  “they have nowhere else to go or stay, so they have followed on after their husbands 
and fathers,” perhaps not quite sensing the desperate attempt to keep families together.523 
 For many black soldiers the decision to join the Union army could be a harrowing one. 
The decision almost always involved the separation of men from their wives and children, a 
daunting prospect for anyone who had managed to keep their families intact within the confines 
of slavery.“ The men who go to camp beg me to keep a record of their wives and children,” 
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chaplain T.W. Conway reported to General Ullman, “and to prevent such a separation as will 
result in their not knowing where their families are.”524 Often times, many enlisted without 
realizing that their family members would not be able to follow the army. Conway also reported 
that the wives of men who were “not expecting to be parted” from their families “beg me to 
hinder their sudden departure for the plantation till they can see their husbands.”525 Conway 
believed that there should be a person appointed to keep records of black families so as to “avoid 
the great evils resulting from this abrupt and cruel separation.”526  
 Witnessing the plight of black women and children led Van Alstyne to wonder what 
might happen to them. Van Alstyne had heard about the contraband camps set up by the Union 
army, and was quick to perceive that emancipation involved several dimensions beyond simply 
freeing slaves. “This arming of the negroes is not such a simple affair it seemed,” he concluded, 
[care for the women and children of black recruits] is a side I had not thought of, but I don’t see 
how it can be dodged.”527 Indeed, as one recent scholar of the contraband camps has concluded, 
the Union army had undertaken what amounted to the largest humanitarian mission in history, 
and the flood of refugees often led to overflowing camps, inadequate care, disease, and death 
among many emancipated persons who never fully realized their freedom.528 
  Despite these difficulties, recruits came in quickly. On successive days in October, one 
recruiting party returned with a 120 new recruits, another thirteen days later came back with 
130.529 “We are getting into full swing” Van Alstyne happily noted at the end of October; in just 
a few weeks three companies had already been organized, and a fourth was well under way.530 
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Once recruits arrived at Union lines, they were immediately sent for physical examinations. The 
quality of these examinations varied widely. Some men were carefully screened, while others 
were taken in large groups and immediately fitted for shoes and a uniform.531 These 
examinations repulsed many of the recruiting agents, as they laid bare the profound physical 
brutality of slavery. Many of the recruits were “scarred from head to foot where they had been 
whipped,” while another man’s back was “nearly all one scar, as if it had been chopped up and 
left to heal in ridges.”532 Reflecting on what he had witnessed, Van Alstyne somberly noted that 
the soldier’s scars “beat all the anti-slavery sermons ever yet preached.”533    
  Following their physical examinations, the real work of turning the former slaves into 
soldiers began in earnest. The men received their uniforms, and began the rigorous regime of 
drill instruction required to turn them into soldiers. “They are willing to learn and some of them 
learn quickly,” Van Alstyne commented during the second week of November, though he also 
observed that, like many other white or black recruits, the fast learners had to help those who fell 
behind.534 Nonetheless, Van Alstyne detected a real zeal to learn from many of the recruits, and 
when he was not out trying to fill up the regiment on recruiting missions, he spent a great deal of 
time conversing with them, and helping write letters to their wives and children. Coming upon 
one soldier that he had “taken pains to educate,” Van Alstyne found him carefully taking apart 
his gun, and studying how it fit back together.535 Noting that most of the men were anxious to 
learn, Van Alstyne predicted that once they had been in the army for a long enough period of 
time, they would make good soldiers.536  
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“By way of an experiment,” Van Alstyne and his recruiters soon learned what Lorenzo 
Thomas and George Stearns were also in the process of learning: black soldiers made excellent 
recruiters.537 One night early in 1864, the officers of the regiment sent out a squad of black 
sergeants from Louisiana Steam Cotton Press recruiting depot, to “try their hand at recruiting.”538 
A short time later, the squad returned with close to sixty recruits, demonstrating that “they can 
beat us at the business, and if they are kept at it we will soon have a full regiment.”539 Alas, Van 
Alstyne does note in his diary whether the black sergeants “kept at it,” but slaves were generally 
more willing to trust black soldiers, who subsequently had an easier time securing larger and 
larger numbers of recruits for black regiments.540  
All told, Van Alstyne proved to be an efficient recruiter. One indication of his 
effectiveness—and that of other recruiters in the Department of the Gulf—can be gleaned 
through the Confederate response to their expeditions. According the Van Alstyne, from the 
moment they stepped foot onto his plantation, “every one” of the recruiters was “known by name 
to [Confederate] General Mouton,” and some officials in the Confederate high command of the 
Tans-Mississippi West even claimed to have a physical description to match with those names.541 
“If any [recruiters] are captured,” Van Alstyne sardonically remarked, they were to be tried for 
“nigger stealing,’ the penalty for which is death.”542 Indeed, Confederate “capturing parties” in 
the region had undertaken a policy of  “giving no quarters to armed negroes and their officers’” 
apparently in defiance of a law passed by the Confederate Congress at the end of May 1863, that 
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labeled black soldiers “deluded victims” and ordered them “received to Mercy & returned to 
their owners.” 543  
Van Alstyne’s recruiting expeditions were supplemented by other methods. Union raids 
into the countryside aimed at disrupting Confederate supply lines and communications 
frequently functioned doubly as recruiting expeditions. From the District of Key West and Dry 
Tortugas, Assistant Adjutant General H.M. Bowers described raiding operations along the coast 
of Western Florida. One hundred and twenty men of the 2nd Florida cavalry, along with the same 
number of men from the 2nd U.S. Colored Troops embarked from Fort Myers and moved along 
the western coast to Bayport, skirmishing with Confederates into the interior for forty miles to 
Brooksville. Along with destroying the plantations of known Confederate guerilla leaders in the 
area, the raiding party returned with thirteen newly freed slaves.544  
Two subsequent expeditions followed in quick succession. The second party, mounted 
about three weeks after the first, went from Cedar Keys to St. Andrews Bay, marching forty-four 
miles into the interior, burning cotton, bridges, a grist mill, and camp with enemy storehouses. 
This quick expedition brought back fifteen newly freed slaves, and was followed by a final foray 
whose stated purpose was “capturing cotton on the Florida R.R.”545 The raiding party followed 
the Florida Railroad about seventy five miles to Otter Creek, ripping up track, burning cotton, 
and netting approximately one hundred contrabands in the process. In just under a month, these 
three expeditions had taken-in nearly 130 new recruits.546  
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Just like in the Mississippi River Valley and Tennessee, not all efforts were successful. 
For example, in early August, Brigadier General George Andrews sent an expedition consisting 
of the 6th New York Volunteers, 250 black infantry from the 6th Corps D’Afrique, fifty 
cavalrymen of the Third Massachusetts, and a section of the 2nd Vermont Battery on a mission to 
Jackson, Louisiana, to “collect negroes” to fill the 12th Regiment, Corps D’Afrique.547 For a brief 
time, everything proceeded according to plan. Lieutenant Hanham, commanding the expedition, 
recruited fifty men in one day, but rumors of an approaching Confederate force put a halt to their 
operations. Although Hanham dispatched scouts to ascertain the enemy’s strength, these men 
were captured, and the expedition was attacked with little warning around 5pm. General 
Andrews report specifically singled out the men of the 6th Corps D’Afrique for “steadiness and 
good conduct,” but the force retreated after a lengthy fight.548 Unfortunately, during the retreat, a 
guide was shot, and the entire force became lost, eventually taking a new route that proved to be 
impassable for the artillery. The entire fiasco cost the detachment seventy-eight casualties, two 
guns, two caissons, and sixteen horses.549 As one of the expeditions officers noted in a letter to 
General Ullman, the whole expedition had been “badly managed” and the results for recruiting 
purposes were  “not expected.”550 
Recruiting difficulties were particularly apparent on Banks’s fall 1863 expedition to 
Texas. G.H. Darling, commander of the 13th Infantry, Corps D’Afrique, was ordered to proceed 
to Port Cavallo, Texas, to recruit for his regiment, but reported “there is not a recruit within fifty 
miles of Port Cavallo” and that “no recruits can be obtained there until the army has advanced as 
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far as Columbus or Houston.”551 Darling suggested to headquarters that he instead be authorized 
to recruit from the “large numbers of colored men in the parishes adjacent to Orleans,” and from 
those efforts he could form a “respectable nucleus” to spearhead his efforts in Texas.552 
Headquarters recognized the practicability of sending men out to the locations in Louisiana 
Darling suggested, but also ordered him to comply with his orders to recruit in Texas.553 
Unable to reach his lofty predictions of 25,000 new black soldiers, Banks resorted to 
conscription. General Orders Number 70, issued at the end of September 1863, conscripted all 
able-bodied black males between the ages of twenty and thirty.554 Banks believed that the 
manpower needs of the army, coupled with the directives urging him to speed up the process of 
recruiting, would outweigh any complaints.555 Sensitive to the firestorm he was creating, Banks 
allowed substitutes for needed skilled workers and promised to furnish planters with a sufficient 
number of workers to get them through the upcoming harvest season. Despite these caveats, 
enough of an uproar was created that at the end of November, Adjutant General Thomas 
suspended Banks orders, and directed that no further recruiting take place on the government 
leased plantations.556 
Conscription also caused friction within army departments desperate for manpower. The 
Chief Quartermaster for the 13th Army Corps reported that “negro recruiting officers take all his 
negro teamsters, as fast as he hires them” and the force here is too small to procure any more.557 
These indiscriminate seizures, several frustrated officials pointed out, had a tendency to disperse 
the very force that the army was trying to employ. By the summer of 1864, reports to 
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Superintendent of Negro Labor George Hanks indicated that 7,500-9,500 “colored men fit to 
bear arms” resided in the swamps surrounding New Orleans, with an additional 3,000-4,000 men 
in the city “who live in idleness part of the time,” and “work just enough to exist.”558 Attempts at 
conscription could lose as many men as it gained, as word of impressment gangs spread quickly 
throughout black communities and drove many deeper into hiding.  
Within existing USCT regiments, problems also arose in securing white officers to 
command the black troops. Banks had informed Halleck in the spring of 1863 “the negroes 
require only good officers to make the best troops the government will have,” but this proved 
easier said than done.559 Some officers were products of a “farcical examination system” 
whereby incompetent or malicious men were awarded commissions by Casey boards, while 
others were proven by subsequent field experience to be poor regimental commanders.560 During 
the summer and fall of 1863, reports detailing the incompetence of white officers continued to 
reach headquarters. For instance, in early July, General William Dwight reported that an enemy 
attack at Springfield Landing had wrecked havoc thanks in large part to “particularly 
disgraceful” conduct of officers in General Ullman’s brigade. The “faulty dispositions” of the 2nd 
Rhode Island Cavalry’s pickets were largely responsible for failing to prevent the surprise attack, 
and officers and men of General Ullman’s brigade, rather than the Confederate attackers, were 
responsible for the materials that were burned at Springfield Landing.561 In a hastily scribbled 
postscript, Dwight added that once the men of Ullman’s brigade were supplied with weapons and 
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ammunition they were quickly formed into line, and “did not in the least yield to the panic about 
them.”562  
Perhaps the most notorious white officer in a black regiment was Lieutenant Colonel 
A.C. Benedict of the 4th United States Colored Infantry. Benedict had quickly acquired a 
reputation for the verbal and physical abuse of black soldiers, and his cruelty resulted in a mutiny 
at Fort Jackson in December 1863. Around 5pm on the evening of December 9th, Benedict 
attempted to discipline two of the regimental drummers by whipping them, all the while 
screaming “I have had a great deal of trouble with you already, and I am going to stop it.”563 In 
response, roughly half the men of the regiment grabbed their weapons, proceeded out onto the 
parade ground, and “commenced firing into the air and shouting that they ‘did not come here to 
be whipped.’”564 The firing lasted about half an hour, until Colonel Drew, commanding the 
regiment, was able to get most of the men back quarters by assuring them “justice [would be] 
done [to] them.”565 Confused telegrams flew back and forth from departmental headquarters, as 
Banks and his staff tried to ascertain the precise nature and extent of the disturbance.566 
Court martial proceedings convened immediately. Lieutenant Colonel Benedict’s 
conduct, Banks informed Washington, “was the immediate cause of the outbreak,” and he was 
charged with “inflicting cruel and unusual punishment, to the prejudice of good order and 
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military discipline,” while thirteen enlisted men were tried for mutiny.567 Benedict was dismissed 
from the service, while four of the thirteen enlisted men were acquitted; seven were sentenced 
with punishments that ran the gamut from dishonorable discharge to terms of hard labor. Two 
men, Private Frank Williams of Company I, and Private Abraham Victoria of Company D, were 
sentenced to be shot, although one of these sentences was later overturned.568 Banks termed the 
whole series of events an “unpleasant affair,” and quickly assured General Halleck—with an eye 
towards heading off any “exciting rumors” that might be reproduced in the Northern 
newspapers—that “there is nothing to excite apprehension or to suggest a doubt as to the perfect 
confidence which the Government may repose in troops of this class.”569  
The attempted mutiny at Fort Jackson crystallized a number of continuing issues 
regarding the overall treatment and purpose of black troops as 1864 began. As General Ullman 
phrased it in a letter to Senator Henry Wilson late in 1863, the question “is whether it be 
intended to make these men soldiers or mere laborers.”570 When given the chance, Ullman 
continued, black soldiers had proven they would fight, but “high officials, outside of 
Washington” seemed to have no other intention but to use these men “as diggers and drudges.”571 
Compounding the problem was that the large amount of time these men had spent working on 
fatigue duty or on building fortifications had left many regiments “without any possibility of any 
drill at all,” and the constant exposure during siege work, including Port Hudson, had depleted 
the strength of many regiments.572 Moreover, many black regiments were burdened with inferior 
arms and supplies, and the issue of unequal pay was taking a severe toll on the morale of many 
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enlisted men.573 In Ullman’s estimation, it was the simple racism of many officials inside and 
outside of the Union army that had been the cause of much unnecessary hardship for soldiers 
who had assiduously aided the Northern cause.574  
 
The issues that Ullman outlined would be thrown into sharp relief during the spring 
campaigns of 1864. In terms of Union operational strategy, Banks’s spring campaign in 1864 
was part of new General-in-Chief Ulysses Grant’s vision to have all the components of the 
Union armies to act in concert with each other, thus pressing all the Confederate armies 
simultaneously. As in the summer and fall of 1863, a central goal of Banks’s campaign was to 
cement Union control of Louisiana and the destruction of Richard Taylor’s army; the corps 
D’Afrique were to play a central role in this second campaign into the Red River Valley. The 
eradication of Taylor’s army would then enable Banks to conduct elections in more parishes in 
time for the convention to draft a new state constitution. The military operations also had an 
international diplomatic objective. French forces had landed in Mexico and had installed a new 
government, and a strong Union presence in Texas would act as a deterrent towards any French 
designs on military interference in the American conflict.  
  Banks’s field command consisted of about 10,000 men from the 19th Army Corps, about 
5,000 from the 13th Corps, and another 10,000 on loan from General William T. Sherman’s 
Army of the Tennessee. Within this massive host was a brigade composed of the 1st, 3rd, 12th, and 
22nd Corps D’Afrique Infantry as well as the 3rd and 5th Corps D’Afrique Engineers. As the 
campaign got underway, Banks wrote to Adjutant General Thomas that he had previously hoped 
to “fill the regiments to the minimum or maximum number” as soon as “more country opened to 
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us.”575 Banks confidently informed his superiors that it was his intention to fill out his black 
regiments “as soon as possible,” and he anticipated that the campaign up the Red River would 
“furnish the material for such purpose.” 576  
 Just like the fall campaign, little went as planned. On April 8th, as Banks columns were 
moving from Natchitoches towards Shreveport, his army was blindsided by Confederate General 
Richard Taylor at Sabine Crossroads, roughly thirty-five miles to the south. During this 
encounter, the brigade of Corps D’Afrique soldiers were guarding the army’s wagon trains, but 
were soon overrun by fleeing Union infantry. “Our army broken and scattered came rushing back 
into the field where we were lying” wrote one Captain in the 1st Corps D’Afrique Infantry, with 
the whole tangled mess of infantry, artillery, cavalry, and camp followers resembling nothing 
more than a “demoralized mass.”577 Despite the fact that Union soldiers managed to repel another 
Taylor attack the following day at Pleasant Hill, Banks withdrew his army back towards Grand 
Encore. Having been advised by the navy against another attempt on Shreveport because of the 
rapidly falling water level in the Red River, Banks allowed his army to rest for a week and half, 
then retreated back towards Alexandria. 
  During the Union retreat black soldiers would make their most important contribution to 
the campaign. When the Union army reached Alexandria, they found that Navy gunboats were 
trapped above the rapids. Thinking quickly, Union engineers devised the idea of constructing a 
series of dams to raise the water level of the river and thereby extricate the stranded ships. Black 
regiments had rendered “valuable service” in working around the clock to help complete 
construction of the dams, one officer wrote, and “are entitled to much credit for their industry 
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and ability showed in the prosecution of their work.”578 Another officer reported that “the 3rd 
Enginrs. were employed in collecting and hauling the necessary material, and the 5th engineers in 
constructing the dam,” with “the regiments…divided into two “reliefs” which relieved each other 
every six hours working day and night. Both officers and men worked with great energy.”579 By 
May 13th, all of the gunboats were out of danger. Colonel George D. Robinson, heading the 3rd 
Engineers, Corps D’Afrique, concluded “the organization of ‘Colored Engineers’ is regarded as a 
complete success by all those who have witnessed their operations.”580  
 The engineers passed this trial by fire, but Nathaniel Banks did not. His battered 
command did not return to Southern Louisiana until May 26th, by which time Major General 
David Hunter, acting as a special emissary from General Grant, had taken Banks’s measure and 
found him wanting. In a terse, but blistering report back to Washington, Hunter described Banks’ 
Department as “one great mass of corruption.”581 According to Hunter, “cotton and politics, 
instead of war, appear to haven engrossed the army,” while the “vital interests of the country are 
laid aside.”582 Although Hunter had found Banks to be personally cordial and agreeable, he 
lacked the confidence of his subordinate officers and the army as a whole, and Hunter 
recommended that General James B. McPherson or another competent commander be placed in 
command. Acting on this report, Major General E.S. Canby was sent to head the newly created 
Military Division of West Mississippi, with authority over the Department of the Gulf. Banks 
would retain an administrative role, but his days as a field commander were over. 
Following the failure of the Red River campaign, many of the black troops who took part 
in the expedition were assigned to Morganza, a post located about halfway between Port Hudson 
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and the mouth of the Red River. Daily routine for the black soldiers stationed there proved to be 
a struggle. Richard D. Irwin, the first historian of the 19th Army Corps remembered the post as 
the “most unfortunate encampment” during the summer of 1864, thanks to a combination of 
oppressive heat, suffocating dust, and swarms of mosquitoes.583 “With the sickly season…close 
at hand, the deaths were many,” Irwin wrote, and the situation was exacerbated by constant 
fatigue and garrison duty, inadequate rations, and insufficient medical supplies.584 With many 
regiments—both white and black—assigned more as “an occupation force rather than as a field 
army” during the remainder of 1864, troops battled weather, sickness, and monotonous military 
routines more often than they did Confederate forces.585   
As many scholars have noted, black troops suffered disproportionately from lack of basic 
food, medical supplies, and a disproportionate amount of fatigue duty. This scholarship however, 
tends to convey the static impression that black troops at all times and in all places were 
suffering solely through the intentional neglect of the Union army.586 The reality, however, is 
more complicated.  The records of organizations such as the United States Sanitary Commission 
do reveal a tremendous amount of hardship endured by black soldiers, it is also clear through the 
efforts of organizations like the Sanitary Commission, that the suffering varied significantly from 
location to location in the Department of the Gulf, as well as varying over time based on the 
precarious nature of Union supply lines. 
Undoubtedly, constant fatigue and fortification duty, combined with the inadequate 
rations or medical supplies, had disastrous consequences for black soldiers. As one surgeon in 
the 2nd Louisiana Engineers explained to United States Sanitary Commission Agent Dr. George 
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Clark, the men stationed at Brashear City were “constantly at work rain and shine” building a 
fort, and were desperately in need of better medical care.587 The regimental hospital was “poorly 
supplied,” with either medicine or adequate clothing, and repeated calls and requisitions were 
met by with the “unfailing answer ‘none in the Dept.’”588 Similarly, G.G. Edgerly, an agent 
assigned to perform an inspection in the remote location of Tortugas, reported that the hospital 
for black engineers was lacked proper bedding and hospital shirts for the patients.589 The doctor 
in charge of the hospital told Edgerly that “no appropriation had been made by the government 
for furnishing this hospital,” and that as a result, he had been unable to secure the necessary 
supplies for the basic medical care of the men under his care.590 “Should the ‘Commission’ think 
proper” to furnish the necessary supplies, Edgerly informed his superior that they would be 
“thankfully received.”591 
Equally as pressing for black soldiers was the need for adequate vegetable rations, as a 
scurvy epidemic decimated both black and white soldiers in 1863 and 1864. Performing an 
inspection of black troops garrisoning Port Hudson during the summer of 1864, Commission 
Agent Henry Boltwood found that cases of scurvy existed “in almost every regiment owing to 
the want of vegetables.”592 The lack of fresh vegetables had already caused serious illness among 
the black soldiers, and unless steps were taken to correct the problem, the “evil must increase 
rapidly.”593 Taking the initiative, Boltwood had already suggested that the commanding officer 
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immediately make a provision for a post and hospital garden in order to combat the disease.594 
Similarly, an inspection of both white and black troops stationed at Brashear City during the 
summer of 1864 reported that while the general health of the soldiers was good, “men need 
vegetables very much,” and the agent was finding it difficult to refuse this “constant request” 
from the soldiers.595  
Agents of the Sanitary Commission often worked feverishly in tandem with officers of 
black regiments to help alleviate the supply problem during 1864. One agent who reported that 
black regiments were “suffering terribly” at Morganza in September 1864, reported about a 
month later that the mortality rate was “greatly diminished” and that scurvy had been 
“effectively banished” in some regiments owing to the USSC’s distribution of vegetables.596 
Indeed, several reports that noted the existence of scurvy among black troops also took pains to 
point out that regiment and post commanders often worked diligently to ensure the general health 
of the black regiments. For instance, the same agent who bitterly criticized the lack of vegetables 
among black regiments stationed at Port Hudson also reported, “sickness is not very prevalent 
considering the heat and the employment of the men.”597 Before he had arrived to inspect Port 
Hudson, agent Henry Boltwood had been informed that the black troops were “dying off like 
sheep,” while white regiments had been unable to muster enough men for guard duty.598 
Boltwood was happy to note the exaggerated nature of these reports, and the number of men on 
sick-roll in both white and black regiments had steadily decreased.599 
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  Black women, children, elderly, and the infirm suffered the most. Reporting from East 
Pass, Florida, Henry Boltwood reported that approximately 1/10th of the refugees in the District 
of West Florida were black.600 This number, Boltwood reported, was “constantly increasing,” as 
about fifty more black refugees during the eight nights of his stay.601 Although Boltwood did not 
always distinguish between white and black refugees in his report, he observed the families of 
the able-bodied men—who were employed by the quartermaster—were “encamped in the 
woods,” and living under condemned army tents.602 Upon closer inspection, Boltwood 
discovered at least twelve instances where refugees were “living under a single quilt or blanket, 
or a rude hut of boughs.”603 The tents were all mildewed and full of holes, and most of them were 
“over-crowded.”604 The only saving grace was that the season had so far been very dry, and for 
that reason, the general health was better than one might expect. Similarly, from the Post 
Hospital at Cedar Keys, Florida, another agent noted that “most of the refugees are in poor health 
when they arrived [at the post],” but their condition had not been improved by the “poorly 
supplied” rations they had received since their arrival.605  
Even as black soldiers battled disease, poor supplies, and the indifference of many 
officials, they continued to render valuable service in the Department of the Gulf throughout the 
rest of 1864 and 1865. The absence of organized Confederate military operations throughout 
much of the Department meant that many black—and white—soldiers spent time constructing 
and fixing fortifications along the Mississippi river. Their most threatening enemy was the 
weather. “The late rains,” the commander of the 11th USCA noted from Camp Parapet, had 
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collapsed three hundred yards worth of earthworks, and more men then were at his disposable 
were needed to perform the necessary maintenance.606 Reports from the black garrison stationed 
at Morganza noted the danger the rains posed for the levees, and one officer in the 65th USCI 
observed that unless the proper steps were taken, the rising waters would threaten several 
hundred thousand rounds of ammunition stored at the fort.607  
Other black regiments were busily engaged in raiding activities. Much like the operations 
described above along the coast of Florida, these raids often served to combat enemy guerillas, 
destroy enemy supply and communication networks, and free slaves. In late February and early 
March, 1865, soldiers from the 74th and 93rd USCI took part in a series of waterborne raids that 
were aimed at capturing Confederate partisans. Meanwhile, the men of the 20th USCI took part in 
operations along a branch of the Peal River aimed at recovering the Union steamboat J.D. 
Swaim. The raiding party eventually found the sunken steamer, raised her, and after battling the 
weather and troublesome impediments in the river, were eventually able to make it back to Fort 
Pike. Along the way, the commander of expedition noted that over five-dozen escaped slaves had 
joined the expedition, and made their way to Union lines.608 
  
Whatever duties they were performing, USCT soldiers usually demonstrated a desire for 
education. Indeed, education for the freedman was the most revolutionary component of 
humanitarian care for blacks in the Department of the Gulf. Some historians, however, have 
equated educational efforts with the same “controlling and civilizing” impulses as slave owners 
viewed plantation discipline. William Messner, for example, views the education of blacks as 
assuming “complementary functions” to plantation discipline, and views the efforts of the Union 
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army to educate blacks more as an attempt at social control than social reform.609  Such 
overwrought conclusions do not fully comport with the evidence: while Banks and other Union 
officials were interested in educating the freedmen according to the tenets of Northern free labor 
ideology, their motivations were not nearly quite as cynical as Messner’s conclusions suggest. In 
fact, an alternate reading of the evidence suggests that education became a critical humanitarian 
impulse that officials viewed as essential to emancipated peoples making as smooth as possible 
transition from slavery to freedom.  
 The antecedents of black education in the Department of the Gulf began almost 
immediately after Banks took command. In early January, 1863, Superintendent of Negro Labor 
George Hanks wrote to Banks Chief of Staff, and informed him that the School of Medicine on 
Common Street opposite Charity Hospital in New Orleans was “the property of Alien enemies 
and as such liable to conscription for the benefit of the US govt.”610 Hanks asked to take 
possession of the building for educational purposes, with specific designs on making it a 
schoolhouse for the instruction of freedmen and women.611 Although Hanks apparently did not 
receive the authority he requested, Banks was soon pressed from other quarters about black 
education. Thomas Conway, having visited most of the plantations between New Orleans and 
Brashear City by early summer, wrote Banks that he was “struck with the necessity for schools,” 
and suggested that he be appointed to superintend the project.612 
When Conway was forced to take a sick leave from the Department of the Gulf in late 
summer 1863, the project passed into the hands of George Hanks. Hanks had given a great deal 
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of thought to how to raise money and public awareness for an education system for blacks, and 
in mid-September, he wrote to Banks proposing a tour of major Northern cities. Hanks would  
hold meetings in order to “tell the public what slavery has been, and what emancipation is” while 
also emphasizing the “immediate educational wants and necessities of the emancipated.”613 In 
this manner, Hanks hoped to raise between $10,000-15,000 for the purchase of supplies, as well 
as “induce benevolent and philanthropic persons” to support a number of teachers for one 
year.614 Realizing the visual power of displaying the physical contrast between slavery and 
freedom, Hanks hoped to take with him one member of the Corps D’Afrique, “costumed in a 
new infantry uniform,” an older former slave “who has his owners initials branded on his 
forehead,” two young girls, and “several instruments of torture which have been used upon the 
negroes by the planters in this state.”615  
Banks threw his entire support behind establishing a school system for blacks. General 
Orders Number 23 announced in early1864 the establishment of schools for children under the 
age of twelve, and Banks followed this up by establishing a three person Board of Education at 
the end of March. The Board, composed initially of Colonel N.H. Frisbie, Edwin Wheelock, B. 
Rush Plumly, and Dr. Isaac Hubbs, were directed to establish schools throughout the department, 
including acquiring the land, constructing the buildings, securing the teachers and educational 
materials, as well as designing a suitable curriculum.616 To support the entire venture, Banks 
directed that the Board also assess property taxes from all residents, and that school sites and 
teachers were to be protected by the provost marshal.617 “I want it understood that the negro 
children must be educated,” he instructed Gulf officials, while planters were told “it is 
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impossible to continue the laborers in their employ, unless some provision is made for the 
education of their children. The policy of the Government demands this, and nothing will be 
allowed to interfere with its success. If persons resist them, they will be removed.”618 
The Board got to work immediately. Barely a week after the order establishing the board 
existence, Hubbs reported to Provost Marshal General Bowen that they had been hard at work 
securing teachers and supplies for plantation schools, and expected to shortly “have in active 
operation at least thirty plantation schools.”619 Supplies were requisitioned from every 
conceivable location, including Northern Aid Associations and the Quartermaster Department, 
while the School of Medicine in New Orleans unwillingly furnished clocks, maps, and even 
“illustrations of natural history and natural philosophy.”620 By the end of June, Edwin Wheelock 
happily reported to Banks that work was progressing rapidly, with new schools were regularly 
being established, “and their success has already placed beyond reasonable dispute the capacity 
of the African to receive our civilization.”621 As a public relations maneuver, Thomas Conway 
suggested that the government help subsidize a newspaper to serve as “an agent for the elevation 
of the colored people,” as well as a way to defend the policies through which Banks “lift[ted] 
fifty thousand, nay, one hundred and fifty thousand souls, from darkness into light, by your 
educational order.”622  
Department of the Gulf officials carried out much of the operational responsibility for the 
school system. Some historians have argued that Union officials deliberately sought to exclude 
aid organizations as part of a deliberate attempt by officials to control as much of the education 
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system—and thus the black population—as possible.623 Yet this analysis does not mesh with the 
explanations offered by representatives from various Northern aid organizations. The 
Northwestern Freedman’s Aid Association praised the “glowing accounts of the interest taken by 
[General Banks]” in the education of the freedmen, and expressed gratification in the 
“administration of the Department of the Gulf in the interest of Freedom and Justice.”624 The 
members were thus disappointed to have to decline an invitation to aid the department’s efforts, 
with the “unwelcome decision” owing to a lack of necessary funds, and a hesitancy to send 
“unaclimated persons” to Louisiana in the middle of the summer.625 Other Northern aid 
associations reported similar problems.626 
Limited assistance from benevolent organizations was just one of many problems the 
Board of Education had to overcome. Opposition from whites in the region was immediate and 
often violent. Joseph Parks, a teacher in Thibodeaux, Louisiana reported that a Mr. Schefferstein, 
a teacher in a white school in the same area, “has given great encouragement to one of his pupils 
in my presence to annoy us,” while also attempting to kidnap several of his students and making 
threats against his life.627 Three other students of the aforementioned Schefferstein entered 
Parks’s schoolhouse and “committed the filthiest nuisance that can be thought of,” while one of 
the boys’ fathers had caused so much of a disruption that Parks had to dismiss his students.628 All 
of these outrages, a member of the Board of Education fumed, had taken place “under the very 
eyes and with knowledge of the Provost Marshal” stationed in the district.629 Unless a provost 
marshal could be placed in the town who could be counted on to “suppress such shameless acts 
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of insult and disloyalty” the school would remain “broken up” and the teachers would have to be 
permanently withdrawn.630 
Whites in the region also resisted any effort by Union officials to collect the necessary 
taxes to fund the school system. Despite Banks instructions that provost marshals were to collect 
the funds immediately, Thomas Conway reported that planters employed numerous tricks to 
avoid paying the tax. Banks had hoped that the state convention meeting in the spring of 1864 
could help solve the problem by providing funding for his education system, but as George 
Dennison reported to Secretary Chase, the delegates had proved recalcitrant.631  After numerous 
delays regarding the funding of separate or integrated school systems during the summer of 
1864, Banks helped effect a compromise whereby a provision was included in the state 
constitution for the education of all children, but the state legislature would have the final say as 
to how the schools were financed. Predictably, the legislature would subsequently refuse to vote 
funds for the education of black children, and Banks was forced to rely on the army’s treasury 
for much of the financing.632 
To make matters worse, internal corruption and resultant financial problems plagued the 
Board of Education. The main culprit in this malfeasance was Dr. Isaac Hubbs. One 
correspondent warned Banks that Hubbs “has an unfortunate temperament,” that manifested 
itself in an attitude where “everybody is wrong but himself,” but the full extent and ramifications 
of Hubbs misdeeds did not become fully apparent until the B. Rush Plumly, the chairman of the 
Board, submitted a blistering report complete with supporting financial records in late 
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September, 1864.633 Hubbs “professed to be on terms with publishers at the North,” Plumly 
wrote, and had been dispatched in April, 1864, to help secure supplies such as books, charts, and 
maps for the schools at a discount.634 Six months later, Plumly reported that he could find no 
records of the accounts for purchases Hubbs had made in New York. Moreover, the only 
supplies that had actually arrived were books that the good doctor had been expressly forbidden 
from purchasing, and their cost exceeded what Hubbs had been authorized to spend on all other 
supplies combined.635 
Fraudulent book purchases were the least of Hubbs’s malfeasance. Plumly also reported 
to—by then new—departmental commander Stephen Hurlbut that he could find no daily reports, 
nor reports of disbursements for any of the period Dr. Hubbs had been connected with the 
Board’s activities.636 Making matters worse, “certain sums of money” that were made from the 
deductions of salaries of absent teachers, or from commissions on purchases made by the Board, 
“had been kept by Hubbs for his own use, and divided with, at least, one third party.637 Hubbs 
alone had the records of these dealings, thus preventing any proper investigation from being 
made. As an example, Plumly reported that one teacher, a Mrs. Mecroney, had been paid $40 for 
the month of July, but on the rolls it showed that $59.70 had been drawn for her payment. “When 
it is remembered that we have 112 teachers…and that an average abatement of five dollars per 
month for alleged absences or delinquency, is quite easily made, the revenue to a disbursing 
agent who is disposed to appropriate such funds would be quite large.”638 Other teachers whose 
salaries Hubbs was supposed to draw had also complained of not being properly paid, while 
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money other funds drawn supposedly for the payment of bills had gone missing.639 Other 
teachers who came from the North with Hubbs’s support drew pay from both a Northern society 
and from the Board with Hubbs full knowledge.640 
Plumly ultimately succeeded in forcing Hubbs’s resignation, but he “carried away with 
him” teacher rolls, other records, and money, leaving the Board with “some small cash” that was 
unequal to the Board’s expenses.641 Serving as a two-person Board, Plumly and Wheelock 
worked tirelessly to undo the damage that Hubbs had caused. About a month after Hubbs was 
forced out, Plumly happily reported that “the negro family thrives” with an estimated 8,200 
children in the school system, and that some of the immediate financial problems were being 
resolved.642 By the end of the war, the number of black children attending school in the 
Department of the Gulf exceeded 11,000, and this number was supplemented by sixty Sunday 
schools, as well as twenty schools for adults that were run at night.643 What had been one of the 
richest and most brutal slave labor regimes in the United States—and thus, the world—in 1860 
now boasted the largest black education system in the country. 
 
While Plumly and Wheelock worked to undo Hubbs’s malfeasance, Nathaniel Banks 
spent the fall and winter of 1864-1865 defending his Department of the Gulf tenure to anyone 
who would listen. At the invitation of the Young Men’s Christian Commission, Banks prepared 
an address entitled “Emancipated Labor in Louisiana” which he delivered to audiences at Boston 
on October 30th, 1864, and at Charlestown, Massachusetts on November 1st. Drawing on reports 
prepared for him by Superintendent Conway, Banks presented his analysis of the condition of 
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freed-persons in the Department of the Gulf, and offered a point-by-point rebuttal to some of the 
criticisms of his labor regulations. Banks clearly relished the opportunity to present his case 
directly to the Northern public, telling his wife, along with several other Department of the Gulf 
officials, that he expected his lecture to help set the record straight. 
From the outset, Banks strove to make hammer home two points: that his series of 
regulations were the only appropriate measures under the conditions found in the Department of 
the Gulf, and concordantly, that his program should be thought of as a series of experiments, 
rather then an unchangeable “permanent” solution.644 Upon his arrival in the Department of the 
Gulf, Banks reminded his listeners; he found thousands of black refugees “clustered about the 
military posts and garrisons, coming in from the surrounding states, without shelter, food, 
clothing, employment, or means of support.”645 The black refugees who attached themselves to 
Union military forays into the Louisiana countryside or campaigns up the Mississippi almost 
immediately swelled these numbers. Confronted by a staggering humanitarian crisis on the one 
hand, and a resistant planter class on the other, Banks argued that he constructed a series of labor 
regulations designed around the basis of “absolute freedom,” and aimed to “prepare the negro for 
an independence as complete as that enjoyed by any other class of people.”646  
At this point, Banks’s began to fudge chronology. Conflating the changes that took place 
over the course of 1863-1864, Banks claimed that black laborers were immediately granted their 
“choice of employment, sufficient and healthy rations for himself and his family, clothing, 
medical attendance, education for his children and wages that would…be increased.”647 
Moreover, Banks was purposely vague when confronting the extent of abuse faced by black 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
644 Nathaniel Banks, Emancipated Labor in Louisiana (New York: 1864), 5. 
645 Ibid., 6. 
646 Ibid., 6. 
647 Ibid., 7. 
	   276	  
workers at the hands of planters and some of the assistant provost marshals. “There may have 
been of ill-treatment or cruelty,” Banks evasively conceded, but it was impossible to effect a 
perfect “reconciliation” between the interests of the laborer, employee, and where the 
government had “interests or authority superior to both.”648 Not wanting to enter into an extended 
discussion of the “frequent and painful disappointments,” Banks quickly pivoted to his 
accomplishments.649 Drawing on comparisons with free laborers in England as well as the 
Northern states, Banks tried to place his free labor system in a broader context. Louisiana had 
traveled the road from slave to free labor society in approximately two years, he reminded his 
audience, and it was unreasonable for Northerners to expect a perfect system in such a short time 
frame. 
Banks’s other forum for self-defense came in the form of a summons to appear before the 
Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War (JCCW). Originally formed in response to the Union 
debacle at Balls Bluff in the fall of 1861, the JCCW’s role had expanded to include virtually any 
issue connected with the prosecution of the war, and was dominated by its two Republican 
leaders, Michigan Senator Zachariah Chandler, and Ohio Senator Benjamin Wade. In the winter 
of 1864-1865, the JCCW was took aim at the reasons for the failure of the Red River campaign, 
though it quickly became clear that the investigation was also aimed at Banks’s role in 
Louisiana’s reconstruction to the Union. Banks confidently believed that the JCCW would be 
satisfied with his account of the Red River Campaign, but others in Washington noticed that the 
general appeared visibly strained when he appeared in public. “The Banks’s are here” noted 
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Elizabeth Blair Lee in her diary, and “not looking happy—the War Committee are rowing him 
up a Red River.”650  
Banks appeared before the JCCW on December 14th, 1864, and his printed testimony 
filled over two-dozen pages in the Official Report. Obviously accustomed to political 
interrogations, Banks generally acquitted himself well, refuting charges that the campaign was 
undertaken with a focus on securing cotton for Northern speculators, and identifying plausible 
breakdowns in the chain of command that contributed to the armies defeat at Sabine Crossroads. 
Knowing that the issue of Lincoln’s plan for Louisiana’s reconstruction was a particular focus of 
Wade and Chandler’s ire, Banks took the opportunity at the end of his session to remind the 
JCCW that they could not possibly understand the conditions on the ground in Louisiana from 
such great distances. “The chief statements in regard to the Department of the Gulf and the Red 
River expedition” Banks pointedly concluded, “have been made by men who were denied 
favors,” and if the committee members were to “go down there and talk to the people” they 
would find them requiring the “assistance and recognition of the Government of the United 
States.”651  
Banks’s JCCW testimony provided another forum for the drama surrounding Louisiana’s 
reconstruction to the Union. As discussed briefly above, during the fall of 1863 Lincoln became 
“bitterly” disappointed at the continued delays of Banks, Military Governor George Shepley, and 
Thomas Durant in forming a new state government, and let it be known that he “could not 
recognize or sustain” the efforts of any new state government that did not accept emancipation as 
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a condition for readmission to the Union.652 This decision, in the words of one historian, “served 
as the catalyst for the split between the radicals and moderates in the Louisiana Free States 
movement,” with radicals hoping for civil and political equality for African Americans and 
moderates who felt that the abolition of slavery went far enough.653 Lurking in the background 
was what Lincoln referred to as “adverse elements” that were seeking to setup a state 
government that repudiated the Emancipation Proclamation.654   
Ever the political opportunist, Banks wrote Lincoln suggesting that the “only speedy and 
certain method” for achieving his desired goal, would be the election “of a state government, 
under the Constitution and Laws of Louisiana, except so much thereof as recognizes and relates 
to slavery, which should be declared by the authority calling the election…inoperative and 
void.”655 That election could be held in two months time, Banks promised the president, and 
would then be followed by a constitutional convention to re-write Louisiana’s 1852 constitution. 
“Other questions relating to the negro”--by which Banks meant black suffrage—could safely be 
postponed until after Louisiana’s readmission with emancipation was secured.656 Banks assured 
Lincoln that he was the only official in the Department of the Gulf who could accomplish these 
goals with rapidity. 
Replying on Christmas Eve, 1863, Lincoln granted Banks’s wish. “I have all the while 
intended you to be master,” the president wrote, “in regard to re-organizing a State government 
for Louisiana, as in regard to the military matters of the Department of the Gulf.” 657Banks 
immediately backed candidate Michael Hahn of the moderate faction, who easily won the 
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governorship over radical candidate Benjamin Flanders and Conservative candidate J.Q.A. 
Fellows on February 22nd, 1864. Banks then issued special orders nullifying the slavery 
provisions of the Louisiana constitution, a stopgap measure until delegates could be elected to a 
constitutional convention that would codify the abolition of slavery. Banks was exultant. From 
his field headquarters where he was directing the Red River campaign, he informed John Hay 
“The revolution is complete” because the “utter extinction of slavery” would provide the basis 
for changes in “all elements” of Louisiana society.658  
Lincoln wanted those changes to include voting rights for some African Americans. 
Shortly after Hahn was elected governor, he received a letter from the president suggesting for 
his “private consideration” that “some of the colored people may not be let in—as for instance, 
the very intelligent, and especially those who have fought in our ranks.”659 According to one 
historian, although the letter was “phrased tentatively” it was really an order from the president, 
and both Hahn and Banks worked diligently throughout the summer of 1864 to try and make 
Lincoln’s “suggestion” a reality.660  
On April 6th 1864, the constitutional convention was gaveled to order in Lyceum Hall in 
New Orleans. Thanks in part to Banks and Hahn maneuvering to prevent a conservative 
candidate from being chosen chairman of the convention, the assembled delegates were able to 
make quick work of abolishing slavery. However, despite the “unremitting efforts” of both men, 
Banks and Hahn only partially succeeded on the issue of black suffrage, eventually squeezing 
through a measure that authorized the legislature to extend the franchise to the categories Lincoln 
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enumerated at a later date.661  By the time the new constitution was officially ratified in early 
September, the document also provided for the establishment of an integrated school system, 
allowed blacks to serve in the militia, and provided for equal protection under the law. “It is not 
perhaps all that could be wished” the ever-observant George Dennison wrote to Salmon Chase 
but provided a “continual opportunity to effect…progress.”662 It was a fitting epitaph for the 
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CHAPTER 4 
“With A Rake That Will Leave No County Unvisited”: Stephen G. Burbridge, James S. Brisbin, 
and The Recruiting of Black Troops in Kentucky, 1863-1865. 
 
 On June 17th 1864 an escaped slave named Jake Dyre presented himself for enlistment to 
Captain James Fidler, Union Army Provost Marshal for the 4th Congressional District in 
Lebanon, Kentucky. Two days later Colonel J.W. Weatherford, commanding the 13th (U.S.) 
Kentucky Cavalry, called on Fidler and announced that Dyre belonged to him and demanded he 
be returned. Fidler informed Weatherford that Dyre could not be returned, but granted 
Weatherford permission to speak with the new enlistee. According to Fidler, Weatherford then 
“improperly” removed Dyre from a nearby Union camp and forcibly marched the terrified man 
through the streets of Lebanon.1 As the pair moved through town, Dyre attempted to escape, was 
shot at, recaptured, and dragged to the Colonel’s living quarters.2 Captain Fidler immediately 
ordered an armed guard to take Dyre back by force; the detachment narrowly avoided a 
confrontation with the 13th Kentucky Cavalry who “threatened to take the negro from [the] guard 
and threatened to do violence to [Dyre].”3 Dyre was eventually escorted to safety, and an anxious 
Fidler hurriedly telegraphed a report to District of Kentucky headquarters in Lexington. 
Fidler’s day was not over. Determined to continue patrolling Lebanon, Fidler was out 
walking the streets alone at around 3 pm, when a member of the 13th Kentucky Cavalry fired at 
him from a house window.4 Sensing discretion was now the better part of valor, Fidler had 
himself surrounded by an armed guard, and fired off demands to his superiors that either he or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 J.M. Fidler to Brig. Gen. S.G. Burbridge, June 19th, 1864, Letters Received (LR), Department of Kentucky 1862-
1869 (DKR), Research Group (RG) 393, part 1, series 2173, Records of Continental Army Commands 1821-1920, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C.  
2 James M. Fidler to Brig. Gen. J.B. Fry June 20th, 1864, LR, DKR, NARA.  
3 Fidler to Burbridge, June 19th, 1864. RG 393, LR, DKR, NARA. 
4 Fidler to Brig. Gen. J.B. Frye, June 20th, 1864, LR, DKR, NARA. 
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the “mutinous and disgraceful” members of the 13th Kentucky Cavalry be removed from 
Lebanon.5 Brigadier General Stephen G. Burbridge, Military Commander of the District of 
Kentucky, immediately directed that Weatherford ban his men from going into Lebanon, and 
ordered the arrest of anyone who further interfered with the recruiting of black soldiers.6 Several 
days later, Burbridge followed up these orders by transferring Weatherford and the men of the 
13th Kentucky away from the Lebanon area.7 Summarizing the ordeal for Major William Sidell, 
Assistant Superintendent of Recruiting in Kentucky, a clearly rattled Fiddler fumed, “I was shot 
at on the street + am threatened because I protected a negro.”8 
 On the surface, Dyre and Fiddler’s ordeal conforms to the contours of existing 
scholarship on emancipation in Kentucky. According to many historians, emancipation in the 
Bluegrass State proceeded “with little guidance from the White House or Congress,” and only 
the combination of determined slaves and some sympathetic Union officers “forced Lincoln to 
change his Border State policy.”9 In this telling, emancipation is often described as having 
“developed its own momentum,” becoming a chaotic and autonomous force that “wrapped 
enslaved people, freedom seekers and both Union and Confederate soldiers in a dangerous and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ibid; J.M. Fidler to Burbridge, June 19th, 1864, LR, DKR, NARA. 
6 J. Bates Dickson to Col. J.W. Weatherford, June 19th, 1864, Vol. 62/117, 119, Telegrams Sent (TS), January 1864-
February 1865, District of Kentucky (DKR), Entry 2168, RG 393, NARA. 
7 W.H. Sidell to Brig. Genl. J.B. Fry June 25th, 1864, LR, DKY, RG 393, NARA. 
8 Capt. J.M. Fidler to Maj. W.H. Sidell, June 19th, 1864, LR, DKY, RG 393 NARA.	  
9 Aaron Astor, Rebels on the Border: Civil War, Emancipation, and the Reconstruction of Kentucky and Missouri 
(Louisiana State University Press, 2012), 3; Howard, Black Liberation in Kentucky, 1862-1884 (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 2. This influence can also be seen in the most recent scholarship on Kentucky. 
Christopher Phillips, for example, has a detailed discussion of how emancipation on the ground in Kentucky, but 
little substantive analysis of how federal policy developed during 1863-1864. Phillips also mistakenly calls 
enrollment “impressment,” and describes a cumbersome administrative process and a provost marshal’s office 
thrown into disarray, but then terms the 24,000 black troops recruited in Kentucky “nothing short of remarkable.” 
Phillips The Rivers Ran Backward: The Civil War and the Remaking of the American Middle Border (Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 259. Aaron Astor’s Rebels on the Border gives more attention to the development and 
importance of federal policy, but still treats it as disconnected from events on the ground. See also Ira Berlin, 
Barbara J. Fields, Thavolia Glymph, Joseph P. Reidy, and Leslie S. Rowland (eds.), Freedom: A Documentary 
History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series 1, Volume 1, Destruction of Slavery (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), chapter 8.  
	   283	  
fraught web.”10 However, a closer look at the details and chronology of Fiddler and Dyre’s story 
suggests that federal emancipation policy in Kentucky cannot possibly be as irrelevant as this 
scholarship has suggested. 
Both Fiddler and Dyre’s presence at the provost marshal’s office that sweltering June day 
can be traced, in part, to broader federal policy. In February, 1864, Congress amended the 1863 
Enrollment Act—requiring all able-bodied black males, free or slave, between the ages of twenty 
and forty five be registered for the draft—to include Kentucky, with Fiddler and his colleagues in 
the Provost Marshal General’s Bureau designated to superintend the process. Enslaved persons 
in Kentucky, caring little for the distinction between enrollment and enlistment, immediately 
seized on provost marshal’s forays into the Kentucky countryside to offer themselves as recruits 
for the Union army. A month later, when Kentucky failed to meet its quota of white troops for 
the national draft, black enrollment gave way to enlistment through a series of War Department 
orders issued between mid-April and mid-June. The last of these orders, General Orders Number 
20, was issued by Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas on June 13th 1864, and declared that the 
full-scale recruitment of black soldiers in Kentucky would take place “as rapidly as possible.”11 
Four days after General Orders Number 20 was announced, Jake Dyre showed up at James 
Fiddler’s doorstep.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Aaron Sheehan Dean, The Calculus of Violence: How Americans Fought the Civil War (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2018), 177. What I term the “momentum thesis” is also endorsed by scholars of the guerilla war in 
Kentucky. These scholars look at the reactionary violence that engulfed the state in reaction to emancipation use it to 
assume that whatever policies were attempting to be enacted had no impact on the ground and therefore did not 
matter. In addition to the works mentioned in note 9 above, see also Daniel Sutherland, A Savage Conflict: The 
Decisive Role of Guerillas in the American Civil War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 
J. Michael Rhyne, “A Blood Stained Sin’: Slavery, Freedom, and Guerilla Warfare in the Bluegrass Region of 
Kentucky, 1863-1865 The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 112, no. 4 (Autumn 2014): 553-587. 
11 General Orders Number 20, June 13th, 1864. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of 
the War of the Union and Confederate Armies (OR) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901) 
Series 3, Volume 4, 429-430. 
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Far from being “wholly disconnected” from federal policy due to chaos on the ground, 
the correspondence of Union officers such as Colonel James S. Brisbin, Major William Sidell, 
and Brigadier General Stephen S. Burbridge tells us exactly the opposite. Precisely because there 
was so much confusion on the ground, Union officials required a high degree of coordination and 
communication with Washington. Brisbin, Sidell, Burbridge, and others regularly sought 
guidance on questions of policy, routinely cited and sought to enforce federal and departmental 
policy directives, and repeatedly pleaded with Washington for more resources to effectively 
implement emancipation policy. In each of these areas it is possible to discern clear connections 
between officials in Kentucky and the policy directives coming from Washington, as well as 
attempts by federal and departmental policy makers to react to changing circumstances on the 
ground. 
Consequently, an examination of the daily operations of Union officers charged with 
implementing emancipation in Kentucky reveals a more integral role for federal policy in 
shaping the actions of Union soldiers with regards to fugitive slaves, emancipation, and the 
destruction of slavery than has previously been allowed. Moreover, it suggests a new perspective 
on the relationship between emancipation, guerilla warfare, and the reactionary violence that 
engulfed Kentucky between 1863-1865. Despite the recent emphasis on seemingly 
uncontrollable violence that accompanied freeing slaves in Kentucky, this chapter illustrates how 
emancipation and the resulting reactionary violence were never autonomous forces that 
accelerated or decelerated entirely of their own accord. The emancipation policies that were 
developed and modified by Union civil and military authorities—and then implemented by 
Union soldiers—always had a tangible, if uneven, impact in Kentucky, and could be measured 
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by the reactions from enemy soldiers, guerillas, civil authorities, and the larger civilian 
population.12 
 Examining emancipation policy and practice in Kentucky also fills several additional 
gaps in the historiography on the Civil War in the Bluegrass State. Specifically, historian John 
David Smith has recently outlined the need for scholars to conduct more research on the 
experiences of black refugees, soldiers, and laborers; to further assess the impact of guerilla 
warfare and irregular violence; and to reconstruct more of the war’s impact on the daily lives of 
everyday Kentuckians. Although Smith separates these areas of inquiry into discrete categories, 
an analytical narrative of the implementation of emancipation policy in Kentucky demonstrates 
the ways that these areas are deeply intertwined, and, in doing so, combines military, political, 
and social history.13 
Additionally, this chapter contributes to the vigorous scholarly debate over Kentucky’s 
exceptionality. Over the last two decades, a growing body of literature has emphasized the 
Bluegrass State’s commonalities with various geographic regions that scholars alternatively term 
the “Lower North,” “middle border,” or “borderland.” Using community studies to compare and 
contrast locations on opposite sides of the Ohio River, these scholars emphasize how geography 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 None of this is to suggest that the clashes over emancipation in Kentucky did not produce chaos, or that the 
resulting turmoil did not help shape events. But historians, particularly those who study guerilla warfare, have been 
too quick to assume that this chaos was sui generis. This is particularly true of Kentucky, where military officials 
had ostensible control over the implementation of emancipation policy, but did not have authority over the legal 
institution of slavery in the state. The chaos stemmed from wartime conditions initiating and then escalating a 
conflict between two acknowledged power structures: the Union army and the civil authorities who maintained 
jurisdiction over the laws and status of slavery within Kentucky’s borders. The conflict between the two certainly 
produced chaos, but as correspondence from both civil and military authorities makes clear, both sides insisted, this 
chaos often resulted from both sides insisting on the applicability and ultimate supremacy of their version of the law. 
Equally as important, neither side seemed to view federal policy as irrelevant to, or having a marginal impact on, 
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13 John David Smith “Whiter Kentucky Civil War and Reconstruction Scholarship?” The Register of the Kentucky 
Historical Society, Vol. 112, No. 2 (Spring 2014): 223-247.   
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informed a “tradition of compromise and accommodation in the Ohio River Valley.”14 In 
contrast, another interpretation emphasizes how the impact of slavery was essential in 
establishing physical and metaphorical borders between slave and free states, and argues that 
emphasizing Kentucky’s geographic commonalities risks obscuring that fundamental 
distinction.15 Although the tendency amongst historians has been to see these two interpretations 
as irreconcilable, this chapter attempts to bridge that divide.16 Using the records of the 
Department of the Ohio Commander Ambrose Burnside, as well as the United States Colored 
Troops Recruiting Office in Nashville, I place Kentucky within the context of Ohio, Indiana, 
Illinois, and Tennessee. At the same time, I will also emphasize the distinctive ways that slavery 
shaped Kentucky’s wartime experience, most notably Kentucky’s determination to thwart 
Republican pressure to abolish slavery, Union antislavery policy, and military emancipation.  
A final note is in order concerning organization and structure. As with previous chapters, 
this section views emancipation from three different “scales of action”—national, departmental, 
and local—in order to better understand the policy and practice of emancipation.17 To achieve 
this goal, the chapter shifts back and forth between the different “scales,” emphasizing points of 
both policy coherence and disjuncture between the high policy articulated by Washington and 
social conditions on the ground in Kentucky. The point here is not to make a case for the perfect 
efficacy of emancipation policy, nor for the primacy or events on the ground. Rather, it is to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Matthew Salafia, Slavery’s Borderland; Freedom and Bondage Along the Ohio River (Philadelphia: The 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). quoted in Smith “Whither Kentucky” 238. See also Stephen I, 
Rockenbach, War Upon Our Border, Two Ohio Valley Communities Navigate the Civil War (Charlottesville: The 
University of Virginia Press, 2016). For other works that emphasize the commonalities between the “Lower North” 
and “Upper South” see Edward L. Ayers In The Presence of Mine Enemies: War in the Heart of America (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2003) and The Thin Light of Freedom: War and Emancipation in the Heart of America (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2017). 
15 See for example, Luke E. Harlow, Religion, Race, and the Making of Confederate Kentucky, 1830-1880 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
16 Kent T. Dollar, Larry H. Whiteacker, and W. Calvin Dickinson (eds). Sister States, Enemy States: The Civil War 
in Kentucky and Tennessee (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010).  
17 Scott Nesbitt and Edward L. Ayers, “Seeing Emancipation: Scales of Freedom in the American South” The 
Journal of the Civil War Era, vol. 1, no. 1 (March, 2011), pgs. 3-24.	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describe the coming together of political abolitionism and federal emancipation policy with its 
implementation by the Union Army to produce a cohesive portrait of emancipation in Kentucky.  
     
Major General Stephen Gano Burbridge did not suffer fools lightly. Born in Scott 
County, Kentucky in 1831, Burbridge seemed destined for a military career. His father had 
served in the War of 1812, while his grandfather had served with George Washington’s 
Continental Army during the American Revolution.18 True to form, Burbridge first attended 
Kentucky Military Institute, then Georgetown College, and subsequently studied law under the 
tutelage of Kentucky Senator Garrett Davis. Burbridge came from a wealthy slave-owning 
family, and apparently young Stephen found the life of a gentlemen planter more to his liking 
than a martial or legal career. By the outbreak of the war, Burbridge had accumulated a personal 
estate valued at $33,000, owned seven slaves, and was living with his brother in Logan County, 
Kentucky.19 
 A staunch Unionist, Burbridge recruited the 26th Kentucky Infantry, and became its 
colonel on August 27th 1861.20 From the fall of 1861 into the spring of 1862, Burbridge suffered 
from what he termed “exceedingly bad” health, and attempted to tender his resignation on May 
1st 1862.21 However, his conduct at the battle of Shiloh in April was enough to win a promotion 
to Brigadier General, and the new rank was apparently sufficient enticement to remain in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Louis De Falaise, “General Stephen Gano Burbridge’s Command in Kentucky”, The Register of the Kentucky 
Historical Society, Vol. 69 No. 2 (April 1971), 101-127. 
19 Year: 1860; Census Place: District 2, Logan, Kentucky; Roll: M653_383; Page: 654; Family History Library 
Film: 803383.  Ancestry.com. 1860 U.S. Federal Census - Slave Schedules [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: 
Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2010. On Burbridge’s background and upbringing see, De Falaise, Gen. Stephen 
Gano Burbridge’s Command in Kentucky”, 101-103, pp. 101-127. 
20 Compiled Service Records of Volunteer Union Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from the State of Kentucky. 
M. 397, Roll 0375, Burbridge, Stephen G. URL: https://www.fold3.com/image/230557372   
21 Burbridge to Brig. Genl. Vanderan April 28th, 1862 and Burbridge to General Don Carlos Buell, April 24th, 1862. 
Both in Compiled Service Records of Volunteer Union Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from the State of 
Kentucky. M. 397, Roll 0375, Burbridge, Stephen G. 
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army. During the fall of 1862, Burbridge participated in the eviction of Braxton Bragg’s forces 
from Kentucky, and subsequently served with some distinction while commanding a brigade in 
the 13th corps of General William Sherman’s Army of the Tennessee.22 In February 1864, 
Burbridge was transferred to the command of General Jacob Amen in the Department of the 
Ohio. With Amen then awaiting trial by courts-martial in Cincinnati, Kentucky Governor 
Thomas Bramlette successfully petitioned President Lincoln to appoint Burbridge to command 
the Military District of Kentucky.23 
 Bramlette would come to regret Burbridge’s appointment, but initially his ascension to 
command was a rare point of agreement between the Lincoln administration and Kentucky’s 
civil leadership. Indeed, relations between the commonwealth and Washington had been strained 
almost from the very outbreak of the conflict. Following the attack on Fort Sumter, Kentucky’s 
House of Representatives adopted a resolution of neutrality as the best means of “preserving the 
internal peace and securing the lives, liberty, and property of the citizens of the state.”24 
Kentucky’s representatives further declared that the state could play a role as “mediators and 
friends to the belligerent powers” but would take no part in the conflict.25 Taking the opportunity 
to lecture “extremists” on both sides, Kentucky House members also made it clear that citizens 
of the Bluegrass State bore no responsibility for the “deplorable” condition of the country.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22Steven E. Woodworth, Nothing But Victory: The Union Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865 (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf), 267. 
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Publicly, Kentucky Governor Beriah Magoffin followed the House’s lead. On May 20th 
1861, the governor issued his own proclamation, urging Kentucky citizens to “pursue such a line 
of wise conduct as will promote peace and tranquility,” and forbidding both Union and 
Confederate troops from making “any movement upon the soil of Kentucky.”27 Magoffin also 
called for the formation of a state militia to resist or prevent any encroachment on Kentucky’s 
sovereignty by Union and Confederate forces, and quickly set about securing loans, arms, and 
ammunition for what he termed Kentucky’s “complete condition of self defense.”28 Despite the 
façade of armed neutrality, what the historians at the Civil War Governor’s Project have termed 
Magoffin’s “not so-secret secessionism” was readily apparent.29 When Secretary of War Simon 
Cameron called on Kentucky for her quota of troops to help suppress the rebellion, Magoffin 
“emphatically” shot back that Kentucky would “furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of 
subduing her sister Southern States.”30 Magoffin also sent repeated requests for arms to 
Confederate Secretary of War Robert Walker and General Gideon Pillow, and his 
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correspondence making clear that the “co-operation of Kentucky with [the Confederate 
government] in [their] military movements” and recruiting took place with his endorsement.31  
 Magoffin, Lincoln, and Confederate President Jefferson Davis all knew Kentucky’s 
geography mocked her pretensions of neutrality. Wedged between Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois to 
the north and west, Tennessee to the South, and Virginia to the east and southeast, Kentucky 
would almost inevitably be drawn into any war lasting longer than a few months. Rivers in the 
Kentucky provided multiple avenues of invasion for any Union army looking to get into 
Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, while Kentucky’s 225,000 slaves and Southern- 
sympathizing governor made the state seem ready made to take its place in the Confederacy. 
Nevertheless, many in Kentucky during the spring of 1861 saw wisdom in neutrality because it 
provided a  “cooling off period for the sorely divided commonwealth for sentiment to 
crystallize.”32  
 Initially, both Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis had little choice but to respect 
Kentucky’s neutrality. In late April, Lincoln informed Kentucky Unionist Senator Garrett Davis 
that the federal government “contemplated no military operations that would make it necessary 
to move troops over [Kentucky’s] territories,” though he added that as president he reserved the 
right to move troops into or over any state.33 Shortly thereafter, Lincoln told Warner L. 
Underwood he hoped Kentucky would remain loyal to the federal government, but barring that, 
“let her stand still and take no hostile part against it, and that no hostile step should tread her 
soil.”34  Even as Lincoln made these assurances, other Kentucky Unionists cautioned the 
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president that the “whole military organization” being formed by Governor Magoffin 
sympathized with the Confederacy, while the governors of Indiana, Ohio, and Illinois sent 
worried telegrams to Washington urging Lincoln to preemptively occupy strategic points in 
Kentucky.35  
For his part, Jefferson Davis could be forgiven for thinking Kentucky would eventually 
join the Confederacy.36 Not only had he been assured of Governor Magoffin’s attempts to 
“instruct [Kentucky’s] state arms to only loyal [Southern] men,” but on May 19th Magoffin had 
written Davis to express his outrage that a “military force had been enlisted and quartered by the 
U.S. authorities within [Kentucky].”37 Although Magoffin questioned the need for Confederate 
troops massing in northern Tennessee, the governor expressed confidence that the Confederate 
government would not “now contemplate or had ever purposed any violation” of Kentucky’s 
neutrality.”38 Magoffin pointedly closed the letter with the suggestion that an “authoritative 
assurance” would go a long way to quieting any apprehension and demonstrating the good 
intentions of the Confederate government.39  
In the meantime, both Lincoln and Davis funneled as many men and resources as 
possible into Kentucky. In late spring, Kentucky Unionists frantically warned Lincoln that 
establishing “some military organization [in Kentucky] under the authority of the United States” 
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was necessary as a “counterpoise” to Governor Magoffin and his Kentucky State Guard.40 
Although Lincoln was hesitant about inflaming Kentuckians, the president directed Robert H. 
Anderson, a Kentucky native and lately the commander of the Federal garrison at Fort Sumter, to 
return home and receive volunteer troops from Kentucky and the Western part of Virginia. 
General Orders Number 27, issued on May 28th 1861 named Anderson the commander of the 
newly created Military Department of Kentucky, which encompassed the area of the state within 
one hundred miles of the Ohio River.41 Anderson, with the assistance of Joshua Speed, was also 
directed to facilitate the distribution of arms “in the hands of friends” in Kentucky, a mission that 
Lincoln hoped Anderson would perform “expeditiously.”42  
Anderson was soon assisted in his endeavors by William “Bull” Nelson, a Navy 
lieutenant on loan to the army, and another native Kentuckian. Nelson quickly impressed 
Kentucky Unionists with his frenetic activity, and by the end of May Joshua Speed was writing 
Lincoln that 5,000 more arms, distributed with Nelson’s “true, active, vigilant” manner, would 
do “incalculable good.”43 On July 1st, Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas ordered Nelson to 
recruit regiments of infantry and cavalry in Eastern and Western Tennessee, as well as muster 
into service three regiments of infantry from Southeastern Kentucky.44 Nelson got to work 
immediately, appointing officers for the Kentucky regiments, sending trusted recruiters off “in 
all directions,” and sparking such a flurry of activity that he predicted companies would be raised 
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faster than they could be armed and supplied.45 Attentive to every logistical detail, Nelson also 
worked with the Unionist Kentucky Home Guards to provide armed details to guard supply 
depots and escort supply trains.46  
Not to be outdone, Jefferson Davis let it be known that any Kentuckian who wanted to 
join the Confederacy need only cross the state’s southern border into Tennessee. Additionally, 
Confederate military leaders were in regular contact with Simon Bolivar Buckner, a Kentucky 
born, West Point educated man in charge of the Confederate-leaning Kentucky State Guard.47 
Davis was kept personally apprised of Confederate recruiting efforts by a network of contacts in 
Kentucky, and by mid-summer both Union and Confederate forces were recruiting openly in the 
state.48 Trying to counter the reach of Anderson’s Military District of Kentucky, Davis was 
especially to “obtain men from northern Kentucky,” particularly those who could supply their 
own weapons.49 
By early summer, Lincoln declared that Kentucky’s policy of  “armed neutrality” could 
not continue. In his July 4th message to Congress, Lincoln blasted the policy of “arming of 
[border] States to prevent the Union forces passing one way, or the disunion, the other” as 
tantamount to being “disunion completed.”50 Back in mid-June, Lincoln had ordered Secretary of 
the Treasury Salmon Chase to rescind a circular banning the flow of goods to the southern states 
through Kentucky, thus making it easier for men and materials to find their way into the waiting 
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hands of the Confederacy.51 Realizing this tactical error, Lincoln admitted that Kentucky’s 
carrying on an extensive and lucrative trade with the Confederacy was intolerable. Kentucky’s 
supposed neutrality, the president declared, “recognizes no fidelity to the Constitution, no 
obligation to maintain the Union” and was treason by almost any standard.52 
 
Meanwhile, chaos reigned in Kentucky during the summer of 1861. Appeals for men, 
weapons, ammunition, and other supplies flew back and forth to both Washington and 
Richmond. General George McClellan, Commander of the Department of the Ohio, wrote to 
Lincoln that the distribution network had been “extremely beneficial” in bolstering the Union 
cause and discouraging secessionists.53 Union men, McClellan told the president, regarded the 
issuing of arms as a “masterpiece of policy” and proof of the United States government’s good 
intentions.54 Meanwhile, Confederate sympathizers sent urgent messages to Davis insisting that 
the Confederacy needed to counteract the supply of arms flowing to Kentucky Unionists from 
Washington.55 These calls were punctuated by numerous instances of violence between the 
Union-leaning Home Guards and the Confederate sympathizing State Guards throughout the 
summer of 1861. “If it requires all these men, and all this money, to keep up an armed neutrality, 
The Frankfort Tri-Weekly opined, “God save the commonwealth from active war.”56  
 With men and material being amassed by both sides, all eyes trained on the congressional 
elections in late June and the General Assembly elections in early August. “The Union men are 
sure they can carry both of these [elections],” McClellan informed General-in-Chief Winfield 
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Scott, but urged that Kentucky be treated with the “utmost delicacy” until the elections were 
over.57 In June, ninety percent of Kentucky’s congressional districts returned Unionist victory, 
and the August state legislature elections placed Unionists in firm control of the State House and 
Senate.58 Bull Nelson, now safely abandoning McClellan’s “delicacy” policy, established Camp 
Dick Robinson in Garrard County on August 6th, 1861.  
Nelson’s actions sent Governor Magoffin into spasms of rage. “A large body of soldiers 
have been enlisted in the United States Army and collected in military camps in the central 
portions of Kentucky” the Governor fumed to Lincoln in mid-August.59 Kentuckians, the 
governor warned, neither needed nor wanted federal troops in their midst, and Magoffin urged 
Lincoln to order the prompt removal of all United States forces. In response, Lincoln bluntly told 
the governor that he had “acted on the urgent solicitation of many Kentuckians” and that the 
force “consists exclusively of Kentuckians, having the camp in the vicinity of their own homes, 
and not assailing, or menacing, any of the good people of Kentucky.”60 Neither General Nelson 
nor Camp Robinson was going anywhere. 
Magoffin’s protests also got nowhere with Jefferson Davis. On the same day that 
Magoffin wrote Lincoln, he also wrote the Confederate president to complain about the massing 
of Confederate troops on the Kentucky-Tennessee border, and about the opening of Camp Boone 
near Clarksville, Tennessee.61 Davis replied that the concentrating of troops was a response to 
the “lawless invasion” of Kentucky by Nelson, and that the Confederacy had no intention of 
violating Kentucky’s neutrality.62 The Confederate government, Davis argued, had respected her 
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neutrality thus far, and maintained trade and other relationships with the Bluegrass State. 
“Neutrality, to be entitled to respect,” Davis acidly concluded, “must be strictly maintained 
between both parties.”63  
Two days after Davis replied to Magoffin, John C. Fremont, Union Commander of the 
Department of Missouri, did his best to send Kentucky into the Confederacy. Fremont had had 
minimal success subduing the “bands of murderers and marauders” in his department and, in 
retaliation, issued a proclamation declaring that the military was assuming the administrative 
powers of the state. Under the terms of his decree, those found to be taking up arms against the 
United States would be court-martialed, their property confiscated, and their slaves freed.64 
Kentucky Unionists were aghast. Joseph Holt warned Lincoln that Fremont’s proclamation had 
aroused the “alarm and condemnation” of the Union-leaning citizens in the state, while Robert 
Anderson declared that, if the order was not “immediately disavowed and annulled,” Kentucky 
would be lost to the Union.”65 Lincoln requested, and then ordered, Fremont to modify his 
proclamation to conform to the Confiscation Act.66 For the moment, Kentucky seemed destined 
for the Confederacy 
Fortunately for Lincoln, Confederate Major General Leonidas Polk somehow managed to 
out-blunder Fremont. Polk was a West Pointer who had shed his army uniform for cleric’s garb, 
becoming an Episcopal bishop before finding his way back into Confederate service when the 
war began. For weeks, Polk had been warily eyeing Union forces under Brigadier General 
Ulysses S. Grant as they concentrated at Cairo, Illinois. Polk suspected that Grant’s intent was to 
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seize the heights at Columbus, Kentucky that commanded the Mississippi River, and hatched 
plan to beat him to the punch.67 Polk marched his forces into Hickman Kentucky on September 
3rd, and then into Columbus on September 4th. Governor of Tennessee Isham Harris immediately 
telegraphed Davis that Polk’s move was “calculated to injure our cause” in Kentucky, and 
begged Davis to order Polk to withdraw immediately.68 Acting on Davis’s instruction, Secretary 
of War Leroy Pope Walker immediately wrote to Harris that Polk had been ordered to affect the 
“prompt withdrawal” of his forces, and that Harris should inform Governor Magoffin that the 
move had been “wholly unauthorized” by Richmond.69 
According to historian Steven Woodworth, Davis had to this point acted with “good 
judgment and decisiveness.”70 However, once Davis received Polk’s missive declaring that 
Union determination to “seize and forcibly possess” Columbus had prompted his actions, his 
mindset apparently changed.71 Davis now began to act with “hesitance and uncertainty,” 
cautiously telling Polk that the “necessity justifies the action.”72 Although the Confederate 
president still professed to be very worried about Kentucky, he now reasoned that Polk’s offer to 
evacuate Kentucky if the Union Army would follow suit was “all that could be required of 
respect for the declared neutrality of Kentucky.”73 By September 13th Davis was fully accepting 
Polk’s logic that the occupation of Columbus had been necessary as a defensive measure, and 
would henceforth defend his friend’s actions.74  
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By the time the Confederate government figured out a coherent response to Polk’s 
actions, General Grant had rendered them moot. Following the Confederate occupation of 
Hickman and Columbus, Polk’s forces had failed to also seize Paducah, on the Ohio River, and 
Grant immediately made them pay. Grant moved his forces into Paducah, seizing the mouth of 
the Tennessee River in the process, then moving up the Ohio River, and seizing the mouth of the 
Cumberland River.75 The sum total of these movements was to render the Confederate position 
at Columbus untenable, but Grant’s shrewdest move might have been a political one. Upon 
entering Kentucky, Grant issued a proclamation announcing that he had simply responded to the 
Confederate invasion, and his only mission was to expel those invaders from Kentucky soil.76  
Polk’s maneuver lost Kentucky for the Confederacy. The Kentucky General Assembly 
instructed Governor Magoffin to issue a proclamation mandating Confederate troops be 
“withdrawn from her soil unconditionally,” passed resolutions calling for the raising of 40,000 
volunteers, and requested that Robert Anderson be ordered to take immediate command of the 
forces needed to “expel the invaders from the soil of Kentucky.”77  Adding a touch of symbolism 
to these resolutions, the General Assembly also ordered the flag of the United States to be flown 
above the State Capitol building at Frankfort.78 
Yet even as Kentucky cast her lot with the Union, the implications of Fremont’s earlier 
proclamation hung like a storm cloud over the state. In the same resolutions calling for 
Confederate troops to be expelled from Kentucky, the General Assembly inserted a clause stating 
that  “no citizen’s property shall be taken or confiscated because of such [political] opinions, nor 
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shall any slave be set free by any military commander.”79 The editor of The Louisville Journal 
warned his fellow citizens to “remember Missouri, Kentuckians….and be ready,” while a mass 
meeting in Hart County passed a series of resolutions predicting that Fremont’s order would 
destroy the value of slave property, and render “all the slave states unfit for the residence of the 
white man.”80 Likewise, The Lexington Statesmen predicted that the “confiscation, abolition, 
despotism!” proposed by Fremont’s proclamation were the acts that Kentuckians should expect 
to see done “in the name of the Union and to preserve the Government” by the abolitionist 
Lincoln administration.81  
 The fears sparked by Fremont’s proclamation illustrated how the presence of the Union 
armies raised would impact the future of slavery in a loyal slave state. What actions could the 
Union army take relative to fugitive slaves? How would federal legislation such as the First 
Confiscation Act be applied in a loyal slave state? Could the Lincoln administration pursue 
abolition in the border-states while also keeping them in the Union?82 Kentucky slaveholders 
saw the writing on the wall almost immediately. “Our negro population is getting restive,” one 
Hawesville resident ominously wrote Governor Magoffin, “from too free a conversation with the 
abolitionists on the other side of the [Ohio] river.”83  
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Due to its relatively small number of slaves, it was Delaware, not Kentucky that served as 
Lincoln’s template for abolition in the border states. According to the 1860 census, Delaware had 
approximately 1,800 slaves at the outbreak of the war, and Lincoln believed that if he could get 
“this plan started in Delaware I have no fear but that the other three borders states will accept 
it.”84 Lincoln first discussed the prospect of gradual abolition with Representative George Fisher, 
Delaware’s member in the House of Representatives, and Benjamin Burton, the state’s largest 
slaveholder, at the White House in early November. Both Fisher and Burton indicated the plan 
might be feasible, and Lincoln drafted two proposals for circulation and introduction in the 
Delaware state legislature. One bill proposed abolishing slavery by 1867, with a “provision of 
apprenticeship” for slave children until they became adults. The second bill—which Lincoln 
personally favored—would immediately free children of slaves born after the passage of the act, 
as well as those who were older than thirty-five, with the process extended out over three 
decades.85   
Roughly a week after he drafted these bills, Lincoln buried a reference to border state 
emancipation in his Annual Message to Congress. In a section enumerating the reasoning, scope, 
and impact of the First Confiscation Act, the president called on Congress to provide funds to 
acquire a territory for the colonization of slaves freed by said Confiscation act, or who might 
become free if some states were to “pass similar enactments.”86 Undoubtedly, the 
uncharacteristically vague phrasing was a consequence of the Delaware plan not yet being public 
knowledge, and the hope that negotiations for its passage might take place out of the public eye. 
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Secretary of War Simon Cameron inadvertently validated Lincoln’s caution when, in his Annual 
Report for 1861, he advocated for emancipation; Kentucky’s General Assembly immediately 
called for his removal.87 
Lincoln monitored the progress of the Delaware plan closely during the winter of 1861-
1862. Democrats in the Delaware legislature circulated “remonstrance’s” against “what they 
were pleased to term the Abolition bill,” and quickly introduced resolutions against the 
measure.88 Daunted but undeterred, Fisher spent the winter months trying to maneuver his bill 
through the Delaware legislature, lobbying fellow representatives, and defending the legislation 
in newspaper editorials.89 A narrow passage in the Senate proved to be a pyrrhic victory, as 
Fisher’s bill came up one vote short in a straw poll in the Delaware House of Representatives, 
and consequently was never introduced.90  
 
While Fisher was struggling to maneuver compensated emancipation through the 
Delaware legislature, the complexity of Union emancipation policy was producing confusion on 
the ground in Kentucky. Beginning in July, 1861, Congressional Republicans had insisted that 
the recapture and rendition of fugitive slaves anywhere was not a Union Army or Navy 
responsibility, and that slaves used to support the rebellion would be discharged from the their 
masters service if they came within Union lines. On the ground in Kentucky, the practical 
application of these instructions were messy, inconsistent, and tended to vary according to the 
individual discretion of regimental, post, and department commanders. “Secretary Cameron says 
something to please the north, which the President modifies to suit Reverdy Johnson and the 
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Border States,” one Union soldier complained, and as a result, “each commander of our 
volunteers follows his political predilections in regard to contrabands.”91 
Confusion over the application of emancipation policy has been compounded by 
historians’ tendency to vaguely describe the actions of “local commanders” on the ground.  
 “Freedom depended on the views of local commanders” Thavolia Glymph concludes, citing the 
actions of a single provost marshal in support of her claim.92 Similarly, Lowell Harrison, one of 
the foremost scholars on emancipation in Kentucky, writes, “the way [fugitive slaves] were 
handled depended largely on the local situation and the sentiments of the officers and men with 
whom they associated.”93 In comparison, Kristopher A. Teeters’ recent work Practical 
Liberators is slightly more specific, focusing his study on how “western officers—both high 
ranking and junior—carried out emancipation in the field.”94 Only by separating out the actions 
of officers at different levels of command—departmental, division, brigade, army post, and 
regimental—can we gain a more nuanced understanding of emancipation on the ground in 
Kentucky. 
Throughout 1861, some departmental and district commanders protected slavery in 
Kentucky. When General Don Carlos Buell became commander of the Department of the Ohio, 
he received a pointed reminder from General-in-Chief George McClellan. “Constantly bear in 
mind” McClellan told his subordinate, “the precise issue for which we are fighting—that issue is 
preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the General Government 
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over all portions of our territory.”95 Within this framework, McClellan instructed Buell to 
“carefully regard” state laws in Kentucky, and assure its citizens that “their domestic institutions 
will in no matter be interfered with.”96 In case Buell somehow missed the point, McClellan wrote 
him again five days later reminding him to  “religiously respect the Constitutional rights of all.”97  
Department of the Cumberland Commander General William T. Sherman’s orders 
mirrored what McClellan told Buell. In mid-October 1861, several slave owners complained to 
Sherman that their slaves had taken refuge inside the lines commanded by Colonel John B. 
Turchin. Sherman immediately took the opportunity to remind Turchin “the laws of the United 
States and of Kentucky all of which are binding compel us to surrender a runaway on application 
of the owner or agent.”98 Scrupulously seeking to follow both local and national fugitive slave 
laws, Sherman instructed his subordinate that all fugitive slaves “shall be delivered up,” and that 
unless the blacks were there as servants to a particular officer or regiment, the wisest course was 
to keep all blacks out of his camp entirely.99 
On November 20th 1861, Department of Missouri Commander Henry W. Halleck issued 
General Orders Number 3, banning fugitive slaves from entering Union lines and excluding 
those who were already present.100 In his instructions to subordinates, Halleck insisted repeatedly 
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that the intent of his order was simply to maintain the proper boundary between military and civil 
law in a loyal slave state. When a soldier under command of General Alexander Asboth returned 
a slave to his owner, Halleck quickly pointed out his procedural error. “The relation between the 
slave and his master is not a matter to be determined by military officials,” he lectured Asboth, 
but “must be decided by civil authorities.”101 A few weeks later, Halleck made the same point in 
a letter dealing with a soldier who refused to return a fugitive slave. “I do not consider it any part 
of the duty of the military to decide upon the rights of the master and slave,” Halleck explained, 
“it is our duty to leave that question for the action of the local civil authorities of the State.”102  
Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant, whose position as commander of the Military 
District of Cairo included part of Kentucky, repeated Halleck’s reasoning to his own 
subordinates. When a Mr. Mercer protested to Grant that Union soldiers stationed at Camp Holt, 
opposite Cairo, were interfering with his slaves and that he had been “forcibly prevented” from 
retrieving them, Grant immediately chastised the commander for treating the civil laws of 
Kentucky, Halleck’s orders, and Grant’s own instructions all “with contempt.”103 “No matter 
what our private views may be,” Grant wrote, “there are in this Department positive orders on 
the subject, and these orders must be obeyed.”104 
Grant’s adherence to Halleck’s orders applied only to loyal Kentucky slaveholders. Just a 
few weeks after Grant assisted Mr. Mercer, he took the exact opposite stance when a known 
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Confederate sympathizer made a similar request. “While it is not the policy of the Military Arm 
of the Government to ignore or in any manner interfere with the Constitutional rights of loyal 
citizens” Grant curtly informed the man, it was also not the policy to assist those who “in any 
manner aid the rebellion.” Citing the Confiscation Act that Congress passed in August, Grant 
added that the man he might take his case to Kentucky’s civil authorities, but that no military 
authorities could restore his property to him. Those who aid the rebellion had “no right to come 
within Union lines,” Grant concluded, much less “invoke [Union forces] aid and assistance” in 
the recovery of fugitive slaves.105  
Officers in the Union Navy used similar logic. When S.L. Phelps, commander of the USS 
Conestoga, was patrolling the Cumberland River late in 1861, a black man “chased by blood 
hounds in full cry after him,” ran down to the river bank and pleaded to be taken aboard.106 Rebel 
cavalry who, Phelps learned, were intent on taking him to work on Confederate fortifications in 
Dover, Kentucky, were following in hot pursuit. Phelps immediately sent out a boat to rescue the 
man and bring him aboard the Conestoga. Describing the incident in his operations report, 
Phelps informed his superiors, “I received [the slave] on board and brought him away,” because 
“his master is a Secessionist.”107 
Northern regiments stationed in Kentucky during the fall of 1861 were warned against 
interfering with slavery. Following his instructions from General McClellan, Buell made certain 
the regiments under his command knew the “domestic institutions [of Kentucky] will in no 
manner be interfered with,” and assured Kentuckians that the “mass of the army was law abiding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 “Commander of the District of Cairo to the Commander of U.S. Forces at Cape Girardeau, Missouri” January 5th 
1862, Berlin, Destruction of Slavery, 424. 
106 “Commander of the USS Conestoga to the Commander of Naval Forces in the Western Waters” December 10th, 
1861, Berlin, Destruction of Slavery, 521. 
107 Ibid. 
	   306	  
and that it is neither its disposition nor its policy to violate the law.”108 From their camp in 
Henderson County, one soldier in the 44th Indiana wrote home “not a soldier nor officer has 
attempted to tamper with the institution. They would be severely punished if they should.”109 
Escaping Kentucky slaves who made their way across the Ohio River to Camp Joe Holt in 
Evansville, Indiana, found soldiers there under orders to return them to their owners.110   
Despite these “positive orders,” many Union soldiers in Kentucky disregarded, evaded, or 
simply refused to follow orders. When Union forces occupied Paducah in September 1861, 
soldiers from an unnamed regiment visited the house of a Mr. Flournoy, and “entered into a 
conversation with one of his negro women.”111 When Flournoy threatened to whip the slave if 
she did not enter his house, the soldiers informed him “the day for whipping negroes was 
past.”112 Likewise, when John Troutman, a farmer from Nelson County, went searching for a 
runaway slave whom he believed to be “secreted” in the Union army encampment near 
Elizabethtown, the “Lincoln soldiers” stationed there “did not seem disposed to lend him any 
facility in his search,” even after Troutman secured written permission from General Sherman to 
search the camp.113 Even such a line toeing general as Don Carlos Buell was forced to admit, “in 
some instance [slaves] may be enticed [into Union lines],” although he made it clear he 
considered those soldiers involved to be “lawless and mischievous.”114 
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Such actions complicate the traditional narrative of Union officials, officers, and enlisted 
men unilaterally treating Kentucky slaveholders with kid gloves.115 As historian Christopher 
Phillips has recently demonstrated, “those who urged caution or conciliation—favoring a 
moderate policy towards middle border slave state civilians…soon found themselves ‘with 
[their] backs in a ditch’” much earlier than many historians have traditionally surmised.116 
Comparing men like Nathaniel Lyon, John Fremont, Franz Siegel, David Hunter, and James 
Lane with George McClellan, Robert Anderson and Don Carlos Buell, Phillips concludes that 
Lincoln may have briefly tolerated “moderation” in the middle border states, but that he did not 
“linger long on this stance.”117  
Of course, many Union officers and enlisted men aided the recapture of fugitive slaves. 
In October 1861, men of the 31st Indiana, stationed at Henderson Kentucky, arrested two fugitive 
slaves who had attempted to escape into Union lines. The Louisville Daily Courier approvingly 
noted it “does not look as if the Federal troops intended to free the negroes, or in any manner 
disturb the relations between master and slave.”118 Likewise, the men of the 56th Ohio told a 
slave seeking refuge in their lines at Mt. Sterling that “he could go no further” with one captain 
even suggesting that he “desired to pay whatever expenses might be incurred in returning the 
slave.”119 Colonel Harris of the 2nd Ohio arrested two men who “came to the [2nd Ohio’s] camp 
in the night under the impression that they could thus insure their freedom” and promptly sent 
them under guard to the town jail.120 Noting that a runaway slave’s fate often depended on the 
regiment he encountered, The Cincinnati Gazette detailed the story of eight slaves who arrived at 
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Camp Nolin, Kentucky, in early December. The escapees were turned over to the provost 
marshal who was “sorely puzzled” as to what action to take. “If our administration were not 
sometimes in the habit of having two or three different policies on the same subject” The Gazette 
remarked, “there could be no hesitation.”121  
 
Back in Washington, Lincoln wasted little time mourning the demise of the Delaware 
plan. On March 6th, 1862, Lincoln sent Congress a proposed joint resolution that expanded the 
offer of compensated emancipation “to any state which may adopt the gradual abolishment of 
slavery” with assistance to facilitate the transition.122 “To deprive [the Confederacy] of this 
hope” as Lincoln explained to James MacDougal a few days later, “would substantially end the 
rebellion.”123 Buried in Lincoln’s message, however, was a warning. If compensated 
emancipation was met with continued resistance, it would prolong the war indefinitely, thus 
rendering such measures “as may seem indispensible, or may obviously promise great efficiency 
towards ending the struggle,” would be unavoidable.124  Lincoln was betting that compensated, 
gradual abolition would appear more palatable to the border states with the threat of expanding 
military emancipation looming in the background. 
On March 10th, Lincoln met with a delegation of border state representatives to make his 
case in person. According to Maryland Congressman John W. Crisfield, Lincoln told gave 
assembled representatives what amounted to an expanded version of the reasoning in his 
Message to Congress. As long as Union armies “must necessarily be brought into contact with 
slaves in the [border states],” slaves would continually enter Union lines, eliciting “numerous, 
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loud, and deep” complaints from slaveholders who wanted them returned and others who 
demanded they be freed.125 The president implored the assembled representatives to see how 
these divisions strengthened Confederate hopes of a unification with the border states, whereas, 
if his plan were adopted, “more would be accomplished towards shortening the war than could 
be hoped from the greatest victory achieved by the Union armies.”126    
 The border state representatives were unmoved. Crisfield told Lincoln that the people of 
Maryland “did not like to be coerced into emancipation,” while Charles Wycliffe of Kentucky 
peppered the president with a barrage of questions about the constitutionality of his plan.127 
Growing wearing of Wycliffe’s line of questioning, Lincoln testily replied that as the resolution 
simply proposed the voluntary  “cooperation with any state” through monetary aid from the 
federal government, he did not see any constitutional problems.128 A tense back and forth 
ensued, with the meeting ending  as Kentucky representative John Crittenden assured Lincoln of 
the group’s confidence in his “high patriotism and sincere devotion to the happiness and glory of 
his country.”129  
Over the next few months, the Border State stalemate continued to deteriorate. On May 
9th General David Hunter, the Commander of the Department of the South, declared martial law 
in his department, announcing that since “slavery and martial law in a free country are 
incompatible…the persons, heretofore held as slaves, are therefore declared free.”130 Kentucky 
newspapers immediately denounced Hunter as “an abolitionist of the darkest sort,” while The 
Kentucky Whig sarcastically announced that “Gen. Beauregard, struck with the brilliancy of Gen. 
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Hunter’s example, is about to issue a proclamation setting free and emancipating forever from 
further servitude, all the horses, oxen, mules and domestic animals in Massachusetts, 
Connecticut and Vermont.”131 On May 19th Lincoln revoked Hunter’s order for failing to 
conform to the First Confiscation Act, but not before sending another warning to the border state 
representatives. “You cannot if you would, be blind to the signs of the times” Lincoln grimly 
observed, entreating the men to think about how a “vast future” might judge their actions.132  
 Six weeks later, on July 12th 1862, Lincoln called the border state representatives to 
another meeting at the White House to discuss compensated emancipation. Two pieces of 
impending legislation loomed over the proceedings. The Senate had just adopted the final 
version of the Second Confiscation Act, establishing universal military emancipation as federal 
policy in the seceded states and reaffirming the ban on military enforcement of the Fugitive 
Slave Clause. Moreover, the passage of an amendment to the 1795 Militia Act, authorizing the 
Union army to receive black men “for the purpose of constructing intrenchments, or performing 
camp service, or any labor, or any military or naval service” was also nearing passage.133 At the 
war’s onset, Lincoln and the Republicans had hoped that gradual abolition in the border states 
would eventually lead to the end of slavery. Now the reverse was coming to pass: with military 
emancipation being implemented on an increasingly wider scale, emancipation in the disloyal 
states would “inexorably spread” into the loyal parts of the South.134  
With both the Second Confiscation Act and Militia Act about to widen the scope of 
military emancipation, Lincoln made one final pitch for compensated emancipation. If only the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Kentucky Whig, reprinted in the Maysville Daily Bulletin, July 3rd, 1862. 
132 “Proclamation Revoking General Hunter’s Order of Military Emancipation of May 9, 1862”, May 19th, 1862, 
Basler, CWAL, v. 5 222-223.	  
133 U.S. Statutes At Large, Treaties, and Proclamations of the United States of America, vol. 12 (Boston, 1863), 597-
600. 
134 Oakes, Freedom National, 292. 
	   311	  
border states had accepted his offer in March, the president claimed, the war “would 
substantially be at an end” but now, with the war having dragged on, “the institution in your 
states will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion.”135 The strained meeting adjourned 
with the representatives promising to caucus amongst themselves and craft another reply to 
Lincoln’s offer. On July 14th, John Crisfield once again penned a stinging rejection on behalf of 
the majority of border state representatives.136  
Lincoln received a similar, if slightly couched, message from Kentucky’s new governor, 
James F. Robinson. “The rebellion must be crushed” Robinson wrote in his first letter to Lincoln 
after assuming the governorship in early August, but the Union must be preserved “unimpaired, 
as it came from the hands of those immortal sages and statesmen who framed it.”137 At the 
moment, however, Robinson had more immediate concerns. Four days before the governor wrote 
his letter, Confederate forces under Generals Edmund Kirby Smith and Braxton Bragg had 
launched an invasion that was currently “far advanced into [Kentucky’s] interior” and Robinson 
pleaded with Lincoln to ensure the state was not “left defenceless.”138 
 The state of emergency occasioned by the invasion immediately widened the scope of  
impressment in Kentucky. H.G. Wright, commanding the Department of the Ohio, told the 
officer in command at Louisville to utilize “citizens white and black” to construct rifle pits and 
breastworks around the city; resulting reports on the number of slaves impressed by the Union 
army ran well into the thousands. 139  Free blacks in Cincinnati were impressed to help build 
breastworks by a combination of city police and Union army officials, and were only released 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 “Appeal to Border State Representatives to Favor Compensated Emancipation,” July 12th, 1862, Basler, CWAL 
v5 317-318. 
136 “Border State Congressman to the President” July 14th, 1862, LP-LOC. 
137 Governor Thomas Robinson to President Abraham Lincoln, August 18th, 1862, LP-LOC. 
138 Ibid. 
139 HG Wright to JT Boyle, September 4th, 1862, OR, 1:16:480; Howard, Black Liberation 45-46. 
	   312	  
when Union General Lew Wallace took measures to free those caught in the dragnet.140 As one 
scholar of emancipation has written, the emergency placed Kentucky slaveholders in something 
of a bind. On the one hand, loyal slaveholders would be paid for the work their slaves performed 
in the army and, “welcomed their confinement under military restraint” because they feared the 
freed slaves who accompanied the Union army in Kentucky would “undermine the discipline and 
morale of their own slaves.”141 On the other hand, as one resident of Glasgow complained, the 
conscription of black men risked them being “corrupted by the Federal Army,” with the writer 
convinced that “guns has been distributed amongst [conscripted blacks].”142 
 In the midst of the Confederate invasion of Kentucky, Lincoln made his preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation public on September 22nd. Reaction throughout the state was 
immediate and vitriolic. The Owensboro Monitor fumed: “radicalism and fanaticism now stand 
at the helm of the Ship of State as she drives headlong upon the raging sea of revolution.”143 The 
Maysville Weekly Bulletin predicted that the “time is brief when we shall have a DICTATOR 
PROCLAIMED for this Proclamation can never be carried out except under the iron rule of the 
worst kind of despotism.”144 A Kentuckian who professed to believe the preliminary 
proclamation to be “a most glorious thing” warned Lincoln to expect the worst from Unionists in 
the state.”145 “Kentucky will always have enough nominal Union men” she told the president, 
“so long thereby they can keep their ‘niggers’ to prevent Your proclamation from reaching 
us.”146  In mid-December, a delegation of composed of border state representatives including 
several Kentuckians  requested an interview Lincoln to discuss “grievances of their people, and 
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of suggesting remedies for the removal of the evils under which they are laboring, and of the 
public mischief to which they may give rise.”147   
Although no record of the December 17th meeting survives, the border state 
representatives must have discussed a number of slavery related grievances with Lincoln. 
Among their complaints were likely some regarding Union soldiers “forcibly detaining the slaves 
of Kentucky Unionists.”148 Indeed, throughout 1862, Union enlisted soldiers and regimental 
officers routinely referenced federal policies—congressional legislation prohibiting the rendition 
of fugitive slaves, the Second Confiscation Act, and the articles of war implementing the 
Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation—in their refusal to return fugitive slaves. When Bob, a 
cook employed by the men of Company E, 76th Illinois Volunteers, was “forcibly delivered to his 
reputed master” one of the regiment’s hospital stewards wasted no time in writing to Lincoln.149 
“Such transactions are common [in Kentucky]” he explained to the president, and slave catchers 
routinely frequented Union camps to recapture escaped slaves.150 The men of the 76th Illinois had 
not enlisted to help with the “dirty work” of slave catching, the steward explained, and “[the 76th 
Illinois] think we understand the law that protects us from it.”151 
Colonel S.D. Atkins and the men of the 92nd Illinois Infantry were also caught at the 
center of multiple confrontations regarding fugitive slaves. Atkins and his men were brigaded 
with several Kentucky regiments, and were under the overall command of the 14th Kentucky’s 
Colonel Cochrane. The combination proved combustible. At Mt. Sterling, fifteen fugitive slaves 
“owned by notorious and avowed Rebels” came into Atkins’ camp, and were subsequently 
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employed as servants by the officers of the regiment.152 These men were “free by the terms of the 
confiscation act and their employment by the officers of the 92nd gave practical force and effect 
to the law” Atkins wrote, and he refused to turn his soldiers into the “slave hounds of 
Kentuckians.”153  
 Colonel Cochrane ensured that word of the 92nd’s antislavery sentiments followed them 
down the road. At Winchester, local citizens, aided by the 14th Kentucky, threatened to “clear 
out” the regiment and reclaim the fugitive slaves sheltered in their ranks.154 When the 92nd 
reached Lexington, Atkins marched his men through with fixed bayonets and loaded weapons, 
threatening to fire a volley into the crowd when someone in the mob tried to take one of the 
slaves. The regiment continued its march, but two miles outside Lexington, the “negro hunters” 
came into camp and served Colonel Atkins with a summons to appear before the Fayette County 
Court on charges of kidnapping.155 
Atkins refused to obey the court order. When Brigadier General Quincy Gillmore 
“recommended” that Atkins comply, he fired back that he could “not afford to piddle away my 
time hunting up niggers or in replying to bills in chancery…when the war is over I will answer 
any civil process.”156 Meanwhile, General Absolom Baird, Atkins division commander, was so 
infuriated by the 14th Regiment’s efforts to “produce prejudice, if not hostility, on the part of the 
community, against [the 92nd Illinois Infantry]” that he ordered Cochrane arrested. Atkins, for his 
part, sent copies of the documents to a Cleveland newspaper, a summary of the events to Illinois 
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Congressmen Owen Lovejoy, and filed formal complaint against Colonel Cochrain with the War 
Department.157 
Although two Illinois regiments are hardly a representative sample, historian Victor 
Howard has examined the diaries, letters, regimental histories and other military records for 
soldiers stationed in Kentucky who hailed from the mid-western states, and found that a stunning 
93.06 percent violated both army orders to keep slaves out of military camps, and Kentucky’s 
Fugitive Slave Law.158 According to Howard, Union soldiers not only actively enticed Kentucky 
slaves from farms and plantations, but engaged in numerous physical confrontations with both 
Unionist Kentucky regiments and Kentucky civilians over the status of blacks within their lines. 
Howard’s conclusions stand in marked contrast to those of more recent historians who argue that 
the March 1862 Articles of War banning the rendition of fugitive slaves were “universally 
flouted” in Kentucky.159 
 Complaints from irate Kentucky planters substantiate Howard’s statistics. Throughout 
1862, slaveholders filled the inboxes of Union Army headquarters throughout Kentucky. The 
commander of the Army of Kentucky reported to the Commander of the Department of the Ohio 
in mid-November that he was “daily annoyed and harassed” by Kentuckians who complained of 
the “abduction of their negroes, by officers and men in this army.”160 “I am constantly 
importuned for orders to deliver up slaves” another brigadier general wrote to the commander of 
the Army of Kentucky’s Third Division, even though the people making the demands were 
“fully cognizant of the act of Congress prohibiting such a course at my hands”161  
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Northern regiment’s refusal to return fugitive slaves also created tension with their 
Kentucky compatriots. Colonel Mundy of the 23rd Kentucky Infantry wrote President Lincoln 
that men from a Michigan regiment “have taken within their lines and hold the negroes of my 
loyal neighbors and myself.”162 When Mundy called on the officer commanding the regiment to 
return his slave, “he flatly refused to do so, justifying his detention by virtue of Your 
proclimation and the new article of war.”163 General J.T. Boyle, Commander of the District of  
Kentucky, and himself a native Kentuckian, had similar problems with the mid-western 
regiments. Boyle complained that the officers and men from some of the Indiana and Michigan 
regiments had “behaved very improperly on the negro question by enticing away the property 
slaves of loyal men.”164 Soldiers had forbidden these loyal residents from seeking slaves within 
their lines, and Boyle worried that further “collisions” over fugitive slaves were inevitable.165  
 Boyle was right to worry. Colonel William Utley, commanding the 22nd Wisconsin 
proved especially defiant in his refusal to return fugitive slaves. On October 18th 1862, General 
Quincy Gilmore ordered Utley to send four contrabands “known to belong to good loyal 
citizens” to his headquarters so that they could be returned to their masters.166 Utley refused, 
citing both Lincoln’s Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation and the relevant congressional 
legislation.167 After a tense back and forth, Utley flatly informed Gilmore that he had “nothing to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 M. Mundy to Lincoln, November 27th, 1862, Harold Holzer, The Lincoln Mailbag: America Writes to the 
President, 1861-1865 (Carbondale: The Southern Illinois University Press, 1998) 77-78. 
163 Ibid., 77. 
164 “New York Republican to the Secretary of State, Enclosing a Letter and an Order from the Commander of the 
District of Western Kentucky” December 5th, 1862, Berlin, Destruction of Slavery, 547. 
165 Ibid. On December 12th, 1862, Wright wrote to Halleck at Gillmore’s request, informing the General in Chief that 
there were “serious apprehensions” of trouble between soldiers and Kentucky citizens as consequence of “our camps 
becoming asylums for negroes belonging to loyal citizens.” Major General Horatio C. Wright to General in Chief of 
the Army, December 12th, 1862, OR 1:20:2:161. 
166 Quincy A. Gillmore to William L. Utley, October 18th, 1862, LP-LOC 
167 William L. Utley to Quincy A. Gillmore, October 18th, 1862, LP-LOC. 
	   317	  
do with [fugitive slaves] coming into camp, and I shall have nothing to do with sending [fugitive 
slaves] out.”168  
Gillmore was livid. Four days after his exchange with Utley, Gillmore issued General 
Order Number 9, branding the enticing of slaves within Union lines an “evil of such magnitude” 
that no more blacks were to be allowed.169 When several Ohio newspapers subsequently blasted 
Gillmore for his order, the general defended himself by outlining his understanding of 
congressional federal policy and the laws of war. Gillmore argued that Kentucky was an entirely 
different case from states that were in “persistent rebellion,” and that newspaper editors had no 
business presuming to have a better understanding of military law or the application 
congressional policy.170 In both private letters and official correspondence, Gillmore claimed that 
he had never returned a slave to any owner, loyal or disloyal, and insisted he was guided by 
“obeying my military superiors according to the rules and articles of war.”171 Concluding one 
letter in a huff, Gilmore told a friend in Ohio that “it is not my duty in Kentucky to free 
[slaves].”172  
 Word of Utley and Gillmore’s standoff spread quickly. “All K.y. is in blaze” Utley 
reported to a friend, because “I refused to be made a niger ketcher.”173 Major General H.G. 
Wright, Gillmore’s superior in the Department of the Ohio, informed Henry Halleck that he 
feared violence between Union troops and Kentucky citizens because Northern regiments had 
become “an asylum for negroes belonging to loyal citizens in the neighborhood.”174 Gillmore’s 
division commander, Gordon C. Granger, had been peppering Wright with similar complaints, 
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reporting to headquarters that Kentucky Unionists were besieging him with accusations that 
Union soldiers were abducting their slaves.175 Granger’s complaints led Wright to ask Halleck 
for “some definite policy” to follow when such cases arose, suggesting an order banning all non-
military personnel from Union camps, and allowing Kentucky’s civil processes to function 
without the obstruction of officers and men.176 
Halleck’s reply was immediate and simple. The general-in-chief referred Wright and 
Granger to the relevant acts of Congress and the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, tersely 
noting that both “will instruct you further on the subject.”177 Some historians have used this 
exchange as an example of “evasion of the question” by the War Department and federal 
policymakers of the status of slavery in the border states.178 Such an analysis, however, does not 
entirely fit with the immediate context of events on the ground in Kentucky. At almost exactly 
the same moment that Halleck was responding to Wright, Colonel John McHenry Jr. of the 17th 
Kentucky issued an order declaring that no fugitive slaves would be allowed within the lines of 
his regiment, and instructing that all fugitive slaves currently within the lines of the regiment 
should be “delivered to his owner or agent appointed, upon application, whether that owner be 
loyal or rebel.”179 When McHenry’s order came to the attention of the War Department, he was 
immediately cashiered from the service for violating the articles of war prohibiting the rendition 
of fugitive slaves.180 Thus, when Halleck directed Wright to abide by the “laws of Congress of 
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last session, the President’s proclamation, and the printed orders of the War Department” it was 
not an evasion, but a warning.181 
Wright got the message. A few weeks after he received Halleck’s instructions, Wright 
received word from General Gordon Granger that citizens in Fayette County had presented him 
with a series of resolutions. Among them were questions about whether the forcible detention of 
certain slaves in Union lines was authorized, and a request for the names of all the slaves 
currently within the lines as well as the regiments who “sheltered” them.182 Wright’s response 
was straight to the point. The general was mystified as to “under what law and for what purpose” 
the citizens had any right to call on Granger or any Union officer for the names of the slaves or 
regiments.183 Brushing aside claims that his soldiers were violating Kentucky law, Wright 
insisted that congressional policy meant “no regiment or officers of my command shall be 
required by my orders to hunt up runaway negroes.”184  The citizens of Kentucky could certainly 
turn to civil authorities for help reclaiming their fugitive slaves, but assistance from any military 
personnel “was not to be expected or desired.”185 
As Wright’s reply indicated, because Kentucky civil laws governing slavery were still 
operative, the threat of re-enslavement was greater in the Bluegrass State than almost anywhere 
else.186 Perhaps the best illustration of this danger came during the Confederate Army of 
Tennessee invasion of Kentucky—discussed briefly above—during the summer and early fall of 
1862. The Union Army pursuing Confederate forces into Kentucky brought with them thousands 
of former Tennessee and Alabama slaves, most of whom were entitled to freedom under the 
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Second Confiscation Act, and Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Yet once these freed 
slaves reached Kentucky, “would be rebels” quickly arrested as many as possible, and “put them 
in [Kentucky] Jails under state authority.”187 By April, 1863, Judge Advocate General Joseph 
Holt, himself a Kentuckian, was telling Secretary of War Edwin Stanton that the practice of 
kidnapping freed slaves “extensively prevails” in Kentucky, and needed to be “repressed with a 
decided and vigorous hand.”188 
Kentucky jails quickly overflowed with recaptured black refugees. During January and 
February, 1863, the city of Louisville imprisoned so many black refugees that officials were 
forced to appeal to neighboring counties to provide additional confinement space.189 Privately 
operated jails sprung up to house runaways, while slave catchers eagerly advertised auctions with 
newspaper ads and broadsides. Kentucky state law stipulated that fugitive slaves confined to jail 
must be sold after eight months, but that period was reduced to thirty days to ease 
overcrowding.190 In order to codify and expand the practice of recapture, imprisonment, and 
resale, the Kentucky state legislature passed laws barring “any negro or mulatto claiming or 
pretending to be free” by virtue of the Emancipation Proclamation or Acts of Congress from 
migrating to or remaining in Kentucky.191  Blacks found to be in violation of the new law would 
be arrested and “disposed of” as runaways.192 
Runaway slave advertisements in Kentucky newspapers unintentionally chronicled the 
plight of black refugees. “COMMITTED TO JAIL” read a typical notice from the early spring of 
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1863, “May Stevens…says he is free, but has no papers showing that fact.” Stevens had been 
captured in Davidson County, Kentucky in the fall of 1862, and remained confined in the county 
jail six months later.193 Another notice advertised the capture of Winnie Ann Morris, escaped 
slave of Sarah Morris of Morgan County, Alabama. Morris had made her way to Evansville, 
Indiana “of her own accord” before being captured by John S. Newsome and committed to jail in 
Kentucky.194 The financial incentives for recapture were high: advertisements frequently 
promised rewards that reached up to $1000 for escaped slaves who were captured and remanded 
to prisons inside state lines, effectively turning Kentucky’s entire white population into one large 
fugitive slave posse.195 
 Kentucky civil authorities also seized black servants attached to Northern regiments. 
Solomon Meek’s son, who was employed as a servant for the quartermaster in an Indiana 
regiment, had accompanied his regiment from Shiloh to Corinth and, in the fall of 1862, into 
Kentucky. When the regiment made camp on the outskirts of Louisville, Meeks’s son was seized 
by a policeman while “in sight of [the regiment’s] encampment” and confined to work house in 
that city.196 General Jacob D. Cox, commanding the District of Ohio, was convinced that some 
action needed to be taken, as this was “only one of a large number of similar cases [in 
Kentucky].” 197 However, General H.H. McLean, the provost marshal general for the Department 
of the Ohio, argued that the proceedings were “strictly in accordance with the laws of Kentucky” 
because Meek’s son was seized by civil authorities.198 Similarly, when a servant working for the 
35th Ohio was seized by a man who claimed to be “controlled in his actions” by General Boyle, 
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the men of the regiment immediately complained to Indiana Congressman George Julian.199 
“General Boyle is responsible for this and others daily of the same kind in [Louisville]” the 
Ohioans protested, and they requested that Julian ask Secretary Stanton to order the man’s 
immediate release.200 
General Boyle had been in conflict with several regiments for months over the status of 
escaped slaves within Union Army lines. Back in November 1862, Boyle had issued orders 
requiring officers under his command to prohibit slaves from entering their camps, and forbade 
all officers and soldiers from meddling with slavery “in any way.”201 By February 1863, General 
M.D. Manson, commander of the District of Western Kentucky, had expanded Boyle’s order to 
include his jurisdiction, but Manson immediately faced a backlash from several Union regiments. 
Several weeks after expanding Boyle’s directive, Manson attempted to enforce his order by 
trying to detain black servants belonging to the 18th and 22nd Michigan. Both regiments refused 
to turn over their men, and a tense standoff ensued when Manson called in the 16th Kentucky to 
try and force the Michiganders compliance.202 
The Michigan regiments still refused to yield their black servants. Frustrated, Manson 
also called on the 79th New York to help enforce the order, but the its colonel said his men 
“could not be persuaded to fire” on the Michigan troops.203 Manson next tried a bit of ham-
handed subterfuge, allowing the Michigan men to board a transport train, then ordering all blacks 
within their lines to come out. The men of the 18th Michigan promptly formed a protective 
square with the black servants in the middle, and, after another tense standoff, the Michiganders 
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were allowed to depart.204 Other Northern regiments took similar stands. In Louisville, an officer 
from the 50th Ohio took a slave from a man named Marshall Key; when Key attempted to 
reclaim his chattel, the officer threatened to shoot him, while soldiers from the regiment 
“actually beat [Key] with their muskets” and drove him away from the slave.205 
By early April, Boyle’s original November order had landed on the desk of Judge 
Advocate General Joseph Holt. The judge advocate general’s response reflected the tensions that 
would characterize dealing with the authority of commanders in a loyal slave state. Holt began 
by clearly stating that the right to determine who was allowed to remain within the lines of the 
Union armies belonged to the commanding generals on the ground. If these commanders 
believed that the presence of slaves was “injurious or dangerous” to the military service, they 
were authorized to free such persons without violating of any law.206 That authority, Holt was 
careful to note, must be “exercised in good faith” and based only on what commanders defined 
as legitimate potential danger to Union armies.207 
 Holt then made it clear that no commander’s discretionary authority could violate 
existing federal policy. Commanders were strictly forbidden by congressional legislation from 
ordering the expulsion of black persons based “on any claim to service or labor of such slaves,” 
or if the object of the expulsion was to place them “within reach of their former masters.”208 Holt 
further informed Stanton that he had received similarly disturbing reports from the Department 
of the Ohio. Former slaves declared free under congressional law were being  “treated as slaves 
and driven from our military camps into the meshes of men who thrust them into prison as 
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fugitives, with the intention of having them sold into servitude under the local laws.”209 Any 
member of the United States forces found “prostituting his police power” over Union army 
camps should be immediately dishonorably discharged from the service.210 
Two weeks later, when an outright case of re-enslavement from the Department of the 
Ohio reached his desk, Holt took action. During the summer of 1862, two slaves named George 
and Sandy escaped from their masters and joined General Negley’s command as servants in the 
Army of the Ohio. When General Buell’s army entered Kentucky during the fall of 1862, the two 
former slaves accompanied the army under the direction of the wagon master of General 
Negley’s division. While en-route to Louisville, George and Sandy were seized as fugitive slaves 
by the authorities in Hardinsburg, in Breckenridge County, and held in jail until the spring of 
1863, when they were advertised for sale, and the news caught the attention of Union authorities 
in Kentucky. Negley wrote to the judge advocate general for direction, and Holt immediately 
dispatched his opinion to Stanton.211 
Holt was unsparing. Under the sixtieth article of war, George and Sandy were in service 
to the United States army as “retainers to the camp” and thus “not liable to be seized by civil 
authorities.”212 Moreover, as one man had belonged to a Confederate guerilla, and another to a 
“noted rebel” when they sought refuge in Union lines, and thus under the Second Confiscation 
Act, were “forever free of their servitude.”213 In Holt’s estimation the law was clear, the Second 
Confiscation Act was the “supreme law of the land, to which the local legislature must give 
way,” and that the local authorities in Kentucky had no more right to seize and detain blacks 
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falling within the section of the Confiscation Act than they do any other captives of war taken by 
the United States.214 George and Sandy’s case was made particularly repugnant to Holt by the 
“important services voluntarily and so loyally rendered” that ought to compel the government to 
“interpose” for their protection.215 
Stanton immediately wrote to Burnside, enclosing Holt’s opinion. “Many other cases 
[like George and Sandy] have arisen or are arising” in the Department of the Ohio, Stanton 
wrote, and in view of the Acts of Congress, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the relevant 
orders of the War Department, a “high obligation” fell upon the commander of every department 
to see that “those who are entitled to the protection of the Government, whether white or black, 
shall not fail to receive that protection.”216 Burnside was ordered prevent any civil or military 
persons from “transgressing the Act of Congress or the President’s Proclamation in respect to 
persons of African Descent,” and to secure the immediate release of any African American found 
to be illegally confined to jail. 217 In a follow-up letter, General-in-Chief Halleck reiterated 
Stanton’s instructions. “The laws of Congress on this subject override any state laws,” the 
general-in-chief pointedly told his subordinate, and “negroes freed by the operations of the War 
and taken into our service are under the protection of the Military.” 218  
Burnside quickly complied. General Orders Number 53 declared all slaves free by either 
the war measure of the President and Congress or by capture during the war were entitled to their 
freedom, and neither civil nor military authorities could interfere. Any sales of such persons were 
void, and anyone found in violation were subject to arrest and trial. General Orders Number 53 
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further reiterated that army personnel were forbidden from interfering with the operation of any 
civil process in Kentucky relating to the “recovery of slaves of citizens of the state,” but likewise 
forbade soldiers from aiding or abetting in their escape from their homes, or from employing  
said persons against the consent of their owners.219 As Holt’s opinions made clear, however, the 
civil laws of Kentucky were now running up against an expansive definition of military authority 
when it came to freeing slaves.  
In the District of Western Kentucky, General Boyle immediately attempted to enforce 
Burnside’s order. Boyle soon reported that all contrabands “coming under the laws of war, the 
acts of congress, and the presidents proclimation have been released” from prison, and that civil 
authorities were throwing “no obstacles” in the army’s way.220 Other Union officers painted a 
grimmer portrait. In testimony before the American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission, Major 
D.C. Fitch and Captain H.M. Jewitt estimated that, in just the two months prior to their testimony 
in November 1863, one thousand recaptured slaves had been sent to Louisville and sold at 
auction. Both officers freely acknowledged their frustration that some Union officers and local 
sheriffs refused to obey orders, and they had little recourse to enforce compliance.221 The only 
way to truly “get hold” of escaped slaves who had been, or were in danger of being re-enslaved, 
Fitch and Jewitt told the AFIC, was to employ Union cavalry, and these efforts had thus far 
yielded mixed results.222 
 
Fitch and Jewitt’s attempts to combat re-enslavement help illustrate the steadily rising 
tension between civil and military authorities in Kentucky during 1862-1863. A higher profile 
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example occurred in late December 1862, when General Wright sounded a dire warning from the 
headquarters of the Department of the Ohio in Cincinnati. Information had come to Wright’s 
attention that the Kentucky legislature intended to secede should the Emancipation Proclamation 
be released as planned—even though it was widely known that the state would be exempted.223 
To forestall any attempt at secession, Wright wanted permission to position several Northern 
regiments around Frankfort, and to arrest any member of the Kentucky legislature or state 
official who voted for secession, recommended secession, or gave the “first indication of 
disloyalty.”224 General Gordon Granger, Wright’s subordinate in Lexington, accordingly 
received instructions to ready a “strong and reliable force” to send to Frankfort if needed.225 
From Washington, General Halleck urged Wright to exercise caution before resorting to force.226 
Governor Robinson’s speech to the legislature on January 8th 1863 filled nearly sixteen 
single-spaced pages of The Senate Journal. More than one-third of the governor’s speech was 
devoted to denouncing the “gigantic evil—one the bare contemplation of which, sickens the 
heart and fills all with gloomy and dreadful forebodings…the destruction of slave property in 
Kentucky.”227 Under the guise of military necessity, Robinson declared, “antislavery 
propagandists” had turned regiments “brought here ostensibly for our protection into cities of 
refuge for runaway slaves.”228 Kentucky’s civil laws regarding fugitive slaves had been rendered 
impotent, Robinson fumed, and both civilians and civil officers alike had been driven out of, or 
prevented from entering, Union Army camps in search of runaways.229 Other prominent 
Kentucky politicians followed suit. On the floor of both the United States House of 
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Representatives and the Kentucky State Legislature, numerous Kentucky politicians predicted—
prophetically, as it turned out—that slaveholders in the Bluegrass State would never allow 
recruiting officers to invade their farms.230  
The howls of protest against emancipation had not yet subsided when a new Conscription 
Act passed Congress on March 3rd, 1863. The Conscription Act provided for the enrollment of 
all men subject to the draft as a preliminary to conscription or enlistment. General Boyle, now 
the adjutant general of Kentucky, wrote John Usher, Secretary of the Interior that public opinion 
in Kentucky “has not yet advanced so far as to permit the enrolling of her slaves with 
impunity.”231 Abandoning all sense of restraint, Boyle bluntly told Usher that the drafting of 
black men would “never be enforced in Kentucky except at the point of a bayonet,” and to expect 
forceful opposition throughout the state.232 Boyle sent a similar warning to Provost Marshal 
General James B. Fry—whose men would oversee enrollment—that any efforts at enrollment of 
blacks would “revolutionize the state” and that there “was not an honest, loyal man in the state in 
favor of it.”233 
 Provost Marshal General Fry was in no mood to have the new policy questioned. 
Enrollment, Fry pointed out, was only taking a census, and he saw no reason why information 
gathering would “revolutionize” the state.234 Fry tartly told Boyle that the Office of the Provost 
Marshal would gather the information ordered by Congress “unless the government orders 
otherwise.”235 In his own attempts to dissuade Washington from carrying out enrollment, 
Ambrose Burnside echoed Boyle’s reasoning. Writing to Lincoln on successive days in late June, 
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Burnside called it “very unwise” to enroll free blacks in Kentucky, as the number of free black 
volunteers would be inconsequential, would result in the disproportionate loss of white 
volunteers, and give the “secret enemies of the government” ammunition to use in the upcoming 
off-year elections.236 Lincoln responded to Burnside and Boyle with telegrams informing them—
in terms identical to what Fry used—that there was nothing going on in Kentucky except a head 
count, but also telling Stanton that Burnside’s concerns were “worth considering.”237  
Lincoln found Burnside’s arguments so compelling because Kentucky was in the midst of 
a heated gubernatorial campaign between Charles A. Wycliffe and Thomas Bramlette. Both 
candidates repeatedly denounced black enrollment and enlistment, but as Assistant Adjutant 
General William Goodloe phrased it in a letter to Lincoln in late June, Wycliffe favored the 
“withholding of men or money for the prosecution of the war until that policy is changed,” while 
Bramlette favored furnishing men or money “until the rebellion is crushed and then settling 
differences of policies.”238 Eager to avoid throwing the election to Wycliffe, the provost marshal 
general was instructed to put enrollment on hold. 
Kentuckians went to the polls and elected Bramlette governor on August 3rd, 1863. Two 
days later, Stanton authorized Burnside to organize as many regiments of black soldiers as he 
could in the Department of the Ohio.239 The Secretary of War had been formulating this plan 
since at least late June, when Stanton had asked Burnside to provide a list of departmental 
officers capable of commanding black troops. Nonetheless, Stanton counseled Lincoln to be 
cautious with Kentucky; the Secretary of War knew Burnside had already been impressing large 
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numbers of black men for the construction of military roads, and, as a result, Stanton advised 
Lincoln that it was not necessary to begin explicitly enrolling or enlisting blacks in the state.240  
Lincoln followed Stanton’s advice. When the War Department confidentially circulated 
General Order Number 329 on October 3rd, Stanton directed that the recruiting of black troops 
could begin in Maryland, Missouri, and Tennessee, but Kentucky was excluded.241 Two weeks 
later, Lincoln issued a call for 300,000 more volunteers, with Kentucky slated to provide slightly 
under 13,000 of those men. Governor Bramlette immediately wrote Lincoln about rumors 
concerning the imminent recruiting of black troops in Kentucky, and warning of the “dire 
effects” it would have in the state. Lincoln quickly replied that the governor was mistaken, 
neither enrollment nor enlistment were slated to begin in Kentucky.242  
Lincoln’s assurances notwithstanding, black recruiting had already begun in Kentucky. 
As discussed in a previous chapter, Stanton had dispatched Major George Stearns to Nashville, 
Tennessee, in the late summer of 1863 to superintend the recruiting of black troops in that 
region. As part of his operation, Stearns had immediately opened recruiting posts at Clarksville 
and Gallatin, in the northern part of Tennessee, in September. Not only did Kentucky slaves 
flood into the Clarksville and Gallatin posts, but Stearns’s agents evidently had few scruples 
about crossing the Tennessee-Kentucky border to secure recruits. “There are comparatively few 
more men belonging in [Gallatin] to be recruited,” one agent wrote in mid-October, before 
proposing a series of expeditions “particularly up near the Kentucky [state] line” and establishing 
temporary recruiting stations for period ranging from two days to a week as the best way to 
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secure more men.243 In a detailed report to Washington written in 1864, Stearns’s successor 
Rueben Mussey chronicled the influx of Kentucky slaves to recruiting posts at Gallatin and 
Clarksville.244 Although it is impossible to know precisely how many Kentucky slaves enlisted in 
Tennessee, estimates for the fall and winter of 1863-1864 were in the thousands.245 
Kentucky slaveholders were furious with Stearns. “You failed to say you had mustered 
[my slaves] in [to the Union army],” one slaveholder from Todd County complained, “but simply 
say you found them at camp.”246 The slaveholder promised Stearns that he was writing to both 
General Grant and the War Department to “settle any pretensions he may have in the matter.”247 
Complaints about Stearns and his agents quickly reached the desk of Tennessee Military 
Governor Andrew Johnson. “During the last year,” Kentucky slaveholder William Watkins 
complained, “many of [his slaves] have been induced to run off. I understand some are on the N 
Western R.R. Others are hiding about Nashville, others are in the army.”248 Watkins told Johnson 
that he had “labored hard” to secure purchase of about 100 slaves during his life, and inquired if 
Johnson would allow him to “bring home” those who wished to return from the army.249  
 Kentucky slaveholders also complained to Governor Bramlette, and in late December 
1863, the governor dispatched Col. B.H. Bristow to Washington to air their grievances. Bristow 
presented what Bramlette considered “proper remedies” for the slaves escaping from Kentucky 
to enlist in Tennessee, including the closure of the Gallatin and Clarksville recruiting stations, a 
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ban on recruiting officers in Tennessee receiving slaves from Kentucky, and requiring all officers 
commanding recruiting stations or detachments in Tennessee to make restitution for all property 
fugitive slaves had stolen from their owners, and the slaves themselves being surrendered to 
Kentucky’s civil authorities.250 Neither Bristow nor Bramlette could have been pleased when the 
War Department refused to yield to these demands, instead instructing officers commanding 
recruiting stations to make restitution for property stolen by slaves. Even the process of 
restitution required clear proof made to the War Department that “such claimant shall not have 
been engaged in the rebellion or furnished aid and comfort to the enemy.”251  
Bramlette was still seething over the Tennessee recruiters when Adjutant General 
Lorenzo Thomas arrived at Louisville in February 1864. The adjutant-general told the governor 
that Kentucky slaves, “being on the borders of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Tennessee,” were 
“constantly crossing state lines” to enlist in black regiments.252 In view of this, Thomas proposed 
a plan whereby Kentucky would receive credit towards their state recruiting quota for the black 
troops, and loyal slave owners would to receive certificates for the slaves who enlisted.253 
Unimpressed, Bramlette replied that he “dreaded any agitation” on the question of black troops 
and hoped Washington would take no action on the matter.254 Furthermore, Bramlette warned 
Thomas that not only would any attempt to recruit black regiments be “greatly injurious” to the 
Union cause, but that the governor was receiving frequent complaints about the black recruiting 
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station that had opened at Paducah, a matter that had caused great an uproar among the state’s 
white population.255 
Colonel Richard Cunningham’s arrival at Paducah had indeed enraged Kentuckians. 
“Nobody here seems to know the extent of [Cunningham’s] authority,” one Paducah resident 
complained to Governor Bramlette, and his recruiting had been “conducted without any respect 
whatever to status of parties I.E. their loyalty or disloyalty.”256 Cunningham’s presence had been 
requested by Kentucky Congressman Lucien Anderson, who, after winning his seat, had been 
kidnapped by guerillas and held for ransom. Following his exchange, Anderson vowed to make 
his former captors feel the hard hand of war, and the War Department granted Cunningham’s 
commission to recruit 1,200 black soldiers with Anderson’s blessing. Cunningham wasted little 
time, and soon complaints about “forcible, insolent and offensive intrusions of armed negroes” 
filled Bramlette’s correspondence.257 By early April, the War Department was appointing 
officers to take command of the regiment Cunningham was raising.258  
As Cunningham began recruiting, Thomas made the rounds of Kentucky politicians in 
the state capital and found them “agreeing fully with the views of the governor.”259 Thomas told 
Stanton he believed the citizens of the state were loyal “by a large majority,” and regarded the 
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institution of slavery as “virtually dead,” but that Kentuckians had “not schooled themselves to 
believe that the time has arrived for decisive action on their part for the abolition of slavery.”260  
Thomas had been taken aback when his appearance in the Bluegrass State prompted “quite the 
excitement amongst all classes,” as many believed he was there “to take their negroes from them 
and put arms in their hands.”261 Startled by the political powder keg he had stumbled into, 
Thomas urged caution, telling Stanton that it would be unwise to attempt recruiting black troops 
in Kentucky, even going so far as to suggest that “it might be well to suspend [Cunningham’s] 
operations at Paducah.”262    
 Thomas might have swallowed Bramlette’s stalling tactics, but Senator Henry Wilson did 
not. Late in 1863, Wilson, James Ashley and several other Republican congressmen demanded to 
know why Kentucky continued to be excluded from the provisions of the March 1863 
Enrollment Act. When Secretary Stanton explained that the wording in the bill was unclear as it 
pertained to Kentucky, Wilson responded by crafting an amendment that provided for the 
enrollment of black males ages twenty through forty-five. The owners of drafted slaves would 
have to show proof of continuous loyalty to the Union in order take advantage of the 
compensation provision. The amended enrollment act passed the house in late February, over the 
strenuous objections of Bramlette and the Kentucky’s congressional delegation.263 
 Sensing which way the policy winds were blowing, Bramlette immediately complained 
again to Lincoln. The governor expressed “much surprise and regret” that the recruiting post for 
black soldiers remained opened at Paducah, and Colonel Richard Cunningham was allowed to 
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continue to conduct recruiting operations.264 Haughtily assuming that his state’s loyalty was 
“beyond questioning,” Bramlette proceeded to lecture the president on the reasons why 
Washington had no power to recruit either black or white troops in the commonwealth.265 “The 
power to organize ‘colored troops’ is a belligerent power” Bramlette argued, and could only be 
exercised over the black populations of “belligerent states and districts.” Since Kentucky was a 
loyal state, and civil slave laws were still operational, Bramlette warned that if recruiters 
attempted to enlist a slave, entice or persuade a slave to leave his master, or to receive a runaway 
slave within their camps and “harbor him with intent to prevent the owner from recovering his 
slave,” they could serve between two to twenty years in prison.266 Lincoln forwarded Bramlette’s 
letter to Stanton and directed him to respond to the governor. 
 Making sure to keep Thomas apprised of his reasoning, Secretary Stanton carefully 
refuted Bramlette’s letter. On a practical level, the Secretary of War pointed out that black 
soldiers had “proved themselves among the bravest of the brave in fighting for the Union,” and 
said the federal government would not simply disregard their contributions.”267 Furthermore, the 
governor was mistaken in his argument that the power to raise colored troops under the Militia 
Act of July 1862 was “confined to the rebellious states, and that Kentucky being loyal, the power 
does not extend to that state.”268 The Militia Act imposed no such limitations, Stanton told 
Bramlette, but rather authorized the use of black soldiers in any state at the discretion of the 
president.269 The War Department would continue to “encourage the enlistment of persons of 
African descent to the full extent of the power conferred by Congress” Stanton concluded, and 
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hoped the Governor would “concur in the reasons that have influenced this action.”270 In late 
March, a fuming Bramlette stormed off to meet with Lincoln in Washington, where an 
agreement was reached that slaves would not be recruited as long as Kentucky met her draft 
quota for white troops.271  
 By this time, enrollment—if not outright recruitment—had commenced in Kentucky. In 
compliance with the recently passed congressional legislation, on March 1st, 1864 Provost 
Marshal General James B. Fry ordered Boards of Enrollment to proceed to enroll “all such 
persons as are liable to military duty,” with lists of the numbers enrolled made out for each sub-
district and district, and then forwarded to the Office of the Provost Marshal General.272 Slave 
owners were to be furnished with a list of all slaves who had been enrolled, with the whole 
process superintended on the ground by Major William Sidell, Acting Assistant Provost Marshal 
General for Kentucky. Accordingly, Sidell immediately ordered provost marshals throughout 
Kentucky to collect the necessary information.273  
 Two weeks later, Sidell submitted his first report on enrollment to Provost Marshal 
General Fry. Resistance had rapidly engulfed the state, and the ensuing violence had hampered 
implementation of enrollment. In the first district, Capt. T.E. Hall reported it “very difficult to 
get enrolling officers,” and those officers he did have found it impossible to carry out their orders 
due to guerilla activity.274 In Logan County, three Union officers simply declined to perform the 
work of enrollment on account of the bloodshed, necessitating both new officers to conduct 
enrollment and additional soldiers to provide protection from guerillas.275 From the 6th District, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 Ibid. 
271 Berlin, Destruction of Slavery, 511. 
272 “Circular Number 8 Provost Marshal General’s Office”, March 1st, 1864, NMHUS.  
273 Major William Sidell to Col. James B. Fry, March 14th, 1864. NMHUS. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Ibid. 
	   337	  
Captain C.W. Berry reported “opposition to the enrollment of negroes is threatened,” but noted 
that many blacks seemed “anxious and willing to enlist.”276  
 As Captain Barry observed, the distinctions between enrollment and enlistment 
evaporated almost immediately. From Owensboro, in Kentucky’s 2nd District, Captain John 
Grissom informed Sidell that supposedly loyal owners were beginning to inquire about terms of 
enlistment and compensation for their slaves. Grissom was unsure whether he was authorized to 
enlist slaves, and he asked Sidell for instructions while pointedly noting that “quite a number of 
recruits” might be obtained through outright enlistment.277 Captain James Fidler, reporting from 
Kentucky’s 4th District, observed that a “large number” of slaves had presented themselves for 
enlistment, but that their masters “universally refused” to give their consent, and asked Sidell for 
guidance.278 Sidell, in turn, addressed these questions to both Burbridge and The Provost 
Marshal General Fry in Washington.279 Resistance on the ground was quickly prompting the 
need for policy clarification and guidance from Washington. 
Washington responded quickly. At the very moment that Sidell was pressing Burbridge 
and Fry for guidance, the War Department was taking another step towards full scale black 
recruiting in Kentucky. In accordance with the earlier arrangement made between Lincoln and 
Bramlette, when Kentucky failed to provide its allotted quota of white volunteers, the War 
Department issued General Orders Number 34 on April 18th, 1864. Burbridge assumed a 
“general superintendence” for raising volunteer and drafted troops in Kentucky, and, reflecting 
the information received from Sidell, Fiddler, and other provost marshals throughout the state, 
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General Orders 34 directed the provost marshals to “receive and regularly enlist” all able-bodied 
slaves and free blacks who may apply to be enlisted, or whose owners request their slaves be 
enlisted.280 Owners were to be presented with certificates for compensation, and recruits were to 
be sent to a general rendezvous at Louisville, before being forwarded to camps of instruction in 
Tennessee, Indiana, and Ohio.281 
Opponents of black troops also did not distinguish between enrollment and enlistment. 
Perhaps the most vocal antagonist was Colonel Frank Wolford of the First Kentucky Cavalry. In 
a series of “seditious speeches” at Danville and Lexington, Wolford had been heard “counseling 
resistance to enrolling negroes & accusing the president of tyranny” assistant adjutant general 
J.H. Hammond reported to Burbridge.282 Governor Bramlette, who shared a stage with Wolford 
for at least one of the speeches, “gave no evidence of dissent” from Wolford’s sentiments, and 
Sidell told Provost Marshal General James Fry that the speeches had created  “much excitement” 
in Lexington.283 Union soldiers warned Sidell that enrollment and enlistment had resulted in a 
“bad spirit” in Kentucky regiments, and complained that Governor Bramlette had attempted to 
order the provost marshal  “to desist from the enrollment of the negroes.”284 
Burbridge would brook no challenges to federal policy. Colonel Wolford was promptly 
arrested and cashiered from the federal service, and when another Kentucky regimental 
commander drunkenly refused to aid enrolling officers, Burbridge promptly “brought [that] 
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colonel to terms” as well.285 From Louisville, Sidell happily reported that he found the 
commanding general to be “firm in his determination to use all the force at his control in 
carrying out the law,” and optimistically—if naively—predicted that Burbridge’s actions would 
have a “tranquilizing” effect on resistance in Kentucky.286 When Governor Bramlette questioned 
Burbridge’s authority for recruiting Kentucky’s slaves, Burbridge fired back that the 
combination of the Second Confiscation Act, the Enrollment Act, and orders from the War 
Department furnished him with “ample authority for all that is being done.”287 
 Orders enforcing the enrollment and recruiting policy quickly appeared in Burbidge’s 
Orders and Letters Sent. “You will render the necessary aid to the proper officers for the 
enrolling of negroes” Burbridge instructed the colonel of the 35th Kentucky Volunteers, and 
subsequently demanded the names of individual officers who “advise resistance” to 
enrollment.288 “It is reported that Col. S.P. Love 11th Kentucky Mounted Infantry has been 
openly advising resistance to the enrollment of negroes in Southern Ky” Burbridge informed one 
of his subordinates at the end of March.289 If the reports were true, Burbridge wanted the colonel 
immediately arrested and the charges sent to district headquarters. To help ensure that the policy 
could be enforced, Burbridge  ordered additional regiments to provide protection the provost 
marshals with protection.290 
 Reports describing the violence led Burbridge to issue General Orders Number 42 on 
May 14th. The commanding general directed Provost Marshal General in the department to arrest 
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and prefer charges against any person preventing the enlistment of anyone attempting to enter the 
service of the United States, and that those arrested would tried by military, not civilian courts.291 
In his communications with Sidell, Burbridge was even more direct, ordering the provost 
marshals to receive any able bodied black male who presented himself for enlistment, 
“regardless of the wishes of their owner.”292 Major C.W. Foster, head of the Bureau of Colored 
Troops, followed up with the War Department’s official approval, and Burbridge instructed the 
provost marshal’s in all the districts under his command to arrest any person “interfering in any 
way with the drafting or recruiting of negroes.”293  
Despite, or perhaps because of Burbridge’s order, guerilla activity metastasized in 
Kentucky. “Efforts have been made in several of my sub-districts to suppress enlistments by 
intimidating negroes” James Fidler wrote in late May, with guerillas “severely handl[ing]” any 
black male captured on their way to a provost marshal’s office.294 In the 2nd District, 
headquartered in Owensboro, Captain John Grissom reported that his county was “infested with 
guerillas” and that as a result, the enrollment and recruiting of black troops was conducted 
“under great disadvantage.”295 Guerillas had captured at least one of Grissom’s subordinate 
officers, and Grissom believed the force at his disposal was inadequate to protect the provost 
marshals or blacks that were trying to enlist.296  
Enslaved Kentuckians defied the guerillas and poured into Union lines. “Once it became 
known to these negroes that they could enlist without the consent of their masters,” the provost 
marshal for Boyle County reported, prospective recruits “thronged the office of the Dep[uty] 
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Pro[vost] Mar[shal] clamoring to be enlisted.”297 At Camp Nelson, in Jessamine County, Captain 
T.E. Hall reported that he had 400 recruits waiting to enlist, more “coming in every hour,” and 
predicted that two regiments could be recruited immediately.298 In early June, another provost 
marshal told Burbridge that 250 men had enlisted within the past eight days alone.299 So many 
recruits came in that Burbridge abandoned the plan of sending recruits to camps in Tennessee, 
and instead began ordering additional recruiting posts to be setup Kentucky to accommodate the 
new recruits.300 
On June 13th 1864, Adjutant General Thomas removed the last barriers to the full scale 
recruiting of black troops in Kentucky with General Orders Number 20. Thomas’s order 
authored the reception of any “able-bodied colored men as they present themselves or are 
delivered by their owners” at camps of reception to be established in each of Kentucky’s 
congressional districts.301 Ten days after General Orders Number 20 was issued, Burbridge told 
Stanton that five regiments of black troops would soon be ready for service, and the following 
week Thomas reported that “a regiment of 1,000 has just been organized [in Louisville], and 
there are 300 men for a second.”302 By early July, Thomas reported that he had about 3,000 black 
recruits present at Camp Nelson, but noted that he needed an adequate number of officers before 
these men could be organized into regiments.303 
The initial influx of black recruits temporarily overwhelmed Union provost marshals. 
From Lebanon, James Fidler reported that so many recruits were coming in that he had not had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Quoted in Astor, Rebels on the Border, 157. 
298 Major William Sidell to Capt. J. Bates Dickson, AAG, May 25th, 1864, LR-DKR, NARA. 
299 Capt. Grisson to General Burbridge, June 8th, 1864, LR-DKR, NARA. 
300 Burbridge to Captain T.E. Hall, June 20th, 1864, TS-DKR, NARA. See also Burbridge to Adjutant General, June 
15th, 1864. NMHUS. 
301 General Orders Number 20, June 13th, 1864, OR 3:4:429-430. 
302 Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas to Secretary of War Stanton, June 29th, 1864, OR 3:4, 459-60. 
303 Adjutant General Thomas to Secretary of War Stanton, July 3rd, 1864, OR 3:4, 467-468. 
	   342	  
time to complete the requisite paperwork.304 Surveying recruiting numbers throughout the state, 
Adjutant General Thomas told the Provost Marshal General Fry that the number of recruits 
“constantly arriving” necessitated the permanent placement of a deputy or assistant provost 
marshal at each site.305 At Camp Nelson, officers complained that policy directives had been 
outpaced by events on the ground. “I am not posted in regard to the object or condition under 
which negroes are to be Enlisted” one officer complained, “there ha[ve] been about 400 negroes 
fed at [Camp Nelson] nearly a week and not one has been enlisted.”306 The same officer later 
cautioned his superiors “unless this Recruiting business is better managed” potential recruits 
would be lost.307 
 Potential recruits paid a high price if caught trying to enlist. One provost marshal 
reported that citizens of the 4th District had begun blocking enlistments “by catching negroes and 
whipping them,” prompting Union officials to hunt down and arrest the parties responsible.308 In 
Louisville, four civilians who were subsequently detained by Union authorities, assaulted a 
group of escaped slaves attempting to enlist. When Major Sidell heard about the assault, he 
begged Burbridge for authority to try the men by military tribunal rather than remand them to the 
civil court. Allowing the civil authorities to punish the men would most likely result in no 
punishment at all, Sidell complained, while the brutality against those who wished to join the 
army would greatly “impede the proper work of enlistment.”309 
Kentucky masters tried every means available to reclaim their former slaves. Assistant 
Adjutant General J. Bates Dickson reported that one master who came to Camp Nelson and 
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“made application for his negro” was quickly turned away, only for the man request the soldier 
be given up as a personal favor.310 When this tactic failed as well, the master enlisted the 
assistance of Henry Alters, a medical officer for the 52nd Kentucky Infantry. Alters promptly 
declared the recruit in question unfit for service and “discharged” him back into his master’s 
care. Burbridge immediately ordered an investigation into the affair, where it was discovered that 
no discharge papers for the soldier, or orders authorizing the discharge could be found.311 Alters 
was relieved of duty, but not before a soldier of the United States army had been returned to 
slavery.312 Other slave owners had less success. When a Mrs. Hiner of Jefferson County 
attempted to reclaim her former chattel by filing a complaint with General Burbridge, the 
commanding general referred the matter to the superintendent of colored troops. “Your servants 
having enlisted of their own free will and word” the officer curtly informed Hiner, and it was 
consequently “not in my power to oblige you in this matter.”313  
 Recruits also confronted blind spots in existing Union Army policy. Since General 
Orders Number 20 specified that the Union Army would accept only able-bodied males, recruits 
could be turned away if they failed a physical examination. One assistant quartermaster warned 
the Judge Advocate General for the Department of Ohio that any blacks ordered out of Union 
lines would surely be “cruelly whipped,” and a captain stationed in Kentucky’s 5th district told 
the provost marshal general in Washington that blacks turned out of Union lines endured “much 
hardship.”314 One rejected recruit, begging Union authorities not to return him to his master, 
cited an incident where rejected black recruits from Marion County had had their ears cut off. 
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Sympathetic Union soldiers agreed that the man in question was likely to be  “carried off” by 
civil authorities in Marion County, and asked Captain T.S. Bell to allow the man perform 
garrison duty.315 However, when Bell attempted to persuade Sidell of this arrangement, he was 
informed that departmental orders required the rejected recruits to be turned out of Union 
lines.316 
 Although he abided by existing orders, Sidell also welcomed the chance to modify Union 
policy. The assistant superintendent for recruiting referred the case to Major C.W. Foster, head 
of the Bureau of Colored Troops in Washington, to “attain such orders as may be applicable to 
the case.”317 In his accompanying endorsement, Sidell further explained “a slave seeks to enlist 
and on being rejected is left to the mercy of his master or any ruffian on his return. He is apt to 
be thrown in jail so that the reward may be drawn for returning him to his master.”318  Major 
Foster immediately wrote to Stanton, and suggested an order be issued allowing the enlistment of 
any recruits unfit for regular service to be employed in the Engineer, Quartermaster, or 
Commissary Departments.319 Stanton approved the measure, and Sidell and Burbridge quickly 
received instructions informing them of the change in policy.320 
 
The expansion of General Orders Number 20 applied only to black men; the wives and 
children of black soldiers, however, could still be turned away. From Munfordville, General 
Hugh Ewing reported that wives were “daily coming in with their husbands,” but  “are given 
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back to their masters in all cases upon application.”321 Determined not be returned to slavery, 
many female refugees frequently reappeared at Union lines. Such was the case at Camp Nelson 
in late May, when three women who had been turned out of the camp returned the next day. Post 
Commander A.H. Clark directed the provost marshal to arrest them, confine them to the military 
prison, and “tie them up and give them a few lashes” before expelling them again.322 Clark also 
directed that any women found in camp without proper authorization would be arrested, sent 
beyond the lines, “and informed that if they returned, the lash awaits them.”323  
Workers from the United States Sanitary Commission witnessed the suffering endured by 
black men, women, and children. One agent wrote a letter to Senator Henry Wilson after 
watching the colonel of a Union regiment “riding at the rear of a slave gang composed of men, 
women, and children, tied together” and guarded by United States soldiers.324 This same agent 
also described the heart-rending scene when a provost marshal and slave owner seized a cook in 
the Convalescent Camp. As the young woman was being dragged out of the camp, she “begged 
the guard to shoot her on the spot, saying her master would whip her to death if he got her 
away.”325 Hearing the commotion, Union soldiers in the hospital forcibly took her from the 
provost marshal, “dressed her in boy’s clothes, and secreted her.”326 Other women and children 
were not so lucky. Thomas Butler, another agent for the USSC, filled his correspondence with 
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descriptions of sick and destitute refugees who escaped slavery only to be turned out of the lines 
at Camp Nelson.327  
The presence of black woman and children at Union camps prompted Burbridge to ask 
for policy clarification from Adjutant General Thomas. “Great numbers [of women and children] 
are following their male relatives who enlist,” Burbridge told the Adjutant General, “can any 
plan be devised to prevent them from becoming a burden to the government?”328 Thomas replied 
with General Orders Number 24, specifying that “none but able bodied men will be received at 
the various [rendezvous] camps,” prohibiting the entry of additional black dependents into 
camps, and directing the families squatting around army posts and regiments be turned out with 
their masters to be informed of the dates for their expulsion.329 In Thomas’s estimation, General 
Orders 24 strictly followed extant federal policy, which authorized him to receive only those 
who could be enlisted in the army.330 At the same time, Thomas clearly had lingering doubts 
about what federal policy required him to do, because a few weeks later he asked the War 
Department about the extent to which he was required to receive all black men, women, and 
children who came within Union lines in Kentucky.331 
Brigadier General Speed Fry, commanding at Camp Nelson, was not burdened by any of 
Thomas’s doubts. Upon receiving Thomas’s order, Fry immediately conducted an in-depth 
examination of the camp, concluding that these women and children were “very destitute, a 
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burden to themselves as well as ourselves.”332 Accordingly, on July 6th, Fry issued a circular 
directing that all women, children, and men who were unfit for military service “be delivered to 
their owners upon application to…headquarters.”333 Some officers at Camp Nelson were livid. 
When Assistant Quartermaster George P. Webster read Fry’s order, he fired off a furious letter to 
the Judge Advocate General for the Department of the Ohio. Webster had been “in the habit” of 
hiring those unfit for military duty for work in the Quartermaster Department, and warned that 
sending away the workers he had hired would quickly deter other slaves from enlisting.334  
 Meanwhile, the War Department responded to Thomas’s inquiry by splitting the 
difference. Stanton acknowledged that congressional law prohibited the return of slaves to their 
owners by military personnel, but noted that there were no provisions for the reception and 
support of non-military personnel. Individual commanders could thus “discourage” women and 
children from coming into their lines, but they could not expel them once they came within 
Union lines.335 Consequently, Burbridge issued orders to T.D. Sedgwick at Camp Nelson that he 
was to try and dissuade women and children from arriving at the camp, but “such as come…must 
be provided for.”336 
Despite the War Department’s attempt to clarify policy, conflicts at Union posts 
continued. At Paducah, Colonel H.W. Barry refused to obey General Orders Number 24. Barry, 
the commander of a black regiment, operated  “under the idea that by doing so he would be 
violating the Articles of War prohibiting the rendition of fugitive slaves.”337 Thomas promptly 
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had Colonel Barry arrested for disobedience of orders and confined to the guardhouse to await 
courts-martial. In his explanation to Washington, Thomas argued that if Colonel Barry were in 
 “any other State, he could not give Kentucky negroes up, but here, in this State, I conceive we 
should not take any but able bodied men.”338 Reviewing the case at the War Department, Stanton 
reversed the decision on the grounds that Paducah was technically in the Department of West 
Tennessee, so that refugees at Paducah could be dealt with as escaped slaves. “The War 
Department decides that the Colored old men, women, and children, in Camp at Paducah are not 
to be returned to their owners” Thomas wrote to the commander at Paducah, and Colonel Barry 
was released from arrest.339 
While Paducah was an exception by virtue of departmental jurisdiction, Camp Nelson 
continued to be a site of struggle between Union authorities and black refugees. On August 13th 
Burbridge directed that all women, children, and men who were unemployed at Camp Nelson be 
expelled, and used a squad of cavalry as well as the provost marshal guard to carry out the 
removal.340 A series of orders from late August through early October continued to order the 
forcible removal of women and children from Camp Nelson.341 Despite these attempts at 
expulsion, more women and children kept arriving at the camp. Recognizing the need for a 
“Government Camp for Wives of Soldiers & other refugees,” Captain T.E. Hall asked John Fee 
to prepare a letter to be sent to Secretary of War Stanton, recommending that it be passed 
through the care of former Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase.342 
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As the War Department struggled to formulate consistent policies regarding black 
refugees, recruiting expeditions proceeded throughout the state. In a similar manner to 
Tennessee, the Mississippi River Valley, and the Department of the Gulf, the combination of 
Confederate guerillas, hostile civilians, and inadequate Union forces meant that recruiting 
numbers in Kentucky could fluctuate wildly from week to week. “Guerillas are in every sub-
district in my district pillaging, murdering and robbing” one provost marshal noted in late June, 
and “recruiting progresses very slowly just now. Slaves cannot come in from distant counties 
because of guerillas.”343 Around the same time George Stillman, Deputy Provost Marshal for 
Hickman County, told another officer that rebel forces were “all over the country” and that his 
men could not go anywhere “at all in safety.”344 From Paducah, Captain R.H. Hall gloomily told 
Sidell the “condition of affairs throughout this district grows worse every day.”345  
Barely one week later, at least one provost marshal had changed his mind. Recruiting was 
now progressing quickly, James Fiddler told James Fry, with so many men appearing at Camp 
Nelson that Burbridge had to ask Sidell for two more recruiting agents and one more mustering 
officer to manage the influx.346 T.H. Sedgwick reported that he had organized and clothed 
seventeen companies of black troops at Camp Nelson, proudly noting that their “appearance, 
marching +c far exceeded my expectations.”347 Meanwhile, Adjutant General Thomas continued 
to send glowing recruiting reports back to Washington, while Judge Advocate General Joseph 
Holt told Stanton on the last day of July that around ten thousand black soldiers had already been 
enlisted in Kentucky. Despite these numbers, Holt cautioned Stanton that Kentucky was still 
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“completely overrun” with guerillas and worried about the overall impact their operations would 
have on recruiting.348  
Holt’s concerns proved prescient. In Nelson and Sherman Counties, black men were “so 
thoroughly intimidated” by threats and violence on the part of citizens and guerillas, that they 
were too frightened to present themselves for enlistment.349 Similarly, a provost marshal in 
Owensboro told Provost Marshal General Fry that recruiting during previous ten days had been 
“not encouraging.”350 According to this same marshal, there were plenty of men who wished to 
enlist, but “for want of p  r o t e c t i o n it is safest for [slaves] to withhold for the present and not 
hazard their lives by hunting a Recruiting Officer.351 Sidell passed the report up to Burbridge’s 
assistant adjutant general, taking care to enumerate the “necessity for protection to recruiting 
officers and recruits” in his accompanying cover letter.352 
To help provide this protection, Union officers called for the recruiting of black cavalry 
regiments. Recruiting regiments of black cavalry, Burbridge told Washington, would  “prove a 
powerful instrumentality in ridding the State of those guerilla bands of robbers and murderers 
which now infest and oppress almost every part of it.”353 Adjutant General Thomas agreed with 
Burbridge’s assessment. Towards the end of July Thomas told E.D. Townsend, Assistant 
Adjutant General in Washington, that by marching cavalry through the countryside, prospective 
recruits “will be saved from mal treatment by their masters and others, when they attempt to 
reach recruiting stations.”354 On July 27th, Thomas repeated his request, explaining to Stanton 
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that authority to organize to regiments of black cavalry would “greatly aid” recruiting and 
operate “most efficiently against guerillas.”355 The next day Stanton telegraphed Thomas with 
authority to raise the necessary regiments, and Burbridge was informed that he could also begin 
recruiting cavalry.356  
The man selected to recruit the new cavalry regiments was James S. Brisbin. Like George 
Stearns and Reuben Mussey in Nashville, as well as Benjamin Rush Plumly, George Hepworth, 
and Edwin Wheelock in New Orleans, Brisbin had deep ties to the Northern antislavery 
community, and was now dispatched by the War Department to act on his antislavery 
convictions.357 Brisbin arrived in Kentucky towards the end of June with orders from Secretary 
Stanton assigning him to duty as “Superintendent of the Organization of the Colored Troops” in 
the state.358 Brisbin and the black cavalry soldiers he recruited would kill two birds with one 
stone: not only would they fulfill the War Department’s directives on black recruiting, but they 
would be part of Burbridge’s efforts to “break up entirely…bands of thieving guerillas” that 
controlled much of the state.359 
Upon reporting for duty, Brisbin found a “considerable number” of black recruits already 
congregated at Union camps throughout the state, with approximately 3,000 at Camp Nelson 
alone.360 Initially assigned to recruit both infantry and cavalry, Brisbin organized the men at 
Camp Nelson into the 114th and 116th USCI, and the 5th USCC, utilizing these first three 
regiments as “an armed force in the state for recruiting, protecting, and receiving all colored men 
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who desired to enlist.”361 In rapid succession, Brisbin then organized the 107th, 108th, 109th 
USCI, along with the 4th, 8th, and 12th Heavy Artillery regiments and, once this initial surge of 
recruits dried up, he deployed his “strong recruiting parties” into the countryside to continue the 
work.362  
Recruiting expeditions for both the  USCI and USCC in Kentucky generally followed a 
similar pattern to expeditions in Tennessee, Alabama, the Mississippi River Valley, and the 
Department of the Gulf. Colonel William H. Revere of the 107th USCI left Louisville with a 
detachment of soldiers on August 12th, 1864. Revere went from Louisville to Shelbyville and 
then to Taylorville, Bloomfield, and Bardstown before returning to headquarters several days 
later. Revere reported minimal guerilla activity, but tried to avoid known pockets of hostility 
without the protection of Brisbin’s “mounted force[s].”363 Revere regretted that the strict time 
frame for his expedition and a shortage of supplies limited the number of recruits he was able to 
gather. However, he still was able to report 218 new men for the Union army, and informed 
headquarters that more men dispatched on the same route would produce “most beneficial” 
results.364  
Not all recruiting missions were sanctioned. Brisbin and Sidell clashed repeatedly with 
soldiers and civilians from neighboring states who crossed into Kentucky on illegal recruiting 
forays. “Citizens of Indiana and vicinity are taking negroes from Kentucky and pressing them in 
the army as substitutes in Indiana” Burbridge complained in mid-July, ordering Sidell to conduct 
an investigation into the problem.365 Despite Sidell’s efforts, the problem persisted throughout 
the summer and into the fall. In late August two Indiana residents, B.Y. Irgle and Solomon 
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Bloomer were charged with “enticing slaves to leave the service of their masters and attempting 
to aid and abet slaves to attempt to leave their owners and escape from Henderson County into a 
Free State.”366 The defendants quickly confessed their intent to sell black recruits as substitutes 
in Indiana, and telling investigators they had expected assistance from the Indiana Home 
Guards.367 Bail was set at $3,000, and Ingle and Bloomer were ordered to jail to await trial.368 
By mid-September, one report insisted, “no less than five hundred negroes have been 
taken [from Kentucky] by the Home Guard of Vandenberg County [Indiana].”369 The very next 
day the state militia on the Kentucky side of the Ohio River reported that three or four white men 
and one black man crossed from Indiana and were captured by armed guerillas. The black man 
was whipped three hundred times and confessed that they had crossed to gain substitutes to sell 
on the other side of the river.370 Major General James Hughes of the Indiana Legion hotly 
disputed the story. Hughes told Stanton that the men, several of whom were members of the 
State Militia, “went over to Kentucky to obtain negro recruits for the US service, but were seized 
before taking any action and were committed to jail.”371 Even USCT recruiters stationed in 
neighboring states caused problems in Kentucky. As late as October 1864, the Adjutant 
General’s Office was still telling Captain Reuben Mussey in Nashville that sending of recruiting 
parties from Tennessee into the Kentucky “creates confusion, and in all probability will not give 
to the service an additional number of men.”372  
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Even with black men from Kentucky being recruited illegally in other states, Brisbin and 
his subordinates managed to keep up a steady flow of recruits.373 On August 27th, Burbridge 
happily reported to Stanton that two initial regiments of cavalry were “nearly full,” and several 
weeks later Brisbin reported that enlistments in the USCC were “sufficient to fill up a company 
every two days.”374 Even officers charged with the organization of a newly organized Invalid 
Regiment USCT reported that nearly 300 men had enlisted at Camp Nelson and Louisville 
combined, with another 200 awaiting transfer from recruiting stations to the Organization 
Depot.375 By mid-September, Thomas told the War Department that recruiting in Kentucky was 
averaging between 100-200 recruits per day, with the current total standing at about 14,000.376 
Obtaining the proper number and quality of officers was another matter. Adjutant 
General Thomas had peppered Stanton with complaints about white officers of black infantry 
and cavalry regiments throughout the summer, and complaints from recruiters that some white 
officers appeared to know “literally nothing!” reached the desk of Burbridge’s assistant adjutant 
general.377 By the end of the summer, Brisbin was rapidly losing patience. “I am greatly in need 
of cavalry officers” he complained to a colonel at Camp Nelson, pointing out that many cavalry 
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regiments throughout Kentucky did not have enough officers to command their recruits.378 
Apparently Brisbin’s pleas fell on deaf ears, because repeated request sent to Washington in 
November complained that officers were still “very much” needed.379  
Brisbin laid blame the lack of officers at the adjutant general’s feet. In early February 
1865, Brisbin told Burbridge that many qualified candidates had passed the examining board, but 
still had not been able to officially report for duty or be paid. The delays were due to Thomas’s 
failure to complete necessary paperwork, even though Brisbin had tried on three different 
occasions to prod the adjutant general.380 “Had we followed Genl. Thomas rule and waited for 
appointments from him” Brisbin seethed, “instead of twenty two regiments of Kentucky Colored 
Troops we have in the field today, we would not have had ten.”381 In subsequent letters Senator 
Benjamin Wade, Brisbin accused the adjutant general of intemperance, lavish expenses, and 
covering up similar charges made by other officers.382 
Some of the officers Thomas did appoint failed to do their duty, and quickly incurred 
Brisbin’s wrath. “You have not reported daily as directed” he reprimanded a recruiting officer at 
Camp Nelson, ordering him to “telegraph reports through here tonight from all your Infantry 
Organizations” in Kentucky.383 “Your orders directed you to report in writing to these 
[headquarters] your progress in recruiting” Brisbin chided another officer, but “no information 
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has been received.”384 Over the course of just two days in late September, Brisbin sent five 
separate messages to recruiters asking for roster reports and officer appointments for cavalry 
regiments.385 Officers who failed to make their reports promptly would be arrested. “See that this 
notification is complied with,” Brisbin instructed T.H. Sedgwick on September 22nd, “and any 
charges against such delinquents forwarded at once.”386 Despite his efforts, problems with 
officers continued to plague Brisbin’s operations well into the winter of 1864-1865.387  
As his orders to ineffective officers indicate, Brisbin attempted to exercise firm 
administrative control over the recruiting apparatus in Kentucky. Of particular concern was the 
need to ensure officers understood the scope of their recruiting operations. “You are not expected 
to confine your operations to the immediate vicinity of Henderson and Owensboro” he explained 
to one officer, “you should move out as far as safety of your command will permit.”388 While 
obeying these instructions, Brisbin explained, the officer was to penetrate the guerilla-controlled 
regions nearby, and “bring out all the Colored men desiring to enlist.”389 Brisbin had an exacting 
attention to detail, and the correspondence and special orders issued from his headquarters 
frequently spelled out not only where recruiting parties were to go, and how they should conduct 
themselves, but also noted the proper procedure for reporting the names and counties of all those 
recruited to the provost marshal’s office.390  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 Brisbin to unnamed captain, August 20th, 1864, LS, DKY, USCT. 
385 Brisbin to Sedgwick, September 20th, 1864 Brisbin to Lt. C. Thomas, September 20th, 1864; Brisbin to Lt. Col. 
Walter Babcock, Brisbin to Lt. C Thomas, September 21st 1864, and J. Ham Davidson, AAG to Lt. Col. Walter 
Babcock September 24th, 1864, LS, DKY, USCT.  
386 Brisbin to Sedgwick, September 22nd, 1864, LS, DKY, USCT, NARA. 
387	  Brisbin to Lt. Col. Thomas Weaver October 18th 1864, and Brisbin to Commanding Officer, 119th United States 
Colored Infantry December 5th 1864, LS, DKY, USCT.	  
388 J.H. Davidson to Lt. Col. Glenn, December 5th, 1864. LS, DKY, USCT. 
389 Ibid.	  	  
390 Brisbin to Lt. A. Glist, August 22nd, 1864 and Unsigned to Lt. Packer, August 24th, 1864, LS, DKY, USCT; 
Special Orders 53, Special Orders 54, and Special Orders 55, September 1864, ibid. See also Sidell to Dickson, 
August 21st 1864, LR-DKR. 
	   357	  
  Brisbin also cautioned his officers to tread carefully around Kentucky civilians. When 
Lieutenant Jacob Hicks went on a recruiting mission for the USCC around Mount Sterling, 
Brisbin warned him to “keep your men in camp and excite no disturbance…the white [Union] 
troops will oppose you but you must not quarrel with them.”391 Because of white Kentuckians 
hostility towards black soldiers, even routine camp duties had the potential to explode into 
violence. When soldiers from the 12th US Heavy Artillery were instructed to arrest Union 
soldiers found outside of their camp near Versailles, they were quickly surrounded by “crowds of 
Citizens…threatening violence.” 392  Efforts by the men of the 12th USHA to disperse the crowd 
led to a scuffle, and followed by a litany of civilian complaints to headquarters.393 Responding to 
the accusations, the major commanding the 12th  “those statements made by the Citizens of 
Versailles are utterly false,” and he defended his soldiers as having tried to avoid conflict with 
Kentucky civilians “in every possible way.”394 A subsequent investigation found a “deep rooted 
prejudice” in the minds of Kentuckians against black soldiers and, with supreme understatement, 
noted that it was “possible” the incident grew out of this prejudice.395  
Relations between United States Colored Cavalry, United States Colored Infantry, and 
Kentucky’s Union troops proved equally as volatile. Colonel J.W. Weatherford and his 13th 
Kentucky Cavalry proved to be particularly antagonistic. By the fall of 1864 the men of the 13th 
Kentucky had a well-earned reputation throughout the state for “throwing obstructions” in the 
way of black recruiting through violence and intimidation.396  One provost marshal stationed at 
Glasgow reported that the 13th Kentucky had been violently “discouraging enlistment of 
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negroes” all through the summer and that “many [recruits] are prevented from coming in from 
fear.”397 Colonel, J.W. Weatherford seemed to relish a collision with Union authorities, 
endorsing the back of one provost marshal’s charges against his regiment by declaring “If Capt. 
Hobson has any charges against me let him make them. I am ready.”398 
Hobson, who served as provost marshal for the district that encompassed Glasgow, was 
indeed ready with the charges. Weatherford and his men, Hobson told headquarters, had a record 
of “belligerent” behavior that had only briefly abated when General Burbridge became 
involved.399 The beleaguered provost marshal’s complaints went first to Sidell and then to 
Assistant Adjutant General Dickson, who wrote of the “chronic ill conduct” of the 13th 
Kentucky, and hoped that “some way may be devised by which their power for evil may be 
curtailed.”400 For his part, Sidell considered it an “anomaly” that for the past half year the 
regiment had “openly opposed, combatted and resisted government measures” relating to the 
recruiting of black troops and managed to go largely unpunished—with only a few of the guilty 
men standing trial for courts martial.401 Despite the litany of complaints, Weatherford remained 
in charge of the 13th Kentucky until the regiment was mustered out in January 1865. 
 Clashes between USCT regiments and white Union soldiers extended beyond Kentucky 
regiments. James Thompson, a surgeon with the 4th US Colored Heavy Artillery, wrote Adjutant 
General Thomas to complain about the treatment he and his men received at the hands of the 34th 
New Jersey Regiment. The trouble started with Thompson’s regiment repeatedly being denied 
permission to go to a local saw mill and get lumber to build a regiments hospital. Colonel 
William Lawrence, who commanded both the 34th New Jersey and the Columbus post where the 
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regiments were stationed, had returned complaints from the regiment to the general commanding 
the District with “provocative” language.402 Tensions between the two regiments then escalated 
to the point where one soldier from the New Jersey regiment fracturing the skull of another from 
the 4th U.S., prompting Thompson to request a transfer to another black regiment where “the 
Authorities are not so much prejudiced against so called ‘Nigger Regiments.”’403  
 
As Brisbin grappled with the problems in his recruiting operations during the autumn of 
1864, the plight of the refugees at Camp Nelson. An inspection of the camp assistant adjutant 
inspector general for the Department of the Ohio noted that “great confusion” prevailed in the 
daily administration of the camp, while workers from the USSC at Camp Nelson detailed the 
increasing amount of sickness and decreasing amount of supplies available to the refugees.404 
Refugees continued to arrive through September and October. In an effort to reduce the numbers, 
Brigadier General Speed Fry, issued orders on November 23rd expelling approximately 400 men, 
women, and children from the camp and out into the frigid Kentucky countryside.405  
Joseph Miller, a former slave who had enlisted in the 124th USCI and been stationed at 
Camp Nelson, recounted the expulsion in a detailed affidavit. When he enlisted, Miller’s wife 
and children had come with him because they feared retribution from his former master, and 
Miller was told by an official in charge “to take my family into a tent within the limits of the 
[Camp Nelson],” where they remained undisturbed until the day prior to the expulsion order.406 
On November 22nd, Miller’s family was told to be prepared to leave the camp by early morning 
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the following day. Despite Miller’s pleading, a “mounted guard” forced his family out of Camp 
Nelson.407 
Desperate for any information on his family’s whereabouts, Miller set out from Camp 
Nelson on foot. He found his wife and children six miles away at Nicholasville, with a crowd of 
freezing refugees all crammed around one fire trying to survive in sub-zero temperatures. By this 
time, one of Miller’s children was already dead, with the grief stricken father later walking the 
twelve-mile round-trip to bury his son. At the time Miller wrote the affidavit three days after the 
expulsion, his surviving family was still at the meetinghouse, where they would all perish within 
six weeks.408 
  News of the expulsion at Camp Nelson was widely reported in Northern newspapers. 
“Slavery is bad” a correspondent for The New York Tribune opined, “but here is an act which 
transcends, in deliberate depravity and cool malignity, the darkest associations of the slave 
mart.” Historians, focusing much of their attention on these editorials, have been quick to 
attribute any subsequent corrective measures to “bad press.”409 Although the public pressure was 
undoubtedly important, this analysis obscures both how quickly Union officers reported the 
expulsion to their superiors, and their responses. Assistant Quartermaster T.E. Hall, for example 
complained immediately to Bates Dickson and Brisbin that the refugees were in a “starving 
condition” and begged Burbridge to intercede on their behalf.410 Dickson immediately 
telegraphed Burbridge, who was commanding the field at Cumberland Gap at the time, explained 
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what Fry had done, and told the General the refugees were “suffering and should be taken care of 
at Camp Nelson.”411 
 Burbridge acted immediately. The following day, he directed Dickson to tell Fry that the 
“colored women and children who seek refuge at Camp Nelson be sheltered and fed there. So far 
as practicable they should be employed by the Government at such labor as they are fitted to 
perform.”412 Captain Hall was directed to take charge of making arrangements for the care of  
refugees, and Fry was ordered to assist in carrying out these instructions. Hall, meanwhile was 
ordered to “see that none are turned out,” and while those who were still in camp or had been 
turned away were to be allowed to return and would fall under Hall’s immediate care.413 When 
Fry resisted, Burbridge sent a follow-up order, and subsequently prepared orders relieving Fry of 
command.414 From Lexington, Adjutant General Thomas bluntly ordered Fry to “receive all who 
come and…take back all you have sent out.”415  
 The expulsion at Camp Nelson brought the issue of care for the families of soldiers to the 
fore. Officers including Sidell, Dickson, and Hall, all noted in their correspondence that 
“families of enlisted negroes were deprived of US protection” and that men continued to be 
deterred from enlisting because slave owners made threats against family members who either 
remained behind or were turned away from Union lines.416 Finally, on December 15th, Thomas 
issued Orders Number 29, providing for the “erection of suitable buildings” or “otherwise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 Dickson to Burbridge, November 27th, 1864, TS-DKR, NARA. 
412 Dickson to Fry, November 28th 1864, TS-DKR. 
413 J. Bates Dickson to T.H. Hall, November 28th 1864, and J. Bates Dickson to Speed Fry November 29th 1864, 
Ibid.	  
414 T.H. Hall to J. Bates Dickson, November 29th, 1864, Sears, Camp Nelson, 141, Dickson to Fry, November 29th, 
1864 and Dickson to Thomas, November 30th 1864. Both in TS-DKY. Fry was not ultimately relieved of command, 
but was transferred away from Camp Nelson. 
415 Adjutant General Thomas to Speed Fry, November 30th 1864, Sears, Camp Nelson, 142.	  
416 William Sidell to General Burbridge, December 15th 1864, LR-DKR; T.H. Hall to J. Bates Dickson and T.H.Hall 
to J.S. Brisbin, November 26th and 27th, 1864, Sears, Camp Nelson, 134-137; “Cruel Treatment of the Wives and 
Children of Colored Soldiers” NY Tribune, November 28th 1864, in Sears, Camp Nelson, 138; Orders No. 29 
December 15th 1864, NMHUS. 
	   362	  
provide for the comfort” of families of recruits who presented themselves at Camp Nelson and 
other rendezvous points. The question of the rights and privileges of black veterans and their 
families would increasingly become a point of contention after the war. 
 
 Recruiting struggles continued during the winter of 1864-1865. Extent Registers of 
Letters Received for the USCI in Kentucky are littered with entries describing enlistment records 
for new recruits, while other entries continued to report on recruiting expeditions.417 As late as 
mid-May, recruiting parties with as many as 300 men were still being sent to the interior of 
Kentucky on recruiting operations to secure soldiers and combat guerilla activity.418 Reactionary 
violence against both recruiters and recruits also continued unabated. An officer with the 5th 
USCC reported in early 1865 that he had been “several times been attacked by guerilla bands” 
but had thus far been successful in fending of his attackers.419 Others were not so fortunate. A 
recruiting officer and ten of his recruits were attacked on their way from Glasgow to Louisville; 
1st Sergeant James Richardson was “murdered and robbed of his papers” by a band of guerillas in 
the process.420 These problems landed on the desk of new department commander General John 
Palmer. 
John Palmer was a Kentucky slaveholder’s worst nightmare. A committed antislavery 
advocate, as well as a sharp legal mind, Palmer replaced Burbridge after Bramlette had finally 
managed to engineer the latter’s removal. Although Palmer recognized that slavery still legally 
existed in Kentucky, he repeatedly made no pretense about his intentions regarding the 
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institution during the spring and summer of 1865. Speaking to a crowd of African Americans in 
Louisville, Palmer told the assembled “my countrymen, you are free, and while I command…this 
department, the military forces of the United States will defend your right to freedom.”421  
Palmer, in the apt words of one historian, “took special delight in torturing slaveholders 
with their own logic.”422 When Palmer received a letter from the mayor of Paris, Kentucky, 
sharing the complaints of the townspeople about the “nuisance” of freed blacks, and asking for 
assistance with what Palmer termed a “scheme for expelling them from the state” Palmer bluntly 
told them that their plan was “morally unjust, and politically tyrannical and in the highest degree 
oppressive.”423 Slavery, he asserted, could never be reestablished, and neither the commanding 
general, nor the soldiers under his command would assist in throwing out people whose support 
was “properly the duty of [Kentucky] people.”424  
James Brisbin disagreed with Palmer about the inevitable demise of slavery. On April 
14th 1865, Brisbin sat down to pen a letter to Kentucky Governor Bramlette. Brisbin was upset 
by what he termed the “disturbed condition of labor in Kentucky.”425 Because the freedom of 
Kentucky slaves was “unsanctioned” by the legislature, and because masters could no longer 
“hold his slaves” black refugees were fleeing to the nearest town or city with a Union outpost for 
protection and food.426 In Louisville alone, Brisbin told the governor, hundreds were arriving 
every day, searching for the “mecca where freedom may be found, when that freedom should 
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reach them in their houses.427 In short, Brisbin observed that military emancipation, however 
successful, had not resulted in the complete abolition of slavery in Kentucky. 
Brisbin knew the remedy for this problem. Only the state of Kentucky, by statute or 
constitutional amendment, or a federal constitutional amendment, could abolish slavery. Perhaps 
reflecting a belief that the ratification of the recently passed Thirteenth Amendment was far from 
inevitable, Brisbin told Governor Bramlette that the Kentucky legislature must pass the 
Constitutional amendment abolishing slavery and place Kentucky “on a free basis.”428 Once their 
freedom was assured, Brisbin predicted, freed slaves would return home, “till the soil” and end 
the crisis.429 Black enlistments had already “bankrupted slavery,” while hundreds more were 
being freed on a daily basis through the “instrumentality of the army.”430 Brisbin pleaded with 
the governor to see reason. It was clearly the “intention and policy” of the government to “make 
every black person in it free” by abolishing slavery in the United States, Brisbin concluded, and 
the sooner that Kentucky accepted the new order of things, the refugee crisis, and the labor crisis 
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